About 96.9% of all eligible shares participated in
Berkshire's 1989 shareholder-designated contributions program.
Contributions made through the program were $5.9 million, and
2,550 charities were recipients.
大约有96.9%的有效股权参与1989年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约590万美
元捐出的款项分配给2,550家慈善机构。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on
pages 52-53. If you wish to participate in future programs, we
strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are
registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee
name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on
August 31, 1990 will be ineligible for the 1990 program.
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在
未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是
受托人的名下，必须在1990年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1990
年的计画。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The annual meeting this year will take place at 9:30 a.m. on
Monday, April 30, 1990. Attendance grew last year to about 1,000,
very close to the seating capacity of the Witherspoon Hall at
Joslyn Museum. So this year's meeting will be moved to the
Orpheum Theatre, which is in downtown Omaha, about one-quarter of
a mile from the Red Lion Hotel. The Radisson-Redick Tower, a much
smaller but nice hotel, is located across the street from the
Orpheum. Or you may wish to stay at the Marriott, which is in
west Omaha, about 100 yards from Borsheim's. We will have buses
at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting
and return after it ends.
今年的股东会预计在1990年4月30日，星期一早上9点30分举行，去年股
东会参加人数突破一万人，差点超过开会场地的座位容量，所以今年的会场将会
移到奥玛哈市中心的Orpheum中心，对街有一家不错的旅馆叫
Radisson-Redick，另外距离红狮旅馆约有1英理远，当然你也可以选择离波
仙珠宝店100公尺远的Marriott，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返股东会会场。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can
make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the
quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual
meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of
intelligent, owner-related questions.
查理跟我一直都很喜欢开股东会，我也希望大家能够来参加，我们股东的素质可
由大家所提出的问题看得出来，我们参加过很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的
股东像Berkshire的股东一样由高智能水准与经营者荣枯与共的股东组合。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can
obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting.
Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have
lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The
attachment also contains information about them.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，
因为开会当天会场不好停车，我们特地为大家预留了一些位置，附件也有相关说
明供大家参考。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska
Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you
to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will
allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both
stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart
any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on
Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays.
一如往常，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭
店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天
到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星
期日则从中午开到下午5点30分。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open
for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday,
April 29th. Ike likes to put on a show, and you can rely on him
to produce something very special for our shareholders.
波仙星期天通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别破例，4月29日星期天从中
午开到下午6点，Ike特地为股东们准备了一场秀，相信他一定可以让大家见识
到一些特别的东西。
In this letter we've had a lot to say about rates of
compounding. If you can bear having your own rate turn negative
for a day - not a pretty thought, I admit - visit Ike on the
29th.
今年我们提到很多次有关复利的事，若是你能忍受个人净值暂时倒退一天的话，
虽然不建议常常这样做，记得在29号去看看Ike的秀吧！
Warren E. Buffett
March 2, 1990 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1990年3月2日
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Last year we made a prediction: "A reduction [in Berkshire's net worth]
is almost certain in at least one of the next three years." During much
of 1990's second half, we were on the road to quickly proving that
forecast accurate. But some strengthening in stock prices late in the
year enabled us to close 1990 with net worth up by $362 million, or
7.3%. Over the last 26 years (that is, since present management took
over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,612.06,
or at a rate of 23.2% compounded annually.
去年我们曾经预测过，Berkshire的净值在未来的三年内有可能会减少，结果在
1990年的下半年我们差点就证明了这项预测的真实性，还好年底前股票价格的
上涨使得我们公司的净值，还是较前一个年度增加7.3%，约3.62亿美元；而
总计过去26年以来(也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长
到现在的4,612美元，年复合成长率约为23.2%。
Our growth rate was lackluster in 1990 because our four major
common stock holdings, in aggregate, showed little change in market
value. Last year I told you that though these companies - Capital
Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, GEICO, and Washington Post - had fine
businesses and superb managements, widespread recognition of these
attributes had pushed the stock prices of the four to lofty levels. The
market prices of the two media companies have since fallen
significantly - for good reasons relating to evolutionary industry
developments that I will discuss later - and the price of Coca-Cola
stock has increased significantly for what I also believe are good
reasons. Overall, yearend 1990 prices of our "permanent four," though
far from enticing, were a bit more appealing than they were a year
earlier.
1990年成长之所以减缓的原因主要是因为我们四个主要的股票投资市值加总
并没有多大的变动所致，去年我曾向各位表示，虽然这些公司-资本城/ABC、可
口可乐、GEICO保险与华盛顿邮报等，拥有良好的企业体质与经营阶层，但是
因为这些特点现在已广为投资大众所认同，所以也促使公司股价推升到一个颇高
的价位；另外其中两家媒体事业之后的股价又大幅滑落，原因在于后面我会再详
细叙述该产业革命性的演进，另外可口可乐的股价也因为我个人也相当认同的原
因为大众所接受而大涨，不过总的来说，目前这四大天王的股价，虽然不够吸引
人，但比起一年以前来说，要算是合理的多。
Berkshire's 26-year record is meaningless in forecasting future
results; so also, we hope, is the one-year record. We continue to aim
for a 15% average annual gain in intrinsic value. But, as we never tire
of telling you, this goal becomes ever more difficult to reach as our
equity base, now $5.3 billion, increases.
Berkshire过去26年来辉煌的记录并不足以确保未来也会如此发展，当然我们
也希望过去一年惨痛的记录也不能代表未来的结果就是如此，我们还是依旧将目
标订在每年15%的实质价值成长率，只是还有一点是过去从未向各位报告的，
以我们现在的股权规模，要完成这项任务的门槛是53亿美金!
If we do attain that 15% average, our shareholders should fare well.
However, Berkshire's corporate gains will produce an identical gain for
a specific shareholder only if he eventually sells his shares at the same
relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them. For
example, if you buy at a 10% premium to intrinsic value; if intrinsic
value subsequently grows at 15% a year; and if you then sell at a 10%
premium, your own return will correspondingly be 15% compounded.
(The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid.) If, however, you
buy at a premium and sell at a smaller premium, your results will be
somewhat inferior to those achieved by the company.
要是我们真的能够达到这样的目标，那么我们的股东一定赚翻了，因为
Berkshire的企业获利将会为那些买卖价格与公司实质价值一致的投资人创造
相同的获利，举例来说，如果你以实质价值10%的溢价买进Berkshire股份，
假设后来公司实质价值每年成长了15%，而之后你同样以实质价值10%的溢价
卖出所持有的股份，则你的投资年报酬率应该也会是15%(这个例子假设期间公
司并未发放任何股利)，当然要是后来你以低于10%的溢价卖出股份的话，那么
你最后所得到的投资报酬率可能就会低于公司同期间15%的报酬率。
Ideally, the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely
mirror those of the company during his period of ownership. That is
why Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I
hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value. We
prefer such steadiness to the value-ignoring volatility of the past two
years: In 1989 intrinsic value grew less than did book value, which was
up 44%, while the market price rose 85%; in 1990 book value and
intrinsic value increased by a small amount, while the market price fell
23%.
在理想的情况下，Berkshire所有的股东的投资报酬，在其拥有公司部份所有权
的期间，应该会与公司本身的经营成果相符，这也是为什么查理孟格-Berkshire
的副主席，也是主要的合伙人，和我本身都希望Berkshire的股价能与其所代表
的实质价值维持一定关系的原因，相较于过去两年股市默视价值的任意波动，我
们宁愿Berkshire股价稳定一点，1989年的实质价值约成长幅度远低于帐面价
值44%的增加幅度，与股价85%的大涨；到了1990年，帐面价值与实质价值
都略微增加，但同期间的本公司的股票价格却下跌了23%。。
Berkshire's intrinsic value continues to exceed book value by a
substantial margin. We can't tell you the exact differential because
intrinsic value is necessarily an estimate; Charlie and I might, in fact,
differ by 10% in our appraisals. We do know, however, that we own
some exceptional businesses that are worth considerably more than
the values at which they are carried on our books.
截至目前为止，Berkshire的实质价值仍与帐面价值仍有一段不小的差距，不过
我们无法告诉你实际的数字是多少，因为实质价值本身就是一个估计数，事实上
光是查理与我自己本身所估出来的数字就可能有超过10%的差距，不过可以确
信的是，我们所拥有一些优秀的企业其实际的价值远高于列示在公司帐上的投资
成本。
Much of the extra value that exists in our businesses has been
created by the managers now running them. Charlie and I feel free to
brag about this group because we had nothing to do with developing
the skills they possess: These superstars just came that way. Our job is
merely to identify talented managers and provide an environment in
which they can do their stuff. Having done it, they send their cash to
headquarters and we face our only other task: the intelligent
deployment of these funds.
我们的被投资公司之所以能够拥有这么多额外的价值，完全要归功于经营它们的
这批优秀经理人，查理跟我可以很自在地夸耀这支团队，因为他们之所以能够拥
有这些才能与我们一点关系都没有，这些超级经理人一直都是如此，而我们的工
作只不过是发掘这些有才能的经理人同时提供一个环境，让他们可以好好地发
挥，就这样他们就会将现金源源不绝地送回总部，接下来我们就会面临另一项重
要的任务-如何有效地运用这些资金。
My own role in operations may best be illustrated by a small tale
concerning my granddaughter, Emily, and her fourth birthday party
last fall. Attending were other children, adoring relatives, and Beemer
the Clown, a local entertainer who includes magic tricks in his act.
我个人在营运上扮演的角色可由我孙女Emily的一个小故事来做说明，去年秋天
在她四岁的生日宴会上，参加的人除了小朋友与疼爱她的家人之外，还有一位小
丑演员Beemer，席间他还特地为大家表演了一段魔术。
Beginning these, Beemer asked Emily to help him by waving a
"magic wand" over "the box of wonders." Green handkerchiefs went
into the box, Emily waved the wand, and Beemer removed blue ones.
Loose handkerchiefs went in and, upon a magisterial wave by Emily,
emerged knotted. After four such transformations, each more amazing
than its predecessor, Emily was unable to contain herself. Her face
aglow, she exulted: "Gee, I'm really good at this."
一开始Beemer请Emily帮他拿一支神奇的魔棒在一个宝贝箱上挥舞，绿色的
手帕放进箱子里，在Emily挥了棒子一下之后，跑出来蓝色的手帕；接着又放进
一条手帕，Emily又挥了一下，这回跑出一条打结的手帕，经过四回合一次比一
次精彩的表演之后，Emily喜不自胜，脸上发光沾沾自喜的大叫，「我实在是太
厉害了!」
And that sums up my contribution to the performance of
Berkshire's business magicians - the Blumkins, the Friedman family,
Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey and Ralph
Schey. They deserve your applause.
这就是我在Berkshire的所有贡献，感谢旗下企业所有的魔术师- Blumkins家
族、Friedman 家族、Mike Goldberg、the Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、
Stan Lipsey与Ralph Schey等人，请为这些人精彩的演出给予热烈的掌声。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported
earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other
major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against
the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead
aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the
earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we
not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of
presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers
than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a
business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the
table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial
statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
Much additional information about these businesses is given on
pages 39-46, where you also will find our segment earnings reported
on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to
read Charlie Munger's letter, which starts on page 56. His letter also
contains the clearest and most insightful discussion of the banking
industry that I have seen.
年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可
以看看查理孟格所写的年报，里头包含我看过对银行产业写的最详尽精辟的分
析。
(000s omitted)
-----------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
------------------- -------------------
1990 1989 1990 1989
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ................ $(26,647) $(24,400) $(14,936) $(12,259)
Net Investment Income ....... 327,048 243,599 282,613 213,642
Buffalo News .................. 43,954 46,047 25,981 27,771
Fechheimer .................... 12,450 12,621 6,605 6,789
Kirby ......................... 27,445 26,114 17,613 16,803
Nebraska Furniture Mart ....... 17,248 17,070 8,485 8,441
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 30,378 33,165 18,458 19,996
See's Candies ................. 39,580 34,235 23,892 20,626
Wesco - other than Insurance .. 12,441 13,008 9,676 9,810
World Book .................... 31,896 25,583 20,420 16,372
Amortization of Goodwill ...... (3,476) (3,387) (3,461) (3,372)
Other Purchase-Price
Accounting Charges ......... (5,951) (5,740) (6,856) (6,668)
Interest Expense* ............. (76,374) (42,389) (49,726) (27,098)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .............. (5,824) (5,867) (3,801) (3,814)
Other ......................... 58,309 23,755 35,782 12,863
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings .............. 482,477 393,414 370,745 299,902
Sales of Securities ............. 33,989 223,810 23,348 147,575
-------- -------- -------- --------
