Total Earnings - All Entities $516,466 $617,224 $394,093 $447,477
====== ====== ===== =======
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.
*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用
We refer you also to pages 47-53, where we have rearranged
Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the
way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you more
in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value than consolidated figures
would do. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings
statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major
investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and
retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non- operating assets and
purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged
in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer
Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the
non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the
companies in segment (2), all purchase- price accounting adjustments,
and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent
companies.
目前我们已将Berkshire的财务信息重新分类为四大部门，这是查理跟我认为最
可以帮助大家计算本公司实质价值的最好方式，以下的资产负债表与盈余表就是
依此分类表示(1)保险事业，另将主要投资部位归类(2)制造、出版与零售事业，
扣除非本业资产与购买法的会计调整(3)金融业的子公司-诸如联合储贷与史考
特飞兹财务公司(4)其它项目，包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)与购买
法调整，还有Wesco与Berkshire母公司一些其它的资产与负债。
If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four
segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP
statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category
presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in
no way bless it.
如果你将这四个部门的盈余与净值加总，会得到与经会计师依一般公认会计原则
查核一致的数字，然而我还是必须强调这种表达方式并未经过会计师的检视，我
想他宁可选择不要看的好。
"Look-Through" Earnings
透视盈余
The term "earnings" has a precise ring to it. And when an earnings
figure is accompanied by an unqualified auditor's certificate, a naive
reader might think it comparable in certitude to pi, calculated to
dozens of decimal places.
盈余这个名词有一个明确的定义，而当盈余数字再加上会计师无保留意见的背书
后，单纯的投资人可能就会以为它是像圆周率一样经过计算，可以到好几个小数
点般精确。
In reality, however, earnings can be as pliable as putty when a
charlatan heads the company reporting them. Eventually truth will
surface, but in the meantime a lot of money can change hands. Indeed,
some important American fortunes have been created by the
monetization of accounting mirages.
然而事实上，当公司盈余数字是由骗徒所主导时，盈余可能像油灰一样地脆弱，
当然到最后真相一定会大白，但在此同时一大笔财富可能已经换手，确实许多美
国财富传奇就是靠着这种会计数字假象所创造出来的。
Funny business in accounting is not new. For connoisseurs of
chicanery, I have attached as Appendix A on page 22 a previously
unpublished satire on accounting practices written by Ben Graham in
1936. Alas, excesses similar to those he then lampooned have many
times since found their way into the financial statements of major
American corporations and been duly certified by big-name auditors.
Clearly, investors must always keep their guard up and use accounting
numbers as a beginning, not an end, in their attempts to calculate true
"economic earnings" accruing to them.
有趣的企业会计并不是件新鲜事，对于企业诈骗的专家，我特别附上班哲明葛拉
罕在1936年所写未经出版有关会计做帐的讽刺性文章，自此之后，我们可以发
现这种葛拉罕所描写的方法散见于各大美国企业财务报表中，而且全部都经过各
大会计师事务所签证背书，所以对此投资人必须特别提高警戒，要了解在计算一
家公司的实质的经济盈余时，会计数字只不过是个出发点，而绝非是最后的结果。
Berkshire's own reported earnings are misleading in a different,
but important, way: We have huge investments in companies
("investees") whose earnings far exceed their dividends and in which
we record our share of earnings only to the extent of the dividends we
receive. The extreme case is Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. Our 17% share of
the company's earnings amounted to more than $83 million last year.
Yet only about $530,000 ($600,000 of dividends it paid us less some
$70,000 of tax) is counted in Berkshire's GAAP earnings. The residual
$82 million-plus stayed with Cap Cities as retained earnings, which
work for our benefit but go unrecorded on our books.
Berkshire本身的盈余在某些重要的方面也有所误导，首先我们主要的被投资公
司其实际盈余远高于后来发放的股利，而Berkshire帐列的盈余也仅限于这些已
发放的股利收入，最明显的例子就是资本城/ABC公司，若依照我们持股17%的
比例，去年可分得的利润是8,300万美元，但Berkshire依照一般公认会计原
则所认列的投资利益却只有53万美元(亦即60万股利收入扣除7万美元的税
负)，剩下8,200多万的盈余则保留在该公司的帐上，虽然实际上对我们大有益
处，但在我们公司的帐上却一点踪迹都没有。
Our perspective on such "forgotten-but-not-gone" earnings is
simple: The way they are accounted for is of no importance, but their
ownership and subsequent utilization is all-important. We care not
whether the auditors hear a tree fall in the forest; we do care who
owns the tree and what's next done with it.
我们对于这种被遗忘但却存在的盈余的态度很简单，到底认不认列数字一点都不
重要，最重要的是我们可以确定这些盈余可以为我们所有且会被充分加以运用，
我们不在乎听到会计师说森林中有一棵树被砍倒了，我们在乎的是这棵树是不是
属于我们的，以及之后要如何来处理它。
When Coca-Cola uses retained earnings to repurchase its shares,
the company increases our percentage ownership in what I regard to
be the most valuable franchise in the world. (Coke also, of course,
uses retained earnings in many other value-enhancing ways.) Instead
of repurchasing stock, Coca-Cola could pay those funds to us in
dividends, which we could then use to purchase more Coke shares.
That would be a less efficient scenario: Because of taxes we would pay
on dividend income, we would not be able to increase our
proportionate ownership to the degree that Coke can, acting for us. If
this less efficient procedure were followed, however, Berkshire would
report far greater "earnings."
当可口可乐利用保留盈余来买回自家股份，该公司等于间接增加我们的持股比
例，也就是此举让我认定这家公司是全世界最好的企业(当然可口可乐还将资金
运用在很多加强公司利益的地方上)，除了买回股份，可口可乐也可以将这些资
金以股利的方式退还给股东，然后我们同样可以利用这笔钱买进更多可口可乐的
股票，只是后面这种做法比较没有效率，因为如此还要支付额外的所得税，使得
最后所得到的持股比例比前面的方式少一点，而讽刺的是要是利用后面的那种做
法，Berkshire的帐面盈余可能还会更好看。
I believe the best way to think about our earnings is in terms of
"look-through" results, calculated as follows: Take $250 million, which
is roughly our share of the 1990 operating earnings retained by our
investees; subtract $30 million, for the incremental taxes we would
have owed had that $250 million been paid to us in dividends; and add
the remainder, $220 million, to our reported operating earnings of
$371 million. Thus our 1990 "look-through earnings" were about
$590 million.
我个人相信最好的方式是利用透视的方法来衡量Berkshire的盈余，2亿5,000
万美元大概是我们在1990年可以从被投资公司那边未分配到的营业利润，扣除
3,000万的额外股利所得税，再将剩下的2亿2,000万美元加到本来的帐列盈
余3亿7,100万，所得的5亿9,000万大概就是我们经过透视的真正盈余。
As I mentioned last year, we hope to have look-through earnings
grow about 15% annually. In 1990 we substantially exceeded that rate
but in 1991 we will fall far short of it. Our Gillette preferred has been
called and we will convert it into common stock on April 1. This will
reduce reported earnings by about $35 million annually and
look-through earnings by a much smaller, but still significant, amount.
Additionally, our media earnings - both direct and look-through -
appear sure to decline. Whatever the results, we will post you annually
on how we are doing on a look-through basis.
就像我去年曾经提到的，我希望我们的透视盈余每年都能够成长15%，在1990
年我们确实大幅超越这个比率，但1991年结果却差很多，我们在吉列的可转换
特别股投资已经被赎回，我们将在4月1日把它们转为普通股投资，虽然这将
会使得我们每年的帐面盈余减少3,500万，透视盈余也会跟着减少，另外我们
在媒体事业的直接与透视盈余也可能下滑，但不论如何，我们每年还是会向大家
报告透视盈余的计算结果。
Non-Insurance Operations
非保险营运
Take another look at the figures on page 51, which aggregate the
earnings and balance sheets of our non-insurance operations.
After-tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51%, a result that
would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500.
看看52页的那些数字，亦即我们非保险事业的盈余与资产负债加总，1990年
的平均股东权益报酬率是51%，这个获利能力在1989年的财星五百大可以排
在前20名。
Two factors make this return even more remarkable. First,
leverage did not produce it: Almost all our major facilities are owned,
not leased, and such small debt as these operations have is basically
offset by cash they hold. In fact, if the measurement was return on
assets - a calculation that eliminates the effect of debt upon returns -
our group would rank in Fortune's top ten.
还有两项因素使得这样的成绩显得更为出色，第一它们完全不靠融资杠杆，几乎
所有的主要设备都是自有而不是向外面租的，仅有的负债可以由自有的现金完全
抵销，事实上若讲到资产报酬率，亦即扣除负债对于盈余的影响，我们非保险事
业甚至可以排在前10名。
Equally important, our return was not earned from industries, such
as cigarettes or network television stations, possessing spectacular
economics for all participating in them. Instead it came from a group
of businesses operating in such prosaic fields as furniture retailing,
candy, vacuum cleaners, and even steel warehousing. The explanation
is clear: Our extraordinary returns flow from outstanding operating
managers, not fortuitous industry economics.
同样重要的是我们的获利并不是来自于像香烟或是电视台这些拥有特殊经济型
态的产业，相反地它们是来自于一些再平凡不过的产业，诸如家具零售、糖果、
吸尘器甚至是钢铁仓储等，这样的解释很明白，我们得来不易的报酬主要是靠优
秀杰出的经理人后天的努力而非先天的产业环境优势。
Let's look at the larger operations:
让我们来看看其中比较大的营运
o It was a poor year for retailing - particularly for big-ticket items
- but someone forgot to tell Ike Friedman at Borsheim's. Sales were up
18%. That's both a same-stores and all-stores percentage, since
Borsheim's operates but one establishment.
去年对零售业来说算是相当惨淡的一年，尤其是单价高的东西，不过大家可能是
忘了提醒在波仙珠宝店Ike Friedman这项事实，导致他店里的业绩逆势成长了
18%，这是单店也是全店的数字，自从波仙仅此一家别无分号的老店开幕以来就
是如此。
But, oh, what an establishment! We can't be sure about the fact
(because most fine-jewelry retailers are privately owned) but we
believe that this jewelry store does more volume than any other in the
U.S., except for Tiffany's New York store.
喔!超厉害的一家店，我们实在不太敢相信这是事实，(因为大部分最高级的珠宝
店多是私人拥有)，但我们却相信这家店除了纽约的Tiffany之外，全美其它所
有的珠宝店没有一家比得上它。
Borsheim's could not do nearly that well if our customers came
only from the Omaha metropolitan area, whose population is about
600,000. We have long had a huge percentage of greater Omaha's
jewelry business, so growth in that market is necessarily limited. But
every year business from non-Midwest customers grows dramatically.
Many visit the store in person. A large number of others, however, buy
through the mail in a manner you will find interesting.
波仙的客户群若只有大奥玛哈都会区600万人口的话，生意可能没有办法做的
那么大，长久以来我们在奥玛哈地区的占有率一直就很高，不过这部份的成长潜
力实在是有限，所幸每年来自非中西部地区的生意都大幅成长，很多都是客户自
己慕名而来单独上门，但还有一大部分是透过相当有趣的邮购方式购买我们的产
品。
These customers request a jewelry selection of a certain type and
value - say, emeralds in the $10,000 -$20,000 range - and we then
send them five to ten items meeting their specifications and from
which they can pick. Last year we mailed about 1,500 assortments of
all kinds, carrying values ranging from under $1,000 to hundreds of
thousands of dollars.
这些客户大多指定要一定品质与价位的珠宝，例如1万到2万美元的绿宝石，
之后我们会送上五到十个符合他们要求的样品供他们做挑选，去年我们总共寄出
超过1,500种组合，每种组合的价值从1,000美元到几十万美元不等。
The selections are sent all over the country, some to people no
one at Borsheim's has ever met. (They must always have been well
recommended, however.) While the number of mailings in 1990 was a
record, Ike has been sending merchandise far and wide for decades.
Misanthropes will be crushed to learn how well our "honor-system"
works: We have yet to experience a loss from customer dishonesty.
这些产品被分送到全美各地，有些人是波仙素未谋面的，(当然他们必须要经过
别人郑重的推荐)，虽然这个数量在1990年达到高峰，但事实Ike在几十年以
前就开始这样的创举，厌世者在得知我们所实施的荣誉制度可能会崩溃，截至目
前为止我们还没有因为客户的不诚实而遭受损失。
We attract business nationwide because we have several
advantages that competitors can't match. The most important item in
the equation is our operating costs, which run about 18% of sales
compared to 40% or so at the typical competitor. (Included in the 18%
are occupancy and buying costs, which some public companies include
in "cost of goods sold.") Just as Wal-Mart, with its 15% operating costs,
sells at prices that high-cost competitors can't touch and thereby
constantly increases its market share, so does Borsheim's. What works
with diapers works with diamonds.
我们之所以能够吸引全美各地的生意上门主要是因为我们有几项优势是其它竞
争对手所无法比拟的，其中最重要的一项就是经营的成本，相较于同业的40%
的高比率，波仙的营业成本大概是营业额的18%(这包含持有与买进成本，有些
公开发行的大公司还把他们列在销货成本项下)，就像是Wal-Mart的营业费用
率只有15%，因此可以以其它高成本竞争者无法达到的价位销售，从而持续地
增加其市场占有率，波仙也是如此，同样的方式除了卖尿布以外，换做于卖钻石
一样管用。
Our low prices create huge volume that in turn allows us to carry
an extraordinarily broad inventory of goods, running ten or more
times the size of that at the typical fine-jewelry store. Couple our
breadth of selection and low prices with superb service and you can
understand how Ike and his family have built a national jewelry
phenomenon from an Omaha location.
由于价格低廉所以销售数量也相当大，因此我们可以备有各式各样的产品存货，
比起其它店规模与数量甚至超过十倍之多，除了种类齐全、价格低廉之外，再加
上我们贴心的服务，这也是为什么Ike与他的家庭可以在奥玛哈这个小地方创造
出全美闻名的珠宝传奇。
And family it is. Ike's crew always includes son Alan and
sons-in-law Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale. And when things are busy
- that's often - they are joined by Ike's wife, Roz, and his daughters,
Janis and Susie. In addition, Fran Blumkin, wife of Louie (Chairman of
Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike's cousin), regularly pitches in. Finally,
you'll find Ike's 89-year-old mother, Rebecca, in the store most
afternoons, Wall Street Journal in hand. Given a family commitment
like this, is it any surprise that Borsheim's runs rings around
competitors whose managers are thinking about how soon 5 o'clock
will arrive?
真是虎父无犬子，Ike的团队总少不了他儿子Alan与女婿Marvin和Donald，
而且要是生意忙不过来的话，Ike的老婆Roz跟他的女儿们Janis与Susie还会
跳进来帮忙，另外Fran Blumkin-Louie的老婆(内布拉斯加家具店的老板-Ike
的侄子)，有时也会插花帮忙，最后大家绝对不要忘了还有高龄89岁的老祖母
Rebecca，每天下午都会手拿华尔街日报坐镇店里，能够有一个家族像这样的投
入，也难怪他们可以轻松击败那些由每天只等五点下班的专业经理人所经营的
店。
o While Fran Blumkin was helping the Friedman family set records
at Borsheim's, her sons, Irv and Ron, along with husband Louie, were
setting records at The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Sales at our
one-and-only location were $159 million, up 4% from 1989. Though
again the fact can't be conclusively proved, we believe NFM does close
