has been able to hire the dean.
Wells Fargo实在是相当的大，帐面资产高达560亿美元，股东权益报酬率高
达20%，资产报酬率则为1.25%，买下他10%的股权相当于以买下一家50亿
美元资产100%股权，但是真要有这样条件的银行，其价码可能会是2.9亿美元
的一倍以上，此外就算真的可以买得到，我们同样也要面临另外一个问题，那就
是找不到像Carl Reichardt这样的人才来经营，近几年来，从Wells Fargo出
身的经理人一直广受各家银行同业所欢迎，但想要请到这家银行的老宗师可就不
是一件容易的事了。
Of course, ownership of a bank - or about any other business -
is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major
earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn
destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic - the
possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it
would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter
how intelligently run. Finally, the market's major fear of the moment is
that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding
and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion.
Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be
particularly vulnerable.
当然拥有一家银行的股权，或是其它企业也一样，绝非没有风险，像加州的银行
就因为位于地震带而必须承担客户受到大地震影响而还不出借款的风险，第二个
风险是属于系统性的，也就是严重的企业萧条或是财务风暴导致这些高财务杠杆
经营的金融机构，不管经营的再好都有相当的危机，最后市场当时主要的考虑点
是美国西岸的房地产因为供给过多而崩盘的风险，连带使得融资给这些扩张建案
的银行承担钜额的损失，而也因为Wells Fargo就是市场上最大的不动产借款银
行，一般咸认它最容易受到伤害。
None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of
the first two occurring, however, is low and even a meaningful drop in
real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for
well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo
currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing
more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the
bank's loans - not just its real estate loans - were hit by problems in
1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest)
averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.
以上所提到的风险都很难加以排除，当然第一点与第二点的可能性相当低，而且
即使是房地产大幅的下跌，对于经营绩效良好的银行也不致造成太大的问题，我
们可以简单地算一下，Wells Fargo现在一年在提列3亿美元的损失准备之后，
税前还可以赚10亿美元以上，今天假若该银行所有的480亿借款中有10%在
1991年发生问题，且估计其中有30%的本金将收不回来，必须全部转为损失(包
含收不回来的利息)，则在这种情况下，这家银行还是可以损益两平。
A year like that - which we consider only a low-level possibility,
not a likelihood - would not distress us. In fact, at Berkshire we would
love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced
no return for a year, but that could then be expected to earn 20% on
growing equity. Nevertheless, fears of a California real estate disaster
similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells
Fargo stock to fall almost 50% within a few months during 1990. Even
though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the
fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many
more shares at the new, panic prices.
若是真有一年如此，虽然我们认为这种情况发生的可能性相当低，我们应该还可
以忍受，事实上在Berkshire选择购并或是投资一家公司，头一年不赚钱没有关
系，只要以后每年能够有20%的股东权益报酬率，尽管如此，加州大地震使得
投资人害怕新英格兰地区也会有同样的危险，导致Wells Fargo在1990年几个
月间大跌50%以上，虽然在股价下跌前我们已买进一些股份，但股价下跌使我
们可以开心地用更低的价格捡到更多的股份。
Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments
throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward
market fluctuations; instead many illogically become euphoric when
stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall. They show no such
confusion in their reaction to food prices: Knowing they are forever
going to be buyers of food, they welcome falling prices and deplore
price increases. (It's the seller of food who doesn't like declining
prices.) Similarly, at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for
newsprint - even though it would mean marking down the value of the
large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand - because we
know we are going to be perpetually buying the product.
以长期投资作为终生目标的投资人对于股市波动也应该采取同样的态度，千万不
要因为股市涨就欣喜若狂，股市跌就如丧考妣，奇怪的是他们对于食物的价格就
一点都不会搞错，很清楚知道自己每天一定会买食物，当食物价格下跌时，他们
可高兴的很，(要烦恼的应该是卖食物的人)，同样的在水牛城报纸我们期望印刷
成本能够降低，虽然这代表我们必须将帐列的新闻印刷存货价值向下调整，因为
我们很清楚，我们必须一直买进这些产品。
Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire's
investments. We will be buying businesses - or small parts of
businesses, called stocks - year in, year out as long as I live (and
longer, if Berkshire's directors attend the seances I have scheduled).
Given these intentions, declining prices for businesses benefit us, and
rising prices hurt us.
同样的原则也适用在Berkshire的投资之上，只要我还健在(若我死后，Berkshire
的董事会愿意透过我所安排的降神会接受我的指示，则期间或许更长久)，我们
会年复一年买下企业或是企业的一部份-也就是股票，也因此企业的价格下跌对
我们会更有利，反之则可能会对我们不利。
The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some
times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We
want to do business in such an environment, not because we like
pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism
that is the enemy of the rational buyer.
股价不振最主要的原因是悲观的情绪，有时是全面性的，有时则仅限于部份产业
或是公司，我们很期望能够在这种环境下做生意，不是因为我们天生喜欢悲观，
而是如此可以得到便宜的价格买进更多好的公司，乐观是理性投资人最大的敌
人。
None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an
intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian
approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What's
required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand
Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in
the financial world: "Most men would rather die than think. Many do."
当然以上所述并不代表不受欢迎或注意的股票或企业就是好的投资标的，反向操
作有可能与群众心理一样的愚蠢，真正重要的是独立思考而不是投票表决，不幸
的是Bertrand Russell对于人性的观察同样地也适用于财务投资之上，「大多
数的人宁死也不愿意去思考！」。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Our other major portfolio change last year was large additions to
our holdings of RJR Nabisco bonds, securities that we first bought in
late 1989. At yearend 1990 we had $440 million invested in these
securities, an amount that approximated market value. (As I write this,
however, their market value has risen by more than $150 million.)
我们去年其它主要的投资组合的变动就是增加RJR Nabisco的债券，我们是在
1989年开始买进这种有价证券，到了1990年底我们的投资金额约为4.4亿美
元，与目前的市价相当(不过在撰写年报的同时，他们的市价已增加了1.5亿美
元)。
Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us, so is
the purchase of below-investment-grade bonds. But opportunities
that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile
impact on Berkshire's results are rare. Therefore, we will look at any
category of investment, so long as we understand the business we're
buying into and believe that price and value may differ significantly.
(Woody Allen, in another context, pointed out the advantage of
open-mindedness: "I can't understand why more people aren't
bi-sexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday
night.")
就像我们很少买进银行股，同样地我们也很少买进投资等级以下的债券，不过能
够引起我们兴趣的投资机会，同时规模大到足以对Berkshire有相当影响力的投
资机会实在是不多，因此我们愿意尝试各种不同的投资工具，只要我们对于即将
买进的投资标的有相当的了解，同时价格与价值有相当大的差距(伍迪艾伦也另
一句台词用来形容开明的好处︰「我实在不了解为什么有那么多人排斥双性恋，
人们在星期六夜晚至少可以有多一倍的机会能够约会？」)。
In the past we have bought a few below-investment-grade
bonds with success, though these were all old-fashioned "fallen
angels" - bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were
downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times. In the 1984 annual
report we described our rationale for buying one fallen angel, the
Washington Public Power Supply System.
在过去我们也曾成功地投资了好几次投资等级以下的债券，虽然他们多是传统上
所谓的失翼的天使，意思是指原先发行时属于投资等级但后来因为公司出现问题
而被降等，在1984年的年报中我们也曾经提到过买进华盛顿公用电力系统债券
的原因。
A kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment
scene in the 1980s - "junk bonds" that were far below investmentgrade
when issued. As the decade progressed, new offerings of
manufactured junk became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable
outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name. In 1990 - even
before the recession dealt its blows - the financial sky became dark
with the bodies of failing corporations.
不过到了1980年代大量假冒的失翼的天使充斥着整个投资界，也就是所谓的垃
圾债券，这些债券在发行时企业本身的信用评等就不佳，十几年下来垃圾债券越
来越垃圾，最后真的变成名符其实的垃圾，到了1990年代在经济衰退引发债权
危机之前，整个投资界的天空已布满着这些假冒失翼天使的尸体。
The disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn't
happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to
focus their efforts as never before, much as a dagger mounted on the
steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed
with intensified care. We'll acknowledge that such an attention-getter
would produce a very alert driver. But another certain consequence
would be a deadly - and unnecessary - accident if the car hit even the
tiniest pothole or sliver of ice. The roads of business are riddled with
potholes; a plan that requires dodging them all is a plan for disaster.
迷信这些债券的门徒一再强调不可能发生崩盘的危机，钜额的债务会迫使公司经
理人更专注于经营，就像是一位驾驶开着一辆轮胎上插着一只匕首的破车，大家
可以确定这位驾驶一定会小心翼翼地开车，当然我们绝对相信这位驾驶一定会相
当小心谨慎，但是另外却还有一个变量必须克服，那就是只要车子碰到一个小坑
洞或是一小片雪就可能造成致命的车祸，而偏偏在商业的道路上，遍布着各种坑
坑洞洞，一个要求必须避开所有坑洞的计画实在是一个相当危险的计画。
In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham
forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: "Confronted with a challenge to
distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the
motto, Margin of Safety." Forty-two years after reading that, I still
think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed
this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s
began.
在葛拉罕智能型投资人的最后一章中，很强烈地驳斥这种匕首理论，如果要将稳
健的投资浓缩成三字箴言，那就是安全边际，在读到这篇文章的42年后，我仍
深深相信这三个字，没能注意到这个简单原则的投资人在1990年代开始就会慢
慢尝到损失的痛苦。
At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were
concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was
issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce
the funds to service it. One particularly egregious "kill- 'em-at-birth"
case a few years back involved the purchase of a mature television
station in Tampa, bought with so much debt that the interest on it
exceeded the station's gross revenues. Even if you assume that all
labor, programs and services were donated rather than purchased, this
capital structure required revenues to explode - or else the station
was doomed to go broke. (Many of the bonds that financed the
purchase were sold to now-failed savings and loan associations; as a
taxpayer, you are picking up the tab for this folly.)
在债务恐慌最高点的时候，资本结构注定导致失败的发生，有些公司的融资杠杆
高到即使是再好的企业也无法负担，有一个特别惨、一出生就夭折的案例，就是
一个坦帕湾地方电视台的购并案，这个案子一年的利息负担甚至还超过他一整年
的营收，也就是说即使所有的人工、节目与服务都不须成本，且营收也能有爆炸
性的成长，这家电视台还是会步上倒闭的命运，(许多债券都是由现在大多倒闭
的储贷机构买进，所以身为纳税义务人的你，等于间接替这些愚蠢的行为买单)。
All of this seems impossible now. When these misdeeds were
done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers pointed to the
"scholarly" research of academics, which reported that over the years
the higher interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more
than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the
friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce
greater net returns than would a portfolio of high-grade bonds.
(Beware of past-performance "proofs" in finance: If history books
were the key to riches, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
现在看起来这种情况当然不太可能再发生，当这些错误的行为发生时，专门贩卖
匕首的投资银行家纷纷把责任推给学术单位，表示研究显示低等级债券所收到的
利息收入应该可以弥补投资人所承担可能收不回本金的风险，因此推断说好心的
业务员所介绍给客户的高收益债券将给客户带来比高等级债券更好的收益，(特
别要小心财务学上过去的统计资料实证，若历史资料是致富之钥，那么富比士四
百大富豪不都应该是图书馆员吗?)
There was a flaw in the salesmen's logic - one that a first- year
student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being
made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to
the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default
experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default
experience of the new issues. (That was an error similar to checking
the historical death rate from Kool-Aid before drinking the version
served at Jonestown.)
不过这些业务员的逻辑有一个漏洞，这是统计系的新生都知道的，那就是假设所
有新发行的垃圾债券都与以前的失翼天使一样，也就是说前者还不出本金的机率
与后者是一样的，(这种错误就像是在喝Jonestown的毒药之前，以过去的死亡
率为参考)。
The universes were of course dissimilar in several vital respects.
For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned
to regain investment-grade status and worked toward that goal. The
junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving
much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a
cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix.
Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the
typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely
developed than were those of the junk-bond-issuing financiopath.
这个世界在许多方面当然有很大的不同，对于开拓者来说，失翼天使的经理人无
不渴望重新到投资等级的名单之上，，但是垃圾债券的经营者就全然不是那么一
回事了，不思解决其为债务所苦的困境，反而偏好运用英雄式的行径，寻找暂时
解脱之道，此外失翼天使忠诚的敏感特质通常比那些垃圾债券经营者要来的好的
多。
Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street's
enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to
the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by
those who didn't care to those who didn't think - and there was no
shortage of either.
华尔街对于这样的差异根本就不在乎，通常华尔街关心的不是它到底有多少优缺
点，而是它可以产生多少收入，成千上万的垃圾债券就是由这帮不在乎的人卖给
那些不懂得思考之人。
Junk bonds remain a mine field, even at prices that today are
often a small fraction of issue price. As we said last year, we have
never bought a new issue of a junk bond. (The only time to buy these
is on a day with no "y" in it.) We are, however, willing to look at the
field, now that it is in disarray.
即使现在垃圾债券的市场价格只有发行价格的一点点，它还是个地雷区，就像是
去年我们曾经说过的，我们从来不买新发行的垃圾债券，(唯一会买进的时点是
没有y之时)，不过趁现在市场一遍混乱，我们倒是愿意花点时间看看。
In the case of RJR Nabisco, we feel the Company's credit is
considerably better than was generally perceived for a while and that
the yield we receive, as well as the potential for capital gain, more than
compensates for the risk we incur (though that is far from nil). RJR has
made asset sales at favorable prices, has added major amounts of
equity, and in general is being run well.
