在RJR Nabisco这个案子我们认为这家公司的债信要比外界想象中好一点，同
时我们感觉潜在的利益，应该可以弥补我们要承担的风险(虽然绝非无风险)，RJR
资产处份的价格还算不错，股东权益增加了许多，现在经营也渐上轨道了。
However, as we survey the field, most low-grade bonds still look
unattractive. The handiwork of the Wall Street of the 1980s is even
worse than we had thought: Many important businesses have been
mortally wounded. We will, though, keep looking for opportunities as
the junk market continues to unravel.
然而在我们看了市场以后发现，大部分低等级的债券还是不具吸引力，华尔街
1980年代的技术比我们想象中差多了，许多重要生意都大受影响，不过我们还
是会继续在垃圾债券市场中寻找好的投资机会。
Convertible Preferred Stocks
可转换特别股
We continue to hold the convertible preferred stocks described in
earlier reports: $700 million of Salomon Inc, $600 million of The
Gillette Company, $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. and $300 million
of Champion International Corp. Our Gillette holdings will be
converted into 12 million shares of common stock on April 1.
Weighing interest rates, credit quality and prices of the related
common stocks, we can assess our holdings in Salomon and
Champion at yearend 1990 as worth about what we paid, Gillette as
worth somewhat more, and USAir as worth substantially less.
我们持续持有先前向各位报告过的可转换特别股，包括所罗门7亿美金、吉列6
亿美金、美国航空3.58亿美金与冠军企业3亿美金。我们吉列的特别股将会在
4月1日转换为1,200万股的普通股，在衡量利率、债信与普通股的价格之后，
我们可以确信在所罗门与冠军企业的投资现值应该与我们当初的成本差不多，吉
列的价值比成本高，至于美国航空的价值则远低于当初的投资成本。
In making the USAir purchase, your Chairman displayed exquisite
timing: I plunged into the business at almost the exact moment that it
ran into severe problems. (No one pushed me; in tennis parlance, I
committed an "unforced error.") The company's troubles were brought
on both by industry conditions and by the post-merger difficulties it
encountered in integrating Piedmont, an affliction I should have
expected since almost all airline mergers have been followed by
operational turmoil.
在投资美国航空时，本人在下我真是抓对了时点，我几乎是在航空业爆发严重的
问题之前，跳进去这个产业，(没有人强迫我，如同在网球场上，我把它形容做
是非受迫性失误)，美国航空问题的发生，导因于产业本身的状况与对Piedmont
购并后所产生的后遗症，这点我应该要早该预料到，因为几乎所有的航空业购并
案最后的结果都是一团混乱。
In short order, Ed Colodny and Seth Schofield resolved the second
problem: The airline now gets excellent marks for service.
Industry-wide problems have proved to be far more serious. Since our
purchase, the economics of the airline industry have deteriorated at an
alarming pace, accelerated by the kamikaze pricing tactics of certain
carriers. The trouble this pricing has produced for all carriers
illustrates an important truth: In a business selling a commodity-type
product, it's impossible to be a lot smarter than your dumbest
competitor.
在这不久之后，Ed Colodny与Seth Schofield解决了第二个难题，美国航空现
在的服务受到好评，不过整个产业所面临的问题却越来越严重，自从我们开始投
资之后，航空业的状况便很急遽地恶化，尤其再加上某些业者自杀性的杀价竞
争，这样的结果导致所有的航空业者都面临一项残酷的事实，在销售制式化商品
的产业之中，你很难比最笨的竞争对手聪明到哪里去。
However, unless the industry is decimated during the next few
years, our USAir investment should work out all right. Ed and Seth
have decisively addressed the current turbulence by making major
changes in operations. Even so, our investment is now less secure than
at the time I made it.
不过除非在未来几年内，航空业全面地崩溃，否则我们在美国航空的投资应该能
够确保安全无虞，Ed与Seth很果决地在营运上做了一些重大的改变来解决目前
营运所面临的问题，虽然如此，我们的投资现在的情况比起当初还是差了一点。
Our convertible preferred stocks are relatively simple securities,
yet I should warn you that, if the past is any guide, you may from time
to time read inaccurate or misleading statements about them. Last
year, for example, several members of the press calculated the value
of all our preferreds as equal to that of the common stock into which
they are convertible. By their logic, that is, our Salomon preferred,
convertible into common at $38, would be worth 60% of face value if
Salomon common were selling at $22.80. But there is a small problem
with this line of reasoning: Using it, one must conclude that all of the
value of a convertible preferred resides in the conversion privilege and
that the value of a non-convertible preferred of Salomon would be
zero, no matter what its coupon or terms for redemption.
我们的可转换特别股算是相当单纯的投资工具，不过我还是必须警告各位，若是
过去的经验有任何参考价值，大家可能还是会读到一些不正确或是误导的讯息，
举例来说像去年，有几家报章杂志错误地将它们的价值与可以转换的普通股价格
混为一谈，我们的所罗门特别股转换价格为38美元，根据它们的逻辑，由于所
罗门普通股的现价为22.8美元，所以其可转换特别股的价值只有面额的60%，
但这样的推论却有一个盲点，因为这样的说法表示所有的可转换特别股，其价值
只在其所拥有的转换权利，至于所罗门不可转换的债券价值则为零，不管它所拥
有的赎回条件为何。
The point you should keep in mind is that most of the value of our
convertible preferreds is derived from their fixed-income
characteristics. That means the securities cannot be worth less than
the value they would possess as non-convertible preferreds and may
be worth more because of their conversion options.
大家必须特别记住的一点是我们可转换特别股大部分的价值其实是来自于固定
收益的特性，这意思是说这些有价证券的价值不可能低于一般不具转换权的特别
股，相反地会因为它们拥有可转换的选择权而具有更高的价值。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I deeply regret having to end this section of the report with a note
about my friend, Colman Mockler, Jr., CEO of Gillette, who died in
January. No description better fitted Colman than "gentleman" - a
word signifying integrity, courage and modesty. Couple these qualities
with the humor and exceptional business ability that Colman
possessed and you can understand why I thought it an undiluted
pleasure to work with him and why I, and all others who knew him, will
miss Colman so much.
很遗憾我必须在报告末段以我的好朋友Colman Mockler-吉列的CEO在今年
一月过世做为结尾，除了「绅士」这个代表品格、勇气与谦和的字，没有其它字
更能贴切形容Colman这个人，除了这些特质之外，再加上他所拥有的幽默与
超凡的经营能力，所以大家应该可以想象与他共事是多么令人感到愉快的一件
事，这也是为何包含我在内的许多人，会对他感到特别怀念的缘故。
A few days before Colman died, Gillette was richly praised in a
Forbes cover story. Its theme was simple: The company's success in
shaving products has come not from marketing savvy (though it
exhibits that talent repeatedly) but has instead resulted from its
devotion to quality. This mind-set has caused it to consistently focus
its energies on coming up with something better, even though its
existing products already ranked as the class of the field. In so
depicting Gillette, Forbes in fact painted a portrait of Colman.
在Colman死之前几天，吉列受到富比士以封面故事大加赞扬，标题很简单，
这家公司在刮胡刀产业的成功，不单单只靠行销手段(虽然他们一再展现这方面
的能力)，同时更源自于他们对于品质的追求，这种心理建设使得他们持续将精
力摆在推出更新更好的产品之上，虽然现有的产品已是市场上最经典的，富比士
对于吉列的形容，就好象是在描述Colman本人一样。
Help! Help!
救命!救命!
Regular readers know that I shamelessly utilize the annual letter in
an attempt to acquire businesses for Berkshire. And, as we constantly
preach at the Buffalo News, advertising does work: Several businesses
have knocked on our door because someone has read in these pages
of our interest in making acquisitions. (Any good ad salesman will tell
you that trying to sell something without advertising is like winking at
a girl in the dark.)
熟悉的读者都知道我经常利用年报不顾廉耻地替Berkshire寻找合适的投资标
的，此外我们也常常在水牛城报纸刊登广告征求投资标的，而如此的宣传做法确
实也收到效果，有好几家企业收到我们相关的讯息后，上门前来(任何好的业务
销售人员都会告诉你不靠广告卖东西就好象是在黑夜里对于女孩扎眼一样没有
用)。
In Appendix B (on pages 26-27) I've reproduced the essence of a
letter I wrote a few years back to the owner/manager of a desirable
business. If you have no personal connection with a business that
might be of interest to us but have a friend who does, perhaps you can
pass this report along to him.
附录B是我回信给一位可能的卖方的摘要，若是你知道那家企业可能会是我们有
兴趣的标的，同时你有认识的朋友在那家企业，欢迎你直接将这份资料送给他参
考。
Here's the sort of business we are looking for:
(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are
of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing
little or no debt,
(4) Management in place (we can't supply it),
(5) Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't
understand it),
(6) An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of
the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price
is unknown).
以下就是我们想要找的企业条件
(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)
(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)
(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)
(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)
(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)
(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise
complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within
five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for
cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in
intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过
五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样
多，否则不考虑发行股份。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-
Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's ownermanagers
wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for
themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the
same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who
continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think
we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We
invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom
we have done business in the past.
我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太- Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望
能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往
常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意
的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that
don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you
advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping
to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses
our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales:
"When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me."
另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机
股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有
一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，对于这类的事业，有首乡村歌曲其中的一句
歌词最能描述我们的感觉，「若电话不响，你就知道那是我」。
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as
described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of
large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold
in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, and Champion. We are not
interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we
might make in the general stock market.
除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股
份，就像我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空与冠军企业这几个Case一样
的公司，不过对于一般直接从股票市场上买进股份的建议我们，则一点兴趣都没
有。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
Ken Chace has decided not to stand for reelection as a director at
our upcoming annual meeting. We have no mandatory retirement age
for directors at Berkshire (and won't!), but Ken, at 75 and living in
Maine, simply decided to cut back his activities.
Ken Chace决定从今年股东会起不再担任本公司的董事，在Berkshire我们没
有强制董事退休的年龄限制(以后绝对也不会有)，但是住在缅因州75岁的Ken
还是决定减少自己在Berkshire的活动量。
Ken was my immediate choice to run the textile operation after
Buffett Partnership, Ltd. assumed control of Berkshire early in 1965.
Although I made an economic mistake in sticking with the textile
business, I made no mistake in choosing Ken: He ran the operation
well, he was always 100% straight with me about its problems, and he
generated the funds that allowed us to diversify into insurance.
Ken是我在1965年透过巴菲特合伙入主Berkshire时，选择经营纺织事业的
第一人选，虽然我在坚持纺织事业继续经营上做了错误的决策，但选择Ken却
是正确的决定，他把公司经营的非常好，对于所面临的问题也是百分之百地坦
诚，更重要的是他产生出足够让我们进军保险业的资金。
My wife, Susan, will be nominated to succeed Ken. She is now the
second largest shareholder of Berkshire and if she outlives me will
inherit all of my stock and effectively control the company. She knows,
and agrees, with my thoughts on successor management and also
shares my view that neither Berkshire nor its subsidiary businesses
and important investments should be sold simply because some very
high bid is received for one or all.
我的内人Susan将会被提名接替Ken担任董事，她个人现在是Berkshire第二
大股东，而且要是她活的比我久的话，还会继承我个人所持有的股份，进而取得
公司的控制权，她明了也完全同意我个人对于可能接替人选的想法，同时也认同
不管是Berkshire本身或是旗下事业与主要的投资，都不会单纯地因为有人出高
价要买，便轻易地对外出售。
I feel strongly that the fate of our businesses and their managers
should not depend on my health - which, it should be added, is
excellent - and I have planned accordingly. Neither my estate plan nor
that of my wife is designed to preserve the family fortune; instead,
both are aimed at preserving the character of Berkshire and returning
the fortune to society.
我强烈地感觉Berkshire企业与经理人的命运不应该依赖在我个人的健康之
上，当然若是因此可以加分会更好，为此我已做好的万全的计画，不管是我个人
或是我内人的遗嘱都不打算将这些财产留给家族，相反地重点会放在如何保持
Berkshire的特质，并将所有的财富回归给社会。
Were I to die tomorrow, you could be sure of three things: (1)
None of my stock would have to be sold; (2) Both a controlling
shareholder and a manager with philosophies similar to mine would
follow me; and (3) Berkshire's earnings would increase by $1 million
annually, since Charlie would immediately sell our corporate jet, The
Indefensible (ignoring my wish that it be buried with me).
所以万一要是明天我突然死了，大家可以确定三件事(1)我在Berkshire的股份，
一股都不会卖(2)继承我的所有权人与经理人一定会遵循我的投资哲学
(3)Berkshire的盈余会因为出售我个人的专用飞机-无可辩解号，每年可增加
100万美元(不要管我希望让她陪葬的遗愿)。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1990
shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made
through the program were $5.8 million, and 2,600 charities were
recipients.
大约有97.3%的有效股权参与1990年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约580万美
元捐出的款项分配给2,600家慈善机构。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages
54-55. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your
shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the
nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so
registered on August 31, 1991 will be ineligible for the 1991 program.
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在
未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是
受托人的名下，必须在1991年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1991
年的捐赠计画。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that
