current after-tax earnings of $1 million. (This after-tax multiplier
of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of about 16.)
几年以来一般人都认为新闻、电视或是杂志产业的获利能力，可以永无止尽地以
每年6%左右的比率成长，而且可以完全不必依靠额外的资金，也因此每年的折
旧费用应该会与资本支出相当，而由于所需的营运资金也相当小，所以帐列盈余
(在扣除无形资产摊销前)几乎等于可以自由分配运用的盈余，也就是说拥有一家
媒体事业，每年几乎可以有6%稳定增加的纯现金流入，同时若我们以10%的折
现率来计算现值的话，等于是一次2,500万的投资，每年可以贡献100万美元
的税后净利贡献(亦即约为25倍的税后本益比，若换成税前盈余本益比则约为
16左右)。
Now change the assumption and posit that the $1 million
represents "normal earning power" and that earnings will bob around
this figure cyclically. A "bob-around" pattern is indeed the lot of
most businesses, whose income stream grows only if their owners are
willing to commit more capital (usually in the form of retained
earnings). Under our revised assumption, $1 million of earnings,
discounted by the same 10%, translates to a $10 million valuation.
Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property's
valuation to 10 times after-tax earnings (or about 6 1/2 times
pre-tax earnings).
现在假设条件改变，这家公司只拥有普通的获利能力，所以每年100万的获利
只能上上下下起伏，这种打摆子的形式就是大部分公司的状况，而公司的获利想
要有所成长，老板就必须要投入更多的资金才办得到(通常都是透过保留盈余的
方式)，经过我们将假设重新做修正，同样以10%加以折现，大概可以达到1,000
万美元的价值，结果可以看出，一项看起来不大重要的假设变动却使这家企业的
价值大幅减少至10倍税后盈余本益比(或6.5倍税前盈余本益比)。
Dollars are dollars whether they are derived from the
operation of media properties or of steel mills. What in the past
caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media far higher
than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media property
were expected to constantly grow (without the business requiring
much additional capital), whereas steel earnings clearly fell in
the bob-around category. Now, however, expectations for media have
moved toward the bob-around model. And, as our simplified example
illustrates, valuations must change dramatically when expectations
are revised.
现金就是现金，不管今天它是靠经营媒体事业或是钢铁工厂得来的都一样，而过
去同样是一元的获利，大家之所以看重媒体事业的原因是预期他会继续成长(股
东不需要再投入额外的资金)，而钢铁业很明显会落入打摆子的那类族群，不过
现在大家对于媒体事业的看法也逐渐改为后者，而如我们刚刚所举简单的例子，
评价的结果可能因为这样的修正而有很大的改变。
We have a significant investment in media - both through our
direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in The
Washington Post Company and Capital Cities/ABC - and the intrinsic
value of this investment has declined materially because of the
secular transformation that the industry is experiencing. (Cyclical
factors have also hurt our current look-through earnings, but these
factors do not reduce intrinsic value.) However, as our Business
Principles on page 2-3 note, one of the rules by which we run
Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses - or investee holdings
that we have classified as permanent - simply because we see ways
to use the money more advantageously elsewhere. (We did sell
certain other media holdings sometime back, but these were
relatively small.)
我们在媒体事业有相当大的投资，不管是百分之百拥有的水牛城日报或是在华盛
顿邮报与资本城/ABC的股票投资，而这些媒体事业的价值因为前面所提到的产
业所面临的形态转变而大幅滑落，(景气循环因素也使得我们现在的透视盈余大
受影响，虽然还不致于让实质价值减少)，然而就像是我们经营Berkshire的企
业原则所揭示的，我们不会只是因为还有其它更有利的资金用途，就随便将已被
列为永恒的事业或主要投资出售，(当然之前我们也确实卖了一些媒体股，不过
规模相对较小)。
The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been
moderated because the Buffalo News, under Stan Lipsey's leadership,
has done far better than most newspapers and because both Cap
Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well-managed. In
particular, these companies stayed on the sidelines during the late
1980's period in which purchasers of media properties regularly
paid irrational prices. Also, the debt of both Cap Cities and
Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold.
As a result, the shrinkage in the value of their assets has not
been accentuated by the effects of leverage. Among publicly-owned
media companies, our two investees are about the only ones
essentially free of debt. Most of the other companies, through a
combination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and
shrinking earnings, find themselves with debt equal to five or more
times their current net income.
还好我们的实质价值受到损害的情况尚称轻微，因为水牛城日报在Stan Lipsey
的领导之下，表现远比其它报纸同业要来的优秀，另一方面资本城与华盛顿邮报
的经营也都很上轨道，特别是在1980年代许多媒体公司以高价大举并购同业
时，我们的投资事业都只是做壁上观，而资本城与华盛顿邮报两家公司的负债也
都很少，甚至于手上的现金就足以清偿所有的债务，因此公司资产的缩水并没有
因为杠杆而扩大，所以现在在所有主要的媒体事业当中，大概就只有我们投资的
这两家公司可以免于债务所苦，而早期那些透过大量购并的同业，除了盈余大幅
缩水之外，还同时背负着至少相当于年度获利能力五倍以上的负债。
The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap Cities
and Washington Post leave us more comfortable with these
investments than we would be with holdings in any other media
companies. Moreover, most media properties continue to have far
better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average
American business. But gone are the days of bullet-proof franchises
and cornucopian economics.
总而言之，资本城及华盛顿邮报超强的资产负债表与管理阶层，持有它们的股份
使得我们比持有别家公司的股份感到更放心，而且就现阶段而言，媒体事业还是
比其它一般美国企业要来的有竞争力，只是不再像过去拥有金刚不坏之身与诱人
的暴利而已。
Twenty Years in a Candy Store
二十年的糖果店
We've just passed a milestone: Twenty years ago, on January 3,
1972, Blue Chip Stamps (then an affiliate of Berkshire and later
merged into it) bought control of See's Candy Shops, a West Coast
manufacturer and retailer of boxed-chocolates. The nominal price
that the sellers were asking - calculated on the 100% ownership we
ultimately attained - was $40 million. But the company had $10
million of excess cash, and therefore the true offering price was
$30 million. Charlie and I, not yet fully appreciative of the value
of an economic franchise, looked at the company's mere $7 million
of tangible net worth and said $25 million was as high as we would
go (and we meant it). Fortunately, the sellers accepted our offer.
我们刚刚跨过历史性的一页，二十年前也就是1972年1月3日，蓝筹邮票公
司(原为Berkshire的分支机构，后来并入Berkshire)，买下喜斯糖果-西岸的一
家盒装巧克力制造与销售厂商，当时卖方所提的报价，以最后取得的100%股权
换算约为4,000万美元，但当时光是公司帐上就有1,000万美元的现金，所以
认真算起来真正出的资金只有3,000万美金，不过当时查理跟我还不是那么了
解一家特许事业所拥有的真正价值，所以在看过帐面净值只有700万美元的报
表之后，竟向对方表示2,500万是我们可以出的最高上限(当时我们确实是这样
子认为)，很幸运的是卖方接受了我们的报价。
The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined
from $102.5 million in 1972 to $1.2 million in 1991. But See's
candy sales in the same period increased from $29 million to $196
million. Moreover, profits at See's grew even faster than sales,
from $4.2 million pre-tax in 1972 to $42.4 million last year.
之后蓝筹邮票公司的邮票买卖收入从1972年的1亿美元下滑到1991年的
1,200万美元，但在同一期间喜斯糖果的营收，却从2,900万成长到1.96亿
美元，更甚者，其获利成长的幅度还远高于营收成长的幅度，税前获利从1972
年的420万，变成去年的4,240万美元。
For an increase in profits to be evaluated properly, it must
be compared with the incremental capital investment required to
produce it. On this score, See's has been astounding: The company
now operates comfortably with only $25 million of net worth, which
means that our beginning base of $7 million has had to be
supplemented by only $18 million of reinvested earnings. Meanwhile,
See's remaining pre-tax profits of $410 million were distributed to
Blue Chip/Berkshire during the 20 years for these companies to
deploy (after payment of taxes) in whatever way made most sense.
对于每多赚一块钱的效益评量，大家必须将其所需额外投入的资金考量进去，就
这点儿言，喜斯的表现实在是相当惊人，这家公司现在的净值只有2,500万美
元，意思是说除了原来投资时的700万美元，后来只保留了1,800万的盈余未
分配，除了之外喜斯将这20年来剩下所赚的4亿1,000万美元，在扣除所得
税之后，全部发还给蓝筹邮票与Berkshire，将资金分配到更有利的地方之上。
In our See's purchase, Charlie and I had one important
insight: We saw that the business had untapped pricing power.
Otherwise, we were lucky twice over. First, the transaction was not
derailed by our dumb insistence on a $25 million price. Second, we
found Chuck Huggins, then See's executive vice-president, whom we
instantly put in charge. Both our business and personal experiences
with Chuck have been outstanding. One example: When the purchase
was made, we shook hands with Chuck on a compensation
arrangement - conceived in about five minutes and never reduced to a
written contract - that remains unchanged to this day.
在买下喜斯时，有一点是我们已预见的，那就是它尚未被发掘的订价能力，另外
我们有两方面算是很幸运，第一整个交易还好没有因为我们愚昧地坚持2,500
万美元的上限而告吹，第二我们选中Chuck Huggins-当时喜斯糖果的副总经
理，立即走马上任，不管是在公事或是私人方面，我们与Chuck共处的经验都
相当难得，有一个例子可以说明，当购并案完成后，我们在短短五分钟内就与
Chuck协议好他担任总经理的薪资报酬，而且连书面契约都没有签，就一直延
续到今天。
In 1991, See's sales volume, measured in dollars, matched that
of 1990. In pounds, however, volume was down 4%. All of that
slippage took place in the last two months of the year, a period
that normally produces more than 80% of annual profits. Despite the
weakness in sales, profits last year grew 7%, and our pre-tax
profit margin was a record 21.6%.
1991年喜斯糖果的销售金额与前一年度相当，但是若是以销售数量来算，则减
少了4%，所有减少的部份大多来自于占年度获利80%的最后两个月，不过尽管
业绩不太好，获利还是成长了7%，税前盈益率更创下21.6%的新高记录。
Almost 80% of See's sales come from California and our
business clearly was hurt by the recession, which hit the state
with particular force late in the year. Another negative, however,
was the mid-year initiation in California of a sales tax of 7%-8?
(depending on the county involved) on "snack food" that was deemed
applicable to our candy.
喜斯糖果80%的收入都来自于加州，而我们的生意很明显地受到景气衰退的影
响，尤其在年度的后半段更是显著，另外一个负面因素是加州在年度中开始对零
食课征7%-8%的营业税(依每个市镇有所不同)，当然巧克力糖果也不能幸免。
Shareholders who are students of epistemological shadings will
enjoy California's classifications of "snack" and "non-snack"
foods:
若是精研认识论差异的股东应该会觉得加州对于零食与非零食的分类感到相当
有兴趣。
Taxable "Snack" Foods Non-Taxable "Non-Snack" Foods
--------------------- -----------------------------
Ritz Crackers Soda Crackers
Popped Popcorn Unpopped Popcorn
Granola Bars Granola Cereal
Slice of Pie (Wrapped) Whole Pie
Milky Way Candy Bar Milky Way Ice Cream Bar
What - you are sure to ask - is the tax status of a melted
Milky Way ice cream bar? In that androgynous form, does it more
resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been left in the
sun? It's no wonder that Brad Sherman, Chairman of California's
State Board of Equalization, who opposed the snack food bill but
must now administer it, has said: "I came to this job as a
specialist in tax law. Now I find my constituents should have
elected Julia Child."
你一定会问，那融化的牛奶冰淇淋棒要不要课税呢? 在这种仿真两可的状态下，
它到底是比较像冰淇淋棒还是在大太阳底下的糖果棒呢? 也难怪Brad
Sherman-加州公平交易委员会的主席，虽然反对这项法案但还是必须负责监督
执行，他提到我以税务专家的身分到这个委员会任职，但我觉得大家要选的对
象，应该是小孩子才对。
Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our
association with Chuck and See's. The obvious ones are that we've
earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process.
Equally important, ownership of See's has taught us much about the
evaluation of franchises. We've made significant money in certain
common stocks because of the lessons we learned at See's.
查理跟我有太多理由要感谢Chuck跟喜斯糖果，最明显的原因是他们帮我们赚
了那么多钱，而且其间的过程是如此令人愉快，还有一点同样重要的是拥有喜斯
糖果让我们对于强势的特许事业有更深一层的认识，我们靠着在喜斯身上所学的
东西，在别的股票投资上，又赚了更多的钱。
H. H. Brown
布朗鞋业
We made a sizable acquisition in 1991 - the H. H. Brown
Company - and behind this business is an interesting history. In
1927 a 29-year-old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased the
company, then located in North Brookfield, Massachusetts, for
$10,000 and began a 62-year career of running it. (He also found
time for other pursuits: At age 90 he was still joining new golf
clubs.) By Mr. Heffernan's retirement in early 1990 H. H. Brown had
three plants in the United States and one in Canada; employed close
to 2,000 people; and earned about $25 million annually before
taxes.
我们在1991年做了一件大型的购并案，那就是买下布朗鞋业，这背后有一段有
趣的故事，1927年时有一位29岁的年轻商人-Ray Heffernan以10,000美
元买下这家公司，并把它搬到麻赛诸赛州，从此展开长达62年的事业(当然同时
他还有其它追求的目标，高龄90岁的他现在还在加入新的高尔夫球俱乐部)，等
1990年Heffernan先生宣布退休时，布朗鞋业在美国已有三座工厂，还有另外
一座在加拿大，每年的税前获利约有2,500万美元。
Along the way, Frances Heffernan, one of Ray's daughters,
married Frank Rooney, who was sternly advised by Mr. Heffernan
before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas he might
have about working for his father-in-law. That was one of Mr.
Heffernan's few mistakes: Frank went on to become CEO of Melville
Shoe (now Melville Corp.). During his 23 years as boss, from 1964
through 1986, Melville's earnings averaged more than 20% on equity
and its stock (adjusted for splits) rose from $16 to $960. And a
few years after Frank retired, Mr. Heffernan, who had fallen ill,
asked him to run Brown.
这期间Heffernan的一个女儿Frances嫁给了Frank Rooney，当时Heffernan
严正地告诉他的女婿最好断了想要参与经营布朗鞋业的念头，但这却是
Heffernan先生所犯下的少数错误之一，Frank后来跑到另外一家鞋业Melville
担任CEO，在他从1964年到1986年担任主管的期间，Mellville每年的股东
权益报酬高达20%，而股价更从16元涨到960元(经过还原后)，而在Frank
退休多年后，Heffernan先生因为生病，才叫Frank回来经营布朗鞋业。
After Mr. Heffernan died late in 1990, his family decided to
sell the company - and here we got lucky. I had known Frank for a
few years but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire as a
possible buyer. He instead gave the assignment of selling Brown to
a major investment banker, which failed also to think of us. But
last spring Frank was playing golf in Florida with John Loomis, a
long-time friend of mine as well as a Berkshire shareholder, who is
always on the alert for something that might fit us. Hearing about
the impending sale of Brown, John told Frank that the company
should be right up Berkshire's alley, and Frank promptly gave me a
call. I thought right away that we would make a deal and before
long it was done.
之后在1990年Heffernan先生过世，他的家人决定要把公司卖掉，所以我们
的机会就来了，那时我们认识Frank也有好几年了，但没有好到让他认为
Berkshire是布朗鞋业合适的买主，反而他把卖公司的事交给一家投资银行来负
责，可想而知投资银行绝对不会想到我们，但是就在去年春天，Frank跟John
Loomis一起到佛罗里达打高尔夫球，John是我多年的好友，同时也是Berkshire
的股东，他总是随时注意有没有适合我们投资的对象，在听到布朗鞋业即将出售
的消息之后，John告诉Frank说这家公司应该要投到Berkshire的麾下，而
Frank也从善如流马上打了通电话给我，我当下觉得我们应该可以谈得成，果然
在不久之后，整个交易便确定了。
Much of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank's
willingness to continue as CEO. Like most of our managers, he has
no financial need to work but does so because he loves the game and
