1983 (53weeks) 133,531 13,699 24,651 207
1982 123,662 11,875 24,216 202
1981 112,578 10,779 24,052 199
1980 97,715 7,547 24,065 191
1979 87,314 6,330 23,985 188
1978 73,653 6,178 22,407 182
1977 62,886 6,154 20,921 179
1976 (53weeks) 56,333 5,569 20,553 173
1975 50,492 5,132 19,134 172
1974 41,248 3,021 17,883 170
1973 35,050 1,940 17,813 169
1972 31,337 2,083 16,954 167
● 我们面临的另一个问题，如上表中可看到的是我们在实际售出的糖果磅数停滞不前，事实
上这是这个行业普遍遇到的困难，只是过去我们的表现明显优于同业，不过现在却一样
惨。过去四年来我们平均每家分店卖出的糖果数事实上无多大变化，尽管分店数有所增加
(而销售费用有同样增加)，当然营业额因我们大幅调涨售价而增加许多，但我们认为衡量
一家店经营绩效的标准在于每家分店卖出糖果磅数而非销售额，1983年平均一家店的销售
量减少了0.8%，不过这已是1979年来较好的表现了，累计的降幅约达8%，集体订购量(约
占整体销售的25%)在经过1970年代成长高峰后已停滞不前。
我们不确定分店与集体订购的销售量无法增加主要是受到我们的订价策略还是景气萧条或
是我们的市场占有率太高的影响，不过1984年我们调涨的幅度较以往几年温和，希望明年
跟各位报告的销售量能因此增加，不过我们却无任何依据能保证这种情况一定发生。
除了销量的问题，喜斯具有多项且重要的竞争优势，在我们主要的销售地区-西部，我们的
糖果为消费者所偏爱，他们甚至愿意用多花二三倍的价钱来享受(糖果就如同股票一样，价
格与价值乃有所不同，价格是指你所付出的，而价值却是指你所得到的) ，我们全美直营
店服务的品质跟我们的产品一样好，亲切贴心的服务人员就跟包装上的商标一样，以一家
雇用二千名季节性员工的企业来说，可是不容易办到的，这都要归功于Chuck与所有同仁
的努力。而由于我们在1984年仅微幅调整价格，所以预期明年度的获利只与今年相当。
● 我们本身除了经营保险业外，还在这项产业有庞大的投资部位，而这些由本人作决策的事
业，其经营成果显而易见的很惨，所幸那些不受本人控制的部份，如GEICO表现杰出，才
避免整个集团经营亮起红灯，没错你心里想的完全正确，几年前我犯下的错误如今已找上
门来了。
整个产业如下表所示，已低迷了好几个年头:
Yearly Change in Combined
Ratio
Premiums Written after
Policyholder
Dividends
% %
1972 10.2% 96.2%
1973 8.0% 99.2%
1974 6.2% 105.4%
1975 11.0% 107.9%
1976 21.9% 102.4%
1977 19.8% 97.2%
1978 12.8% 97.5%
1979 10.3% 100.6%
1980 6.0% 103.1%
1981 3.9% 106.0%
1982 (Rev.) 4.4% 109.7%
1983 (Est.) 4.6% 111.0%
● 资料明白显示出目前整个产业，包括股市、共同基金与互助会所面临的惨况，Combined
Ratio代表所有的保险成本(发生的理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比重，一百以下表示有
承销利益，反之则发生亏损
如同去年我们所揭示的原因，我们认为1983年的惨况仍将持续好几个年头，(正如Yogi所
说:又是déjà vu.)不过并不表示情况不会好转，事实上一定会，只是要未来几年的平均
Combined Ratio明显低于前几年的水准将不太可能，基于对通货膨胀的预期，除非保费
收入每年以超过10%成长，否则损失比率将很难压到比现在的水准还低。
我们自己的Combined Ratio是121，由于最近Mike Goldberg以接手负责保险事业的经
营，所以这个烫手山竽交给他来解决，要比本人亲自处理要来得好得多了，然而不幸的
是，保险这行业前置期很长，虽然企业政策与人员可随时改进，但其效果却须要相当长的
一段时间才能显现，(事实上我们就靠这点在投资GEICO上，赚了很多钱，我们可以在公
司营运效益真正显现之前，先一步预期) ，所以目前的窘境事实上是我两三年前直接负责
营运时所捅下的偻子。所以尽管整体表现不佳，但其中仍有几位经理人表现杰出，Roland
所领导的National Indemnity在同业对手一片惨泹时，一支独秀，而Tom在Colorado展露
头角，我们可说是挖到宝了。
近来我们在再保险领域的表现极为活跃，而事实上我们希望能够再更活跃一些，在这行投
保者相当注重承保者长期的债信以确保其对之多年后的承诺得以实现，这一点波克夏所提
供坚实的财务实力使我们成为客户倚赖的首选。这行生意的来源主要是终身赔偿
(Structured Settlement)即损害请求者每月定期领取赔偿费直到终身而非一次给付，这对请
求者来说可享受税赋上的优惠，也可避免一下子把赔偿款花得精光，通常这些被害人皆严
重伤残，所以分次给付可确保其往后数十年的衣食无虞，而关于这点我们自认为可提供无
与伦比的保障，没有其它再保业者，即使其资产再雄厚，有比我们更坚强的财务实力。
我们也想过或许靠着本身坚强的财务实力，可承受有意愿移转其损失赔偿准备的公司，在
这类个案中，保险公司一次付给我们一大笔钱，以承担未来所有(或一大部份)须面临的损
害赔偿，当然相对的受托人要让委托人对其未来年度的财务实力有信心，在这一点上我们
的竞争力明显优于同业。
前述两项业务对我们而言极具潜力，且因为它们的规模与预计可产生的投资利益大到让我
们特别将其承销成绩，包括Combined Ratio 另行列示，这两项业务皆由National
Indemnity的Don 负责。 (1983)
● GEICO在1983年的表现之好，其程度跟我们自己掌管的保险事业差劲的程度一样，跟同业
平均水准111相比，GEICO在加计预估分配给保户的股利后的数字为96，在这之前我从不
认为它能够表现的如此之好，这都要归功于优异的企业策略与经营阶层。
Jack与Bill在承销部们一贯维持着良好的纪律(其中包含最重要的适当地损失准备提列)而他
们的努力从新事业的开展有成获得了回报，加上投资部门的Lou Simpson，这三个人组成
了保险业的梦幻队伍。
我们拥有GEICO大约三分之一的股权，依比例约拥有二亿七千万的保费收入量，约比我们
本身所有的还多80%，所以可以这么说我们拥有的是全美最优质的保险业务，但这并不代
表我们就不需改进自有的保险业务。(1983)
● 有人常问为什么波克夏不分割它的股票，而这个问题通常是建立在这个动作将会对股东有
利的假设基础之上，不过我们并不认同这点，让我告诉你为什么。
我们有一个目标是希望波克夏的股价能与其本身拥有的内含价值成正相关(请注意是合理的
正相关而非完全一致，因为如果一般绩优公司的股价远低于其真正价值的话，波克夏也很
难免除在外) ，而一个公司要维持合理的股价跟其所背后的股东有很大关系，若公司的股
东与潜在的买家主要都是基于非理性或情绪性的投资该公司股票，则公司股票便会不时出
现很离谱的价格，躁郁的人格会导致躁郁的价格，这种性格甚至有助于我们买卖其它公司
的股票，但我们尽量避免这种情况跟波克夏沾上边将会对身为股东的你我有利。
很难确保公司股东皆维持高水平，A太太可依自己喜好选择其个人的四百文件投资组合，任
何人都可买任何股票，没有任何公司可依智力、情绪稳定度、道德感或衣着品味来筛选股
东，所以股东优生学基本上是一项不可能的任务。
但大致而言，我们觉得可透过不断地沟通公司经营哲学以吸引并维持优质的股东群，以达
到自我筛选的目的。例如一场标榜为歌剧的音乐会，跟另一场以摇滚乐为号召的演唱会，
铁定会吸引不同的观众群来欣赏，虽然任何人皆可自由买票进场。相同地透过不断地宣传
与沟通，我们希望能够吸引到认同我们经营理念与期望的股东(一样重要的是说服那些不认
同的远离我们)我们希望那些倾向长期投资且把公司当成是自己事业一样看待的股东加入我
们，大家重视的是公司的经营成果而非短期的股价波动。
具有这项特质的投资人属于极少数，但我们却拥有不少，我相信大概有90%(甚至可能超过
95%)的股东已投资波克夏或Blue Chips达五年以上，另外95%的股东，其持有的波克夏股
票价值比起其本身第二大持股超过两倍以上，在股东上千人，市值超过十亿的公司中，我
敢保证波克夏的股东与经营者的想法是最能契合的，我们很难再将我们股东的素质再加以
提升。
如果我们将公司的股票分割，同时采行一些注重公司股价而非企业价值的动作，我们吸引
到的新进股东其素质可能要比离开的股东差得多，当波克夏的股价为1,300元时，很少有人
负担得起，对于买得起一股的人来说，将股票分割为一百股对他来说并无任何影响，而那
些认为有差别且真的因为我们股票分割而买进的人肯定会将我们现有的股东水准往下拉(难
到我们牺牲到那些原有思想透澈换来一堆认为九张十元钞要比一张百元钞好的蛋头真得能
够提升整个股东团队的素质吗?)人们若非基于价值而买进股票早晚也会基于相同原因卖掉
股票，他们的加入只会使公司的股价偏离价值面而作不合理的波动。所以我们尽量避免那
些会招来短期投机客的举动，而采取那些会吸引长线价值型投资者的政策，就像你在怖满
这类型投资者的股票市场中买进波克夏的股票，你也可以在相同的市场中卖出，我们尽量
维持这种理想的状态。
股票市场上讽刺的一点是太过于重视变动性，经纪商称之为流动性与变现性，对那些高周
转率的公司大加赞扬(那些无法让你口袋麦可麦可的人，一定会让你的耳朵不得闲)但投资
人必须有所认知，那就是凡事对庄家有利的一定对赌客不利，而过热的股市跟赌场没有两
样。假设一家公司的股东权益报酬率为12%，而其股票年周转率为百分之百，又若买卖股
票须抽1%的手续费(低价股的费率可能还更高)而公司股票以帐面净值进行交易，这样算下
来光是每年股权移转的交易成本便占去净值的百分之二，且对公司的获利一点帮助都没
有，(这还不包括选择权交易，后者将会使这项磨擦成本更上一层楼)玩这种大风吹的游戏
实在是有点划不来，若是政府突然宣布调高企业或个人所得税16%时，相信大家一定都会
跳起来，但过度重视变动性的结果便是要付出这样的代价。
过去在每天交易量约一亿股的年代(以今日的水准算是相当低的了) ，对所有权人来说是绝
对是祸不是福，因为那代表大家要付出二倍于五千万股交易量的成本，又假设每买卖一股
的交易成本为十五分钱，则一年累积下来约要花费75亿美金的代价，这相当于爱克森石
油、通用动力、通用汽车与太古石油这四家全美最大企业的年度盈余加总，这些公司以
1982年底计有750亿美元净值，约占财富杂志五百大企业净值与获利的12%，换句话说投资
人只因为手痒而将手中股票换来换去的代价等于是耗去这些大企业辛苦一年的所得，若再
加计约20亿投资管理费的话，更相当于全美前五大金融机构(花旗、美国银行、大通银行、
汉华银行与摩根银行)获利的总和，这昂贵的游戏只是用来决定谁能吃这块饼，但没有一点
办法让饼变得更大。(我知道有一种论点说这过程能使资金作更有效的配置，但我们却怀疑
其可信度，相反的过热的股市反而妨碍的资金合理的配置，反而使饼变得更小。亚当史密
斯说:自由市场中有一只看不见的大手能导引经济社会使其利益极大化，我们的看法是-赌
场般的股市与神经质的投资行为仿佛是一只看不见的大脚碍手碍脚地拖累了经济社会向前
发展。
与那些过热的股票相比，波克夏目前的买卖价差约为30点，或大约2% ，依据交易量大小
的不同，买卖双方所需支付的成本约略从4%(只买卖几股)递减至1 1/2 %(若量大的话可以议
价方式降低差价与手续费)，而波克夏的股票交易单量通常较大，故平均成本不超过2%。
同时波克夏股票的周转率(扣除盘商间交易与亲属赠与)每年约仅3%，也就是说总的而言，
波克夏股东每年所付出的交易成本约占其市值的万分之六，粗估约为90万美金(这笔金额不
少，但远低于市场平均) ，股票分割会增加交易成本，降低股东素质并鼓励公司股价与其
内含价值悖离，我们想不到有任何一点好处。(1983)
● 去年这时我登了一小段广告寻求可能的购并对象，在我们的新闻事业我们告诉广告主重复
刊登便会有结果(事实上是如此)，所以今年我再复述一次我们购并的标准: 我们对具以下条
件的公司有兴趣:
(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有五百万美元)
(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)
(3)高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)
(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)
(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)
(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)
我们不会进行敌意购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟) ，我
们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股
份。我们欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，对于那些好的公司与好的
经营阶层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。(1983)
● 今年的股东指定捐赠计划约有96.4%的有效票参与，总计在1984年初(帐列1983年)捐出的款
项分配给1,353家慈善机构，共计约三百万美元，虽然股东回复占股权的比率颇高，但占股
东总数的比率却不甚理想，主要的原因可能是新购并进来的股东人数较多且不熟悉本计划
的内容，我们建议新股东赶快阅读相关信息，若你也想参加的话，我们强烈建议你赶快把
股份从经纪人那儿改登记于自己的名下。(1982)
● Blue Chips与波克夏的合并案顺利完成，仅有低于0.1%的股东表示反对，也没有人要求再
评估，在1983年我们因而获得了一些租税上的优惠，我们预期往后几年能够再获得一些，
此外整个合并案有个小插曲，相较于1965年现有经营阶层接手时的1,137,778股，波克夏现
今有1,146,909股流通在外，若你当初持有1%的股权约等于现在的0.99%股权，不过波克夏
的资产已从过去单纯的纺织机器设备厂房，增加为拥有新闻、糖果、家具与保险事业，外
加13亿美金的有价证券。
我们欢迎原来是Blue Chips的股东加入我们，为了帮助你们对波克夏有进一步的认识，只
要来信索取我们很愿意将1977-1982的年报寄给各位。(1983)
● 附录(待续)
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
This past year our registered shareholders increased from
about 1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our
merger with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration
in the pace of natural?increase that has raised us from the
1000 level a few years ago.
With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize
the major business principles we follow that pertain to the
manager-owner relationship:
o Although our form is corporate, our attitude is
partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as
owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because
of the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or
worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself
as the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view
the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the
assets.
o In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are all
major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at
least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is
represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.
o Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications
mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain
in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not
measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by
its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that
the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future - a
greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be
disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average
large American corporation.
o Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly
owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and
consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second
choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily
through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance
subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the
need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital
allocation.
o Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership
and because of the limitations of conventional accounting,
consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about
our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and
managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However,
we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we
control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures,
along with other information we will supply about the individual
businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about
them.
o Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or
capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are
similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not
reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to
purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely
the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose
earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the
pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely
unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the
unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic
business value through capital gains.
o We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to
structure it on a long-term fixed rate basis. We will reject
interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance
sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the
only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our
fiduciary obligations to policyholders, depositors, lenders and
the many equity holders who have committed unusually large
portions of their net worth to our care.
o A managerial wish list?will not be filled at shareholder
expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses
at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to
our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would
do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by
diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the
stock market.
o We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically
against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by
assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at
least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this
test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year
rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to
use retained earnings wisely.
o We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in
business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of
issuance - not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock
for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as
well. We will not sell small portions of your company - and that
is what the issuance of shares amounts to - on a basis
inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
o You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I
share that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price,
we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that
Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses
as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as
long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations.
We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us
into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to
suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to
satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The
projections will be dazzling - the advocates will be sincere -
but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible
industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in
quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard
your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We
would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage
in it.
o We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the
pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our
guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to
know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less.
Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it
would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of
accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves
than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on
others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO
who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in
private.
o Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our
activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally
required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject
to competitive appropriation just as good product or business
acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk
about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities
we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks
