当我们在订价时，长期而言我们预期只要支付出90%收到的保费收入，当然在
任何一个特定年度，我们可能大赚或是大亏，一部份的原因在于一般公认会计原
则并不允许我们在没有重大灾害发生的年度提拨损失准备，以弥补其它年度一定
会发生的损失，事实上以一年为期的会计期间并不适合这类的保险业务，所以换
句话说当你在评断我们公司的年度绩效时，一定要特别注意到这一点。
Last year there appears to have been, by our definition, one
super-cat, but it will trigger payments from only about 25% of our
policies. Therefore, we currently estimate the 1991 underwriting
profit from our catastrophe business to have been about $11
million. (You may be surprised to learn the identity of the biggest
catastrophe in 1991: It was neither the Oakland fire nor Hurricane
Bob, but rather a September typhoon in Japan that caused the
industry an insured loss now estimated at about $4-$5 billion. At
the higher figure, the loss from the typhoon would surpass that
from Hurricane Hugo, the previous record-holder.)
去年照我们的定义可能会有一件霹雳猫保单要付上我们年度保费收入的25%，
因此我们预计1991年这类业务的承保获利大约是1,100万美元(或许你很好奇
想要知道1991年所发生的最大灾害是什么? 它既不是奥克兰大火也不是Bob
飓风，而是九月在日本发生的台风造成的损失估计在40-50亿美元上下，若以
上限估计，这个数字将超过Hugo飓风先前所创下的最高损失记录)。
Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance
protection for marine and aviation disasters as well as for natural
catastrophes. In the 1980's much of this reinsurance was supplied
by "innocents" - that is, by insurers that did not understand the
risks of the business - but they have now been financially burned
beyond recognition. (Berkshire itself was an innocent all too often
when I was personally running the insurance operation.) Insurers,
though, like investors, eventually repeat their mistakes. At some
point - probably after a few catastrophe-scarce years - innocents
will reappear and prices for super-cat policies will plunge to
silly levels.
保险业者总会需要大量的再保险来规避航海与航空以及天然灾害等意外事故，在
1980年代许多再保险保单都是由外行人来承接，这些人根本就不知道这类保险
的风险有多高，所以现在他们已经被烫的不省人事，(就连Berkshire在本人经
营这项业务时也是如此)，保险业者如同投资人一样，还是会一再重复所发生的
错误，只要有一、两年意外灾害较少，就会有无知的业者跳出来以极低的价格杀
价竞争抢单。
As long as apparently-adequate rates prevail, however, we will
be a major participant in super-cat coverages. In marketing this
product, we enjoy a significant competitive advantage because of
our premier financial strength. Thinking insurers know that when
"the big one" comes, many reinsurers who found it easy to write
policies will find it difficult to write checks. (Some reinsurers
can say what Jackie Mason does: "I'm fixed for life - as long as I
don't buy anything.") Berkshire's ability to fulfill all its
commitments under conditions of even extreme adversity is
unquestioned.
然而只要市场上费率看起来合理，我们就会继续留在这一行里，而在推销这类保
单时，我们所拥有的最大竞争优势就是我们的财务实力，有远见的客户都知道许
多再保业者可以很轻松地接下保单，但是当重大的意外灾害接连发生时，要他们
支付赔偿金可能就有点困难，(有些再保业者就像Jackie Mason所说的一样，我
可以一辈子不花钱，只要我不买任何东西)，相对地Berkshire在任何极端的状
况下，都能够履行他所做出的承诺。
Overall, insurance offers Berkshire its greatest
opportunities. Mike Goldberg has accomplished wonders with this
operation since he took charge and it has become a very valuable
asset, albeit one that can't be appraised with any precision.
总的来说，保险业提供Berkshire相当大的机会，Mike Goldberg在他接手这
项业务之后，就一直缔造出优异的成绩，也使得保险子公司成为我们非常宝贵的
资产，虽然我们无法以精确的数字来衡量。
Marketable Common Stocks
有价证券股票投资
On the next page we list our common stock holdings having a
value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments
belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关
系企业所持有)。
12/31/91
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............ $ 517,500 $1,300,500
46,700,000 The Coca-Cola Company. .............. 1,023,920 3,747,675
2,495,200 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. .... 77,245 343,090
6,850,000 GEICO Corp. ......................... 45,713 1,363,150
24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................ 600,000 1,347,000
31,247,000 Guinness PLC ........................ 264,782 296,755
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ......... 9,731 336,050
5,000,000 Wells Fargo & Company 289,431 290,000
As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to
investing. Guinness is a new position. But we held the other seven
stocks a year ago (making allowance for the conversion of our
Gillette position from preferred to common) and in six of those we
hold an unchanged number of shares. The exception is Federal Home
Loan Mortgage ("Freddie Mac"), in which our shareholdings increased
slightly. Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock
market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from
the active to the patient. (With tongue only partly in check, I
suggest that recent events indicate that the much-maligned "idle
rich" have received a bad rap: They have maintained or increased
their wealth while many of the "energetic rich" - aggressive real
estate operators, corporate acquirers, oil drillers, etc. - have
seen their fortunes disappear.)
一如往常，以上这张表显示我们李伯大梦式的投资方式，健力士Guinness是我
们最新的投资部位，至于其它七项主要的投资都持有一年以上(如果把吉列从特
别股转换成普通股也包含在内的话)，其中六项投资甚至连持股数都没有变动，
唯一的例外是联邦家庭贷款抵押(Freddie Mac)，我们投资的股数略微增加，我
们以不变应万变的做法主要是反应我们把股票市场当作是财富重分配的中心，而
钱通常由积极的份子流到有耐性的投资人手中，(我嘴巴可能闭的不够紧，我认
为最近几件事情显示许多躺着赚的有钱人招到许多攻击，因为他们好象没做什么
事就使得本身的财富暴涨，而在此同时过去那些积极活跃的有钱人，如房地产大
亨、企业购并家与石油钻探大亨等，却眼睁睁地看着自己的财产一点一滴地缩
水)。
Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire's first significant
investment in a company domiciled outside the United States.
Guinness, however, earns its money in much the same fashion as
Coca-Cola and Gillette, U.S.-based companies that garner most of
their profits from international operations. Indeed, in the sense
of where they earn their profits - continent-by-continent - Coca-
Cola and Guinness display strong similarities. (But you'll never
get their drinks confused - and your Chairman remains unmovably in
the Cherry Coke camp.)
我们在健力士Guinness的持股代表Berkshire第一次对海外公司进行大规模的
投资，不过Guinness所赚的钱与可口可乐、吉列刮胡刀等美国公司却极为类
似，主要都是仰赖国际部门的营运，确实以国际性的眼光来看，Guinness与可
口可乐的获利来源有相当的共通性，(但是大家绝对不能将自己最爱的饮料搞混
掉，像我个人的最爱依旧是樱桃可口可乐)。
We continually search for large businesses with
understandable, enduring and mouth-watering economics that are run
by able and shareholder-oriented managements. This focus doesn't
guarantee results: We both have to buy at a sensible price and get
business performance from our companies that validates our
assessment. But this investment approach - searching for the
superstars - offers us our only chance for real success. Charlie
and I are simply not smart enough, considering the large sums we
work with, to get great results by adroitly buying and selling
portions of far-from-great businesses. Nor do we think many others
can achieve long-term investment success by flitting from flower to
flower. Indeed, we believe that according the name "investors" to
institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who
repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic.
我们还是持续地在寻找大型的企业，那种令人容易了解、具有持续性且让人垂涎
三尺的事业，并且由有能力才干并以股东利益为优先的经营阶层，虽然这些要求
的重点并不一定保证结果就一定令人满意，当然我们一定要以合理的价格投资并
且确保我们的被投资公司绩效表现与我们当初所评估的一致，这样的投资方法-
寻找产业的超级明星，是我们唯一能够成功的机会，查理跟我的天资实在是有
限，以我们目前操作的资金规模，实在是无法靠着买卖一些平凡普通的企业来赚
取足够的利益，当然我们也不认为其它人就有办法以这种小蜜蜂飞到西、飞到东
的方法成功，事实上我们认为将这些短线进出如此频繁的法人机构称为投资人，
就好象是把一个每天寻找一夜情的花花公子称作为浪漫情人一样。
If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say, to
private companies in Omaha, I would, first, try to assess the longterm
economic characteristics of each business; second, assess the
quality of the people in charge of running it; and, third, try to
buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price. I
certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in
town. Why, then, should Berkshire take a different tack when
dealing with the larger universe of public companies? And since
finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult,
why should we discard proven products? (I was tempted to say "the
real thing.") Our motto is: "If at first you do succeed, quit
trying."
今天假设我的投资天地仅限于比如说奥玛哈地区的私人企业，那么首先我们仔细
地评估每家企业长期的竞争力，第二我会再评估经营者的特质，之后再以合理的
价格买进一小部份的股权，既然我不可能雨露均沾地去买镇上所有公司的股权，
那么为什么Berkshire在面对全美一大堆上市大公司时，就要采取不同的态度，
也因为要找到好的事业并加上好的经理人是如此的困难，那么为什么我们要拋弃
那些已经被证明过的投资对象呢? (通常我喜欢把它们称做是狠角色)，我们的座
右铭是如果你第一次就成功了，那就不要费力再去试别的了。
John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor
matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business
associate, F. C. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: "As
time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method
in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which
one thinks one knows something about and in the management of
which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits
one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which
one knows little and has no reason for special confidence. . . .
One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are
seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in
which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence."
著名经济学家凯恩斯，他的投资绩效跟他的理论思想一样杰出，在1934年8
月15日他曾经写了一封信给生意伙伴Scott上面写到，随着时光的流逝，我越
来越相信正确的投资方式是将大部分的资金投入在自己认为了解且相信的事业
之上，而不是将资金分散到自己不懂且没有特别信心的一大堆公司，每个人的知
识与经验一定有其限度，就我本身而言，我很难同时有两三家以上的公司可以让
我感到完全的放心。
Mistake Du Jour
实时供应的错误
In the 1989 annual report I wrote about "Mistakes of the First
25 Years" and promised you an update in 2015. My experiences in the
first few years of this second "semester" indicate that my backlog
of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if I stick to
my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden myself in
these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further
bumblings. (Post-mortems prove useful for hospitals and football
teams; why not for businesses and investors?)
在1989年的年报中，我曾经写过Berkshire头25所犯的错误，而且承诺在
2015年还会再有更新的报告，但是第二阶段的头几年让我觉得若是坚持原来的
计画的话，可能让这些记录多到难以管理，因此我决定每隔一段时间会在这里丢
出一点东西，所谓自首无罪，抓到双倍，希望我公开的忏悔能够免于大家继续对
我的轰炸(不管是医院的死后验尸或是足球队常常用到的事后检讨，我想应该也
能够适用在企业与投资人之上)。
Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission,
rather than the commission, category. That may spare Charlie and me
some embarrassment, since you don't see these errors; but their
invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this mea culpa, I am
not talking about missing out on some company that depends upon an
esoteric invention (such as Xerox), high-technology (Apple), or
even brilliant merchandising (Wal-Mart). We will never develop the
competence to spot such businesses early. Instead I refer to
business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem
clearly attractive - but in which we nevertheless end up sucking
our thumbs rather than buying.
通常我们很多重大的错误不是发生在我们已经做的部份，而是在于我们没有去做
的那部份，虽然因为各位看不到这些失误，所以查理跟我可以少一点难堪，但看
不到不代表我们就不必付出代价，而这些我公开承认的错误，并不是指我错过了
某些革命性的新发明(就像是全录像印技术)、高科技(像是苹果计算机)或是更优秀
的通路零售商(像是威名百货)，我们永远不可能拥有在早期发掘这些优秀公司的
能力，反而我指的是那些查理跟我可以很容易就了解且很明显对我们有吸引力的
公司，无奈在当时我们只是不断地咬着指甲犹豫不决，就是不能下定决心把他们
买下来。
Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but I
wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic: In early 1988,
we decided to buy 30 million shares (adjusted for a subsequent
split) of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which
would have been a $350-$400 million investment. We had owned the
stock some years earlier and understood the company's business.
Furthermore, it was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie Mae's
CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited
and had established the company as a financial powerhouse - with
the best yet to come. I visited David in Washington and confirmed
that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a large
position.
每位作者都知道，要让读者了解其意思最好的方式就是举个例子，不过希望我现
在举的例子不会过于极端，回顾1988年当时我们决定以3.5亿到4亿美元之
间，买进3,000万股(经过事后的分割调整)的联邦国家贷款协会，简称Fannie
Mae，我们之前曾经拥有过这家公司的股份，也对其所处的产业相当了解，另外
很显然的，也很清楚David Maxwell也就是Fannie Mae的总裁，有能力处理
他所接下的一堆问题，同时进一步将公司建立成为一个金融巨擘，一切可说是前
景看好，为此我还特地到华盛顿拜访David，确认他对于我们持有该公司一大部
分的股权不会感到任何的不愉快。
After we bought about 7 million shares, the price began to
climb. In frustration, I stopped buying (a mistake that,
thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose similarly
during our purchase program). In an even sillier move, I
surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the
7 million shares we owned.
只不过当我们开始买进不到700万股时，该公司股价就开始上涨，失望之余，
我立刻停止买进(事后回想还好我没有在买进可口可乐时犯下相同的错误)，更有
甚者，我觉得区区700万股对我们来说实在是没有太大的意义，所以之后又把
持有的700万股全部卖掉。
I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation for my
amateurish behavior vis-a-vis Fannie Mae. But there isn't one.
What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of the
approximate gain that Berkshire didn't make because of your
Chairman's mistake: about $1.4 billion.
我期盼对于我这样不具职业水准的投资行为可以给各位一个稍微合理一点的解
释，不过我实在是编不出来，不过我倒是可以跟各位报告因为本人的这项错误，
大概使得Berkshire在1991年少赚了14亿美元。
Fixed-Income Securities
固定收益证券
We made several significant changes in our fixed-income
portfolio during 1991. As I noted earlier, our Gillette preferred
was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to common
stock; we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was
subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call; and we purchased
fixed-income securities of American Express and First Empire State
Corp., a Buffalo-based bank holding company. We also added to a
small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late
1990. Our largest holdings at yearend were:
1991年我们在固定收益证券这方面的投资有很大的变动，如同先前曾提到的我
们的吉列可转换特别股被强制赎回，使得我们必须将之转换为普通股，另外我们
也出清了RJR Nabisco的债券，因为它在被转换后赎回，在另一方面我们也买
进美国运通与第一帝国-一家水牛城的银行控股公司的固定收益证券，此外还在
1990年底买进了一些ACF工业的债券，以下是截至年底我们持有的主要部位：
(000s omitted)
-----------------------------------
Cost of Preferreds and
