of wits.
去年股东会Nicholas Kenner又杠上我了，他表示：「我在去年1990年报中
表示他在1990年5月11号满十岁，但事实上他那时才刚满9岁」，他接着又
用很嘲讽的语气说：「如果你连这个都搞不清楚，我如何还能相信你报告中的其
他数字是正确的」到现在我还在想如何做出一个有力的回答，今年Nicholas还
会出席，他拒绝了我邀请他当天到迪士尼乐园玩的建议，所以请大家继续好好观
赏这一面倒的机智问答。
Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 1992 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1992年2月28日
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over
the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over)
book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6%
compounded annually.
1992年本公司的净值成长了20.3%，总计过去28年以来，也就是自从现有经
营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的7,745美元，年复合成
长率约为23.6%。
During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.52
billion. More than 98% of this gain came from earnings and
appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming
from the issuance of new stock. These shares were issued as a
result of our calling our convertible debentures for redemption
on January 4, 1993, and of some holders electing to receive
common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative.
Most holders of the debentures who converted into common waited
until January to do it, but a few made the move in December and
therefore received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to
the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding: $25 million were
converted into shares before yearend; $46 million were converted
in January; and $405 million were redeemed for cash. The
conversions were made at $11,719 per share, so altogether we
issued 6,106 shares.
回顾过去一年，Berkshire的净值增加了15.2亿美元，其中98%系来自于盈余
与投资组合的增值，剩下的2%则是因为发行新股的缘故，这些股份是因为我们
赎回在1993年1月4日所发行的可转换特别股，其中有部份持有人不要现金
而选择领取本公司的普通股，大部分的持有人选择在1月进行转换，另外有一
小部份则在去年12月就径行转换，总计当初我们发行总值4.76亿美元的债券
中，4,600万在一月转换，另外4.05亿美元则以现金赎回，转换价订为11,719
美元一股，换算下来一共发行了6,106股。
Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That
compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares
outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year
during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired control of the
company.
Berkshire目前流通在外股数为1,152,547股，相较于1964年10月1日当
初，巴菲特合伙取得Berkshire控制权时的1,137,778股来说，增加的股数实
属有限。
We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire,
doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal
value, however, has not been easy to obtain, since we have always
valued our shares highly. So be it: We wish to increase
Berkshire's size only when doing that also increases the wealth
of its owners.
对于发行新股我们有相当严格的规定，那就是除非我们确信所收到的价值与我们
付出的一致时，我们才会考虑这样做，当然同等的价值不是那么容易达到，因为
我们一向自视甚高，不过那又如何，除非确定公司股东的财富也会增加，否则我
们不会随便扩大规模。
Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand-in-hand as an
amusing but value-destroying experience in our past illustrates.
On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank
whose management was hell-bent on expansion. (Aren't they all?)
When our bank wooed a smaller bank, its owner demanded a stock
swap on a basis that valued the acquiree's net worth and earning
power at over twice that of the acquirer's. Our management -
visibly in heat - quickly capitulated. The owner of the acquiree
then insisted on one other condition: "You must promise me," he
said in effect, "that once our merger is done and I have become a
major shareholder, you'll never again make a deal this dumb."
大家要知道这两个目的不一定就会自然吻合，事实上在我们过去所举过的例子
中，有些就是看起来有趣但却是让价值受到减损的经验，在那次经验中，我们在
一家银行有相当大的投资，而银行经理人对于扩张却有极度偏好，(他们不都是
如此吗?)，当我们投资的银行在追求另外一家较小的银行时，对方开出的价码是
以其净值与获利能力作为基础后的两倍，当时我们的经理人因为正在热头上，所
以很快就答应了，这时对方又得寸进尺开出另外一项条件，他说：「你必须答应
我，在整个购并案完成后，我可以变成公司最大的股东，同时以后你也不能在做
类似这次交易那样愚蠢的购并案」。
You will remember that our goal is to increase our per-share
intrinsic value - for which our book value is a conservative, but
useful, proxy - at a 15% annual rate. This objective, however,
cannot be attained in a smooth manner. Smoothness is
particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply
to the common stocks owned by our insurance companies, whose
portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshire's net worth.
Since 1979, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have
required that these securities be valued at their market prices
(less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation)
rather than at the lower of cost or market. Run-of-the-mill
fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results
to gyrate, especially in comparison to those of the typical
industrial company.
大家一定要记得，我们的终极目标是希望能让公司每年以15%稳定的速度来增
加每股的实质价值，当然公司的帐面价值虽然保守了点，但却是相当有用的替代
性指针，不过这样的目标很难以平稳地态势达成，这在Berkshire尤其困难，因
为会计原则规定，我们旗下保险事业所持有，占Berkshire相当大部分的股票投
资必须以市价列示。自从1979年以来，一般公认会计原则就要求它们以市价方
式而非原先的成本与市价孰低法列在公司帐上(当然要扣除未实现资本利得估计
应支付的税负)，股票价格如同水车滚轮般上上下下，也使得我们每年结算的成
绩变化很大，尤其是在与一般公司产业比较时更为明显。
To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been - and
to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term
results - we show on the facing page our annual change in pershare
net worth and compare it with the annual results (including
dividends) of the S&P 500.
为了解释我们净值变化的程度以及股票市场波动对于公司帐面盈余短期的影
响，从今年起我们决定在年报的首页放置每年公司净值变化以及与S&P 500指
数(含现金股利)之间的比较。
You should keep at least three points in mind as you
evaluate this data. The first point concerns the many businesses
we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in
stock market valuations. The impact of these businesses on both
our absolute and relative performance has changed over the years.
Early on, returns from our textile operation, which then
represented a significant portion of our net worth, were a major
drag on performance, averaging far less than would have been the
case if the money invested in that business had instead been
invested in the S&P 500. In more recent years, as we assembled
our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally
exceptional managers, the returns from our operating businesses
have been high - usually well in excess of the returns achieved
by the S&P.
大家在评估这份资料时至少必须要注意三个重点，第一、我们旗下许多事业每年
年度的获利并不受股市波动的影响，而这些企业对于我们绝对或相对的影响每年
也都不一样，就早期而言，由于我们在纺织事业的报酬占我们净值相当大的部
份，所以要是在这方面投资不当，我们的绩效可能会远远落后于将钱摆在S&P
500指数相关类股之上，不过到了最近，当我们逐渐利用投资组成一支由优秀
经理人经营的优秀企业团队时，这些企业所带来的报酬通常远高于投资S&P 500
指数。
A second important factor to consider - and one that
significantly hurts our relative performance - is that both the
income and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a
substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are
pre-tax. To comprehend the damage, imagine that Berkshire had
owned nothing other than the S&P index during the 28-year period
covered. In that case, the tax bite would have caused our
corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in
the table for the S&P. Under present tax laws, a gain for the
S&P of 18% delivers a corporate holder of that index a return
well short of 13%. And this problem would be intensified if
corporate tax rates were to rise. This is a structural
disadvantage we simply have to live with; there is no antidote
for it.
第二项应该要特别注意的因素-也是影响我们相对表现的因素，那就是我们投资
证券所产生的收益与资本利得必须要负担相当重的税负，而在此同时S&P 500
指数却是以免税基础计算的，为了让大家了解这期间的差异性，假设Berkshire
在过去28年间就只投资S&P 500指数，则最后所得到的投资报酬将远低于S&P
500指数本身的表现，依照目前的税率，若是S&P 500上涨18%，则在课税后
投资人真正得到的报酬只有13%不到，而这个问题若是考量目前税率即将调高
的情况，将会变得更严重，这是一个我们必须要忍受的结构性问题，基本上没有
办法可解。
The third point incorporates two predictions: Charlie
Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are
virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an
investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the
past decade, and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by
Berkshire's expanding capital base will substantially reduce our
historical advantage relative to the index.
第三点包含两个预测，查理孟格-Berkshire的副主席兼主要合伙人，跟我都相
当清楚，那就是未来十年内S&P 500指数的表现将无法像过去十年那样的好，
而我们同样也相信以Berkshire目前资本规模越来越大的趋势，将会大大影响过
去我们大幅超越指数的表现。
Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain:
We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to
make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue
to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should
be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also
from grown-ups who behave in the market like children. However,
it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their
underlying businesses, as they have so dramatically done for some
time, and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that
the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be
significantly smaller than they were in the last. Our second
conclusion - that an increased capital base will act as an anchor
on our relative performance - seems incontestable. The only open
question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some
tolerable, though slowed, pace.
做出第一项预测有违我们的本性，一直以来我们认为股市预言家唯一的价值就是
让算命先生看起来像那么一回事，即便是现在，查理跟我还是相信短期股市的预
测是毒药，应该要把他们摆在最安全的地方，远离儿童以及那些在股市中的行为
像小孩般幼稚的投资人，虽然有时股市的表现会有相当大的起伏，然而很明显的
股市的表现不可能永远都能超越其背后所代表的企业，这也是为何我们胆敢预测
未来十年投资人在股市所获得的报酬将很难再像过去十年那样的优异的原因。我
们第二点结论，规模越来越大的资金将会拖累我们的绩效，对于这点倒是不容置
疑，唯一的问题在于我们拖着这样的重担的同时，如何还能以缓慢但是可以忍受
的速度前进。
We will continue to experience considerable volatility in
our annual results. That's assured by the general volatility of
the stock market, by the concentration of our equity holdings in
just a few companies, and by certain business decisions we have
made, most especially our move to commit large resources to
super-catastrophe insurance. We not only accept this volatility
but welcome it: A tolerance for short-term swings improves our
long-term prospects. In baseball lingo, our performance
yardstick is slugging percentage, not batting average.
往后我们将会继续经历年度绩效的上下变动，面对多变的股市，这点绝对可以确
定，尤其是我们将资金集中在几家主要的被投资公司之上，同时也因为我们将大
部分的资源摆在超级意外险之上的商业决策，我们不但接受这种变动，而且相当
能够接受，只要忍受短期变动的同时可以为我们带来长期的效果，套句棒球常用
的术语，我们的表现主要是看长打率而不是打击率。
The Salomon Interlude
所罗门插曲
Last June, I stepped down as Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc
after ten months in the job. You can tell from Berkshire's 1991-
92 results that the company didn't miss me while I was gone. But
the reverse isn't true: I missed Berkshire and am delighted to
be back full-time. There is no job in the world that is more fun
than running Berkshire and I count myself lucky to be where I am.
去年六月，在接手十个月后，我正式辞去所罗门董事会临时主席的职务，大家可
以从1991年到1992年Berkshire的经营绩效看出，公司并没有因为我暂时不
在而发生任何差错，不过反过来说就不一定了，我很怀念Berkshire且很愿意再
度回到公司担任全职工作，对我而言，世界上没有任何其它工作比起经营
Berkshire更有乐趣，很庆幸我自己能够身处现在这个位置。
The Salomon post, though far from fun, was interesting and
worthwhile: In Fortune's annual survey of America's Most Admired
Corporations, conducted last September, Salomon ranked second
among 311 companies in the degree to which it improved its
reputation. Additionally, Salomon Brothers, the securities
subsidiary of Salomon Inc, reported record pre-tax earnings last
year - 34% above the previous high.
这次所罗门的任务虽然不是很愉快，但却相当有趣且值得，在去年九月财富杂志
票选全美最受崇敬企业的年度调查中，所罗门在全部的311家公司中名列第二
进步奖，此外所罗门兄弟-所罗门集团其下的证券子公司，其税前盈余更是创下
之前历史新高34%之多。
Many people helped in the resolution of Salomon's problems
and the righting of the firm, but a few clearly deserve special
mention. It is no exaggeration to say that without the combined
efforts of Salomon executives Deryck Maughan, Bob Denham, Don
Howard, and John Macfarlane, the firm very probably would not
have survived. In their work, these men were tireless,
effective, supportive and selfless, and I will forever be
grateful to them.
所罗门能够得到解救需要感谢许多人，其中有几位尤其要特别提到的，若是没有
Deryck Maughhan、Bob Denham、Don Howard与John Macfarlane等人
的通力合作，这家证券商很可能无法幸免，这些人努力不懈、有效率、无私奉献
的精神，让我永远感佩他们。
Salomon's lead lawyer in its Government matters, Ron Olson
of Munger, Tolles & Olson, was also key to our success in getting
through this trouble. The firm's problems were not only severe,
but complex. At least five authorities - the SEC, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York, and the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice - had important concerns about
Salomon. If we were to resolve our problems in a coordinated and
prompt manner, we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal,
business and human skills. Ron had them all.
所罗门在政府事务方面的首席律师-Munger, Tolles&Olson联合律师事务所的
Ron Olson也是这次问题能够顺利解决的核心人物，所罗门所面临的问题不但
严重而且相当复杂，至少有五个主管机关-证管会、纽约联邦准备银行、美国财
政部、纽约南区地方法院与司法部的反托拉斯部门都牵涉其中，若是我们想要以
明快有组织性地解决这件事，我们绝对必须要有一位具有商务法律专业与沟通技
巧的律师来帮忙，Ron正是具备有这样条件的最佳人选。
Acquisitions
购并案
Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating
for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with
excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like,
trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we
look for them constantly. In the search, we adopt the same
attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse: It
pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not
pay to be in a hurry.
在Berkshire所有的活动中，最令查理跟我感到雀跃的是当我们找到同时具有超
强产业竞争力并且还拥有我们信任与崇敬的经营者的那种企业，想要买到这类公
司可不是件容易的事，但我们会一直努力寻找，而在寻找的过程当中，我们采取
的就像是与一般人寻找终身伴侣一样相同的态度，当然积极、乐观与开放的态度
是应该的，但绝对没有必要躁进。
In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry
managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of
the story about the frog-kissing princess. Remembering her
success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads,
expecting wondrous transfigurations. Initially, disappointing
results only deepen their desire to round up new toads.
("Fanaticism," said Santyana, "consists of redoubling your effort
