when you've forgotten your aim.") Ultimately, even the most
optimistic manager must face reality. Standing knee-deep in
unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring"
charge. In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program,
the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the
tuition.
过去我看过许多对于购并活动相当饥渴的经理人，很显然地可能是小时候青蛙王
子的故事看太多了，脑中只记得那美丽的结局，他们很慷慨地花大笔的银子取得
亲吻蟾蜍的机会，期望会有神奇的事情发生，而失望的结果往往只会让他们更积
极地寻找下一次机会，(Santyana说：所谓的狂乐就是当你忘了目标何在时，还
加倍投入你的心力)，到最后即使是最乐观的经理人还是要被迫面对现实，深陷
在一堆没有反应的蟾蜍当中，然后他会再大声地宣布将进行另一波的重整改造方
案，在这种企业版的全新出击方案，CEO学到相当宝贵的教训，只不过学费却
必须由股东们来出。
In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads.
They were cheap dates - I've never been much of a sport - but my
results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced
toads. I kissed and they croaked.
早年在我担任经理人时，也曾碰到几只蟾蜍，还好他们算是相当便宜的了，虽然
我并没有那么积极，但所得到的结果与那些花高价追求蟾蜍的凯子经理人差不
多，在亲了之后，它们还是依然聒聒叫。
After several failures of this type, I finally remembered
some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros
who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain
anonymous). Said the pro: "Practice doesn't make perfect;
practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy
and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair
businesses at good prices.
在失败过几次之后，我终于想起我曾经从某位职业高尔夫选手的建议(像所有职
业选手一样，只要和我打过球的，通常都不太愿意我提起他们的名字)，他说：
「不断的练习虽然无法达到完美的境界，但练习却能够使你的成绩永续维持」，
也因此我决定改变我的投资策略，试着以合理的价格买进好公司而不是以便宜的
价格买进普通的公司。
Last year, in December, we made an acquisition that is a
prototype of what we now look for. The purchase was 82% of
Central States Indemnity, an insurer that makes monthly payments
for credit-card holders who are unable themselves to pay because
they have become disabled or unemployed. Currently the company's
annual premiums are about $90 million and profits about $10
million. Central States is based in Omaha and managed by Bill
Kizer, a friend of mine for over 35 years. The Kizer family -
which includes sons Bill, Dick and John - retains 18% ownership
of the business and will continue to run things just as it has in
the past. We could not be associated with better people.
去年十二月，我们做了一个我们现在所认为最典型的购并案，那就是买下中央州
险公司82%的股权，这是一家专门受理信用卡持有人因为突然失业或是失能而
付不出信用卡帐单风险的保险公司，现在这家保险公司一年的保费收入大概是
9,000万美元，获利1,000万美元，总部就设于奥玛哈，并且由与我结交35
年以上的老朋友Bill Kizer所管理，Kizer家族包含他几个儿子持有剩下18%的
股权，而且还会如同以前那般地经营这项事业，我们实在是不太可能再找到更合
适的人选。
Coincidentally, this latest acquisition has much in common
with our first, made 26 years ago. At that time, we purchased
another Omaha insurer, National Indemnity Company (along with a
small sister company) from Jack Ringwalt, another long-time
friend. Jack had built the business from scratch and, as was the
case with Bill Kizer, thought of me when he wished to sell.
(Jack's comment at the time: "If I don't sell the company, my
executor will, and I'd rather pick the home for it.") National
Indemnity was an outstanding business when we bought it and
continued to be under Jack's management. Hollywood has had good
luck with sequels; I believe we, too, will.
碰巧的是这件最新的购并案与我在26年前第一次所做的案子有许多雷同之处，
在当时，我们从另一位老朋友Jack Ringwalt手中，买下奥玛哈另一家保险公司
-国家产险公司，这家公司是由Jack一手草创，同时也跟Bill一样，当他打算把
公司卖掉时，第一个人就想到我，(Jack当时说到：若是我自己不卖这家公司，
我的遗嘱执行人也会卖，所以我宁可自己为它找个归宿)，国家产险在我们当初
买下时，就是一家相当优秀的好公司，而在Jack的领导下依旧维持这样的情况，
好莱坞在发行电影续集时，通常都会有不错的成绩，我想我也是。
Berkshire's acquisition criteria are described on page 23.
Beyond purchases made by the parent company, however, our
subsidiaries sometimes make small "add-on" acquisitions that
extend their product lines or distribution capabilities. In this
manner, we enlarge the domain of managers we already know to be
outstanding - and that's a low-risk and high-return proposition.
We made five acquisitions of this type in 1992, and one was not
so small: At yearend, H. H. Brown purchased Lowell Shoe Company,
a business with $90 million in sales that makes Nursemates, a
leading line of shoes for nurses, and other kinds of shoes as
well. Our operating managers will continue to look for add-on
opportunities, and we would expect these to contribute modestly
to Berkshire's value in the future.
Berkshire的购并标准详另页，除了母公司本身时常对外进行购并，我们旗下的
子公司偶尔也会自行新添生力军，以延伸其产品线或是通路能力，就这点儿言，
我们很愿意扩大旗下经理人的视野，因为我们相当清楚他们优异的能力，这绝对
是低风险高报酬的一件事，在1992年我们总共有5件这样类似的案例，另外
还有一件比较大的案子，在年底时，布朗鞋业买下Lowell鞋业-一家年营业额
9,000万美金，专门制造护士专用鞋的公司，当然我们旗下事业的经理人还是继
续寻找扩充的机会，而我们也预期他们未来将能够为Berkshire创造出更多的价
值。
Then again, a trend has emerged that may make further
acquisitions difficult. The parent company made one purchase in
1991, buying H. H. Brown, which is run by Frank Rooney, who has
eight children. In 1992 our only deal was with Bill Kizer,
father of nine. It won't be easy to keep this string going in
1993.
不过市场上目前的趋势再度地不利于购并活动的进行，母公司在1991年所买下
的布朗鞋业，经营者Frank有八个小孩，我们在1992年唯一的案子的经理人，
Bill有九个小孩，不过我想这种趋势很难在1993年继续维持下去。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's
reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of
Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments
are not charged against the specific businesses to which they
apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This
procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they
would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've
explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to
us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing
GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a
business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in
the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our
audited financial statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
(000s omitted)
-----------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
---------------------- ----------------------
1992 1991 1992 1991
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $(108,961) $(119,593) $ (71,141) $ (77,229)
Net Investment Income.... 355,067 331,846 305,763 285,173
H. H. Brown (acquired 7/1/91) 27,883 13,616 17,340 8,611
Buffalo News .............. 47,863 37,113 28,163 21,841
Fechheimer ................ 13,698 12,947 7,267 6,843
Kirby ..................... 35,653 35,726 22,795 22,555
Nebraska Furniture Mart ... 17,110 14,384 8,072 6,993
Scott Fetzer
Manufacturing Group .... 31,954 26,123 19,883 15,901
See's Candies ............. 42,357 42,390 25,501 25,575
Wesco - other than Insurance 15,153 12,230 9,195 8,777
World Book ................ 29,044 22,483 19,503 15,487
Amortization of Goodwill .. (4,702) (4,113) (4,687) (4,098)
Other Purchase-Price
Accounting Charges ..... (7,385) (6,021) (8,383) (7,019)
Interest Expense* ......... (98,643) (89,250) (62,899) (57,165)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions .......... (7,634) (6,772) (4,913) (4,388)
Other ..................... 72,223 77,399 36,267 47,896
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Operating Earnings .......... 460,680 400,508 347,726 315,753
Sales of Securities ......... 89,937 192,478 59,559 124,155
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Total Earnings - All Entities $ 550,617 $ 592,986 $ 407,285 $ 439,908
======== ======== ========= ======
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual
Savings & Loan. Includes $22.5 million in 1992 and $5.7 million in
1991 of premiums paid on the early redemption of debt.
*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用，另外加计1992年与1991年分别赎回可转换债券
所额外支付的2,250万与570万溢价。
A large amount of additional information about these
businesses is given on pages 37-47, where you will also find our
segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. Our goal is to give you
all of the financial information that Charlie and I consider
significant in making our own evaluation of Berkshire.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们
的目的是希望给你所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必要的资
讯。
"Look-Through" Earnings
透视盈余
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which
consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous
section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major
investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our
profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by
Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been
distributed to us. Though no single figure can be perfect, we
believe that the look-through number more accurately portrays the
earnings of Berkshire than does the GAAP number.
之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到的帐列盈
余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公
司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所
得税。虽然没有任何一项数字是完美的，但我们相信这项透视盈余会比按一般公
认会计原则下的数字更能够反应Berkshire实际的获利状况。
I've told you that over time look-through earnings must
increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is
to grow at that rate. Our look-through earnings in 1992 were $604
million, and they will need to grow to more than $1.8 billion by
the year 2000 if we are to meet that 15% goal. For us to get
there, our operating subsidiaries and investees must deliver
excellent performances, and we must exercise some skill in capital
allocation as well.
我曾经告诉各位，长期而言，如果我们的实质价值也期望以这个幅度来成长的
话，透视盈余每年也必须增加15%，1992年我们的透视盈余约为6.04亿美元，
而到公元2000年为止，若要以15%的目标，透视盈余必须成长到18亿美元，
要完成这样的目标，代表我们旗下的营运事业及主要的被投资公司必须要有更杰
出的表现，同时我们本身资金规划分配也要更有效益才成。
We cannot promise to achieve the $1.8 billion target. Indeed,
we may not even come close to it. But it does guide our decisionmaking:
When we allocate capital today, we are thinking about what
will maximize look-through earnings in 2000.
我们不敢保证届时一定可以达到18亿美元的目标，甚至很有可能根本就达不
到，不过这目标还是对我们的决策有帮助，每当我们现在在分配资金时，我们都
会想到要如何将2000年的透视盈余极大化。
We do not, however, see this long-term focus as eliminating
the need for us to achieve decent short-term results as well.
After all, we were thinking long-range thoughts five or ten years
ago, and the moves we made then should now be paying off. If
plantings made confidently are repeatedly followed by disappointing
harvests, something is wrong with the farmer. (Or perhaps with the
farm: Investors should understand that for certain companies, and
even for some industries, there simply is no good long-term
strategy.) Just as you should be suspicious of managers who pump
up short-term earnings by accounting maneuvers, asset sales and the
like, so also should you be suspicious of those managers who fail
to deliver for extended periods and blame it on their long-term
focus. (Even Alice, after listening to the Queen lecture her about
"jam tomorrow," finally insisted, "It must come sometimes to jam
today.")
不过我们对于长期目标的专注并不代表我们就不注重短期结果，总的来说我们早
在5到10年前就预先规划设想，而当时所作的举动现在才开始慢慢地回收，如
果每次有信心的播种最后的收割结果都一再让人失望的话，农夫就应该要好好地
检讨原因了，(不然就是农地有问题，投资人必须了解对于某些公司或甚至是某
些产业，根本就没有所谓的长期性策略)，就像是你可能会特别留心那些利用会
计手法或出售资产撑高短期盈余的经理人，你也应该要特别注意那些一再延长达
成目标期程，并把长期目标一直挂在嘴上的人，(即使是爱莉丝一再听到母后明
天再挤牛奶的说教，她最后还是忍不注坚持，总有一些应该要今天挤吧！)
The following table shows you how we calculate look-through
earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very
rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been
included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly
under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数
字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益
项下)
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)
----------------------- ----------------------- ------------------
1992 1991 1992 1991
-------- -------- -------- --------
Capital Cities/ABC Inc. ....... 18.2% 18.1% $ 70 $ 61
The Coca-Cola Company ......... 7.1% 7.0% 82 69
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 8.2%(1) 3.4%(1) 29(2) 15
GEICO Corp. ................... 48.1% 48.2% 34(3) 69(3)
General Dynamics Corp. ........ 14.1% -- 11(2) --
The Gillette Company .......... 10.9% 11.0% 38 23(2)
Guinness PLC .................. 2.0% 1.6% 7 --
The Washington Post Company ... 14.6% 14.6% 11 10
Wells Fargo & Company ......... 11.5% 9.6% 16(2) (17)(2)
-------- -------- -------- --------
Berkshire's share of
undistributed earnings of major investees $298 $230
Hypothetical tax on these
undistributed investee earnings (42) (30)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 348 316
-------- --------
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $604 $516
(1) Net of minority interest at Wesco
已扣除Wesco的少数股权
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
以年平均持有股权比例计算
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both recurring and significant
扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得，
Insurance Operations
保险事业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table
presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance
industry:
下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数
Yearly Change Combined Ratio
in Premiums After Policyholder
Written (%) Dividends
------------- --------------
1981 ........................... 3.8 106.0
1982 ........................... 3.7 109.6
1983 ........................... 5.0 112.0
1984 ........................... 8.5 118.0
1985 ........................... 22.1 116.3
1986 ........................... 22.2 108.0
1987 ........................... 9.4 104.6
1988 ........................... 4.5 105.4
1989 ........................... 3.2 109.2
