下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关
系企业所持有)。
12/31/92
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. $ 517,500 $1,523,500
93,400,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............... 1,023,920 3,911,125
16,196,700 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
("Freddie Mac") ................... 414,257 783,515
34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45,713 2,226,250
4,350,000 General Dynamics Corp. ............... 312,438 450,769
24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600,000 1,365,000
38,335,000 Guinness PLC ......................... 333,019 299,581
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company .......... 9,731 396,954
6,358,418 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 380,983 485,624
Leaving aside splits, the number of shares we held in these
companies changed during 1992 in only four cases: We added
moderately to our holdings in Guinness and Wells Fargo, we more
than doubled our position in Freddie Mac, and we established a new
holding in General Dynamics. We like to buy.
除了股票分割，我们1992年在这些主要投资的持股只有四项变动，我们小幅增
加Guinness与Wells Fargo的持股，另外将Freddie Mac的持股增加一倍，
至于通用动力则是全新增加的投资。
Selling, however, is a different story. There, our pace of
activity resembles that forced upon a traveler who found himself
stuck in tiny Podunk's only hotel. With no T.V. in his room, he
faced an evening of boredom. But his spirits soared when he spied
a book on the night table entitled "Things to do in Podunk."
Opening it, he found just a single sentence: "You're doing it."
我们很喜欢买股票，不过卖股票又是另外一回事，就这点我们的步伐就像是一个
旅行家发现自己身处于只有一个小旅馆的小镇上，房间里没有电视，面对慢慢无
聊的长夜，突然间他很兴奋地发现桌上有一本书名为「在本小镇可以做的事」，
只是当他翻开书后，里面却只有短短的一句话：「那就是你现在在做的这件事」。
We were lucky in our General Dynamics purchase. I had paid
little attention to the company until last summer, when it
announced it would repurchase about 30% of its shares by way of a
Dutch tender. Seeing an arbitrage opportunity, I began buying the
stock for Berkshire, expecting to tender our holdings for a small
profit. We've made the same sort of commitment perhaps a halfdozen
times in the last few years, reaping decent rates of return
for the short periods our money has been tied up.
我们很高兴能买到通用动力，之前我并未特别留意这家公司，直到去年夏天该公
司宣布买回流通在外30%的股权，看到这样难得的套利机会，我开始替
Berkshire买进这家公司的股票，预期透过公司买回股份可以小赚一笔，在过去
几年中，我们曾经做了好几次类似这样的交易，让短期投入的资金获得相当丰厚
的报酬。
But then I began studying the company and the accomplishments
of Bill Anders in the brief time he'd been CEO. And what I saw
made my eyes pop: Bill had a clearly articulated and rational
strategy; he had been focused and imbued with a sense of urgency in
carrying it out; and the results were truly remarkable.
之后我开始研究这家公司，以及Bill Anders在担任该公司CEO短短期间所做
的事，没想到让我眼睛一亮，Bill有一套精心设计的策略，他相当专注于把这项
策略付诸实行，而最后所得到的成果也相当不错。
In short order, I dumped my arbitrage thoughts and decided
that Berkshire should become a long-term investor with Bill. We
were helped in gaining a large position by the fact that a tender
greatly swells the volume of trading in a stock. In a one-month
period, we were able to purchase 14% of the General Dynamics shares
that remained outstanding after the tender was completed.
过不了多久，我就把短期套利的念头拋开，决定Berkshire应该成为Bill的长期
投资者，而受惠于买回股份的消息，成交量扩大，我们得以买进大量的部位，在
短短一个月期间，我们一口气买进通用动力14%的股份，这是在扣除该公司本
身买回的股份之后的比例。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what
it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report:
"We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we
would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want
the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with
favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent
people; and (d) available at a very attractive price." We have
seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both
market conditions and our size, we now substitute "an attractive
price" for "a very attractive price."
我们在股权投资的策略跟15年前1977年度报告的那套一样，并没有多大的变
化，在选择股票投资所采用的评估方式与买下一整家企业的情况没什么两样，我
们希望投资的对象(1)是我们所了解的(2)具有长期的远景(3)由才德兼具的人所
经营(4)非常吸引人的合理价格。但考量目前市场的情况与公司的资金规模，我
们现在决定将"非常吸引人的价格"改成"吸引人的价格"。
But how, you will ask, does one decide what's "attractive"?
In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose
between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition:
"value" and "growth." Indeed, many investment professionals see
any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual crossdressing.
或许你又会问，那么到底应该如何决定价格够不够吸引人呢? 在回答这个问题
时，大部分的分析师通常都会选择两种看起来对立的方法，"价值法"与"成长法"，
事实上有许多投资专家会将这两种方法交替运用，就像是轮流换穿衣物一样。
We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be
confessed, I myself engaged some years ago). In our opinion, the
two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component
in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose
importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact
can be negative as well as positive.
我们觉得这种观念似是而非(为此我个人必须承认，好几年前我也是采用这种方
法)，基本上我们认为这两种方法本为一体，在计算一家公司的价值时，成长当
然是一件很重要的因素，这个变量将会使得所计算出来的价值从很小到极大，所
造成的影响有可能是正面的，也有可能是负面的。
In addition, we think the very term "value investing" is
redundant. What is "investing" if it is not the act of seeking
value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously
paying more for a stock than its calculated value - in the hope
that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price - should be
labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor - in our
view - financially fattening).
此外，我们也认为所谓的「价值投资」根本就是废话，若是所投入的资金不是为
了换取追求相对应的价值的话，那还算是投资吗? 明明知道所付出的成本已经高
出其所应有的价值，而只是寄望在短期之内可以用更高的价格卖出根本就是投机
的行为，(当然这种行为一点都不会违法，也不违反道德，只是就我们的观点来
说，只是在玩吹气球游戏而已)。
Whether appropriate or not, the term "value investing" is
widely used. Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having
attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low priceearnings
ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such
characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from
determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something
for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the
principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly,
opposite characteristics - a high ratio of price to book value, a
high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield - are in no way
inconsistent with a "value" purchase.
不管适不适当，「价值投资」这个名词常常被人引用，一般而言，它代表投资人
以较低的股价/净值比或是本益比或是高的股利收益率买进投资标的，很不幸的
是，就算是具备以上所有的特点，投资人还是很难确保所买到的投资标的确有此
价值，从而确信他的投资是依照取得企业价值的原意在进行；相对地，以较高的
股价/净值比或是本益比或是低的股利收益率买进投资标的，也不一定就代表不
是一项有「价值」的投资。
Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about
value. It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value,
sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is
far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured
money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or
worse) growth. For these investors, it would have been far better
if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more
the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.
同样的企业成长本身而言，也很难保证就一定代表价值，当然成长通常会对价值
有正面的影响，有时是相当重要的一项前提，但这种影响却不是绝对，例如投资
人以往将大笔的资金投入到国内的航空业来支持获利无望(或是悲惨)的成长，对
于这些投资人来说，应该会希望莱特兄弟当初没有驾着小鹰号成功起飞，航空产
业越发达，这些投资人就越悲惨。
Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can
invest at incremental returns that are enticing - in other words,
only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a
dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return
business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.
成长只有当企业将资金投入到可以增加更多报酬的活动上，投资人才有可能受
惠，换句话说，只有当每投入的一块钱可以在未来创造超过一块钱的价值时，成
长才有意义，至于那些需要资金但却只能创造出低报酬的公司，成长对于投资人
来说反而是有害的。
In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago,
John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we
condense here: The value of any stock, bond or business today is
determined by the cash inflows and outflows - discounted at an
appropriate interest rate - that can be expected to occur during
the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same
for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important, and
difficult to deal with, difference between the two: A bond has a
coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the
case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the
future "coupons." Furthermore, the quality of management affects
the bond coupon only rarely - chiefly when management is so inept
or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast,
the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity
"coupons."
在John Burr Williams 50年前所写的投资价值理论当中，老早便已提出计算价
值的公式，。我把它浓缩列示如下：今天任何股票、债券或是企业的价值，都将
取决于其未来年度剩余年限的现金流入与流出，以一个适当的利率加以折现后所
得的期望值，特别注意这个公式对于股票与债券皆一体适用，不过这里有一点很
重要但却很难克服差异的差异，那就是债券有债票与到期日可以清楚的定义未来
的现金流入，但是就股票而言，投资者必须自己去分析未来可能得到的票息，更
重要的是管理阶层的品质对于债券的影响相当有限，顶多因为公司无能或是诚信
明显不足而延迟债息的发放，但是对于股票投资者来说，管理阶层的能力将大大
影响未来票息发放的能力。
The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash
calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should
purchase - irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn't,
displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a
high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book
value. Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown
equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable:
When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment,
they should be bought.
根据这种现金流量折现的公式计算，投资人应该选择的是价钱最低的那一种投
资，不论他的盈余变化大不大、营收有没有成长，与现在的盈余以及帐面价值差
多少，虽然大部分的状况下，投资股票所算出来的价值会比债券要来多划算，但
是这却不是绝对，要是当债券所算出来的价值高于股票，则投资人应该买的就是
债券。
Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own
is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of
incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst
business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite - that
is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low
rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very
hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little
capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if
it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant
stock repurchases.
今天先不管价格多少，最值得拥有的企业是那种在一段长的期间可以将大笔的资
金运用在相当高报酬的投资上，最不值得拥有的企业是那种跟前面那个例子完全
相反的，在一段长的期间将大笔的资金运用在相当低报酬的投资之上，不幸的
是，第一类的企业可遇不可求，大部分拥有高报酬的企业都不需要太多的资金，
这类企业的股东通常会因为公司发放大量的股利或是买回自家公司的股份而大
大地受惠。
Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate
equities are not difficult, an analyst - even one who is
experienced and intelligent - can easily go wrong in estimating
future "coupons." At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this
problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we
believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple
and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to
constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash
flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us. What
counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but
rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An
investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she
avoids big mistakes.
虽然评估股权投资的数学计算式并不难，但是即使是一个经验老到、聪明过人的
分析师，在估计未来年度票息时也很容易发生错误，在Berkshire我们试图以两
种方法来解决这个问题，首先我们试着坚守在我们自认为了解的产业之上，这表
示他们本身通常相当简单且稳定，如果企业很复杂而产业环境也一直在变，我们
实在是没有足够的聪明才智去预测其未来的现金流量，碰巧的是，这个缺点一点
也不会让我们感到困扰，就投资而言，人们应该注意的，不是他到底知道多少，
而是应该注意自己到底有多少是不知道的，投资人不需要花太多时间去做对的
事，只要他能够尽量避免去犯重大的错误。
Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety
in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock
to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in
buying. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly
emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment
success.
第二点一样很重要，那就是我们在买股票时，必须要坚持安全边际，若是我们所
计算出来的价值只比其价格高一点，我们不会考虑买进，我们相信恩师葛拉罕十
分强调的安全边际原则，是投资成功最关键的因素。
Fixed-Income Securities
固定收益证券
Below we list our largest holdings of fixed-income securities:
下表是我们固定收益证券主要持有的部位：
(000s omitted)
------------------------------------
Cost of Preferreds and
Issuer Amortized Value of Bonds Market
------ ------------------------ ----------
ACF Industries Debentures ...... $133,065(1) $163,327
American Express "Percs" ....... 300,000 309,000(1)(2)
Champion International Conv. Pfd. 300,000(1) 309,000(2)
First Empire State Conv. Pfd. .. 40,000 68,000(1)(2)
Salomon Conv. Pfd. ............. 700,000(1) 756,000(2)
USAir Conv. Pfd. ............... 358,000(1) 268,500(2)
Washington Public Power Systems Bonds 58,768(1) 81,002
(1) Carrying value in our financial statements
(1)是指财务报表上的帐面价值
(2) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me
(2)公平价值是由查理跟我来判断
During 1992 we added to our holdings of ACF debentures, had
some of our WPPSS bonds called, and sold our RJR Nabisco position.
1992年我们增加了ACF债券的部位，另外华盛顿公用电力系统债券有部份被
赎回，另外RJR Nabisco的部位则已出清。
Over the years, we've done well with fixed-income investments,
having realized from them both large capital gains (including $80
million in 1992) and exceptional current income. Chrysler
Financial, Texaco, Time-Warner, WPPSS and RJR Nabisco were
particularly good investments for us. Meanwhile, our fixed-income
losses have been negligible: We've had thrills but so far no
spills.
过去几年来，我们在固定收益证券的表现还不错，靠着他们不但实现了相当大量
的资本利得(包含1992年的8,000万)与利息收益，克莱斯勒、Texaco、时代
华纳、WPPSS与RJR Nabisco都是相当好的投资，另一方面发生损失的部份也
相当少，虽然过程一度紧张但幸好最后并没有搞砸。
Despite the success we experienced with our Gillette
