Oddly, the Council of Institutional Investors has chimed in
with a variation on that theme, opining that options should not be
viewed as a cost because they "aren't dollars out of a company's
coffers." I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting
possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving
their reported profits. For example, they could eliminate the cost
of insurance by paying for it with options. So if you're a CEO and
subscribe to this "no cash-no cost" theory of accounting, I'll make
you an offer you can't refuse: Give us a call at Berkshire and we
will happily sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of longterm
options on your company's stock.
很奇怪的是机构投资人协会这时也插进来表示不同的意见，他们认为选择权不应
当被视作为一种成本，因为从头到尾公司根本就不需要从口袋里掏出一毛钱，我
认为这样的理由等于是给了所有美国企业大幅改善帐面获利的难得良机，例如他
们可以以选择权的方式来支付公司的保险费，所以如果由你来担任CEO，同时
充分地运用这种不付现金就没又支出的会计理论，我绝对可以提出一个你无法拒
绝的条件，打个电话到Berkshire给我们，我们很愿意以取得贵公司长期认股权
的代价，接受你们的保单。
Shareholders should understand that companies incur costs when
they deliver something of value to another party and not just when
cash changes hands. Moreover, it is both silly and cynical to say
that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply
because it can't be quantified with pinpoint precision. Right now,
accounting abounds with imprecision. After all, no manager or
auditor knows how long a 747 is going to last, which means he also
does not know what the yearly depreciation charge for the plane
should be. No one knows with any certainty what a bank's annual
loan loss charge ought to be. And the estimates of losses that
property-casualty companies make are notoriously inaccurate.
公司股东们必须了解当公司将某些有价值的东西交给别人，实际上就已经发生成
本了，而不是等到现金付出去时才算，还有一点，如果有人说因为所付出的实在
是难以准确衡量，因此就可以不须认列成本，这实在是既愚蠢又让人啼笑皆非的
说法。会计这档子事本来就充满的不确定性，有哪一个经理人或是会计师可以正
确的预估一架波音747客机的寿命到底有多久，那么难道他就不能估列这架飞
机一年所需分担的折旧费用有多少吗? 何况像是产险业的损失估计更是有名的
不准。
Does this mean that these important items of cost should be
ignored simply because they can't be quantified with absolute
accuracy? Of course not. Rather, these costs should be estimated
by honest and experienced people and then recorded. When you get
right down to it, what other item of major but hard-to-preciselycalculate
cost - other, that is, than stock options - does the
accounting profession say should be ignored in the calculation of
earnings?
所以难道这类重大的成本项目，就可以因为一句难以估计而加以省略吗? 当然不
行，相反地这些成本应该由诚实有经验的人加以估算并认列在帐上，而说到这
里，没有其它任何成本，会像员工认股权成本金额既高影响更重大的了，难道会
计师在计算年度损益时真的可以将这个项目刻意省略不计吗?
Moreover, options are just not that difficult to value.
Admittedly, the difficulty is increased by the fact that the
options given to executives are restricted in various ways. These
restrictions affect value. They do not, however, eliminate it. In
fact, since I'm in the mood for offers, I'll make one to any
executive who is granted a restricted option, even though it may be
out of the money: On the day of issue, Berkshire will pay him or
her a substantial sum for the right to any future gain he or she
realizes on the option. So if you find a CEO who says his newlyissued
options have little or no value, tell him to try us out. In
truth, we have far more confidence in our ability to determine an
appropriate price to pay for an option than we have in our ability
to determine the proper depreciation rate for our corporate jet.
更何况，选择权也不是那么地难以估计，虽然授与经理人的选择权，因为加了许
多限制条款，而使得计算的难度增加，所代表的价值也略微减少，但却从不表示
他们就完全没有价值，事实上，如果我们旗下的经理人愿意，我也可以提供给他
们有限制的认股权作为报酬奖励，而在发行的那天，虽然行使的价格远高于现在
的市价，但Berkshire还是必须因此付出一大笔金额，好让他们能在未来年度行
使这项认股权，所以如果若你遇到任何一位总裁跟你说他发行的认股权一点价值
都没有的话，告诉他来找我们试一试，事实上比起决定企业专机每年的折旧费
用，对于认股权的评价我们觉得有信心多了。
It seems to me that the realities of stock options can be
summarized quite simply: If options aren't a form of compensation,
what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And,
if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in
the world should they go?
总而言之，个人对于认股权的看法可以归纳为以下简单几点。如果认股权不算是
对经理人的一种报酬的话，那么它又算是什么? 而如果一家公司可以不必把报酬
列为是一种费用的话，那么它又算是什么? 又如果一家公司可以不必把费用列入
盈余计算的话，那么它到底又跑到哪里去了呢?
The accounting profession and the SEC should be shamed by the
fact that they have long let themselves be muscled by business
executives on the option-accounting issue. Additionally, the
lobbying that executives engage in may have an unfortunate byproduct:
In my opinion, the business elite risks losing its
credibility on issues of significance to society - about which it
may have much of value to say - when it advocates the incredible on
issues of significance to itself.
会计学者以及证管会应该对于选择权会计长期受到企业牵制而感到羞愧，此外企
业长期不遗余力的游说也会产生相当不良的副作用，个人认为，企业人士竟会为
了一己之私利而干冒为社会尽一份心力、失去重大议题公信力的风险。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
We have two pieces of regrettable news this year. First,
Gladys Kaiser, my friend and assistant for twenty-five years, will
give up the latter post after the 1993 annual meeting, though she
will certainly remain my friend forever. Gladys and I have been a
team, and though I knew her retirement was coming, it is still a
jolt.
今年我们有两件遗憾的消息，首先Gladys Kaiser我个人的朋友同时也是我25
年的助理决定在1993年股东会后，辞去后面那项职务，虽然她永远都是我的好
朋友，长久以来Gladys与我已培养出相当好的团队默契，虽然我老早就知道她
准备退休的计画，但一时之间我还是不太能够接受这项事实。
Secondly, in September, Verne McKenzie relinquished his role
as Chief Financial Officer after a 30-year association with me that
began when he was the outside auditor of Buffett Partnership, Ltd.
Verne is staying on as a consultant, and though that job
description is often a euphemism, in this case it has real meaning.
I expect Verne to continue to fill an important role at Berkshire
but to do so at his own pace. Marc Hamburg, Verne's understudy for
five years, has succeeded him as Chief Financial Officer.
第二去年九月Verne McKenzie辞去在本公司长达30年的财务长职位，早期
Verne曾担任巴菲特合伙企业的签证会计师，不过他将以顾问的名义继续留在
Berkshire，虽然在大部分的情形下，这种顾问名义只是形式性的，但Verne却
是真的会在Berkshire扮演重要的角色，只是会稍做调整以符合他本身的步调，
而跟在Verne已有五年之久的Marc Hamburg，将会接替Verne担任Berkshire
财务长的位置。
I recall that one woman, upon being asked to describe the
perfect spouse, specified an archeologist: "The older I get," she
said, "the more he'll be interested in me." She would have liked
my tastes: I treasure those extraordinary Berkshire managers who
are working well past normal retirement age and who concomitantly
are achieving results much superior to those of their younger
competitors. While I understand and empathize with the decision of
Verne and Gladys to retire when the calendar says it's time, theirs
is not a step I wish to encourage. It's hard to teach a new dog
old tricks.
我一直记得有个女人曾经被问到什么样的男人是最理想的终身伴侣，她回答说：
「考古学家！因为我越老，他就越对我有兴趣。」我想她也应该会喜欢我的品味，
对于Berkshire这群老早就超过他们退休年龄的资深经理人，我特别珍惜，因为
相较之下他们远比那些年轻许多的同侪表现要出色的多，不过我还是相当尊重
Verne与Gladys决定退休的想法，时间到了就必须休息，当然我也绝对不鼓励
其它人这样做，因为实在很难教新狗老把戏。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I am a moderate in my views about retirement compared to Rose
Blumkin, better known as Mrs. B. At 99, she continues to work
seven days a week. And about her, I have some particularly good
news.
对于退休年龄的看法比起B太太我可算是温和的多，现年99岁的她还是一样每
周工作七天，提到她我有一项好消息要报告。
You will remember that after her family sold 80% of Nebraska
Furniture Mart (NFM) to Berkshire in 1983, Mrs. B continued to be
Chairman and run the carpet operation. In 1989, however, she left
because of a managerial disagreement and opened up her own
operation next door in a large building that she had owned for
several years. In her new business, she ran the carpet section but
leased out other home-furnishings departments.
大家应该记得当B太太家族在1983年买NFM 80%的股权卖给Berkshire时，
B太太还是继续留下来担任负责人并经营地毯生意，然而在1989年，她因为管
理意见与其它家族成员不合而决定在隔壁自己再开一家店，在那里她亲自经营地
毯生意，至于家具的部份则租给其它家具百货业者经营。
At the end of last year, Mrs. B decided to sell her building
and land to NFM. She'll continue, however, to run her carpet
business at its current location (no sense slowing down just when
you're hitting full stride). NFM will set up shop alongside her,
in that same building, thereby making a major addition to its
furniture business.
不过去年底，B太太决定把这家店连同土地全部卖回给NFM，但她还是会继续
在原来的地方经营她的地毯生意(在这样的情况下，她还是一点都没有停下来的
意思)，NFM将会在她店的旁边增设家具部门以扩大营运。
I am delighted that Mrs. B has again linked up with us. Her
business story has no parallel and I have always been a fan of
hers, whether she was a partner or a competitor. But believe me,
partner is better.
我很高兴B太太可以再度与我们合伙做生意，她成功的故事实在是前所未有，而
我本人也是她忠实的支持者，不管她是我们的伙伴或是竞争对手，当然最好是能
成为伙伴。
This time around, Mrs. B graciously offered to sign a noncompete
agreement - and I, having been incautious on this point
when she was 89, snapped at the deal. Mrs. B belongs in the
Guinness Book of World Records on many counts. Signing a noncompete
at 99 merely adds one more.
有鉴于上次她89岁时，我在签约时疏忽掉，这一次经过B太太的首肯，同意签
下竞业禁止的条款了，B太太有好几项记录可以名列金氏世界记录之中，在99
岁签下竞业禁止条款，只不过是再增添一项罢了。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Ralph Schey, CEO of Scott Fetzer and a manager who I hope is
with us at 99 also, hit a grand slam last year when that company
earned a record $110 million pre-tax. What's even more impressive
is that Scott Fetzer achieved such earnings while employing only
$116 million of equity capital. This extraordinary result is not
the product of leverage: The company uses only minor amounts of
borrowed money (except for the debt it employs - appropriately - in
its finance subsidiary).
Ralph Schey-史考特飞兹的总裁，也是另一位我希望他能够一直工作到99岁
的经理人，在去年击出了满贯全垒打，总计去年创造出1.1亿美元的税前获利，
更令人印象深刻的是史考特飞兹总计也不过用了1.16亿美元的资本，就缔造出
这样惊人的盈余数字，而且这样的结果并没有靠任何的财务杠杆，整个公司只有
少量的借款(扣除旗下的财务金融子公司所运用的借款不算)。
Scott Fetzer now operates with a significantly smaller
investment in both inventory and fixed assets than it had when we
bought it in 1986. This means the company has been able to
distribute more than 100% of its earnings to Berkshire during our
seven years of ownership while concurrently increasing its earnings
stream - which was excellent to begin with - by a lot. Ralph just
keeps on outdoing himself, and Berkshire shareholders owe him a
great deal.
史考特飞兹现在在存货与固定资产上的投资比起当初我们在1986年买下该公
司时还要少，这代表着公司不但可以将我们拥有该公司七年的期间，所赚到的盈
余全部分配给我们，同时还能继续保持获利能力大幅度的成长，Ralph不断地超
越自我，而Berkshire欠他的也越来越多。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Those readers with particularly sharp eyes will note that our
corporate expense fell from $5.6 million in 1991 to $4.2 million in
1992. Perhaps you will think that I have sold our corporate jet,
The Indefensible. Forget it! I find the thought of retiring the
plane even more revolting than the thought of retiring the
Chairman. (In this matter I've demonstrated uncharacteristic
flexibility: For years I argued passionately against corporate
jets. But finally my dogma was run over by my karma.)
眼尖的读者应该会发现，1992年420万美元的营业费用，比起1991年的560
万还要少的多，或是各位会以为是我把企业专机-无可辩解号给卖掉了，别做梦！
除非我退休，否则别想打这架飞机的主意，(对于这点我个人展现了前所未有的
弹性，早年对于企业专机我曾大力反对，不过到最后我的理念还是屈服在个人的
因果报应之下)。
Our reduction in corporate overhead actually came about
because those expenses were especially high in 1991, when we
incurred a one-time environmental charge relating to alleged pre-
1970 actions of our textile operation. Now that things are back to
normal, our after-tax overhead costs are under 1% of our reported
operating earnings and less than 1/2 of 1% of our look-through
earnings. We have no legal, personnel, public relations, investor
relations, or strategic planning departments. In turn this means
we don't need support personnel such as guards, drivers,
messengers, etc. Finally, except for Verne, we employ no
consultants. Professor Parkinson would like our operation - though
Charlie, I must say, still finds it outrageously fat.
其实公司营业费用的减少主要是因为1991年的费用特别高的缘故，当时因为一
次性地提列早期1970年代纺织事业与环境相关的费用所致，而现在一切回复正
常，所以我们税后的费用占帐列税后盈余的比率不到1%，占年度透视盈余的比
率更低于0.5%，在Berkshire我们没有法律、人事、公关或是营运企划部门，
这同时也代表我们不需要警卫、司机或是跑腿的人，最后除了Vernre以外，我
们也没有任何的顾问，Parkinson教授一定会喜欢我们的营运模式，虽然我必须
说查理还是觉得我们的组织过于庞杂。
At some companies, corporate expense runs 10% or more of
operating earnings. The tithing that operations thus makes to
headquarters not only hurts earnings, but more importantly slashes
capital values. If the business that spends 10% on headquarters'
costs achieves earnings at its operating levels identical to those
achieved by the business that incurs costs of only 1%, shareholders
of the first enterprise suffer a 9% loss in the value of their
holdings simply because of corporate overhead. Charlie and I have
observed no correlation between high corporate costs and good
corporate performance. In fact, we see the simpler, low-cost
operation as more likely to operate effectively than its
bureaucratic brethren. We're admirers of the Wal-Mart, Nucor,
Dover, GEICO, Golden West Financial and Price Co. models.
在某些公司，营业费用可能占营业利益10%以上，这种十分法不但对于盈余有
相当的影响，同时对企业价值也有很大的伤害，比起一家总部费用占其盈余的
1%的公司来说，投资人可能因为企业总部额外的费用，立即就要遭受9%以上的
损失，查理跟我这么多年观察下来的结果，企业总部的高成本与公司的绩效改善
之间可以说是完全没有关系，事实上我们认为组织越简单、成本越低的公司运作
起来会比那些拥有庞大官僚组织的公司更有效率的多，就这点而言，我们相当佩
服Wal-Mart、Nucor、Dover、GEICO与Golden West等公司。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Late last year Berkshire's stock price crossed $10,000.
Several shareholders have mentioned to me that the high price
causes them problems: They like to give shares away each year and
find themselves impeded by the tax rule that draws a distinction
between annual gifts of $10,000 or under to a single individual and
those above $10,000. That is, those gifts no greater than $10,000
are completely tax-free; those above $10,000 require the donor to
use up a portion of his or her lifetime exemption from gift and
estate taxes, or, if that exemption has been exhausted, to pay gift
taxes.
去年底Berkshire的股价正式超越10,000美元大关，有许多股东反应高股价让
他们产生相当的困扰，因为他们每年必须分出部份股份，却发现Berkshire的股
份价值超过10,000美元年度赠与税上限的门槛，因为超过上限代表捐赠人必须
使得个人终身捐赠的上限额度，而且若是再超过的话，就必须要缴赠与税。
I can suggest three ways to address this problem. The first
