了3,944股，此外在买下Dexter鞋业时，(后面报告还会详加叙述)
我们又发行了25,203股，总计一共新发行了29,147股，增加4.78
亿美元的净值，每股帐面净值也因发行价格高于原先帐面每股净值而
提升。
Of course, it's per-share intrinsic value, not book value,
that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures the
capital, including retained earnings, that has been put into a
business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of the
cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining
life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated.
Berkshire, however, is an exception: Our book value, though
significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful
device for tracking that key figure. In 1993, each measure grew
by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory but
unexciting.
当然真正重要的是每股实质价值而非帐面净值，帐面净值是一个会计名词，用来
衡量一家公司所投入的资本，也包含未分配的盈余在内，实质价值则是对于一家
企业终其一生所能产生现金流量的估计折现值，对大部分的公司来说，这两个数
字大多不相关，不过Berkshire算是一个例外，我们的帐面净值，虽然远低于实
质价值，但却是追踪实质价值相当好的一项指针，在1993年两项数值大约皆以
14%左右的比率增加，这种成绩虽让人满意却不令人惊喜。
These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger gain
- 39% - in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course,
market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same
destination. But in the short run the two often diverge in a
major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two years
ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed
market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings
gains. In the 1991 Annual Report, I said that the stocks of
these companies could not continuously overperform their
businesses.
这些利得比起Berkshire本身股价39%的涨幅来说还是略微逊色，当然就长期
而言，Berkshire的市价与实质价值将会到达相同的水平，但短期而言，两者的
变化可能会有很大的差异，这种现象稍后我们会再详细讨论，两年前我们两项主
要的投资可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀的股价表现远超过本身的盈余成长，在1991年
的年报中，我便说过这些公司的股票市价不可能永远持续超越其本业。
From 1991 to 1993, Coke and Gillette increased their annual
operating earnings per share by 38% and 37% respectively, but
their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%. In other words,
the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that no doubt
partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names.
Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings
performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire will
also prosper, though not in a lock-step manner.
从1991年到1993年，可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀每股获利的增加幅度分别为38%
与37%，但是同期间股票市价的涨幅却只有11%与6%，换句话说，这些公司的
表现超越股票市场，主要的原因还在于华尔街对于品牌有很深的疑虑，但是不管
怎样，真正重要的还是这些公司本身的获利情况，如果他们经营顺利，Berkshire
也就跟着水涨船高，虽然不是依照一步步稳定的方式前进。
Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919
at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly
reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the stock down
by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single share,
with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million. As
Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is a voting
machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only
money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the longrun,
the market is a weighing machine."
接着让我为各位上一次历史课，1919年可口可乐股票以每股40美元公开上
市，到了1920年由于市场对于可口可乐的前景看法相当冷淡，而将股价下修一
半至19.5美元，然而时至今日，1993年底，若是将收到的股利再重复投资下
去，则当初股票的价值将变成210万美元，就像葛拉罕所说：「短期而言，市
场是投票机器，投资人不须靠智能或情绪控制，只要有钱都可以登记参加投票，
但就长期而言，股票市场却是一个体重机。」
So how should Berkshire's over-performance in the market
last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at a higher
percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the
case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in a world
of 6% or 7% long-term interest rates, Berkshire's market price
was not inappropriate if - and you should understand that this is
a huge if - Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I can
attain our long-standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per-share
intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15%. We have not
retreated from this goal. But we again emphasize, as we have for
many years, that the growth in our capital base makes 15% an
ever-more difficult target to hit.
所以我们应该如何看待Berkshire去年的股价超越本质的表现呢? 很明显的在
1993年底Berkshire的股价占实质价值比重较年初为高，另外一方面，在长期
利率只有6%到7%的投资环境下，同时若是你了解查理孟格跟本人只能让
Berkshire的实质价值每年达到15%的成长的话，你就知道Berkshire去年这样
的股价表现实在是有点反常，虽然对于这样的目标我们从不妥协，但我们必须再
一次强调，随着资本规模的日益扩大，想要达到这个目标的困难度也与日俱增。
What we have going for us is a growing collection of goodsized
operating businesses that possess economic characteristics
ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance
ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about
this group.
不过另一方面，伴随我们的是由一些相当规模且拥有竞争优势的企业，并且由杰
出的经理人所经营，对于这样的梦幻组合大家大可以放心。
The capital-allocation work that Charlie and I do at the
parent company, using the funds that our managers deliver to us,
has a less certain outcome: It is not easy to find new
businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite
that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we are
happy to report an important success in 1993.
倒是查理跟我在母公司利用子公司所贡献资金所作的资金分配工作，所面临的不
确定性就比较高，要找到像我们现在拥有一样好的企业并不容易，但是虽然难度
高，查理跟我却绝对不会放弃追寻，而很高兴在1993年我们能有相当成功的斩
获。
Dexter Shoe
Detxter 鞋业
What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of H.
H. Brown, a superbly-run manufacturer of work shoes, boots and
other footwear. Brown has been a real winner: Though we had
high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been
considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Issler and the
talented managers who work with them. Because of our confidence
in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe, at the end of
1992. Lowell was a long-established manufacturer of women's and
nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing. Again,
results have surpassed our expectations. So we promptly jumped
at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter, Maine,
which manufactures popular-priced men's and women's shoes.
Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing: It is one of the
best-managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business
lifetimes.
去年我们所做的乃是基于1991年买进HH布朗鞋业-一家管理良善的鞋子、靴
子制造公司的续曲，布朗鞋业成为一家真正成功的赢家，虽然一开始我们就对他
就有相当高的标准，但是在Frank与其它经理人的努力之下，这家公司的表现
甚至还超过我们的预期，基于我们对Frank团队的信心，接着在1992年年底
我们又买下Lowell鞋业，Lowell是一家女鞋与护士鞋的老牌制造公司，不过他
的管理还需要改进，再一次他的表现又超乎我们的预期，所以我们立刻又再接再
厉在去年又趁机买下缅因州的Dexter鞋业，一家专门制造高级男女鞋的品牌，
这次我可以向大家保证Dexter并不需要改造，Dexter是查理跟我在职业生涯
中，所见过最好的公司之一。
Harold Alfond, who started working in a shoe factory at 25
cents an hour when he was 20, founded Dexter in 1956 with $10,000
of capital. He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder, his nephew.
The two of them have since built a business that now produces over
7.5 million pairs of shoes annually, most of them made in Maine
and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the
domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to
compete with imports from low-wage countries. But someone forgot
to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H. H.
Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together make the
U.S. plants of both companies highly competitive against all
comers.
话说Harold Alfond从20岁以时薪25美分开始到制鞋工厂做工，并在1956
年靠着一万美元的资本创立Dexter，1958年他的侄子Peter加入，从此两人
建立起年产750万双鞋子的企业，大部分的鞋子都在缅因州生产，其余的则在
波多黎各，就像大家都知道的，国内的制鞋业，一般被认为无法与国外进口低价
产品竞争，但是大家似乎忘记提醒布朗鞋业与Dexter经营团队有这么一回事，
是他们让两家公司位于美国的工厂拥有高度的竞争力以对抗外来的入侵者。
Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets, located
primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major
manufacturer of golf shoes, producing about 15% of U.S. output.
Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacture of traditional
shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels: Last
year both Nordstrom and J.C. Penney bestowed special awards upon
Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992.
Dexter还包含77家的零售门市，主要集中在西北地区，该公司同时也是高尔
夫球鞋的主要制造商，全美的市场占有率约为15%，不过他的主要业务还是传
统通路商的传统鞋类，这也是它最擅长的领域，去年Dexter还获得Nordstrom
与JC Penny所颁发的年度最佳供货商奖项。
Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of
merger, November 7th. In 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe
operations to have more than $550 million in sales, and we would
not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these
businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago we had no thought
of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that
industry, and I sing "There's No Business Like Shoe Business" as
I drive to work. So much for strategic plans.
Berkshire只能从1993年11月7号购并日后开始计入Dexter的业绩，在1994
年我们预计Berkshire光是在鞋类方面的销售额就达到5.5亿美元，而总计税前
获利极有可能超过8,500万，记得在五年前我们根本就没想到会跨进鞋类这一
行，现在光是在这个产业所雇用的员工就超过7,200人，现在我每天上班，都
会边开车边唱，没有一个行业会像卖鞋这一行，策略计画还有很多发挥的空间。
At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates
what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we think
it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it
embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision. We
prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics of
businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics
of managers with whom we wish to associate - and then to hope we
get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter, we did.
在Berkshire，对于将来会进入那个产业，我们并没有特定的看法，事实上，我
们常在想对于一家大型企业的股东来说，与其追求具有远景的新创事业有时反而
有害，所以我们比较偏爱专注于那些我们想要拥有的经济型态以及我们喜爱一起
共事的经理人，剩下的就只看我们有没有足够的运气，找到同时拥有这两项特点
的组合了，在Dexter我们确实找到了。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now we pause for a short commercial: Though they owned
a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter (who were not
interested in cash) made a sound decision in exchanging their
Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in effect,
was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business for a
smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses. They
incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security that can
be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that can be
converted to cash in amounts, and at times, of their own
choosing. Should members of their families desire to, they can
pursue varying financial paths without running into the
complications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a
private business.
接下来让我们休息一下，进段小广告，虽然他们拥有商业界的宝石，但我们也相
信Harold与Peter(他们对于现金都不感兴趣)做了一个正确的决定，将Dexter
的股份转为Berkshire的股份，他们所做的，实际上等于将一家规模小的好公司
的全部权益转成一家大规模好公司的一部份权益，这样的转换并不会产生租税负
担，同时还可享有依个人意愿随时进行赠与或变现的好处，如果他们的家族成员
有意愿，他们可以依照自己的想法追求不同的目标，而不必像过去那样所有的资
产全部绑在一家私人的企业。
For tax and other reasons, private companies also often find
it difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire,
in contrast, can diversify with ease. So in shifting their
ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a
reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter now have
non-controlling shares in Berkshire, rather than controlling
shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners and
that we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect to
retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result from the
merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result. Since I
have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life to
Berkshire shares - and since the company will issue me neither
restricted shares nor stock options - my gain-loss equation will
always match that of all other owners.
基于租税规划以及其它理由，私人企业通常很难透过延伸本业以外的投资达到分
散风险的目的，相对的，在Berkshire我们可以很轻易地就多角化，因此藉由经
营权移转至Berkshire，Dexter的股东可以很轻易地就解决转投资的问题，更
重要的是，虽然Harold与Peter现在持有的是Berkshire无控制权的股份，而
不是原先Dexter具控制权的股份，但他们很清楚自己将被视为真正的合伙人，
同时我们也会以经营者的心态参与，所以一旦他们决定将自己的投资转为
Berkshire的股份，那么从合并那天开始，他们就可以确定本身的投资成果将会
与我个人的投资成果相当，而因为我个人绝大部份的身家都摆在Berkshire，也
因为我个人从不会自公司身上取得特殊的股份或员工认股权，所以我个人的成败
得失也将与其它所有公司股权持有人一致。
Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we can
keep our promises: There will be no changes of control or
culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally, and of
paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that they will
get to run their business - an activity they dearly love -
exactly as they did before the merger. At Berkshire, we do not
tell .400 hitters how to swing.
此外，Harold与Peter也相当了解，在Berkshire我们言出必行，在可见的未
来几十年内，Berkshire的控制权与文化将不会有所改变，最后同时也是最重要
的一点，Harold与Peter可以确定将能够继续经营原来的企业，这是他们最喜
爱的工作，这点不会因为合并案完成而有任何的改变，在Berkshire，我们不会
鸡婆地去提醒打击率高达四成的强打者应该要如何挥棒。
What made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense
for a few other owners of large private businesses. So, if you
have a business that might fit, let me hear from you. Our
acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix on page 22.
我想这些的道理同样也适合其它大型私人企业的所有者，所以如果你有公司的情
况符合我们的标准的，请务必让我知道，在年报的后段有我们拟购并企业的标
准。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's
reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of
Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments
are not charged against the specific businesses to which they
apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This
procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they
would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've
explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to
us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing
GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a
business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in
the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our
audited financial statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
(000s omitted)
------------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
-------------------- ------------------
1993 1992 1993 1992
---------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
