Underwriting ............... $ 30,876 $(108,961) $ 20,156 $(71,141)
Net Investment Income ...... 375,946 355,067 321,321 305,763
H. H. Brown, Lowell,
and Dexter ............... 44,025* 27,883 28,829 17,340
Buffalo News ................. 50,962 47,863 29,696 28,163
Commercial & Consumer Finance 22,695 19,836 14,161 12,664
Fechheimer ................... 13,442 13,698 6,931 7,267
Kirby ........................ 39,147 35,653 25,056 22,795
Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 21,540 17,110 10,398 8,072
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 38,196 31,954 23,809 19,883
See's Candies ................ 41,150 42,357 24,367 25,501
World Book ................... 19,915 29,044 13,537 19,503
Purchase-Price Accounting &
Goodwill Charges ......... (17,033) (12,087) (13,996) (13,070)
Interest Expense** ........... (56,545) (98,643) (35,614) (62,899)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions ............ (9,448) (7,634) (5,994) (4,913)
Other ........................ 28,428 67,540 15,094 32,798
---------- ---------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings ............. 643,296 460,680 477,751 347,726
Sales of Securities ............ 546,422 89,937 356,702 59,559
Tax Accruals Caused by
New Accounting Rules ........ --- --- (146,332) ---
---------- ---------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - All Entities .. $1,189,718 $ 550,617 $688,121 $407,285
* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired,
November 7, 1993.
*Dexter的盈余仅含购并日1993年11月7日以后的盈余
**Excludes interest expense of Commercial and Consumer Finance
businesses. In 1992 includes $22.5 million of premiums paid on
the early redemption of debt.
**不含商业与消费金融公司的利息费用，另外1992年部份还包含2,250万提前赎回债券的溢
价。
A large amount of information about these businesses is given
on pages 38-49, where you will also find our segment earnings
reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 52-59, we have
rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-
GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and
I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the
financial information that we would wish you to give us if our
positions were reversed.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们
的目的是希望给你所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必要的资
讯。
"Look-Through" Earnings
透视盈余
We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which we
believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does
our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings
consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous
section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major
investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our
profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by
Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been
distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here
exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major
restructuring charges.
之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到的帐列盈
余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公
司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所
得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企业调整的
主要支出。
Over time, our look-through earnings need to increase at about
15% annually if our intrinsic value is to grow at that rate. Last
year, I explained that we had to increase these earnings to about
$1.8 billion in the year 2000, were we to meet the 15% goal.
Because we issued additional shares in 1993, the amount needed has
risen to about $1.85 billion.
长期而言，如果我们的实质价值想要以每年15%的幅度来成长的话，那么透视
盈余每年也必须增加以这个幅度来成长，去年我曾经提到，到公元2000年为
止，Berkshire若要以15%的目标，透视盈余必须成长到18亿美元，而由于1993
年我们又发行了一些新股，所以现在的门槛提高到18.5亿美元。
That is a tough goal, but one that we expect you to hold us
to. In the past, we've criticized the managerial practice of
shooting the arrow of performance and then painting the target,
centering it on whatever point the arrow happened to hit. We will
instead risk embarrassment by painting first and shooting later.
这是一个高难度的目标，不过也希望大家能够继续支持我们，在过去我们常常批
评有些管理阶层总是先把箭射出去后再划上准心，不管这箭射得有多歪，因此关
于这点我们宁愿先标出准心，然后再瞄准目标射箭。
If we are to hit the bull's-eye, we will need markets that
allow the purchase of businesses and securities on sensible terms.
Right now, markets are difficult, but they can - and will - change
in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. In the meantime, we'll
try to resist the temptation to do something marginal simply
because we are long on cash. There's no use running if you're on
the wrong road.
如果我们想要命中靶心，那么我们绝对需要有能以合理价格买到好的公司与股份
的市场，不过对我们来说，现在市场上的情况并不理想，当然这种情况随时都有
可能会改变，在此同时，我们也会尽量避免手上闲钱太多而去做那些浪费工夫的
蠢事，若方向不对，再怎么努力冲刺也是白费力气。
The following table shows how we calculate look-through
earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very
rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been
included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly
under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数
字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益
项下)。
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)
------------------------ --------------------- --------------------
1993 1992 1993 1992
------ ------ ------ ------
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ..... 13.0% 18.2% $ 83(2) $ 70
The Coca-Cola Company ........ 7.2% 7.1% 94 82
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.8%(1) 8.2%(1) 41(2) 29(2)
GEICO Corp. .................. 48.4% 48.1% 76(3) 34(3)
General Dynamics Corp. ....... 13.9% 14.1% 25 11(2)
The Gillette Company ......... 10.9% 10.9% 44 38
Guinness PLC ................. 1.9% 2.0% 8 7
The Washington Post Company .. 14.8% 14.6% 15 11
Wells Fargo & Company ........ 12.2% 11.5% 53(2) 16(2)
Berkshire's share of undistributed
earnings of major investees $439 $298
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed
investee earnings(4) (61) (42)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 478 348
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $856 $604
(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest
at Wesco
不包含Wesco的少数股权
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
以年平均持有股权比例计算
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both
recurring and significant
扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得，
(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays
on the dividends it receives
适用的税率为14%，这是Berkshire收到现金股利时的平均税率。
We have told you that we expect the undistributed,
hypothetically-taxed earnings of our investees to produce at least
equivalent gains in Berkshire's intrinsic value. To date, we have
far exceeded that expectation. For example, in 1986 we bought
three million shares of Capital Cities/ABC for $172.50 per share
and late last year sold one-third of that holding for $630 per
share. After paying 35% capital gains taxes, we realized a $297
million profit from the sale. In contrast, during the eight years
we held these shares, the retained earnings of Cap Cities
attributable to them - hypothetically taxed at a lower 14% in
accordance with our look-through method - were only $152 million.
In other words, we paid a much larger tax bill than our lookthrough
presentations to you have assumed and nonetheless realized
a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable to
these shares.
我曾告诉过各位，我们预估这些已依估计税率调整过的未分配盈余至少可以为
Berkshire创造出同等的实质价值，而到目前为止，其真正的结果甚至超乎我们
的预期，举例来说，我们在1986年以每股172.5美元的价格买进300万股资
本城/ABC公司的股份，去年我们以每股630美元的价格处分了其中的三分之
一，在支付35%的资本利得税后，我们实现2.97亿美元的税后盈余，相对地，
在我们持有这些股份的八年期间，经由这些股份资本城公司分配给我们的透视盈
余在扣除估计14%的所得税之后，只有1.52亿美元，换句话说，透过出售这些
股份，所获取的利益，即便在扣除较高的所得税负之后，还是比原先透过持股所
分配到的盈余还要高出许多。
We expect such pleasant outcomes to recur often in the future
and therefore believe our look-through earnings to be a
conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic earnings.
而我们也预期这样的情况在未来还会持续发生，因此我们相信Berkshire所计算
的透视盈余，算是相当保守的表达方式。
Taxes
税负
As our Cap Cities sale emphasizes, Berkshire is a substantial
payer of federal income taxes. In aggregate, we will pay 1993
federal income taxes of $390 million, about $200 million of that
attributable to operating earnings and $190 million to realized
capital gains. Furthermore, our share of the 1993 federal and
foreign income taxes paid by our investees is well over $400
million, a figure you don't see on our financial statements but
that is nonetheless real. Directly and indirectly, Berkshire's
1993 federal income tax payments will be about 1/2 of 1% of the total
paid last year by all American corporations.
就像是刚刚提到的资本城股份出售案，Berkshire可以说是联邦政府的缴税大
户，总计在1993年，我们总共缴了3.9亿美元的所得税，其中2亿属于本业
获利，另外1.9亿则源自于资本利得，此外我们的被投资公司另外向联邦政府与
国外政府又缴交了超过4亿美元的所得税，这是你在本公司的财务报表上看不
到，但却又确实存在的，直接再加上间接合计，Berkshire占去年所有美国企业
缴给联邦政府所得税总额的1.5%。
Speaking for our own shares, Charlie and I have absolutely no
complaint about these taxes. We know we work in a market-based
economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than it does
the efforts of others whose output is of equal or greater benefit
to society. Taxation should, and does, partially redress this
inequity. But we still remain extraordinarily well-treated.
对于这个比例，查理跟我本人一点怨言也没有，我们知道我们是在一个市场导向
的经济社会，我们努力所收到的报酬，其比例甚至比一些对这个社会有更多贡献
的人还要多，透过租税政策，多多少少可以降低这种不合理性，不过即便是如此，
我们还是认为自己受到特别优厚的待遇。
Berkshire and its shareholders, in combination, would pay a
much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership or "S"
corporation, two structures often used for business activities.
For a variety of reasons, that's not feasible for Berkshire to do.
However, the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated -
though far from eliminated - by our strategy of investing for the
long term. Charlie and I would follow a buy-and-hold policy even
if we ran a tax-exempt institution. We think it the soundest way
to invest, and it also goes down the grain of our personalities. A
third reason to favor this policy, however, is the fact that taxes
are due only when gains are realized.
虽然Berkshire若是以合伙或S型企业的形式来经营，(在美国许多商业活动确
实是以这两种形态在运作)，Berkshire跟其所有的股东，总的来说可以大大减少
所需负担的税负，但基于许多理由，那样的做法并不适合Berkshire的运作，所
幸我们以企业形态运作的模式所受到的租税惩罚，因为我们采取长期投资的策略
而稍稍减轻，虽然就算是证交所得免税，查理跟我还是会坚持遵照买进并持有的
策略，这是我们认为最好的投资方式，同时也最符合我们的个人特质，当然第三
个好处就是因为这样做可以使我们只有在实现资本利得时才需要缴税。
Through my favorite comic strip, Li'l Abner, I got a chance
during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes, though I
missed the lesson at the time. Making his readers feel superior,
Li'l Abner bungled happily, but moronically, through life in
Dogpatch. At one point he became infatuated with a New York
temptress, Appassionatta Van Climax, but despaired of marrying her
because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested
solely in millionaires. Dejected, Abner took his problem to Old
Man Mose, the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch. Said the sage:
Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours (1, 2,
4, 8 . . . . 1,048,576).
经由我个人最喜爱的漫画短片，Li'l Abner，我有机会可以体会到延迟支付所得
税的好处，虽然当时我没有好好地利用那次机会，为了让他的读者觉得自己很优
越，Li'l Abner一直快乐地维持单身，直到他为纽约一位女演员Appassionatta
深深地着迷，但由于她只对百万富翁有兴趣，因此一贫如洗的Abner可以说是
一点希望都没有，在遭到拒绝之后，Abner跑去智能老人Mose那里请他指点
迷津，结果这位圣贤对Abner说，很简单你只要能够将身上仅有的一块钱，复
制20次，Appassionatta自然就会投入到你的怀抱(1,2,4,8,….,1,048,576)。
My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse,
dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a jackpot that
spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following Mose's
advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next
double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham.
我记得这段漫画的最后一段是Abner跑到一家旅馆，将他仅有的一块钱投入吃
角子老虎中，结果竟然中了七星，一时之间奖金掉满地，没想到他老兄一丝不苟
遵照Mose老人的旨意，只捡起了其中的两块钱之后，就出发去寻找下一次复制
的机会，看到这里我便舍弃了Abner，并开始研读葛拉汉的理论。
Mose clearly was overrated as a guru: Besides failing to
anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions, he also
forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say, to the 35%
federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed one double
annually, he would after 20 years only have accumulated $22,370.
Indeed, had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a
35% tax on each, he would have needed 7 1/2 years more to reach the
$1 million required to win Appassionatta.
Mose很显然地不配当他人的精神导师，除了低估Abner对于他的指示过于盲
从的程度，他也忘了考虑到可能的税负，假设今天Abner也像Berkshire一样
必须负担高达35%的联邦所得税的话，而且他每年只能成功地复制一次的话，
就算连续20年都如他所愿，他也只能累积到22,370元，当然若是他能持之以
恒地保持这样的记录的话，他则还须多等上七年半，才能累积到所需的100万
以赢得Appassionatta的芳心。
But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single
investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2 times? In
that case, he would have realized about $200 million pre-tax or,
after paying a $70 million tax in the final year, about $130
million after-tax. For that, Appassionatta would have crawled to
Dogpatch. Of course, with 27 1/2 years having passed, how
Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on $130 million
is another question.
然而要是Abner只将资金放在单一不变的投资之上，同时连续27年半都能保
持每年倍数成长的记录的话，这样到最后，他在税前可以累积高达二亿美元的获
利，或是在扣除7,000万美元的所得税之后，得到税后1亿3,000万美元的利
益，届时可能会换做是Appassionatta爬着来求他了，当然等到27年后，一
个坐拥1亿多美元的富翁会怎么看待年华老去的Appassionatta，则又是另外
一回事了。
What this little tale tells us is that tax-paying investors
will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment that
compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of
investments compounding at the same rate. But I suspect many
Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago.
这宗小故事告诉我们必须负担税负的投资人从每年固定以一个比率成长的单一
投资上，可以获得比每年更换投资对象所得的多的多，即便是两者成长的幅度一
样也是如此，不过我怀疑许多Berkshire的股东老早就已经知道这个道理了。
Insurance Operations
保险事业营运
At this point in the report we've customarily provided you
with a table showing the annual "combined ratio" of the insurance
