industry for the preceding decade. This ratio compares total
insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) to revenue from
premiums. For many years, the ratio has been above 100, a level
indicating an underwriting loss. That is, the industry has taken
in less money each year from its policyholders than it has had to
pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during
the year.
接下来到这里我们通常会准备一张表来说明保险业过去十多年来的综合比率，综
合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，多年以来，比
率在100以下代表有承保的损失，也就是说，保险业者当年度从客户那里收到
的保费，不足以支应必须支付给保户的理赔款以及营运所需的费用开支。
Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact: Insurers get
to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before paying
it out. This happens because most policies require that premiums
be prepaid and, more importantly, because it often takes time to
resolve loss claims. Indeed, in the case of certain lines of
insurance, such as product liability or professional malpractice,
many years may elapse between the loss event and payment.
当然若是两者能够相等，将会是一个很令人高兴的结局，因为保险业者在真正支
付给客户理赔金之前，通常有一段时间可以将这笔钱好好地运用，因为大部分的
保单都是先向客户收取保费，更重要的是，通常得花上一段时间才会将损失理赔
款给付出去，尤其是像产品责任险或是专门职业执行业务不当等保险，通常要花
上好几年的时间，才能将理赔损失定案。
To oversimplify the matter somewhat, the total of the funds
prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for incurred-butnot-
yet-paid claims is called "the float." In the past, the
industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to 111 and
still break even from its insurance writings because of the
earnings derived from investing this float.
再讲白一点，这些保户预付的保险费加上那些已经发生但还未理赔的资金统称为
保险浮存金，在过去，利用这些浮存金创造投资收益，使得整个保险业即使面临
高达107到111的综合比率，却依然可以维持损益两平。
As interest rates have fallen, however, the value of float has
substantially declined. Therefore, the data that we have provided
in the past are no longer useful for year-to-year comparisons of
industry profitability. A company writing at the same combined
ratio now as in the 1980's today has a far less attractive business
than it did then.
不过随着利率下滑，保险浮存金的价值大幅滑落，因此过去我们提供的比率已经
无法用来衡量保险业者每年的获利状况比较，今天一家拥有相同综合比率的保险
公司比起1980年代来说，已无法同日而语。
Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting
results and the current risk-free earnings obtainable from float
can one evaluate the true economics of the business that a
property-casualty insurer writes. Of course, the actual investment
results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float and
stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should be
carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial
performance. But that should be a separate analysis from the one
we are discussing here. The value of float funds - in effect,
their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation to
the investment operation - should be determined simply by the riskfree,
long-term rate of interest.
我们认为只有将保险业的承保结果与保险浮存金可以获得的无风险盈余做分
析，才有办法正确地评估一家产物意外险公司真正的价值，当然一家保险公司利
用其浮存金与股东资金所能创造的投资收益也相当重要，这点也是投资人在该公
司的经营表现时，必须特别注意的，只不过那需要分开另外分析，而不是我们现
在要讨论的主题。事实上，保险浮存金的价值，关键在于其从保险营运移转至投
资营运的转拨价格，这点可以简单的以长期无风险的资金利率作为标准。
On the next page we show the numbers that count in an
evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business. We calculate our
float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our
premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves
and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agent's
balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable
to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our
underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an
underwriting profit, which includes 1993, our cost of float has
been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by
adding underwriting profit to float income.
下一页我们将会列出如何计算出Berkshire保险事业价值，首先先计算浮存金总
额-相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金部位算是相当大的，将所有的损
失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成
本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而
定，在某些年度由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负
的，此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利
益。
(1) (2) Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds
------------ ----------- -------------- -------------
(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)
1967 profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%
1968 profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%
1969 profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%
1970 $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%
1971 profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%
1972 profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%
1973 profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%
1974 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%
1975 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%
1976 profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%
1977 profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%
1978 profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%
1979 profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%
1980 profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%
1981 profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%
1982 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%
1983 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%
1984 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%
1985 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%
1986 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%
1987 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%
1988 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%
1990 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
1991 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
1992 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%
1993 profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%
As you can see, in our insurance operation last year we had
the use of $2.6 billion at no cost; in fact we were paid $31
million, our underwriting profit, to hold these funds. This sounds
good - is good - but is far from as good as it sounds.
大家应该看得出，去年我们保险事业的营运结果，等于是让我们可以免费利用
26亿美元的浮存金，而事实上，应该还要再加上3,100万美元的承保利益，这
看起来相当不错，不过实际上并没有想象中的那么好。
We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of
"super-cat" policies (which other insurance and reinsurance
companies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega
catastrophes) and because last year we had no losses of consequence
from this activity. As that suggests, the truly catastrophic
Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super-cat losses, the
reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from
private insurers.
我们试着大家冷静一下，因为我们接下的生意其中有一大部分属于霹雳猫保单
(这是其它保险公司或再保公司专门买来分担他们在发生重大意外灾害时，所可
能造成的损失)，同时去年这类的业务并没有出现重大的损失，意思是说，就连
发生在1993年真正严重的中西部水灾也没有触及霹雳猫损失理赔的门槛，原因
在于很少有私人保险公司会去购买水灾险。
It would be fallacious, however, to conclude from this singleyear
result that the super-cat business is a wonderful one, or even
a satisfactory one. A simple example will illustrate the fallacy:
Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every century.
If you annually give 5-for-1 odds against its occurrence that year,
you will have many more winning years than losers. Indeed, you may
go a straight six, seven or more years without loss. You also will
eventually go broke.
这样很容易会产生错觉，并做出单一年度霹雳猫的成绩是相当不错且令人满意的
一年，一个简单的例子足以说明一切，假设每个世纪平均都会发生25次重大的
意外事件，而你每年都以以一赔五的比率赌它今年不会发生，则你赌对的年份可
能远比赌错的年份多出许多，甚至你有可能连续赌对六年、七年，甚至是更多年，
但我必须说，不管怎样，到最后你一定会以破产作为结局。
At Berkshire, we naturally believe we are obtaining adequate
premiums and giving more like 3 1/2-for-1 odds. But there is no way
for us - or anyone else - to calculate the true odds on super-cat
coverages. In fact, it will take decades for us to find out
whether our underwriting judgment has been sound.
在Berkshire，我们直觉地相信我们已经收到合理的保费，以类似以一赔三又二
分之一的赌率接受赌注，当然没有人可以真正正确地算出霹雳猫保险真正的赔
率，事实上，可能要等到几十年后，我们才能知道当初的判断是否正确。
What we do know is that when a loss comes, it's likely to be a
lulu. There may well be years when Berkshire will suffer losses
from the super-cat business equal to three or four times what we
earned from it in 1993. When Hurricane Andrew blew in 1992, we
paid out about $125 million. Because we've since expanded our
super-cat business, a similar storm today could cost us $600
million.
不过我们确实知道，当损失真正降临时，铁定是件轰动的事，以后可能会发生三
倍或四倍于我们在1993年所赚到的盈余那样大的意外事件，1992年Andrew
飓风发生的那次，我们总共赔了1.25亿美元，时至今日由于我们已大幅扩大在
霹雳猫保险的业务量，所以同样规模的飓风可能会造成我们六亿美元左右的理赔
损失。
So far, we have been lucky in 1994. As I write this letter,
we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake
will be nominal. But if the quake had been a 7.5 instead of a 6.8,
it would have been a different story.
1994年到目前为止，我们还算是幸运，在我写这封信时，我们因为洛杉矶大地
震所造成的损失还算在正常范围之内，不过要是当时地震发生的规模不是6.8
而是7.5的话，那么最后的结果就完全不是那么一回事了。
Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super-cat policies.
In Ajit Jain, we have by far the best manager in this business.
Additionally, companies writing these policies need enormous
capital, and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that
of our main competitors. In most lines of insurance, huge
resources aren't that important: An insurer can diversify the
risks it writes and, if necessary, can lay off risks to reduce
concentration in its portfolio. That isn't possible in the supercat
business. So these competitors are forced into offering far
smaller limits than those we can provide. Were they bolder, they
would run the risk that a mega-catastrophe - or a confluence of
smaller catastrophes - would wipe them out.
Berkshire本身很适合从事霹雳猫保险的业务，我们有业界最优秀的经理人Ajit
Jain，此外从事这行需要相当雄厚的资金实力，在这点我们公司的净值大概是其
他主要竞争对手的10到20倍，对大部分的保险业务而言，背后所拥有的资源
还不是那么地重要，一家保险公司可以很轻易地就把它所承担的风险分散出去，
若有必要，也可以降低险种集中度以减低风险，但是对霹雳猫保险这种特殊的保
险就没有办法这样子做，所以其它的竞争同业只能被迫降低理赔的上限来因应，
而要是他们胆敢承担更高的风险，则一个超大型的意外灾害或是连续发生几个较
小型的灾害，就有可能让他们粉身碎骨。
One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that
each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world buys
very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire. Better than
anyone else, these giants understand that the test of a reinsurer
is its ability and willingness to pay losses under trying
circumstances, not its readiness to accept premiums when things
look rosy.
有一件事情可以显示我们超强的竞争力与卓越的声誉，那就是全世界前四大再保
公司全部都向Berkshire投保钜额的霹雳猫保险，这些大公司比谁都清楚，对于
再保公司来说，真正要考验的是他们在困难的状况下，愿意且能够支付理赔金的
能力与意愿，而绝对不是在太平时期勇于接受保费收入的意愿。
One caution: There has recently been a substantial increase
in reinsurance capacity. Close to $5 billion of equity capital has
been raised by reinsurers, almost all of them newly-formed
entities. Naturally these new entrants are hungry to write
business so that they can justify the projections they utilized in
attracting capital. This new competition won't affect our 1994
operations; we're filled up there, primarily with business written
in 1993. But we are now seeing signs of price deterioration. If
this trend continues, we will resign ourselves to much-reduced
volume, keeping ourselves available, though, for the large,
sophisticated buyer who requires a super-cat insurer with large
capacity and a sure ability to pay losses.
值得注意的是，近年来愿意接受再保业务的供给量大幅增加，再保业者总共募集
了近50亿美元的资金来进军这类业务，且大部分都是新成立的公司，很自然的
这些新进的业者急欲承接业务以证明当初他们吸收资金时所作的预估，这些新加
入的竞争并不会影响我们1994年的营运，因为我们早已经接满了生意，主要是
在1993年签下的，不过我们已经看到保费价格有恶化的趋势，如果这种情况持
续下去，我们将会大幅降低承接的业务量，但随时准备好接下大型且复杂的保险
业者所欲寻找确定能够理赔损失的保证。
In other areas of our insurance business, our homestate
operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business,
headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit-card operation, managed by the
Kizer family; and National Indemnity's traditional auto and general
liability business, led by Don Wurster, all achieved excellent
results. In combination, these four units produced a significant
underwriting profit and substantial float.
在我们其它保险业务方面，我们由Rod领导的住宅保险、Brad带领的员工退休
保险以及由Kizer家族经营的信用卡保险业务，以及由Don所领导的国家产险
所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面，总的来说，这四类业务都表现的相当
不错，不但有承保获利，还贡献了相当大金额的保险浮存金。
All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though
its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an
intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount -
larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.
总而言之，我们拥有第一流的保险事业，虽然他们的经营成果变化相当的大，但
是其实质价值却远超过其帐面的价值，而事实上，在Berkshire其它事业的身上
也有类似的情况。
Common Stock Investments
股票投资
Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over
$250 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to
subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我们超过二亿五千万美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于
Berkshire关系企业所持有)。
12/31/93
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
2,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. $ 345,000 $1,239,000
93,400,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............... 1,023,920 4,167,975
13,654,600 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
("Freddie Mac") ................... 307,505 681,023
34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45,713 1,759,594
4,350,000 General Dynamics Corp. ............... 94,938 401,287
24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600,000 1,431,000
38,335,000 Guinness PLC ......................... 333,019 270,822
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company. ......... 9,731 440,148
6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 423,680 878,614
Considering the similarity of this year's list and the last,
you may decide your management is hopelessly comatose. But we
continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an
interest in a business that is both understandable and durably
wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to
replace.
看到今年所列的投资与去年竟如此的相似，你可能会认为本公司的管理阶层实在
是昏庸到无可救药的地步，不过我们还是坚持相信离开原本就熟悉且表现优异稳
定的公司，实在是非常不智之举，这类的公司实在是还难找到更好的替代。
Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble
understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they
operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb longterm
economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of
price. "Why," the CEO would ask, "should I part with my crown
jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal
investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously -
move from business to business when presented with no more than
superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of
these is perhaps, "You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you
