书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面
前，只要你愿意都可以从他那里买进或卖出你的投资，只要他老兄越沮丧，投资
人拥有的机会也就越多，这是由于只要市场波动的幅度越大，一些超低的价格就
更有机会会出现在一些好公司身上，很难想象这种低价的优惠会被投资人视为对
其有害，对于投资人来说，你完全可以无视于他的存在或是好好地利用这种愚蠢
的行为。
In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a
company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much
borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to
know the company's name. What he treasures is the price history of
its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price
history and instead will seek whatever information will further our
understanding of the company's business. After we buy a stock,
consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a
year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in
See's or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then, should
we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?
在评估风险时，Beta理论学者根本就不屑于了解这家公司到底是在做什么，他
的竞争对手在干嘛，或是他们到底借了多少钱来营运，他们甚至不愿意知道公司
的名字叫什么，他们在乎的只是这家公司的历史股价，相对地，我们很愿意不管
这家公司过去股价的历史，反而希望尽量能够得到有助于我们了解这家公司的资
讯，另外在我们买进股份之后，我们一点也不在意这家公司的股份在未来的一、
两年内是否有交易，就像是我们根本就不需要持有100%股权的喜斯糖果或是布
朗鞋业的股票报价来证明我们的权益是否存在，同样地我们也不需要持有7%的
可口可乐每日的股票行情。
In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is
whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment
(including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective
holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he
had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial
stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering
precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy
that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation
are:
我们认为投资人应该真正评估的风险是他们从一项投资在其预计持有的期间内
所收到的税后收入加总(也包含出售股份所得)，是否能够让他保有原来投资时拥
有的购买力，再加上合理的利率，虽然这样的风险无法做到像工程般的精确，但
它至少可以做到足以做出有效判断的的程度，在做评估时主要的因素有下列几
点︰
1) The certainty with which the long-term economic
characteristics of the business can be evaluated;
1)这家公司长期竞争能力可以衡量的程度
2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated,
both as to its ability to realize the full potential of
the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;
2)这家公司管理阶层发挥公司潜能以及有效运用现金可以衡量的程度
3) The certainty with which management can be counted on
to channel the rewards from the business to the
shareholders rather than to itself;
3)这家公司管理阶层将企业获得的利益确实回报给股东而非中饱私囊可
以衡量的程度
4) The purchase price of the business;
4)买进这家企业的价格
5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be
experienced and that will determine the degree by which
an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his
gross return.
5)投资人的净购买力所得，须考虑税负与通货膨胀等因素必须从投资收
益总额中扣除的部份
These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably
fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind.
But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not
negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice
Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but
nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can
investors - in an inexact but useful way - "see" the risks inherent
in certain investments without reference to complex equations or
price histories.
这些因素对于许多分析师来说，可能是丈二金刚摸不着头脑，因为他们根本无法
从现有的数据库中找到这些信息，但是取得这些精确数字的难度高并不代表他们
就不重要或是无法克服，就像是司法正义一样，Stewart法官发现他根本无法找
到何谓猥亵的标准，不过他还是坚称，只要我一看到就知道是不是，同样地对于
投资人来说，不需靠精确的公式或是股价历史，而只要运用不太精确但却有用的
方式，就可以看到潜藏在某些投资里的风险。
Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and
Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than,
say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about
44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in
value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which
Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in
which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.
就长期而言，可口可乐与吉列所面临的产业风险，要比任何计算机公司或是通路商
或小得多，可口可乐占全世界饮料销售量的44%，吉列则拥有60%的刮胡刀市
场占有率(以销售额计)，除了称霸口香糖的箭牌公司之外，我看不出还有那家公
司可以像他们一样长期以来享有傲视全球的竞争力。
Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their
worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their
brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of
their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive
advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic
castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily
without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks
of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a
warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."
更重要的，可口可乐与吉列近年来也确实一点一滴地在增加他们全球市场的占有
率，品牌的力量、产品的特质与配销通路的优势，使得他们拥有超强的竞争力，
就像是树立起高耸的护城河来保卫其经济城堡，相对的，一般公司却要每天耗尽
心思去打没有意义的游击战，就像是彼得．林区所说的，对于那些只会销售量贩
式产品的公司来说，大家应该在其股票上加印这句警语-「竞争可能有害于人类
的利益」。
The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to
even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks
is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who
possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude
from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and
Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured?
Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company
- its stock - is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent
in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion makes
sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no
sense.
可口可乐与吉列的竞争力在一般产业观察家眼中实在是显而易见的，然而其股票
的Beta值却与一般平庸、完全没有竞争优势的公司相似，难道只因为这样我们
就该认为在衡量公司所面临的产业风险时，完全不须考虑他们所享有的竞争优势
吗? 或者就可以说持有一家公司部份所有权-也就是股票的风险，与公司长期所
面临的营运风险一点关系都没有，我们认为这些说法，包含衡量投资风险的Beta
公式在内，一点道理都没有。
The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for
differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy
company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy
company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite
possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they
have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the
factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness.
Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining
himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably
intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment
risks with a useful degree of accuracy.
Beta学者所架构的理论根本就没有能力去分辨，销售宠物玩具或呼拉圈的玩具
公司与销售大富翁或芭比娃娃的玩具公司，所隐藏的风险有何不同? 但对一般普
通的投资人来说，只要他略懂得消费者行为以及形成企业长期竞争优势或弱势的
原因的话，就可以很明确的看出两者的差别，当然每个投资人都会犯错，但只要
将自己集中在相对少数，容易了解的投资个案上，一个理性、知性与耐性兼具的
投资人一定能够将投资风险限定在可接受的范围之内。
In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine
whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie." We
couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend
years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our own
intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding,
and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the
roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving
technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of
its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what
would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer
industries? Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors and
corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.)
Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the
future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We'll stick instead
with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack
when one is sitting in plain sight?
当然有许多产业，连查理或是我可能都无法判断到底我们在玩的是宠物玩具或芭
比娃娃，甚至在花了许多年时间努力的研究这些产业之后，我们还是无法解决这
个问题，有时是因为我们本身智识上的缺陷，阻碍了我们对事情的了解，有时则
是因为产业特性的关系，例如对于一家随时都比须面临快速变迁技术的公司来
说，我们根本就无法对其长期的竞争力做出任何的评断，人类在三十年前，是否
就能预知现在电视制造或计算机产业的演进，当然不能，就算是大部分钻研于这方
面领域的投资人与企业经理人也没有办法，那么为什么查理跟我要觉得应该要有
去预测其它产业快速变迁前景的能力呢? 我们宁愿挑些简单一点的，一个人坐的
舒舒服服就好了，为什么还要费事去挨稻草里的针呢?
Of course, some investment strategies - for instance, our
efforts in arbitrage over the years - require wide diversification.
If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk
should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutuallyindependent
commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase a
risky investment - one that indeed has a significant possibility of
causing loss or injury - if you believe that your gain, weighted
for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably
weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but
unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this
strategy. Should you choose to pursue this course, you should
adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which
will want to see lots of action because it is favored by
probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.
当然，有些投资策略，例如我们从事多年的套利活动，就必须将风险分散，若是
单一交易的风险过高，就比须将资源分散到几个各自独立的个案之上，如此一
来，虽然每个个案都有可能导致损失或伤害，但只要你确信每个独立的个案经过
机率的加权平均能够让你获致满意的报酬就行了，许多创业投资者用的就是这种
方法，若是你也打算这样做的话，记得采取与赌场老板搞轮盘游戏同样的心态，
那就是鼓励大家持续不断的下注，因为长期而言，机率对庄家有利，但千万要拒
绝单一一次的大赌注。
Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when
an investor who does not understand the economics of specific
businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a longterm
owner of American industry. That investor should both own a
large number of equities and space out his purchases. By
periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the knownothing
investor can actually out-perform most investment
professionals. Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its
limitations, it ceases to be dumb.
另外一种需要分散风险的特殊情况是，当投资人并没有对任何单一产业有特别的
熟悉，不过他却对美国整体产业前景有信心，则这类的投资人应该分散持有许多
公司的股份，同时将投入的时点拉长，例如，透过定期投资指数基金，一个什么
都不懂的投资人通常都能打败大部分的专业经理人，很奇怪的是，当愚昧的金钱
了解到自己的极限之后，它就不再愚昧了。
On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able
to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensiblypriced
companies that possess important long-term competitive
advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you.
It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I
cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money
into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding
that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands best
and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit
potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a
good thing can be wonderful."
另一方面，若是你是稍具常识的投资人，能够了解产业经济的话，应该就能够找
出五到十家股价合理并享有长期竞争优势的公司，此时一般分散风险的理论对你
来说就一点意义也没有，要是那样做反而会伤害到你的投资成果并增加你的风
险，我实在不了解那些投资人为什么要把钱摆在他排名第20的股票上，而不是
把钱集中在排名最前面，最熟悉了解同时风险最小，获利可能最大的投资之上，
或许这就是先知梅西卫斯特所说的，「好事物越多，就越完美」。
Corporate Governance
企业治理
At our annual meetings, someone usually asks "What happens to
this place if you get hit by a truck?" I'm glad they are still
asking the question in this form. It won't be too long before the
query becomes: "What happens to this place if you don't get hit by
a truck?"
在年度的股东会上，有人常常会问︰「要是那天你不幸被车撞到，该怎么办?」
我只能说很庆幸他们还是在问这样的问题，而不是「要是那天你不被车撞到，我
们该怎么办?」。
Such questions, in any event, raise a reason for me to discuss
corporate governance, a hot topic during the past year. In
general, I believe that directors have stiffened their spines
recently and that shareholders are now being treated somewhat more
like true owners than was the case not long ago. Commentators on
corporate governance, however, seldom make any distinction among
three fundamentally different manager/owner situations that exist
in publicly-held companies. Though the legal responsibility of
directors is identical throughout, their ability to effect change
differs in each of the cases. Attention usually falls on the first
case, because it prevails on the corporate scene. Since Berkshire
falls into the second category, however, and will someday fall into
the third, we will discuss all three variations.
这样的问题让我有机会谈谈近年来相当热门的话题-公司治理，首先我相信最近
许多公司的董事们已开始试着把他们的腰杆打直，而现在的投资人比起以前来
说，也慢慢地被公司当作真正的拥有人来对待，但是评论专家并没有仔细地去区
别目前公开上市公司三种截然不同的经营权与所有权形态，虽然在法律上，董事
们应该承担的责任是责无旁贷的，但他们能发挥影响力进行改变的程度却有很大
的不同，大家通常都把注意力摆在第一类的案例之上，因为这是目前一般企业的
常态，但由于Berkshire本身是属于第二类，甚至有一天会变成第三类，所以在
这里我们有必要讨论一下三者的不同。
The first, and by far most common, board situation is one in
which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In that case,
I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee
owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all
proper ways. Unfortunately, "long-term" gives directors a lot of
wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability to think
independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders
while still claiming to be acting in their long-term interest. But
assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a
management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have the
responsibility for changing that management, just as an intelligent
owner would do if he were present. And if able but greedy managers
over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders'
pockets, directors must slap their hands.
首先是第一类，也是目前最普遍的一类，在公司的股权结构中，并没有一个具掌
控能力的大股东，在这种情况下，我相信董事会的行为应该要像是公司有一个因
事未出席的大股东一样，在各种情况下，都要能够确保这位虚拟大股东的长期利
益不会受到损害，然而很不幸的是，所谓的长期利益，反而给了董事会很大的弹
性操作空间，而假设董事会运作尚称顺畅，不过经营阶层却很平庸甚至差劲时，
那么董事会就必须负起责任将经营阶层换掉，就好象一般公司老板会做的决定一
样，另外要是经营阶层能力尚可，只不过过于贪心，不时地想要从股东的口袋里
捞钱，那么董事会就必须适时地出手制止并给予警告。
In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something he
doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his
views. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make
the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director
can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel
free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors
