书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面 .2
seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors would
in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort. But I
see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are
serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect a vigorous
rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that should
discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational
causes.
在这种一般常见的情况下，当个别董事发觉有不合理的现象时，应该试着说服其
他董事有关他的看法，若能够成功，那么董事会就有能力做出适当的决定，但是
假设要是这位落寞的董事孤掌难鸣，无法获得其它董事的支持，那么他就应该要
让没能出席的股东知道他的看法，当然很少有董事真的这样做，很多的董事事实
上并没有足够的胆识敢做这样大胆的动作，但我却认为这样的举动并没有什么不
妥，当然假设问题真的很严重的话，自然而然发出不平之鸣的董事一定会遭到其
他不认同看法的董事严正的驳斥，认为反对的董事不要在枝微末节或是非理性的
原因上捣乱。
For the boards just discussed, I believe the directors ought
to be relatively few in number - say, ten or less - and ought to
come mostly from the outside. The outside board members should
establish standards for the CEO's performance and should also
periodically meet, without his being present, to evaluate his
performance against those standards.
对于前述讨论的董事会形态，我认为董事的人数不必太多，最好是十个以内，同
时大部分成员应该从外部遴选，而外部董事应该要能够建立对CEO表现的评核
制度，并定期聚会，在CEO不在场的情况下，依据这些原则评断其表现。
The requisites for board membership should be business savvy,
interest in the job, and owner-orientation. Too often, directors
are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to
the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes in
selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments
are so hard to undo: The pleasant but vacuous director need never
worry about job security.
至于董事会成员遴选的条件，并须具备商业经验、对这项角色有兴趣同时以股东
利益为导向，只是目前大部分被遴选出来的董事，大多是因为他们的社会地位或
只是为了增加董事会成员的多样化，这样的做法是错误的，更有甚至，这种错误
还有后遗症，因为董事被任命之后就很难再加以撤消，好说话且没有意见的董事
是不怕找不到位置的。
The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the
controlling owner is also the manager. At some companies, this
arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock
endowed with disproportionate voting power. In these situations,
it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners
and management and that the directors cannot effect chang，e except
through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner/manager is mediocre or
worse - or is over-reaching - there is little a director can do
about it except object. If the directors having no connections to
the owner/manager make a unified argument, it may well have some
effect. More likely it will not.
第二种就像是发生在Berkshire的，具控制权的大股东本身也是经营阶层，在某
些公司，经过特殊的安排，将公司的股权按投票权重的不同分成两类，也会产生
这种情况，在这种情况下，很明显的董事会并非所有权人与经营阶层之间的中
介，且除非经由劝说，否则董事会很难发挥改变的影响力，也因此要是老板经营
者本身的能力平庸或很差劲或不顾他人，则董事除了表示反对以外，别无他法，
而要是与老板经营者没有关系的董事碰巧做出相同的结论，有时或许还有用，但
大部分的状况下是无济于事的。
If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently
serious, the outside directors should resign. Their resignation
will signal their doubts about management, and it will emphasize
that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's
shortcomings.
而要是公司无法做出改变，且情况演变的很严重时，外部董事就应该要辞职，外
部董事的辞职等于是对现有的经营阶层投下反对票，同时凸显外部董事没有能力
纠正老板经营者缺失的现象。
The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling
owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples of
which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside directors
in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy with
either the competence or integrity of the manager, they can go
directly to the owner (who may also be on the board) and report
their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside
director, since he need make his case only to a single, presumably
interested owner, who can forthwith effect change if the argument
is persuasive. Even so, the dissatisfied director has only that
single course of action. If he remains unsatisfied about a
critical matter, he has no choice but to resign.
第三种情况是公司拥有具控制权的大股东，但却不参与公司经营，这种特殊个案
在现实社会中有Hershey食品与道琼公司等例子，公司能够充分运用外部董事
的能力，若是董事们对于经营阶层的能力或品格感到不满意，他们可以直接向大
股东反应(当然大股东可能也是董事成员)，这种环境相当适合外部董事的发挥，
因为他只需要将情况向单一且关心公司前景的所有权人报告，同时只要论点理由
充分就可以马上发挥改变的效果，但即便如此，有意见的董事也只能有这样的选
择管道，若是他对于特定事情的处理结果不满意，他还是只能辞职而别无其它选
择。
Logically, the third case should be the most effective in
insuring first-class management. In the second case the owner is
not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors often
find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild overreaching.
Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of
the board - an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if
management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious - their hands
are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in situations
of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around
they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds
unfettered.
理论上，第三种情况最能够确保一流的经营阶层存在，因为第二种情况，老板不
可能把自己给Fire掉，而第一种情况，董事们通常很难与表现平庸又难以驾驭
的经理人打交道，而除非那些有意见的董事能够获得董事会多数的支持，这是一
件很困难的协调沟通任务，尤其是经营阶层的表现虽然可恨但却罪不至死的时
候，基本上他们的手脚是被绑的死死的，实务上，面临这种现象的董事通常会说
服自己留在董事会，至少还能有所图，但在此同时，经营阶层却还是同样可以为
所欲为。
In the third case, the owner is neither judging himself nor
burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can also
insure that outside directors are selected who will bring useful
qualities to the board. These directors, in turn, will know that
the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather than
being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling
owner is intelligent and self-confident, he will make decisions in
respect to management that are meritocratic and pro-shareholder.
Moreover - and this is critically important - he can readily
correct any mistake he makes.
在第三种情况下，老板本身不必衡量自己的表现也不必费心去取得多数人的支
持，同时他也可以确保所遴选出来的外部董事将可对董事会的素质有所提升，而
这些被选中的董事，也可以确定所提出的建议会真正被听进去，而不是被消极抵
制的经营阶层当作是耳边风，而若是大股东本身够聪明且有自信，那么他就能够
找到以股东利益为优先的菁英经理人，还有一点更重要的是，他能够随时准备改
正本身所犯的错误。
At Berkshire we operate in the second mode now and will for as
long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is excellent.
For better or worse, you are likely to have me as an owner/manager
for some time.
在Berkshire，我们现在是以第二种情况在做营运，而且在我有生之年都会是如
此，至于我个人的健康状况，我必须要强调，实在是好极了，不管是好或坏，大
家都必须继续接受我担任大股东兼经营者。
After my death, all of my stock will go to my wife, Susie,
should she survive me, or to a foundation if she dies before I do.
In neither case will taxes and bequests require the sale of
consequential amounts of stock.
直到我死后，我拥有的所有股份将会归我内人Susie拥有，要是她比我长寿的
话，不过要是她比我早死，所有的股份将会捐给一个基金会，且不论如何都不会
因为遗产或赠与税而必须被迫出售相当的股份。
When my stock is transferred to either my wife or the
foundation, Berkshire will enter the third governance mode, going
forward with a vitally interested, but non-management, owner and
with a management that must perform for that owner. In preparation
for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years ago, and
in 1993 our son, Howard, joined the board. These family members
will not be managers of the company in the future, but they will
represent the controlling interest should anything happen to me.
Most of our other directors are also significant owners of
Berkshire stock, and each has a strong owner-orientation. All in
all, we're prepared for "the truck."
而当我的股份移转到我内人或是基金会之后，Berkshire将会进入第三种公司治
理情况，变成一个关心公司但却不参与经营的大股东搭配完全为股东设想的经理
人，为了预先做准备，Susie在几年前已经被选为公司的董事，而1993年我的
儿子豪尔也紧接着加入董事会，这些家族成员以后将不会担任公司的经理人，但
要是万一我不在时，他们将继承控制公司的权力，当然公司其它的董事本身也都
是主要的股东，且皆有很强的股东利益导向，总而言之，对于那辆卡车可能到来，
我们已经作好了准备。
Shareholder-Designated Contributions
股东指定捐赠计画
About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's
1993 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions
made through the program were $9.4 million and 3,110 charities were
recipients.
大约有97%的有效股权参与1993年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约940万美
元捐出的款项分配给3,110家慈善机构。
Berkshire's practice in respect to discretionary philanthropy
- as contrasted to its policies regarding contributions that are
clearly related to the company's business activities - differs
significantly from that of other publicly-held corporations.
There, most corporate contributions are made pursuant to the wishes
of the CEO (who often will be responding to social pressures),
employees (through matching gifts), or directors (through matching
gifts or requests they make of the CEO).
Berkshire在自由乐捐方面的做法，(不同于具有特定商业目的的捐赠)，与其它
公开上市公司的做法有很大的不同，因为大部分的公司所作的捐赠大多是依照
CEO的意愿(他们通常背负许多社会压力)，员工(透过相对赠与)或董事(透过相对
赠与或是对于CEO的要求)。
At Berkshire, we believe that the company's money is the
owners' money, just as it would be in a closely-held corporation,
partnership, or sole proprietorship. Therefore, if funds are to be
given to causes unrelated to Berkshire's business activities, it is
the charities favored by our owners that should receive them.
We've yet to find a CEO who believes he should personally fund the
charities favored by his shareholders. Why, then, should they foot
the bill for his picks?
不过在Berkshire我们相信公司所有的钱都是属于股东的，就像是在私人家族合
伙企业一样，因此只要这些捐赠资金与公司本身商业活动无关的话，那么就应该
要由股东们所想要赠与的慈善机构收到这些款项，就像是我们还没看到过有
CEO愿意拿自己的钱，依照股东们的意愿进行乐捐，那么又有什么理由，让股
东为公司的CEO买单呢?
Let me add that our program is easy to administer. Last fall,
for two months, we borrowed one person from National Indemnity to
help us implement the instructions that came from our 7,500
registered shareholders. I'd guess that the average corporate
program in which employee gifts are matched incurs far greater
administrative costs. Indeed, our entire corporate overhead is
less than half the size of our charitable contributions. (Charlie,
however, insists that I tell you that $1.4 million of our $4.9 million
overhead is attributable to our corporate jet, The Indefensible.)
而我必须说明的是我们这项计画执行起来并不困难，去年秋天，我们从国家产险
公司借调一个人为期两个月，帮我们处理来自7,500位股东的捐款指示，而我
也相信其它公司花在处理相同捐赠规模所发生的成本铁定比我们高出许多，事实
上，我们公司每年所有的行政费用甚至不到我们每年捐赠金额的一半，(查理坚
持我必须向大家报告，总计490万美元的营业费用当中，有140万是发生在公
司的企业专机-无可辩解号之上)。
Below is a list showing the largest categories to which our
shareholders have steered their contributions.
(a) 347 churches and synagogues received 569 gifts
(b) 283 colleges and universities received 670 gifts
(c) 244 K-12 schools (about two-thirds secular, onethird
religious) received 525 gifts
(d) 288 institutions dedicated to art, culture or the
humanities received 447 gifts
(e) 180 religious social-service organizations (split
about equally between Christian and Jewish) received
411 gifts
(f) 445 secular social-service organizations (about 40%
youth-related) received 759 gifts
(g) 153 hospitals received 261 gifts
(h) 186 health-related organizations (American Heart
Association, American Cancer Society, etc.) received
320 gifts
下表显示股东指定捐赠的前十大慈善机构
(a)347个教堂与犹太教堂收到569笔善款
(b)283所大专院校收到670笔善款
(c)244所K-12学校收到525笔善款(三分之二是普通学校，另外三分之一属教会学校)
(d)288所艺术、文化或人类学研究机构收到447笔善款
(e)180所宗教性社福机构(犹太教与基督教各半)收到411笔善款
(f)445所民间社福机构(其中四成与青少年相关)收到759笔善款
(g)153所医疗机构收到261笔善款
(h)186所与医疗相关的机构(如美国心脏学会，美国癌症协会等) 收到320笔善款
Three things about this list seem particularly interesting to
me. First, to some degree it indicates what people choose to give
money to when they are acting of their own accord, free of pressure
from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second, the
contributions programs of publicly-held companies almost never
allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these
institutions are what many shareholders would like to support.
Third, the gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting
philosophies: 130 gifts were directed to organizations that
believe in making abortions readily available for women and 30
gifts were directed to organizations (other than churches) that
discourage or are opposed to abortion.
在这之中，有三点我认为特别有趣，首先，某种程度可以显示出当人们系依个人
意志而非迫于募款人的压力或募款机构感性的诉求时，所可能做出的选择，第
二，一般大公司的捐赠计画从未将教堂或犹太教堂列入考虑，但这却是股东心目
中最佳的选择之一，第三，股东们所做出的决定有时有明显的冲突，有130笔
捐款给支持堕胎的机构团体，而另外有30笔的捐款指定要给反堕胎的机构团体
(扣除宗教机构不算)。
Last year I told you that I was thinking of raising the amount
that Berkshire shareholders can give under our designatedcontributions
program and asked for your comments. We received a
few well-written letters opposing the entire idea, on the grounds
that it was our job to run the business and not our job to force
shareholders into making charitable gifts. Most of the
shareholders responding, however, noted the tax efficiency of the
plan and urged us to increase the designated amount. Several
shareholders who have given stock to their children or
grandchildren told me that they consider the program a particularly
good way to get youngsters thinking at an early age about the
subject of giving. These people, in other words, perceive the
program to be an educational, as well as philanthropic, tool. The
bottom line is that we did raise the amount in 1993, from $8 per
share to $10.
去年我曾经告诉大家我考虑提高Berkshire股东指定捐赠计画的额度，并询问大
家的意见，不过我们却收到一些股东来信反对整个计画，他们认为我们的责任是
将公司经营好而不是去强迫股东做一些慈善捐赠，当然大部分的股东还是支持这
项计画，认为这种做法可以享受租税优惠，并敦促我们提高捐赠的额度，有好几
位把部份股份移转给子女或孙子女的股东告诉我，他们认为这是让下一代了解施
比受有福最好的教育方法，因此最后我们还是决定将下限从每股8美元提高到
每股10元。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that
Berkshire distributes, our operating businesses make contributions,
including merchandise, averaging about $2.5 million annually.
These contributions support local charities, such as The United
Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
Berkshire除了透过股东指定捐赠计画对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每
年也会透过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在250万美元左右。
这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐
出的相当。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our
shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages
50-51. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your
shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the
nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so
registered on August 31, 1994 will be ineligible for the 1994
