书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面 .4
己在不中意的好球带挥棒，我绝对无法成为打击率3成44的强打者，而可能变
成2成5的普通球员，查理跟我都很同意这样的看法，所以我们宁愿静静的等
待球儿滑进我们喜欢的好球带。
We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts,
which are an expensive distraction for many investors and
businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the
huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two
oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or
treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.
对于坊间一般投资人与商业人士相当迷信的政治与经济的预测，我们仍将保持视
而不见的态度，三十年来，没有人能够正确地预测到越战会持续扩大、工资与价
格管制、两次的石油危机、总统的辞职下台以及苏联的解体、道琼在一天之内大
跌508点或者是国库券殖利率在2.8%与17.4%之间巨幅波动。
But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the
slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did
they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses
at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let
a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of
capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when
apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the
foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.
不过令人惊讶的是，这些曾经轰动一时的重大事件却从未让班哲明．葛拉罕的投
资哲学造成丝毫的损伤，也从没有让以合理的价格买进优良的企业看起来有任何
的不妥，想象一下，若是我们因为这些莫名的恐惧而延迟或改变我们运用资金的
态度，将会使我们付出多少的代价，事实上，我们通常都是利用某些历史事件发
生，悲观气氛到达顶点时，找到最好的进场机会，恐惧虽然是盲从者的敌人，但
却是基本面信徒的好朋友。
A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next
30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit
from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we
have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little
effect on our long-term results.
在往后的三十年间，一定还会有一连串令人震惊的事件发生，我们不会妄想要去
预测它或是从中获利，如果我们还能够像过去那样找到优良的企业，那么长期而
言，外在的意外对我们的影响实属有限。
What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that
during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie
and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will
you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation
arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside
than the downside.
而就像我曾经承诺过的，除了获利没办法像以前那么好之外，你们在Berkshire
股权所得到的待遇将会与查理和我一完全致，如果你遭受损失，我们也不好过，
如果我们吃香的，那么你们也就跟着喝辣的，而且我们绝对不会靠任何奖金报酬
制度让我们多占点便宜而破坏这样美好的关系。
We further promise you that our personal fortunes will
remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will
not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money
elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment
portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many
friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in
the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.
此外我们也向大家保证我个人绝大部份的身家都将继续摆在Berkshire的股份
之上，我们不会在央求各位参与我们投资的同时，还把自己的钱摆在别的地方，
甚至于巴菲特家族以及查理跟我在1960年代经营合伙企业时期的老朋友，所拥
有的投资绝大部份也都是以Berkshire股份为主。
Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years
ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities
having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire
share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those
securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only
about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various
manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were
almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses
in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest
expense.
值得庆幸的是，我们可以在一个很好的基础上努力打拼，十年前，也就是在1984
年，Berkshire的保险子公司持有价值17亿美元的股票投资组合，每股约当有
1,500美元的投资，扣除这部份的收益与资本利得不算，Berkshire当年的税前
盈余只有区区的600万美元，没错，虽然我们在制造、零售以及服务事业方面
依然有不错的利润，但是大部分的盈余都被保险事业的承保损失、营业费用以及
利息支出所抵消掉。
Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000
per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these
securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million.
During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000
(including eleven people at World Headquarters).
时至今日，我们持有的股票投资组合价值超过180亿美元，每股约当有15,000
美元，若是再一次我们将这些股票投资所产生的收益扣除的话，我们在1994年
的税前盈余是3.84亿美元，十年来，雇用的员工人数从原先的5,000人增加到
22,000人，(包含企业总部的11人在内)。
We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps
of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some
ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing
a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows
hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.
之所以能有这样的成果，要归功于旗下这群特别的经理人，是他们让那些看起来
很普通平凡的事业能有不凡的结果，Casey曾经把他带领一支棒球队的工作，形
容为靠着别人击出全垒打赚钱过活，这也是我在Berkshire维生的方式。
The businesses in which we have partial interests are
equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will
illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280
billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on
each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of
Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings,
which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200
million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has
a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by
revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250
million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion
bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire
Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.
我们持有少数股权企业的贡献，对Berkshire来说也功不可没，从一些统计数字
中，可以看出他们的重要性，1994年可口可乐总计卖出2,800亿罐八盎斯饮
料，每罐大概能赚一美分，不过积沙成塔，若按Berkshire拥有7.8%可口可乐
的股权比例，我们大概可以分配到210亿罐，总计光是饮料贡献给我们的盈余
就有二亿美元；同样的，透过对于吉列的持股，Berkshire大概可以分得全世界
刮胡刀7%的市场占有率(以营收而非销量计算)，约为2.5亿美元的销售额；另
外在拥有530亿美元资产的富国银行，我们持有13%的股权大概就等于是一家
拥有70亿美元资产同时每年获利一亿美元的银行。
It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope
diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just
mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't
limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a
growing collection.
我们宁愿拥有天然钻石的一小部份，也不要有100%的人工钻石，而刚刚提到的
那些公司堪称为天然的稀有宝石，更难得的是我们不是只拥有现在这一些，以后
还会得到更多更多。
Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply
- and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time,
however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of
businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a
satisfactory rate.
股票价格仍会持续波动，有时幅度会很大，同时经济景气的循环也会上上下下，
然而就长期而言，我们相信所拥有的这类优良企业的价值很有可能还会继续以稳
定的速度成长。
Book Value and Intrinsic Value
帐面价值与实质价值
We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily
calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly,
we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is
impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.
我们会固定公布每股的帐面价值，虽然它的用处不大，但这总算是一个比较容易
计算的数字，就像是我们一再提醒各位真正重要的是实质价值，虽然这个数字没
有办法准确计算但却有必要将以估算。
For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that
Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that
figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since
all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable
textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern
nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964,
then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance
sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a
Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the
liabilities are solid."
例如我们可以很确定的告诉大家1964年每股的帐面价值是19.46美元，不过
这个数字很明显的高于其实质的价值，因为公司的资产主要集中于获利不怎么理
想的纺织事业，我们纺织资产的继续经营或清算价值都远比不上帐面价值，所以
任何想要了解1964年Berkshire资产负债表健全性的人士，得到的答案跟恶名
昭彰的好莱坞大亨可能给你的答案一样，「放心好了，所有的负债都如假包
换！」。
Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the
businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying
value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette,
are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you
book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough,
albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's
intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in
concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate
gain in intrinsic value also.
如今Berkshire的情况已完全倒转，我们掌控的许多企业其实际的价值远高于帐
面价值，(至于无法掌控的公司，如可口可乐或吉列刮胡刀则是以目前市价列
示)，不过我们还是照旧提供各位帐面价值的数字，因为虽然这项数字被严重低
估，但仍然可以被当作为追踪Berkshire实质价值的一项指针，事实上，以去年
来说，这两项数字以颇为一致的速度变动，帐面价值增加了13.9%，而实质价
值大概也是以这个速度成长。
We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the
cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining
life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up
with a highly subjective figure that will change both as
estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates
move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is allimportant
and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative
attractiveness of investments and businesses.
我们将实质价值定义为一家企业在其生涯中所能产生现金流量的折现值，任何人
在计算实质价值都必须特别注意未来现金流量的修正与利率的变动都会影响到
最后计算出来的结果，虽然模糊难辨，但实质价值却是最重要的，也是唯一能够
作为评估投资标的与企业的合理方法。
To see how historical input (book value) and future output
(intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of
investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost
as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should
include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he
chose college rather than a job.
为了了解历史投入的帐面价值与未来产出的实质价值会有怎样不同的演变，让我
看看另外一种不同形式的投资-大学教育，假设把教育成本当作是帐面价值，再
算的仔细一点，还要包含学生因为读书而放弃工作收入的机会成本。
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic
benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic
value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate
will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an
estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his
education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must
then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to
graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic
value of the education.
在这里，我们姑且先不论非经济的效益而只专注于经济效益，首先，我们必须先
估计这位毕业生在毕业后终其一生的职场生涯所能得到的收入，然后再扣除要是
他没有接受这项教育，原本可以得到的收入，从而我们可以得到因为这项投资，
他可以获得的额外收入，当然之后还要利用一个适当的利率加以折现，得到截至
毕业日止的折现值，所得到的数字也就等于这场教育所能够带来的实质经济价
值。
Some graduates will find that the book value of their
education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever
paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other
cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its
book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In
all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an
indicator of intrinsic value.
有些毕业生可能会发现其帐面成本可能远高于计算出来的实质价值，这就代表着
不值得他去接受这样的教育，相对地，要是接受教育所产生的实质价值远高于投
入的成本，那么就表示这样的投资是明智的抉择，不过不管怎样，有一点很明确
的，那就是实质价值的多寡跟帐面投入成本一点关系都没有。
Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an
example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not
only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic
value can change but also will provide an accounting lesson that
I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've
chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to
be a huge winner.
若各位觉得这种说法学究气太重，就让我们以Berkshire本身实际投资史考特飞
兹的经验当做具体的例证，在这里我们不但可以解释帐面价值与实质价值之间的
关系会有多大的变化，同时可以藉此替大家上一课期待已久的会计学，当然这次
我选择说明的对象是一个相当成功的购并投资案。
Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986.
At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and
today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no
disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby,
and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important
contributors to earnings as well.
Berkshire是在1986年初买下史考特飞兹的，在当时这家公司拥有22项不同
的事业，时至今日我们没有新增，也没有处分其中任何一项，史考特飞兹主要的
营运集中在世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与Campbell空压机，当然其余的事业对
盈余的贡献也相当重要。
We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time
had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 million premium we
handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic
value was close to double its book value.
当时我们斥资3.152亿美元买下帐面价值1.726亿美元的史考特飞兹，超过的
1.426亿美元溢价，代表着我们认为这家公司的实质价值大概是其帐面价值的两
倍。
In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer,
as well as its earnings and dividends, since our purchase.
下表显示的是自我们买下史考特飞兹后，历年来的帐面价值以及它的获利与股利
收入。
(1) (4)
Beginning (2) (3) Ending
Year Book Value Earnings Dividends Book Value
---- ---------- -------- --------- ----------
(In $ Millions) (1)+(2)-(3)
1986 ............... $172.6 $ 40.3 $125.0 $ 87.9
1987 ............... 87.9 48.6 41.0 95.5
1988 ............... 95.5 58.0 35.0 118.6
1989 ............... 118.6 58.5 71.5 105.5
1990 ............... 105.5 61.3 33.5 133.3
1991 ............... 133.3 61.4 74.0 120.7
1992 ............... 120.7 70.5 80.0 111.2
1993 ............... 111.2 77.5 98.0 90.7
1994 ............... 90.7 79.3 76.0 94.0
Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott
Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends of $125 million in
1986, though it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that
we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance
sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when
we purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used
by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not sold plants
and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like.
Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a
conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.
因为在购并交易完成当年，公司帐上有多余的现金，所以虽然史考特飞兹1986
年的获利只有4,030万美元，但却能够支付Berkshire 1.25亿美元的股利，另
外还有一点我必须强调的是，在史考特飞兹我们并没有运用任何的财务杠杆，事
实上，该公司在我们购并之初的负债便相当有限，之后甚至还掉了所有的债务(除
了财务子公司的借款)，同时我们也没有把工厂卖掉再租回来或是出售应收帐款
之类的举动，在我们拥有的这几年，史考特飞兹一直以相当保守的财务杠杆经营
并且维持相当高的流动性。
As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased
steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown
