书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面 .5
commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was
exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly
extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by
comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500,
a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone company.
大家可以看到，史考特飞兹的盈余在我们买下之后持续稳定的增加，不过在此同
时净值却未呈等比例的增加，也因此在我们买下该公司时，就已经相当不错的股
东权益报酬率，到现在又变得更加优异，我们甚至可以拿它与财星五百大作比
较，事实上以史考特飞兹的规模，若单独计便得以列入五百大之林。
Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list - the latest
available for inspection - the company's return on equity would
have ranked 4th. But that is far from the whole story. The top
three companies in return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord
Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and none
of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those
they realized when they were accorded debt forgiveness in
bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating
windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it
first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed,
Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company
ranking tenth.
以所能得到最新的1993年五百大名单来说，该公司的股东权益报酬率可以名列
第四，故事还没结束，前三名分别是Insilco、LTV与Gaylord，全部都是因为
当年度脱离破产边缘，除了当年因为债务获得免除致使盈余暴增之外，其它年度
的获利皆乏善可陈，因此若扣除这些没什么营运的烂果子的话，史考特飞兹的股
东权益报酬率足以名列财星五百大首位，远远比其它对手拋在脑后，甚至是第十
名的两倍之多。
You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be
explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic
position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather,
the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO
Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later.
或许你会认为史考特飞兹的成功不过是盈余循环的高峰、独占垄断或是靠财务杠
杆，不过全都不对，这家公司真正成功的原因在于总裁Ralph Schey优异的管
理技能，这点在后面我们还会详加报告。
First, however, the promised accounting lesson: When we
paid a $142.6 million premium over book value for Scott Fetzer,
that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet.
I'll spare you the details of how this worked (these were laid
out in an appendix to our 1986 Annual Report) and get to the
bottom line: After a premium is initially recorded, it must in
almost all cases be written off over time through annual charges
that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings
statement.
接下来是之前说过的会计课，我们支付超过史考特飞兹帐面价值1.426亿美元
的溢价，将会被记录在Berkshire的资产负债表上，详细的细节我就予以省略(这
些在我们1986年年报的附录都有)，而溢价在登录之后，不管怎样都必须按年
摊销当作成本，并显现在每年的盈余报表之上。
The following table shows, first, the annual charges
Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott Fetzer
acquisition premium and, second, the premium that remains on our
books. These charges have no effect on cash or the taxes we pay,
and are not, in our view, an economic cost (though many
accountants would disagree with us). They are merely a way for
us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so
that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott
Fetzer actually employs in its business.
下表显示，第一栏是Berkshire每年必须慢慢地摊销购买史考特飞兹所产生的溢
价的余额，第二栏是每年必须摊销的金额，这些费用对现金部位或税负支出都不
会有影响，同时就我们的观点而言，也没有任何实质的经济意义(虽然很多会计
师可能不同意我们的看法)，这不过是让我们的帐列投资成本能够慢慢减少，到
最后终与史考特飞兹本身帐列净值一致的方法而已。
Beginning Purchase-Premium Ending
Purchase Charge to Purchase
Year Premium Berkshire Earnings Premium
---- --------- ------------------ --------
(In $ Millions)
1986 ................ $142.6 $ 11.6 $131.0
1987 ................ 131.0 7.1 123.9
1988 ................ 123.9 7.9 115.9
1989 ................ 115.9 7.0 108.9
1990 ................ 108.9 7.1 101.9
1991 ................ 101.9 6.9 95.0
1992 ................ 95.0 7.7 87.2
1993 ................ 87.2 28.1 59.1
1994 ................ 59.1 4.9 54.2
Note that by the end of 1994 the premium was reduced to
$54.2 million. When this figure is added to Scott Fetzer's yearend
book value of $94 million, the total is $148.2 million, which
is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's
books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for
the company when it was acquired. Yet Scott Fetzer is now
earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the intrinsic
value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have
just as consistently marked down its carrying value through
purchase-premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings and
net worth.
大家可能注意到截至1994年底为止，帐列的溢价还剩下5,420万美元，这个
数字若再加上史考特飞兹当年底的净值9,400万美元的话，就等于Berkshire
帐上持有该公司的投资成本1.482亿美元，这个数字甚至不到当初我们买下它
时的一半不到，然而史考特飞兹现在每年所赚的钱，却是当时的二倍，很明显的，
其实质价值一直都在成长，然而透过溢价摊销，Berkshire帐上持有的投资成本
却一再向下调整。
The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and
its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge. As I
mentioned earlier - but am delighted to mention again - credit
for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart
and high-grade manager.
史考特飞兹实质价值与其在Berkshire帐上的帐面价值差距越来越大，如同先前
我曾经提到而现在也很高兴在重申一次，这种不对称的现象完全都要归功于
Ralph Schey-这位专注、聪明且高格调的经理人。
The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben
Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not
necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary
results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this
statement holds true in business management as well. What a
manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted.
That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals
and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side,
Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and
is self-confident without being self-important.
Ralph之所以能够成功的原因并不复杂，我的老师葛拉汉四十五年前就告诉我，
画蛇不必添足，尔后在我个人的投资生涯，我相当惊讶地发现，这道理也适用在
企业管理之上，经理人真正应该做的是把基本工夫做好而不分心，这正是Ralph
的做事方法，在设立好正确的目标后，并毫不犹豫放手去做，至于在私底下，
Ralph也是很好共事的人，对于问题他坦率直言，自信却不自大。
He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I
do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At
Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie
and I, at 71 and 64 respectively, now keep George Foreman's
picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a
mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.
我忘了经验丰富的Ralph今年真正的岁数? 但我确信他跟我们旗下其它许多经
理人一样，老早就过了65岁，在Berkshire，我们注重的是绩效，而不是年资，
查理今年71岁，而我64岁，两人都把拳王George Foreman的照片摆在桌上，
你可以记下，我们对于强制退休年龄的反感将会与日俱增。
Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation
实质价值与资金分配
Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers
as it is for investors. When managers are making capital
allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares -
it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share
intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle
may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when
misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.
了解实质价值，对经理人来说，其重要性与投资人一般，当经理人本身在做资金
分配的决策时-也包含决定买回股份，必须确定这些举动能够增加公司的实质价
值，并尽量避免损害实质价值的举动，这原则看来理所当然，但是违反的情况却
屡见不鲜，而只要不当的决策形成，股东的权益立即就会受到伤害。
For example, in contemplating business mergers and
acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the
transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings
per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book
value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going
back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old
first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic
interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA
student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger
of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer
would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what
could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?
举例来说，在思考企业合并与购并活动时，许多经理人都会专注于每股盈余是会
被稀释或是反稀释(或是在金融机构，则是每股帐面价值)，过分强调这点是相当
危险的，回到我们先前所举大学教育的例子，假设一位25岁MBA一年级的学
生，考虑将他个人未来的经济利益与另一位25岁的工人做结合，他会发现如果
现在尚无谋生能力的他，要是现在与工人做一比一的合并的话，他往后几年的赚
钱能力将会立即大幅提升，但是你想这位MBA会笨到接受这样的提议吗?
In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the wouldbe
purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective
acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of
non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At
Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase
opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term
earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value.
Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice:
"Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a
result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer
than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.
谈到企业购并，对于可能的买主来说，只专注于现在的获利情况却不管潜在的卖
方拥有不同的前景、不一样的非营业资产或不同的资本结构，是一件很愚蠢的
事，在Berkshire我们不知拒绝了多少那种虽然会让短期盈余美观但却可能损及
每股实质价值的合并案或投资机会；总之我们的方式乃效法Wayne Gretzky的
建议，要紧盯小精灵的去向而不是它现在的位置，结果长期下来比起运用一般的
投资标准方法，我们的股东因此多赚了好几十亿美元。
The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an
egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of
the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the
acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the
investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But,
alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders,
often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer
typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that
enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and
"you are running a chain letter in reverse."
很遗憾的是，大部分的购并交易案都充满了不公平性，对于被购并方来说，算是
得到解脱，购并一方的管理阶层则名利双收，旁边的投资银行家与专业顾问也都
能跟着大捞一笔，只不过真正受害的却是购并方背后全体的股东，他们损失惨
重，原因在于购并公司最后所得到的实质价值通常远比得到的低，就像是
Wachovia公司已退休的领导人John Medlin说，这种事做太多，就好象是在倒
写连锁信一样。
Over time, the skill with which a company's managers
allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's
value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates
far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use
internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money
to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But
often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or
investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make
sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you
need a $50,000 rug.
就长期而言，公司经理然滥用公司资金将会对企业的价值有很大的影响，我们认
为一家好公司所能贡献出的现金(至少是在早期)，一定会超过其本身内部所需，
而公司当然可以透过分配股利或买回股份的方式回馈给股东，但是通常企业的
CEO会要求公司策略企划部门、顾问或是投资银行，做出购并一、两家公司的
必要性报告，这样的做法就好象是问你的室内设计师，你是否应该增添一条五万
美元的地毯。
The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological
bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they
possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive
is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be
acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't
disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged
by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a
teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex
life. It's not a push he needs.
这类购并问题又因为隐藏在背后的生物原始本能而变得更复杂，许多CEO之所
以能够做到这个位置，部份的原因在于他们先天拥有相当丰富的动物本能与自
尊，当然我们必须承认一位主管拥有这样的特质，有时对他们有极大的优势，然
而这种本能在他们爬上顶峰之后并不会消失，而当CEO被其顾问们鼓励去进行
购并交易时，我想他的反应跟一位青少年被父亲鼓励可以拥有正常的性生活一
样，这样的做法未免有点揠苗助长。
Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be
said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals.
This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining
to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life
insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through
the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he
abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply
said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."
几年前，我的一位CEO朋友半开玩笑地在无意间透露出许多大交易的病态心
理，我这位朋友经营的是一家产物意外险公司，当时他在董事会上向所有的成员
解释为何公司必须要取得一家人寿保险公司，在就经济与策略面解释了半天理由
之后，突然间他停止了演说，同时露出顽皮的眼神说道：「好吧！我承认，谁叫
其它人也都有一家。」
At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn
extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses.
As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy
their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left,
they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those
funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal
will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we
believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying
economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and
trust.
在Berkshire，我们的经理人不断地透过看似平凡普通的事业，赚取惊人的报
酬，这些经理人的第一步是先寻找可以充分利用其盈余的最佳方法，之后再把剩
余的资金交回给查理跟我，然后我们会试着为这些资金寻找更好的出路以创造出
更多的实质价值，我们的目标是取得我们熟悉了解、有持续竞争力且由我们喜
爱、崇拜与信任的经理人所经营的公司的部份或全部所有权。
Compensation
薪资报酬
At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as
about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey
based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of
Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible
for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock
option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally
capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting
home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at
Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over.
Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon
Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire
but Scott Fetzer is lagging?
在Berkshire，有关薪资报酬这方面，我们试着采取与处理资金分配时一样合理
的做法，举例来说，我们给付给Ralph Schey的报酬是根据他在史考特飞兹而
非Berkshire的成绩而定，这样的方式再合理不过了，因为他负责的是单一部门
而非全Berkshire的营运，若是将他的报酬全部锁在Berkshire的荣枯身上，对
Ralph Schey来说，其报酬将会显得不公平，比如说有可能他在史考特飞兹击出
全垒打但查理跟我却在Berkshire把事情给搞砸了，最后使得他的功劳与我们的
过错相抵销，而万一要是Berkshire别的部门大放异彩的同时，史考特飞兹的表
现却平平，那么Ralph Schey又有什么理由跟其它人一样分享Berkshire的获
利与奖金呢?
In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of
