书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面 .6
large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to
results in the area that a manager controls. When capital
invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge
managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and
credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.
在设定薪资报酬标准时，我们不会吝啬提出重赏的承诺，但绝对必须是在各个经
理人的职权范围内论功行赏，当我们决定对某项营运投入大笔资金时，我们会将
高额的资金利息成本算在其经理人的头上，相对地，当他们将多余的资金释回给
我们时，我们也会对等的利息收入记在其经理人的功劳簿上。
The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely
visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds
at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when
earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge.
But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental
investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly
to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this twoway
arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to
send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his
business.
这种资金有价的游戏规则，在史考特飞兹决策上再清楚也不过了，如果Ralph
可以运用额外的资金创造出高额的报酬，那么他就绝对有理由这么做，因为当公
司的投资报酬超过一定的门槛后，他本身所获得的奖金也会跟着水涨船高，不过
我们的奖励方式可是赏罚分明，相对地，要是额外的投入的资金没有办法贡献足
够的报酬，Ralph本身连同Berkshire都将一体受害，另一方面，要是Ralph
能将多余用不到的资金送回奥玛哈给我们的话，他将可以因而获得丰厚的奖金报
酬。
It has become fashionable at public companies to describe
almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of
management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment
means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside.
Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms
of "heads I win, tails you lose."
最近上市公司很流行强调管理阶层的利益与公司的股东是一致的，不过在我们的
赏罚簿上，所谓的"一致"是对等的，而不是只有当公司营运顺利时才如此，许多
公司的一致性就不符合我们的标准，因为表面上虽是如此，但其实骨子里玩的却
是"正面我赢，反面你输"的游戏。
A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock
option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the
option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings
are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the
combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and
compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has
done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even
note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to
the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this
vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders
to approve an option plan.
这种不一致的情况最明显的莫过于员工认股权了，因为认股权的认购价格并没有
定期予以检视调整，这等于是漠视公司本身随着盈余的累积自动可增加的获利能
力，假设一家公司给予员工十年的认股权，又该公司股利发放的比例很低，则经
理人就很有可能会得到超过其本身应得的报酬，计较一点的人甚至会发现，每年
支付给股东的盈余越来越少，但经理人透过认股权行使所得到的利益却越来越
多，到目前为止，我还没有在一般公司股东会的投票议案里，看到有要求股东表
决是否核准认股权计画案的。
I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement
with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes,
immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the
"help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement
embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored
by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they
have established that you have a large problem (and one, of
course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with
Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in
1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with
the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though
the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic
characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some
cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.
我忍不住要提到我们与史考特飞兹总裁Ralph Schey所做的薪资协议，在我们
正式买下史考特飞兹之后，只花了五分钟就达成这项协议，这中间没有律师或人
力资源顾问的"协助"，这些条件仅仅包含了几个简单的概念，与那些不得不提出
复杂的条款否则就无法附上高昂的帐单的人力资源顾问有很大的不同(而且这些
条款每年还须定期检视以决定是否有修正的必要)，反观我们与Ralph的协议到
目前为止从未更动过，当初在1986年我们双方认为公平合理的，至今仍然是如
此，同样的我们与旗下事业其它经理人的协议也都相当简单，当然依照产业特性
的不同以及部份经理人同时拥有部份所有权等情形，而有所变化。
In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that
pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal
accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who,
after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements
are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus
on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally,
irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative
behavior at subsidiaries.
在所有的个案中，我们强调的是公平合理，当然经理人对于高的不合理，或是名
不符实的报酬通常都来者不拒，必竟没有人会拒绝免费的热透彩，但是这类的安
排，对于公司的资源来说是一种浪费，同时也会导致经理人忘记他真正应该关心
的事，此外，母公司脱序的行为等于是间接鼓励旗下子公司起而效尤。
At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial
responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the
only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of
what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a
compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed
both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with
people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few
boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of
the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the
heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't
expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we
have no possible need.
在Berkshire，只有查理跟我对公司整体的经营负全责，因此我们两人是唯一应
该以公司整体的表现作为薪资报酬的依据，即便如此，那也不是我们两人真正想
要的方式，我们花了相当的时间塑造我们的公司与工作模式，好让我们可以与我
们欣赏的人一起做我们想做的事，同时也让我们可以不会被迫去做一些无聊或是
不想做的工作，当这些物质与精神的报酬流向企业总部时，我们是最大的受惠
者，在这种田园诗歌般的工作环境下，我们不期望股东们还需要额外给予一些我
们不太需要的多余报酬。
Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be
delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe
to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work
never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."
事实上，就算不领薪水，查理跟我还是会乐在我们现在这种舒适的工作，最起码，
我们效法里根总统的信条，辛勤的工作不太可能要一个人的命，但我在想为何要
冒这个险呢。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table on the next page shows the main sources of
Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchasepremium
charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis
of Scott Fetzer are not assigned to the specific businesses to
which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown
separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our
businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased
them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to
investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires
purchase premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The
total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to
the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
------------------- -------------------
1994 1993 1994 1993
-------- -------- -------- --------
(000s omitted)
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............... $129,926 $ 30,876 $ 80,860 $ 20,156
Net Investment Income ...... 419,422 375,946 350,453 321,321
Buffalo News ................. 54,238 50,962 31,685 29,696
Fechheimer ................... 14,260 13,442 7,107 6,931
Finance Businesses ........... 21,568 22,695 14,293 14,161
Kirby ........................ 42,349 39,147 27,719 25,056
Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 17,356 21,540 8,652 10,398
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 39,435 38,196 24,909 23,809
See's Candies ................ 47,539 41,150 28,247 24,367
Shoe Group ................... 85,503 44,025* 55,750 28,829
World Book ................... 24,662 19,915 17,275 13,537
Purchase-Price Premium Charges (22,595) (17,033) (19,355) (13,996)
Interest Expense** ........... (60,111) (56,545) (37,264) (35,614)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions ............. (10,419) (9,448) (6,668) (5,994)
Other ........................ 36,232 28,428 22,576 15,094
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings ............. 839,365 643,296 606,239 477,751
Sales of Securities ............ 91,332 546,422 61,138 356,702
Decline in Value of
USAir Preferred Stock ..... (268,500) --- (172,579) ---
Tax Accruals Caused by
New Accounting Rules ...... --- --- --- (146,332)
-------- --------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - All Entities .. $662,197 $1,189,718 $494,798 $688,121
======== ======= ======= =======
* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired,
November 7, 1993.
*Dexter的盈余仅含购并日1993年11月7日以后的盈余
**Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
**不含商业与消费金融公司的利息费用。
A large amount of information about these businesses is given
on pages 37-48, where you will also find our segment earnings
reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 53-59, we have
rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-
GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and
I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the
financial information that we would wish you to give us if our
positions were reversed.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们
的目的是希望给你所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必要的资
讯。
"Look-Through" Earnings
透视盈余
In past reports, we've discussed look-through earnings, which
we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than
does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings
consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous
section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major
investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our
profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by
Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been
distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here
exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major
restructuring charges.
之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，比起一般公认会计原则的数字，这是我们认为它
更能反应Berkshire本身实际的获利状况，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到
的帐列盈余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应
在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能
要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企
业调整的主要支出。
If our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of 15%,
our look-through earnings, over time, must also increase at about
that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I
told you that meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate
look-through earnings of about $1.8 billion by 2000. Because we've
since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85
billion.
长期而言，如果我们的实质价值想要以每年15%的幅度来成长的话，那么透视
盈余每年也必须增加以这个幅度来成长，几年前我第一次提到这个观念时曾表
示，到公元2000年为止，Berkshire若要以15%的目标，透视盈余必须成长
18亿美元以上，而由于1993年我们又发行了一些新股，所以现在的门槛提高
到18.5亿美元。
We are now modestly ahead of schedule in meeting our goal, but
to a significant degree that is because our super-cat insurance
business has recently delivered earnings far above trend-line
expectancy (an outcome I will discuss in the next section). Giving
due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our target
but that, of course, is no sure thing.
到目前为止，我们稍微超越目标进度，但其中有一项很重要的原因是我们的霹雳
猫保险近年来的表现超乎预期的好 (有关这部份在下一段我还会详加叙述)，虽
然即使扣除这项不正常部份，我们还是符合当初预期，但还是不能保证一定达的
到。
The following table shows how we calculate look-through
earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very
rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been
included in the operating earnings itemized on page 12, mostly
under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数
字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益
项下)。
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)
----------------------- ---------------------- -----------------
1994 1993 1994 1993
------ ------ ------ ------
American Express Company ...... 5.5% 2.4% $ 25(2) $ 16
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ...... 13.0% 13.0% 85 83(2)
The Coca-Cola Company ......... 7.8% 7.2% 116(2) 94
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.3%(1) 6.8%(1) 47(2) 41(2)
Gannett Co., Inc. ............. 4.9% --- 4(2) ---
GEICO Corp. ................... 50.2% 48.4% 63(3) 76(3)
The Gillette Company .......... 10.8% 10.9% 51 44
PNC Bank Corp. ................ 8.3% --- 10(2) ---
The Washington Post Company ... 15.2% 14.8% 18 15
Wells Fargo & Company ......... 13.3% 12.2% 73 53(2)
------ ------
Berkshire's share of undistributed
earnings of major investees $ 492 $422
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed
investee earnings(4) (68) (59)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 606 478
------- ------
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $1,030 $ 841
(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest
at Wesco
不包含Wesco的少数股权
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
以年平均持有股权比例计算
(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both
recurring and significant
扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得，
(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays
on the dividends it receives
适用的税率为14%，这是Berkshire收到现金股利时的平均税率。
Insurance Operations
保险事业营运
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our
insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we develop and,
second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In
an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require
that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually
takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.
就像我们在过去年报跟各位解释过的，保险事业最重要的关键，第一是保险浮存
金的数量，第二是它的成本，浮存金是我们持有并非我们所有，保险事业营运之
所以能有浮存金的原因在于大部分的保单都要求保户必须预付保险费，另外更重
要的是保险公司在被知会并真正理赔之前，通常都要经过好长的一段时间。
