书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面 .7
Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover
the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an
"underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float.
通常保险公司实际上收到的保费并不足以支应发生的损失与费用，所以大多会产
生承保的损失，而这就是浮存金的成本。
An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of
float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to
obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of
its float is higher than market rates for money.
长期而言，保险公司的浮存金成本若能低于其它资金管道所需的成本就能获利，
但是要是其浮存金成本高于货币市场利率的话，其是否有存在的价值就有疑问。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's
insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we
have compiled our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts
relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss
adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and
unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents' balances,
prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges
applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by
our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an
underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been
negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding
underwriting profit to float income.
如同下表中的数字所显示的，Berkshire的保险事业大获全胜，表中的浮存金，
系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣
金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮
存金部位算是相当大的，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而
定，在某些年度由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负
的，此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利
益。
(1) (2) Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds
------------ ------------- ------------- -------------
(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)
1967 .......... profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%
1968 .......... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%
1969 .......... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%
1970 .......... $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%
1971 .......... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%
1972 .......... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%
1973 .......... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%
1974 .......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%
1975 .......... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%
1976 .......... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%
1977 .......... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%
1978 .......... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%
1979 .......... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%
1980 .......... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%
1981 .......... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%
1982 .......... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%
1983 .......... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%
1984 .......... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%
1985 .......... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%
1986 .......... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%
1987 .......... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%
1988 .......... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989 .......... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%
1990 .......... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
1991 .......... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
1992 .......... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%
1993 .......... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%
1994 .......... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%
Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and
are even more pleased that it proved to be cost-free. But our
message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we
have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently
looks.
查理跟我对于1994年的浮存金能够继续成长都感到相当高兴，更有甚者，这些
资金都是完全免费的，但是我们还是要像去年那样再强调一次，虽然我们的保险
事业经营得不错，但实际上并没有外界想象中的好。
The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat"
business (which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance
companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of megacatastrophes)
was again highly profitable. Since truly major
catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be
expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to
record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our
super-cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994
should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant
losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add
that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995
Kobe earthquake.
我们之所以一再强调这一点的原因在于我们的霹雳猫业务(也就是专门提供保险
公司与再保公司规避重大天然灾害风险的保单)今年再度赚大钱，由于真正重大
的灾害并不常发生，所以我们的霹雳猫业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，突然发
生重大的损失，换句话说，我们这项霹雳猫业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几
年才有办法看清，当然1994年绝对是相当好的一年，唯一的重大灾害要算是一
月所发生的加州大地震，另外在这里我要特别声明1995年初发生的神户大地震
对我们造成的损失并不大。
Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and nonstandardized.
Therefore, the underwriting of this business
requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto
policies, for which a mass of data is available. Here Berkshire
has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose
underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply
enormous.
霹雳猫保单有数量少、金额高且非制式化的特性，因此，要承接这类业务必须仰
赖相当专业的判断，而不像一般的汽车保险有庞大的数据库可供参考，就这点而
言，Berkshire拥有一张王牌-Ajit Jain，他是我们霹雳猫业务的经理人，拥有最
精细的承保技巧，他可以说是我们的无价之宝。
In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the supercat
business because of our towering financial strength, which
helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its
protection against true mega-catastrophes - such as a $50 billion
windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in
California - to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows
that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery
is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default.
There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will
evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that
Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of
unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.
此外，在霹雳猫业务，Berkshire还拥有一项特殊的优势，那就是我们雄厚的财
务实力，这对我们有相当大的帮助。首先，谨慎小心的保险公司都会希望对于真
正天大的灾害-比如说像是纽约长岛发生飓风或加州大地震这类可能造成五百亿
美元损失发生时，可以得到相当确切的依靠，但是保险公司也相当清楚，这类会
造成本身财务需要支持的灾害，同样也有可能导致许多再保公司自顾不暇而破
产，所以它们不太可能笨到将保费付出后，却换得无法兑现的承诺，也因此
Berkshire可以确保在不可预期的天灾发生时，仍然有办法拿得出钱来理赔的稳
当保证，就成为我们最佳的竞争优势。
The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can
write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For
example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term
policy for $400 million of California earthquake coverage and we
wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world
who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for
their own account.
再者雄厚的财务实力让我们可以签下别人想都不敢想的大额保单，举例来说，
1994年，有一家保险业者临时想要买一张金额高达4亿美元的加州地震险保
单，我们二话不说立刻接下来，我们敢说全世界除了我们以外，可能没有人敢独
立接下这样的保单。
Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts
by spreading the burden over a number of small policies. But, at
best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In
the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a
risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its wellbeing.
At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for
coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that we are asked
to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.
一般来说，保险经纪人通常倾向将大额的保单拆成数张小额的保单以分散负担，
但是这样的作业安排却颇耗费时间，同时也使得本来想要寻求再保分散风险的保
险公司并须被迫面对它本来不愿意承担的风险，进而危及保险公司本身的利益，
相对地在Berkshire，我们对单一保单的投保上限最高可以到达5亿美元，这是
其它同业所做不到的。
By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose
Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally acceptable to
us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow suboptimum
strategies in order to "smooth" their reported earnings.
By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher
long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability.
虽然接下这类大额的保单，会使得Berkshire的经营成果变得很不稳定，但我们
完全可以接受这样的结果，通常保险同业(其实其它的行业也一样)总是倾向采取
比较保守的做法，使得营运数字可以平滑稳定一点，但是就这点而言，我们的做
法比较不一样，选择接受变动较大的前景，我们可以获致比前景确定的方式更高
的长期投资报酬。
Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our
"worst case," knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge
what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island
hurricane, a California earthquake, and Super Cat X all in the same
year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by noninsurance
troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses
from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be
accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's,
Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac.
在承受这类风险时，Ajit跟我总是会将焦点摆在最坏的状况下，虽然我们知道实
在是很难去衡量，大家可以想象如果同一年发生长岛飓风、加州地震以及霹雳猫
X时，会是怎样的一个光景，此外，保险损失通常会伴随非保险的问题，例如假
设我们因为加州大地震而承受大量的霹雳猫损失，在此同时股市的大跌很有可能
也会伴随而来，此举将会使得我们在喜斯糖果、富国银行与弗迪麦的持股价值大
减。
All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance
loss from a super-cat is now about $600 million after-tax, an
amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from
other sources. If you are not comfortable with this level of
exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after
the inevitable mega-catastrophe.
在考虑过所有的状况之后，我们认为在最坏的情况下，我们在霹雳猫保险所可能
产生的损失大约在6亿美元的上下，稍稍超过Berkshire每年从其它事业的盈
余，如果你对于这样的风险感到不自在，那么现在是你卖出Berkshire股份的最
佳时机，而不是等到这种无可避免的大灾难发生。
Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices
for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent
of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few
years ago will be inclined to chase premiums, irrespective of their
adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important
group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of
business in 1995.
我们霹雳猫的业务量在1995年很有可能会下滑，因为保险的价格略微下滑，原
因在于几年前新加入再保市场的资金，正以不合理的价格竞逐保单，尽管如此，
我们还是拥有一些重要的客户群，可以稳定的贡献我们1995年业绩。
Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results
in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers'
compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card
operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's
traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster
- all of these generated significant underwriting profits
accompanied by substantial float.
Berkshire其它保险事业1994年的营运表现皆相当杰出，由Rod领导的住宅
保险、Brad带领的员工退休保险以及由Kizer家族经营的信用卡保险业务，以
及由Don所领导的国家产险所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面，总的来
说，这四类业务都表现的相当不错，不但有承保获利，还贡献了相当大金额的保
险浮存金。。
We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all,
we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will
be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value
that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact,
than is the case at any other Berkshire business.
总而言之，我们可以做出与去年同样的结论，我们拥有第一流的保险事业，虽然
他们的经营成果变化相当的大，但是其实质价值却远超过其帐面的价值，而事实
上，在Berkshire其它事业的身上也有类似的情况。
Common Stock Investments
股票投资
Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over
$300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to
subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我们超过三亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关
系企业所持有。
12/31/94
Shares Company Cost Market
------ ------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
27,759,941 American Express Company. .......... $ 723,919 $ 818,918
20,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ........... 345,000 1,705,000
100,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............. 1,298,888 5,150,000
12,761,200 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
("Freddie Mac") ................. 270,468 644,441
6,854,500 Gannett Co., Inc. .................. 335,216 365,002
34,250,000 GEICO Corp. ........................ 45,713 1,678,250
24,000,000 The Gillette Company ............... 600,000 1,797,000
19,453,300 PNC Bank Corporation ............... 503,046 410,951
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ........ 9,731 418,983
6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company .............. 423,680 984,727
Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in
concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in
a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive
advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When
these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible
prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage
to overcome).
我们的投资组合持续保持集中、简单的风格，真正重要的投资概念通常可以用简
单的话语来作说明，我们偏爱具有持续竞争力并且由才能兼具、以股东利益为导
向的经理人所经营的优良企业，只要它们确实拥有这些特质，而且我们能够以合
理的价格买进，则要出错的机率可说是微乎其微(这正是我们一直不断要克服的
挑战)。
Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed
using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count.
If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent
on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and
enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed
an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting
and complex variables.
投资人必须谨记，你的投资成绩并非像奥运跳水比赛的方式评分，难度高低并不
重要，你正确地投资一家简单易懂而竞争力持续的公司所得到的回报，与你辛苦
地分析一家变量不断、复杂难懂的公司可以说是不相上下。
We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it
is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose
long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries
about an economy or a stock market that we know to be
unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an
uninformed guess?
对于买进股份我们注意的只是价格而非时间，我们认为因为忧虑短期不可控制的
经济或是股市变量而放弃买进一家长期前景可合理的预期的好公司是一件很愚
蠢的事，为什么仅是因为短期不可知的猜测就放弃一个很明显的投资决策呢?
We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972,
Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott
Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available
and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In
each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what
the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach
as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety,
why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of
wonderful businesses in the stock market?
