这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表
示对内布拉斯加美式足球队教练-Tom Osborne以及其所带领的全美最佳队伍
-Cornhuskers队的敬意，我敦促大家一定要穿Huskers队的红色出席今年的
股东会，而我也可以向各位保证Berkshire的经营双人组会有50%以上穿著正
确的服色出席。
We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the
meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be
downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the
Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the
much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of
the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118
rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is
the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from
Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be
buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:45 and 9:00 for the
meeting and return after it ends.
由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订房间，想要住在市中心
的人(距离会场约6英哩)可以选择拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆-Radisson-
Redick旅馆或是旁边较大一点的Red Lion旅馆，至于会场附近则有Holiday
Inn (403个房间)、Homewood Suites (118个房间)或Hampton Inn (136个
房间)，另一个推荐的旅馆是位在奥玛哈西区的Marriott，离波仙珠宝店约100
公尺，距离会场约10分钟的车程，届时在哪里将会有巴士接送大家往返股东会
会场。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can
obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A
good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who
stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be
able to walk to the meeting.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，
当天会场有相当大的停车场，住在Holiday Inn 、Homewood Suites或
Hampton Inn的人可以直接走路过来开会。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska
Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you
from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a
special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has
opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells
electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio
equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you
will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their
display on the floor.
一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭
店与机场，我希望大家特别能到内布拉斯加家具店参观，因为今年新开幕的超大
卖场，贩卖各式家电、电子信息、CD唱片、摄影机与视听产品，自开幕以来，
销售业绩惊人，到了现场之后，你绝对会对产品的多样与展示方式印象深刻。
The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre
site about two miles north of the Centre. The stores are open from
10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and
noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello
to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work in our Mrs. B's
Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store - or, for that
matter, an hour.
位于NFM主馆旁边的超级大卖场距离会场约2英哩远，营业时间平日从早上
10点到下午9点，星期六从早上10点到下午6点，星期日则从中午开到下午
6点，到了那里记得向高龄101岁的B太太Say hello，她每天都会到B太太仓
库工作，或者应该说是每个小时。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for
shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This
is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises.
Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more
reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there.
平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，在股东会当天会特别为股东与来宾开放，从中午
开到下午6点，这天总是相当的特别，我们会试着让大家得到一些意外的惊喜，
而通常那天也是该店全年营业额最高的一天，这也是查理跟我希望能在那里看到
各位的主要原因之一。
On Saturday evening, April 29, there will be a baseball game
at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo
Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob
Rich, Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to
entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a
capitalist's Randy Johnson - young, strong and athletic - and not
the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season. So I will
need plenty of vocal support.
在前一天4月29日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家
队对水牛城水牛队的比赛，水牛队的老板是我的好朋友-Mindy跟Bob，我希望
他们也能参加，若他们真的来了，我会引诱Bob与我在投手丘上来一场对决，
Bob可以称得上是资本家的强森巨投，年轻、健壮且精力充沛，绝对是你在球季
中不会想要遇到的对手，所以届时我希望大家都能到场给予我声援。
The proxy statement will include information about obtaining
tickets to the game. About 1,400 shareholders attended the event
last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff and threw a
strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What
many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my
fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be
all smoke.
股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得入场的门票，去年大约有1,400位股东出席这
项盛会，当晚开赛前，我投出一只时速高达8英哩的好球，只是许多球迷在当
场并没有看到我不顾的捕手要求投出快速球的指示反而祭出我的上飘球，至于今
年我要投出的球路至今仍然是个谜。
Warren E. Buffett
March 7, 1995 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1995年3月7日
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our gain in net worth during 1995 was $5.3 billion, or
45.0%. Per-share book value grew by a little less, 43.1%,
because we paid stock for two acquisitions, increasing our shares
outstanding by 1.3%. Over the last 31 years (that is, since
present management took over) per-share book value has grown from
$19 to $14,426, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.
1995年本公司的净值成长了45 %约53亿美元，但由于去年以发行股份的方式
并购了两家公司，使得发行在外股份增加了1.3%，所以每股净值仅成长了
43.1%，而总计过去31年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值
由当初的19元成长到现在的14,426美元，年复合成长率约为23.6%。
There's no reason to do handsprings over 1995's gains. This
was a year in which any fool could make a bundle in the stock
market. And we did. To paraphrase President Kennedy, a rising
tide lifts all yachts.
对于1995年能够有这样的成果并没有什么值得好高兴的，因为在去年那样的股
票市场状况，任何一个笨蛋都可以很轻易在市场上有所斩获，我们当然也不例
外，套句甘乃迪总统说过的一句话，只要一波大浪来就可以撑起所有的船只。
Putting aside the financial results, there was plenty of
good news at Berkshire last year: We negotiated three
acquisitions of exactly the type we desire. Two of these,
Helzberg's Diamond Shops and R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, are
included in our 1995 financial statements, while our largest
transaction, the purchase of GEICO, closed immediately after the
end of the year. (I'll tell you more about all three acquisitions later in
the report.)
先不管亮丽的财务数字，去年对Berkshire来说，有许多令人振奋的好消息，我
们总共谈成了三件我们渴望已久的公司购并交易，其中两家-Helzberg钻石店
与R.C. Willey家具店，将可列入Berkshire 1995年的财务报表之中，而另外
一项更大的交易-买进GEICO剩余全部的股权，则在年度结束后不久正式敲定
(在年报后面会再详加叙述这三件并购交易)。
These new subsidiaries roughly double our revenues. Even
so, the acquisitions neither materially increased our shares
outstanding nor our debt. And, though these three operations
employ over 11,000 people, our headquarters staff grew only from
11 to 12. (No sense going crazy.)
这些新加入的子公司将使我们的营收增加一倍，然而购并之后公司流通在外的股
份或是负债并没有增加多少；另外，虽然这三家公司旗下员工人数合计高达
11,000人，但集团总部的人员却仅由11人增加为12人，(我们还没有到走火
入魔的地步)。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner,
and I want to build a collection of companies - both wholly- and
partly-owned - that have excellent economic characteristics and
that are run by outstanding managers. Our favorite acquisition
is the negotiated transaction that allows us to purchase 100% of
such a business at a fair price. But we are almost as happy when
the stock market offers us the chance to buy a modest percentage
of an outstanding business at a pro-rata price well below what it
would take to buy 100%. This double-barrelled approach -
purchases of entire businesses through negotiation or purchases
of part-interests through the stock market - gives us an
important advantage over capital-allocators who stick to a single
course. Woody Allen once explained why eclecticism works: "The
real advantage of being bisexual is that it doubles your chances
for a date on Saturday night."
Berkshire的副主席，同时也是我的主要合伙人-查理．曼格以及我本人一直致
力于建立起一个拥有绝佳竞争优势，且由杰出经理人领导的企业所组成的集团，
其中一部份是100%持有，一部份则是持有部份股权，当然我们最希望的方式还
是透过协商以公平合理的价格取得全部的股权，不过如果我们在股票市场中有机
会能够找到以低于购并整家公司所需的平均价格，取得一家好公司相当程度的股
份的话，我们也很乐于尝试，事实上这种双管齐下的做法，(也就是经由协议买
下整家公司或是透过股市买进部份股权)，使得我们比起其它坚持单一做法的资
金分配者来说，拥有绝佳的优势。伍迪．艾伦曾经用以下的方式来形容为什么会
有折衷派出现，他说：双性恋者最大的好处就是可以让他们在周末时，比一般人
整整多出一倍的约会机会。
Over the years, we've been Woody-like in our thinking,
attempting to increase our marketable investments in wonderful
businesses, while simultaneously trying to buy similar businesses
in their entirety. The following table illustrates our progress
on both fronts. In the tabulation, we show the marketable
securities owned per share of Berkshire at ten-year intervals. A
second column lists our per-share operating earnings (before
taxes and purchase-price adjustments but after interest and
corporate overhead) from all other activities. In other words,
the second column shows what we earned excluding the dividends,
interest and capital gains that we realized from investments.
Purchase-price accounting adjustments are ignored for reasons we
have explained at length in previous reports and which, as an act
of mercy, we won't repeat. (We'll be glad to send masochists the
earlier explanations, however.)
多年来，我们的看法一直与伍迪一致，在努力增加我们非凡企业的投资部位的同
时，也试着买下一些同样优秀企业的全部所有权，下表充分显示了我们在这两方
面的进展，表中列示出在十年间Berkshire每股所拥有的股票价值以及每股在扣
除利息与营业费用之后来自其它活动的营业利益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计
调整数)，换言之，后者所代表的是在扣除我们从股票投资所得的股利、利息收
入与资本利得之后的盈余收益，至于购买法会计调整数不列入的原因，在以前的
年报中，我们已经花了相当的篇幅解释过了，在这个地方我们就不再重复了，当
然如果你有被虐待的倾向的话，我们也不介意再复述一次。
Pre-tax Earnings Per Share
Marketable Securities Excluding All Income from
Year Per Share Investments
---- --------------------- --------------------------
1965 ................ $ 4 $ 4.08
1975 ................ 159 (6.48)
1985 ................ 2,443 18.86
1995 ................ 22,088 258.20
Yearly Growth Rate: 1965-95 33.4% 14.7%
These results have not sprung from some master plan that we
concocted in 1965. In a general way, we knew then what we hoped
to accomplish but had no idea what specific opportunities might
make it possible. Today we remain similarly unstructured: Over
time, we expect to improve the figures in both columns but have
no road map to tell us how that will come about.
当初在1965年时，我们并未刻意规划什么伟大的计画，来达成以上的成果，我
们只知道我们应该朝这个方向做，但却不晓得到底会有什么样的机会会出现，时
至今日，我们同样是漫无目标，只能够预期这两栏的数字都能够持续地精进，至
于应该要如何达成，并没有一个明确的概念。
We proceed with two advantages: First, our operating
managers are outstanding and, in most cases, have an unusually
strong attachment to Berkshire. Second, Charlie and I have had
considerable experience in allocating capital and try to go at
that job rationally and objectively. The giant disadvantage we
face is size: In the early years, we needed only good ideas, but
now we need good big ideas. Unfortunately, the difficulty of
finding these grows in direct proportion to our financial
success, a problem that increasingly erodes our strengths.
我们拥有两项优势，首先，我们旗下事业的经理人都相当优秀，且大部分的经理
人都与Berkshire保持紧密的关系，第二，查理跟我本人在资金分配方面拥有相
当丰富的经验，可以理性客观地执行这项工作，我们所面临最大的劣势是规模太
大，在早年，我们只需要好的投资方案，但是现在我们需要的却是又"大"又好的
投资方案，然而不幸的是，要找到能够与Berkshire发展速度相匹配的公司的难
度日益升高，这个问题持续地侵蚀我们的竞争优势。
I will have more to say about Berkshire's prospects later in
this report, when I discuss our proposed recapitalization.
在报告的后段讨论有关公司所提的股权重组提案，我会再详加说明Berkshire未
来的前景。
Acquisitions
并购活动
It may seem strange that we exult over a year in which we
made three acquisitions, given that we have regularly used these
pages to question the acquisition activities of most managers.
Rest assured, Charlie and I haven't lost our skepticism: We
believe most deals do damage to the shareholders of the acquiring
company. Too often, the words from HMS Pinafore apply: "Things
are seldom what they seem, skim milk masquerades as cream."
Specifically, sellers and their representatives invariably
present financial projections having more entertainment value
than educational value. In the production of rosy scenarios,
Wall Street can hold its own against Washington.
以往到了这里，通常是我们质疑其它公司从事的并购活动的时间，然而大家对于
我们在去年突然发神经地进行了三件并购案可能会感到相当奇怪，不过大家倒是
可以放心，查理跟我本人从来就没有失去我们原来保持的怀疑态度，我们坚信大
部分的并购活动会大大损及发起并购公司背后所代表的股东利益，HMS 围裙说
得没有错︰事情通常不是他们外表所看到得的那样，去脂牛奶会被冒充成奶油，
犹有甚者，卖方与其代表人总是会提出一些娱乐性质高于教育性质的财务预估数
字，在规划出美丽的大饼这招方面，华尔街的能力可是不会输给华府的。
In any case, why potential buyers even look at projections
prepared by sellers baffles me. Charlie and I never give them a
glance, but instead keep in mind the story of the man with an
ailing horse. Visiting the vet, he said: "Can you help me?
Sometimes my horse walks just fine and sometimes he limps." The
vet's reply was pointed: "No problem - when he's walking fine,
sell him." In the world of mergers and acquisitions, that horse
would be peddled as Secretariat.
我实在不了解为什么有些可能的买主会相信卖方提出的预估数字，查理跟我连看
都懒得看他们一眼，我们一再谨记一位拥有跛脚马主人的故事，他牵着病马去给
兽医看说到︰「你可以帮帮我吗? 我实在是搞不懂为什么这匹马的表现时好时
坏。」，兽医的回答正中要害，「没问题，趁它表现正常的时候，赶快把它卖掉」，
在并购的世界中，这样的跛脚马往往被装饰成圣物到处行骗。
At Berkshire, we have all the difficulties in perceiving the
future that other acquisition-minded companies do. Like they
also, we face the inherent problem that the seller of a business
practically always knows far more about it than the buyer and
also picks the time of sale - a time when the business is likely
to be walking "just fine."
在Berkshire，我们无从了解这些有意从事并购的公司到底怎么会做出这样的举
动，与他们一样，我们也面临一个先天上的问题，那就是卖方永远比买方了解内
情，所以很自然地，他们一定会挑选卖出的最佳时机，也就是当跛脚马表现的都
很正常的时候。
Even so, we do have a few advantages, perhaps the greatest
being that we don't have a strategic plan. Thus we feel no need
to proceed in an ordained direction (a course leading almost
invariably to silly purchase prices) but can instead simply
decide what makes sense for our owners. In doing that, we always
mentally compare any move we are contemplating with dozens of
other opportunities open to us, including the purchase of small
pieces of the best businesses in the world via the stock market.
Our practice of making this comparison - acquisitions against
passive investments - is a discipline that managers focused
simply on expansion seldom use.
尽管如此，我们还是拥有几项优势，其中最有利的大概就是我们并没有一套策略
计画，所以我们就没有必要依照固定的模式(一种几乎注定会以离谱的价钱成交
的模式)，而是完全以股东本身的利益为优先，在这样的心态之下，我们随时可
