这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .2
以客观地将购并案与其它潜在的几十种投资机会做比较，其中也包含经由股票市
场买进部份股权，我们习惯性地做比较，购并vs被动的投资，是一昧地想要扩
张经营版图的经理人绝对做不出来的。
Talking to Time Magazine a few years back, Peter Drucker got
to the heart of things: "I will tell you a secret: Dealmaking
beats working. Dealmaking is exciting and fun, and working is
grubby. Running anything is primarily an enormous amount of
grubby detail work . . . dealmaking is romantic, sexy. That's
why you have deals that make no sense."
管理大师彼得．杜拉克几年前在对时代杂志的一次专访中，切中要点的提到︰让
我告诉你一个秘密，促成交易比辛勤工作好，促成交易刺激有趣，而工作却尽是
一些骯脏污龊的事，经营任何事业无可避免的是一大堆繁杂的工作，而促成交易
相对的就很性感浪漫，而这也是为什么通常交易的发生都没什么道理可循。
In making acquisitions, we have a further advantage: As
payment, we can offer sellers a stock backed by an extraordinary
collection of outstanding businesses. An individual or a family
wishing to dispose of a single fine business, but also wishing to
defer personal taxes indefinitely, is apt to find Berkshire stock
a particularly comfortable holding. I believe, in fact, that
this calculus played an important part in the two acquisitions
for which we paid shares in 1995.
在从事并购案时，我们还有一项优势，那就是我们可以提供给卖方，一种背后由
众多优秀企业所组成的股份当作对价，当一家公司的老板或家族想要处分绩优的
家族产业，同时希望相关的税负能够继续递延下去时，应该会发现Berkshire的
股票是一种相当好的选择，事实上，我相信这样的盘算在我们1985年促成以股
份交换的两项购并案中扮演极关键的角色。
Beyond that, sellers sometimes care about placing their
companies in a corporate home that will both endure and provide
pleasant, productive working conditions for their managers. Here
again, Berkshire offers something special. Our managers operate
with extraordinary autonomy. Additionally, our ownership
structure enables sellers to know that when I say we are buying
to keep, the promise means something. For our part, we like
dealing with owners who care what happens to their companies and
people. A buyer is likely to find fewer unpleasant surprises
dealing with that type of seller than with one simply auctioning
off his business.
此外，有些卖方也会关心他们的公司是否能够找到一个稳定可靠的美满归宿，可
以让其旗下员工有一个良好的工作环境，而就这点而言，Berkshire绝对与众不
同，我们旗下事业的经理人拥有绝对的自主权，此外我们的股权结构使得卖方可
以相信当我们在购并时，所做出的每一个承诺将会被信守，对我们而言，我们也
希望能与真正关心购并后其公司与员工会有怎样结局的老板打交道，就我们的经
验而言，这类的卖主通常会较那些一心要把所拥有的公司拍卖掉的人，要让我们
少发现许多令人不愉快的意外。
In addition to the foregoing being an explanation of our
acquisition style, it is, of course, a not-so-subtle sales pitch.
If you own or represent a business earning $25 million or more
before tax, and it fits the criteria listed on page 23, just
give me a call. Our discussion will be confidential. And if you
aren't interested now, file our proposition in the back of your
mind: We are never going to lose our appetite for buying
companies with good economics and excellent management.
以上算是对于我们购并模式的一些解释，当然在这里我也要打一点小广告，如果
你拥有或代表一家每年税前获利超过2,500万美元的公司，同时也符合我们表
列的各项标准的话，记得打个电话给我，我们谈话的内容将会完全保密，当然若
是你现在没有兴趣，也请你把我们的这些条件记在脑海，因为我们从来就不会放
弃买下拥有优良的竞争优势与杰出经理人的公司的意愿。
Concluding this little dissertation on acquisitions, I can't
resist repeating a tale told me last year by a corporate
executive. The business he grew up in was a fine one, with a
long-time record of leadership in its industry. Its main
product, however, was distressingly glamorless. So several
decades ago, the company hired a management consultant who -
naturally - advised diversification, the then-current fad.
("Focus" was not yet in style.) Before long, the company
acquired a number of businesses, each after the consulting firm
had gone through a long - and expensive - acquisition study. And
the outcome? Said the executive sadly, "When we started, we were
getting 100% of our earnings from the original business. After
ten years, we were getting 150%."
为了将以上购并论点做一个总结，我忍不住再重复一遍，去年一位企业经理人告
诉我的一则小故事︰他提到他原来经营一家由他一手扶持的好公司，在其所处的
产业拥有长期的领导地位，只是其前景显得有些黯淡，所以几十年前，这家公司
特别聘请了一家管理顾问公司，很自然的管理顾问建议他们应该要多角化经营，
这在当时还是股风潮(专注本业的论调还未成形)，不久之后，这家公司在经过顾
问公司一连串冗长且收费昂贵的购并调查之后，陆续买进了好几家公司，你一定
会想要问，最后结果如何? 这位主管很难过的说，一开始我们的盈余百分之百是
来自于我们原来的本业，但是过了十年后，这个比例变成百分之一百五十!
Helzberg's Diamond Shops
Helzberg 钻石店
A few years back, management consultants popularized a
technique called "management by walking around" (MBWA). At
Berkshire, we've instituted ABWA (acquisitions by walking
around).
几年前，管理顾问专家有一句相当流行的术语-走动式管理，在Berkshire我们
运用的则是走动式并购。
In May 1994, a week or so after the Annual Meeting, I was
crossing the street at 58th and Fifth Avenue in New York, when a
woman called out my name. I listened as she told me she'd been
to, and had enjoyed, the Annual Meeting. A few seconds later, a
man who'd heard the woman stop me did so as well. He turned out
to be Barnett Helzberg, Jr., who owned four shares of Berkshire
and had also been at our meeting.
1994年五月，在年度股东会过后不久，正当我在纽约第五大道与58街交叉路
口准备过马路时，突然有一位妇人叫我的名字，我停下驻足，她提到自己很喜欢
参加Berkshire的股东会，过了一会儿，旁边一位先生听到这位妇人的谈话，也
如法炮制的把我给拦下来，没想到他竟是Barnett Helzberg二世，他持有
Berkshire四股的股份，同时也曾参加过我们的股东会。
In our few minutes of conversation, Barnett said he had a
business we might be interested in. When people say that, it
usually turns out they have a lemonade stand - with potential, of
course, to quickly grow into the next Microsoft. So I simply
asked Barnett to send me particulars. That, I thought to myself.
will be the end of that.
在我们短暂的交谈之中，Barnett表示他拥有一家我们可能会有兴趣的公司，普
通当人们这样说的时候，一般都是指一些茶水摊，当然搞不好，也有可能会变成
微软第二，所以我只是简单地请Barnett将他的资料送给我，然后我想一切将就
此结束。
Not long after, Barnett sent me the financial statements of
Helzberg's Diamond Shops. The company had been started by his
grandfather in 1915 from a single store in Kansas City and had
developed by the time we met into a group with 134 stores in 23
states. Sales had grown from $10 million in 1974 to $53 million
in 1984 and $282 million in 1994. We weren't talking lemonade
stands.
过了不久，Barnett果然把Helzberg钻石店的财务报表送给我，这家公司是在
1915年由其祖父创立，当初只不过是在堪萨斯市的一家单店，然而直到我们碰
面时，该公司已发展成在全美23个州拥有134家分店的集团，营业额也从1974
年的1,000万美元成长到1984年的5,300万美元，乃至于1994年的二亿
8,200万美元，这显然不是一间茶水摊。
Barnett, then 60, loved the business but also wanted to feel
free of it. In 1988, as a step in that direction, he had brought
in Jeff Comment, formerly President of Wanamaker's, to help him
run things. The hiring of Jeff turned out to be a homerun, but
Barnett still found that he couldn't shake a feeling of ultimate
responsibility. Additionally, he owned a valuable asset that was
subject to the vagaries of a single, very competitive industry,
and he thought it prudent to diversify his family's holdings.
Barnett现年六十岁，很热爱这项事业，但也很希望能够减轻负担，在1988年
他跨出第一步，找到Wanamaker前任总裁-Jeff Comment来协助他经营事
业，这个决定事后证明相当正确，但Barnett还是觉得他的压力相当沉重，而且，
他虽然拥有价值不菲的事业，但却面临单一且竞争相当激烈的产业，因此他认为
有必要要分散家族持股的风险。
Berkshire was made to order for him. It took us awhile to
get together on price, but there was never any question in my
mind that, first, Helzberg's was the kind of business that we
wanted to own and, second, Jeff was our kind of manager. In
fact, we would not have bought the business if Jeff had not been
there to run it. Buying a retailer without good management is
like buying the Eiffel Tower without an elevator.
Berkshire被要求提出一个报价，我们花了一段时间才在价格上达成协议，然而
此外从头到尾我都没有太多的疑问，首先，Helzberg是那种我们想要拥有的事
业，第二Jeff，是属于我们这喜欢的经理人类型，事实上，要是这项事业不是由
Jeff所经营的话，我们可能就不会考虑买下它，买下一家没有优良管理的零售
业，就好象是买下一座没有电梯的艾菲尔铁塔。
We completed the Helzberg purchase in 1995 by means of a
tax-free exchange of stock, the only kind of transaction that
interested Barnett. Though he was certainly under no obligation
to do so, Barnett shared a meaningful part of his proceeds from
the sale with a large number of his associates. When someone
behaves that generously, you know you are going to be treated
right as a buyer.
我们在1995年完成对Helzberg的并购案，以免税的股权交换方式进行，这也
是Barnett唯一愿意接受的方式，虽然没有法令规定，但是他还是将并购后的所
得与其众多的员工一起分享，就这点而言，你可以确信对员工如此慷慨的人，相
信也会公平合理地对待新加入的买主。
The average Helzberg's store has annual sales of about $2
million, far more than competitors operating similarly-sized
stores achieve. This superior per-store productivity is the key
to Helzberg's excellent profits. If the company continues its
first-rate performance - and we believe it will - it could grow
rather quickly to several times its present size.
Helzberg单店年平均营业额大约是二百万美元，这个数字远比其它相同规模的
竞争对手多得多，这种高生产力正是Helzberg拥有高获利的关键因素，如果这
家公司能够继续这种一流的表现，(我们相信绝对没问题)，则在不久的将来它将
可以发展为数倍于现在的规模。
Helzberg's, it should be added, is an entirely different
sort of operation from Borsheim's, our Omaha jewelry business,
and the two companies will operate independently of each other.
Borsheim's had an excellent year in 1995, with sales up 11.7%.
Susan Jacques, its 36-year-old CEO, had an even better year,
giving birth to her second son at the start of the Christmas
season. Susan has proved to be a terrific leader in the two
years since her promotion.
有一点必须强调的是，Helzberg经营的形态与我们原有在奥玛哈的珠宝事业-
波仙珠宝店完全不同，两家公司仍然会维持各自独立的营运，波仙1995年的业
绩相当理想，营收较去年又增加了11.7%，该公司总裁-Susan Jacques的表现
更是优异，去年圣诞节前夕她产下第二个儿子，在接任二年后，Susan证明自己
是位相当杰出的领导者。
R.C. Willey Home Furnishings
R.C. Willey家具店
It was Nebraska Furniture Mart's Irv Blumkin who did the
walking around in the case of R.C. Willey, long the leading home
furnishings business in Utah. Over the years, Irv had told me
about the strengths of that company. And he had also told Bill
Child, CEO of R.C. Willey, how pleased the Blumkin family had
been with its Berkshire relationship. So in early 1995, Bill
mentioned to Irv that for estate tax and diversification reasons,
he and the other owners of R.C. Willey might be interested in
selling.
关于R.C. Willey家具店-这家犹他州最大家具店的并购案，这次换做是内布拉
斯加家具店的Irv Blumkin做走动式并购，多年以来，Irv一直向我提及这家公
司所拥有的竞争力，而他也不断地告诉R.C. Willey总裁-Bill Child，Blumkin
家族与Berkshire的合作关系是多么地令人愉快，终于到了1995年，Bill向Irv
提及基于资产税负与分散风险考量，他自己本身与R.C. Willey其它股东有意出
售该公司股份。
From that point forward, things could not have been simpler.
Bill sent me some figures, and I wrote him a letter indicating
my idea of value. We quickly agreed on a number, and found our
personal chemistry to be perfect. By mid-year, the merger was
completed.
从那一刻开始，事情就变得再简单也不过了，Bill给了我一些数字，而我则回信
表达我对价值的看法，我们很快地就达成价格上的协议，而后续所产生的化学变
化可说是再完美不过了，一直到年中，整个合并案大功告成。
R.C. Willey is an amazing story. Bill took over the
business from his father-in-law in 1954 when sales were about
$250,000. From this tiny base, Bill employed Mae West's
philosophy: "It's not what you've got - it's what you do with
what you've got." Aided by his brother, Sheldon, Bill has built
the company to its 1995 sales volume of $257 million, and it now
accounts for over 50% of the furniture business in Utah. Like
Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey sells appliances,
electronics, computers and carpets in addition to furniture.
Both companies have about the same sales volume, but NFM gets all
of its business from one complex in Omaha, whereas R.C. Willey
will open its sixth major store in the next few months.
R.C. Willey有一段相当精彩的故事，1954年当Bill从其岳父手中接下这项事业
时，该公司的年营业额只有25万美元，从那个基础开始，Bill运用Mae West
的哲学，重点不在于你得到的是什么，重点在于你将得到的如何运用，在其兄弟
Sheldon的协助之下，Bill将公司的营业额一举提升到1995年的2亿5,700
万美元，目前拥有犹他州超过50%以上的市场占有率，就像是NFM一样，除了
家具以外，R.C. Willey也贩卖小家电、电子信息与地毯等商品，两家公司的营
业额相当，只是NFM的营收全部来自在奥玛哈惟一的一家总店，而R.C. Willey
却即将在几个月后成立第六家分店。
Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career,
I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth
and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly
nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star
phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in
manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a
retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is
always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are
meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of
new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.
零售业的经营相当不易，在我个人的投资生涯中，我看过许多零售业曾经拥有极
高的成长率与股东权益报酬率，但是到最后，突然间表现急速下滑，很多甚至被
迫以倒闭关门收场，比起一般制造业或服务业，这种剎那间的永恒在零售业履见
不鲜，部份的原因是这些零售业者必须时时保持聪明警戒，因为你的竞争对手随
时准备复制你的做法，然后超越你，同时消费者绝对不会吝于给予新加入业者尝
试的机会，在零售业一但业绩下滑，注定就会失败。
In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business,
there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For
example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station
very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward
nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for
decades. You'd do far better, of course, if you put in Tom
Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him.
For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to
bankruptcy.
相对于这种必须时时保持警戒的产业，还有一种我称之为只要聪明一时的产业，
举个例子来说，如果你在很早以前就懂得睿智地买下一家地方电视台，你甚至可
以把它交给懒惰又差劲的亲人来经营，而这项事业却仍然可以好好地经营个几十
年，当然若是你懂得将Tom Murphy摆在正确的位置之上，你所获得的将会更
惊人，但是对零售业来说，要是用人不当的话，就等于买了一张准备倒闭关门的
门票。
The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are
blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done
so successfully for decades. Like the CEOs of our other
operating units, they will operate autonomously: We want them to
feel that the businesses they run are theirs. This means no
second-guessing by Charlie and me. We avoid the attitude of the
alumnus whose message to the football coach is "I'm 100% with you
- win or tie." Our basic goal as an owner is to behave with our
managers as we like our owners to behave with us.
不过今年我们买下的这两家零售业，却很幸运的拥有喜欢面对竞争挑战的经理
人，同时过去几十年来也表现的相当优异，就像是我们旗下其它事业的经理人，
他们将可以独立自主地经营事业，我们希望他们觉得就好象是在经营自己的事业
一样，没错就是这样，查理跟我绝没有其它的意思，我们尽量避免像校友会常常
对足球校队教练所说的那样︰不论赢或是打平，我们永远与你站在同一阵线，身
为所有权人，我们的基本原则是期望我们自己的行为与我们要求旗下的经理人的
表现一样。
As we add more operations, I'm sometimes asked how many
people I can handle reporting to me. My answer to that is
simple: If I have one person reporting to me and he is a lemon,
that's one too many, and if I have managers like those we now
