这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .4
1972 ...... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%
1973 ...... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%
1974 ...... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%
1975 ...... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%
1976 ...... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%
1977 ...... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%
1978 ...... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%
1979 ...... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%
1980 ...... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%
1981 ...... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%
1982 ...... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%
1983 ...... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%
1984 ...... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%
1985 ...... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%
1986 ...... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%
1987 ...... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%
1988 ...... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989 ...... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%
1990 ...... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
1991 ...... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
1992 ...... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%
1993 ...... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%
1994 ...... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%
1995 ...... profit 3,607.2 less than zero 5.95%
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float
has grown at an annual compounded rate of 20.7%. In more years
than not, our cost of funds has been less than nothing. This
access to "free" money has boosted Berkshire's performance in a
major way.
自从1967年我们进军保险业以来，我们的浮存金每年以20.7%复合成长率增
加，大部分的年度，我们的资金成本都低于零以下，受惠于这些免费的资金，大
大地帮助Berkshire的绩效提升。
Any company's level of profitability is determined by three
items: (1) what its assets earn; (2) what its liabilities cost;
and (3) its utilization of "leverage" - that is, the degree to
which its assets are funded by liabilities rather than by equity.
Over the years, we have done well on Point 1, having produced high
returns on our assets. But we have also benefitted greatly - to a
degree that is not generally well-understood - because our
liabilities have cost us very little. An important reason for this
low cost is that we have obtained float on very advantageous terms.
The same cannot be said by many other property and casualty
insurers, who may generate plenty of float, but at a cost that
exceeds what the funds are worth to them. In those circumstances,
leverage becomes a disadvantage.
任何一家公司的获利能力决定于(1)资产报酬率(2)负债的成本(3)财务杠杆的运
用-也就是其运用负债而非股东权益来支应资产取得的程度。多年以来，我们在
第一项表现的相当不错，运用资产所产生的报酬很高，然而在另外一方面由于资
金成本极低，也使得我们受惠不少，这点就比较不为人所知，资金成本之所以可
以压得很低，主要是由于我们可以用很有利的条件取得保险浮存金，关于这点在
其它同业身上就不敢说了，通常他们也能取得大量的保险浮存金，但是取得的成
本可能远超过应该付的代价，在这种状况下，运用财务杠杆反而变得相当不利。
Since our float has cost us virtually nothing over the years,
it has in effect served as equity. Of course, it differs from true
equity in that it doesn't belong to us. Nevertheless, let's assume
that instead of our having $3.4 billion of float at the end of
1994, we had replaced it with $3.4 billion of equity. Under this
scenario, we would have owned no more assets than we did during
1995. We would, however, have had somewhat lower earnings because
the cost of float was negative last year. That is, our float threw
off profits. And, of course, to obtain the replacement equity, we
would have needed to sell many new shares of Berkshire. The net
result - more shares, equal assets and lower earnings - would have
materially reduced the value of our stock. So you can understand
why float wonderfully benefits a business - if it is obtained at a
low cost.
由于多年来这些保险浮存金几乎没有让我们增加任何额外的成本，所以它们实际
上等同于股本，当然不同于真正的股本，这些资金并不真正属于我们，不过假设
在1994年我们持有的不是34亿美元的浮存金，而是34亿美元的股本的话，
在这种情况下，我们拥有的总资产一点都不会增加，而且我们的盈余却可能还会
不增反减，因为去年浮存金的成本是负的，也就是说浮存金的存在对于我们的获
利还有额外的贡献，而资本的增加却代表着Berkshire必须额外再发行许多新
股，所以想当然尔，更多的股份代表着更低的每股盈余，等于大大地减损了每股
股份的价值，所以大家应该能够了解，为什么浮存金对于一个企业来说如此的重
要，尤其是当它们取得的成本极低之时。
Our acquisition of GEICO will immediately increase our float
by nearly $3 billion, with additional growth almost certain. We
also expect GEICO to operate at a decent underwriting profit in
most years, a fact that will increase the probability that our
total float will cost us nothing. Of course, we paid a very
substantial price for the GEICO float, whereas virtually all of the
gains in float depicted in the table were developed internally.
在购并GEICO之后，我们的保险浮存金马上增加近30亿美元，而且展望未来
这数字还会继续成长，此外我们也预期GEICO每年还能够继续拥有相当的承保
获利，这等于保证这些浮存金不但不须负担资金成本还能额外贡献给我们获利，
当然就内部转拨而言，我们还是必须支付GEICO一笔相当的对价以取得浮存
金。
Our enthusiasm over 1995's insurance results must be tempered
once again because we had our third straight year of good fortune
in the super-cat business. In this operation, we sell policies
that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves
from the effects of mega-catastrophes. Since truly major
catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be
expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to
record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our
super-cat business will take many years to measure. We know that
the results of years like the past three will be at least partially
offset by some truly terrible year in the future. We just hope
that "partially" turns out to be the proper adverb.
对于1995年我们的保险营运绩效的兴奋程度可能要再度稍微降温一下，原因在
于我们的霹雳猫再保业务连续第三年大放异彩，我们出售保单给保险公司与再保
公司以分散其面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风险，由于真正重大的灾害并不
常发生，所以我们的霹雳猫业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，才突然发生重大的
损失，换句话说，我们这项霹雳猫业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几年才有办
法看得清，我们很清楚的了解过去三年来优异的成果一定会被未来某些悲惨的年
度给抵消掉部份的效果，当然我们希望所谓的"部份"是个适当的形容词。
There were plenty of catastrophes last year, but no super-cats
of the insured variety. The Southeast had a close call when Opal,
sporting winds of 150 miles per hour, hovered off Florida.
However, the storm abated before hitting land, and so a second
Andrew was dodged. For insurers, the Kobe earthquake was another
close call: The economic damage was huge - perhaps even a record -
but only a tiny portion of it was insured. The insurance industry
won't always be that lucky.
去年天灾不断，但没有一个逾越霹雳猫的界限，曾有一个强风Opal在美国东南
部以每小时150英哩的速度徘徊在佛罗里达附近，所幸它在登陆前及时转弱，
而避免成为第二个Andrew飓风，另外对保险公司来说，阪神大地震同样令人
印象深刻，不可讳言，那次造成的总体经济损失可算是空前，不过由于其中仅有
一小部份有保险，所以最后真正保险理赔的金额有限，当然保险业不可能永远都
那么幸运。
Ajit Jain is the guiding genius of our super-cat business and
writes important non-cat business as well. In insurance, the term
"catastrophe" is applied to an event, such as a hurricane or
earthquake, that causes a great many insured losses. The other
deals Ajit enters into usually cover only a single large loss. A
simplified description of three transactions from last year will
illustrate both what I mean and Ajit's versatility. We insured: (1)
The life of Mike Tyson for a sum that is large initially and that,
fight-by-fight, gradually declines to zero over the next few years;
(2) Lloyd's against more than 225 of its "names" dying during the
year; and (3) The launch, and a year of orbit, of two Chinese
satellites. Happily, both satellites are orbiting, the Lloyd's folk
avoided abnormal mortality, and if Mike Tyson looked any healthier,
no one would get in the ring with him.
Ajit Jain可说是我们霹雳猫业务的天纵英才，当然他同时也负责许多重要的非霹
雳猫业务，在保险业所谓的灾害，系指可能导致许多理赔损失的事件，诸如飓风
或地震等，另外Ajit也负责受理一些单一重大事件的投保，以下三件个案应该
可充分以说明我所说的意思，同时展现Ajit的多才多艺，我们受理(1)拳王泰森
的生命险，当然一开始金额相当的高，但随着一场场的比赛在几年后逐渐递减到
最后变成零(2)英国最大保险劳埃氏总计225人的生命险以及(3)保证两颗中国
卫星的发射及在轨道上周转一年；结果所幸中国卫星发射顺利，并在轨道上正常
运转，同时劳埃氏的死亡率还算正常，而拳王泰森看起来再健康不过，看不出有
谁可以从他手上抢下冠军戒指。
Berkshire is sought out for many kinds of insurance, both
super-cat and large single-risk, because: (1) our financial
strength is unmatched, and insureds know we can and will pay our
losses under the most adverse of circumstances; (2) we can supply a
quote faster than anyone in the business; and (3) we will issue
policies with limits larger than anyone else is prepared to write.
Most of our competitors have extensive reinsurance treaties and
lay off much of their business. While this helps them avoid shock
losses, it also hurts their flexibility and reaction time. As you
know, Berkshire moves quickly to seize investment and acquisition
opportunities; in insurance we respond with the same exceptional
speed. In another important point, large coverages don't frighten
us but, on the contrary, intensify our interest. We have offered a
policy under which we could have lost $1 billion; the largest
coverage that a client accepted was $400 million.
Berkshire目前积极寻求各类保险业务，包含霹雳猫与大型单一风险，因为(1)
我们无与伦比的财务实力，使得投保客户可以确定不论在多糟的状况下，他们都
可以顺利获得理赔(2)我们可以最快的速度向客户完成报价(3)我们可以签下比其
他保险公司金额更高的保单，其它竞争同业大多都有范围广阔的再保条款，并将
大部分的业务分保出去，虽然这样的做法可以让他们避免重大的损失意外，但却
也破坏掉他们的弹性与反应时间，大家都知道，Berkshire抓住投资与购并的动
作向来相当的快，在保险业务方面我们的反应速度也是如此，另外还有很重要的
一点，高额的保险上限吓唬不了我们，相反地更能引起我们的兴趣，我们可以接
受的最高理赔上限是10亿美元，相较之下，其它同业所能容忍的最高限度仅为
4亿美元。
We will get hit from time to time with large losses. Charlie
and I, however, are quite willing to accept relatively volatile
results in exchange for better long-term earnings than we would
otherwise have had. In other words, we prefer a lumpy 15% to a
smooth 12%. Since most managers opt for smoothness, we are left
with a competitive advantage that we try to maximize. We do,
though, monitor our aggregate exposure in order to keep our "worst
case" at a level that leaves us comfortable.
总有一天我们会碰上大麻烦，但是查理跟我本人却相当可以接受这种变动剧烈的
结局，只要长期来说我们的报酬可以令人满意，讲的再白一点，我们比较喜欢上
下变动的15%，更甚于平淡无奇的12%，而正因为大部分的经理人倾向平淡，
这使得我们长期报酬极大化的目标享有绝对的竞争优势，当然我们会密切注意避
免让最坏的状况超越我们可以容忍的范围。
Indeed, our worst case from a "once-in-a-century" super-cat is
far less severe - relative to net worth - than that faced by many
well-known primary companies writing great numbers of property
policies. These insurers don't issue single huge-limit policies as
we do, but their small policies, in aggregate, can create a risk of
staggering size. The "big one" would blow right through the
reinsurance covers of some of these insurers, exposing them to
uncapped losses that could threaten their survival. In our case,
losses would be large, but capped at levels we could easily handle.
事实上，即使是发生百年一次的超级大灾难的最坏情况下，我们净值所可能受到
的损害程度可以远比其它签下一大堆产物意外险保单的知名保险业者要来的轻
微许多，虽然这些同业没有像我们一样签下单一极高上限的保单，但是所谓积沙
成塔，他们累积的小额保单却可能造成无以弥补的后果，因为后者可能会直接穿
越再保险的防护罩，使他们必须承担没有上限的损失与生存的危机，至于我们，
损失数字虽然很大，但却是在我们可以轻易化解的范围之内。
Prices are weakening in the super-cat field. That is
understandable considering the influx of capital into the
reinsurance business a few years ago and the natural desire of
those holding the capital to employ it. No matter what others may
do, we will not knowingly write business at inadequate rates. We
unwittingly did this in the early 1970's and, after more than 20
years, regularly receive significant bills stemming from the
mistakes of that era. My guess is that we will still be getting
surprises from that business 20 years from now. A bad reinsurance
contract is like hell: easy to enter and impossible to exit.
近年来霹雳猫保单的价格一直萎糜不振，这点可以理解的原因在于几年前大量的
资金流进再保业界竞逐有限的保单生意，然而不管别人怎么做，我们是绝对不会
以不合理的价格赔钱做生意的，早在1970年代初期，我们就一直在不知情的情
况下，犯下类似的错误，结果在往后的二十年内，因为那个年代错误所付出的代
价，化成理赔损失的帐单不断地涌进本公司，而我有预感我们将会为20年前所
犯的错误继续付出代价，一张糟糕的再保合约就像是地狱一样，进去容易，但想
要出来可就难了。
I actively participated in those early reinsurance decisions,
and Berkshire paid a heavy tuition for my education in the
business. Unfortunately, reinsurance students can't attend school
on scholarship. GEICO, incidentally, suffered a similar,
disastrous experience in the early 1980's, when it plunged
enthusiastically into the writing of reinsurance and large risks.
GEICO's folly was brief, but it will be cleaning things up for at
least another decade. The well-publicized problems at Lloyd's
further illustrate the perils of reinsurance and also underscore
how vital it is that the interests of the people who write
insurance business be aligned - on the downside as well as the
upside - with those of the people putting up the capital. When
that kind of symmetry is missing, insurers almost invariably run
into trouble, though its existence may remain hidden for some time.
早年我积极参与再保业务，结果使得Berkshire必须为我这一堂课付出昂贵的学
费，更不幸的是，修再保课程的学生根本没有办法拿到奖学金，碰巧的是GEICO
在1980年代初期，也面临过类似悲惨的命运，当时该公司一头热地栽进再保与
大型灾害保险的业务，虽然GEICO愚昧的举动为期不久，但是它却必须花费十
年以上的工夫收拾残局，著名的英国劳埃氏保险的困境进一步说明了不当再保可
能造成的灾难以及共同投入资金参与保险业务出资人的利益，基本上就是一个生
命共同体，不管是在顺境与逆境皆然，一旦人们失去对于这点观念的聚焦，保险
业者就注定会发生问题，而且通常必须经历一段时间后，问题才会逐渐地浮上台
面。
A small, apocryphal story about an insurance CEO who was
visited by an analyst tells a lot about this industry. To the
analyst's questions about his business, the CEO had nothing but
gloomy answers: Rates were ridiculously low; the reserves on his
balance sheet weren't adequate for ordinary claims, much less those
likely to arise from asbestos and environmental problems; most of
his reinsurers had long since gone broke, leaving him holding the
sack. But then the CEO brightened: "Still, things could be a lot
worse," he said. "It could be my money." At Berkshire, it's our
money.
有一段小故事是有关一位保险公司总裁接受一位分析师访问谈到保险业的经
营，面对分析师询问关于其公司的情况时，得到的答案显得相当无奈，费率低得
离谱、财务报表上所提的准备连一般理赔都不够，更不要说其它那些因为石绵与
环保问题所引发的重大损害赔偿，想到许多以往依靠的再保公司都已倒闭，只剩
他一个人独撑大局，突然间这位总裁略微释怀的说到，当然情况有可能会更糟，
再来可能就会轮到我的荷包，天啊!在Berkshire，这可是我们的荷包呢!
Berkshire's other insurance operations, though relatively
small, performed magnificently in 1995. National Indemnity's
traditional business had a combined ratio of 84.2 and developed, as
usual, a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over
the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had an
average combined ratio of 85.6. Our homestate
operation, managed by Rod Eldred, grew at a good rate in 1995 and
achieved a combined ratio of 81.4. Its three-year combined ratio
is an amazing 82.4. Berkshire's California workers' compensation
business, run by Brad Kinstler, faced fierce price-cutting in 1995
and lost a great many renewals when we refused to accept inadequate
