这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .5
rates. Though this operation's volume dropped materially, it
produced an excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at
Central States Indemnity, continues to do an extraordinary job.
His premium volume was up 23% in 1995, and underwriting profit grew
by 59%. Ajit, Don, Rod, Brad and John are all under 45, an
embarrassing fact demolishing my theory that managers only hit
their stride after they reach 70.
Berkshire其它的保险营运，虽然规模相对较小，但在1995年的表现却同样极
为出色，国家产物保险传统业务的综合比率只有84.2，同时以其保费收入来看，
还贡献了大量的浮存金，过去三年以来，这个由Don Wurster负责的部门平均
的综合比率只有85.6；另外由Rod Eldred负责的Homestate业务也有相当幅
度的成长，去年的综合比率更只有81.4，过去三年平均为82.4；由Brad负责
的加州劳工退休基金在1995年面对激烈的价格竞争，同时还因为拒绝不合理的
降价要求而失去续约的机会，虽然此举使得业务量大幅缩减，但整体的承保利益
仍然相当可观；最后负责中央州立产险公司营运的John则依然表现出色，1995
年的保费收入成长23%，承保利益更大幅增加59%，Ajit、Don、Rod、Brad
与John的年纪都在45岁以下，这种情况也让我以往认为经理人要到70之后
才能随心所欲的论点破功。
To sum up, we entered 1995 with an exceptional insurance
operation of moderate size. By adding GEICO, we entered 1996 with
a business still better in quality, much improved in its growth
prospects, and doubled in size. More than ever, insurance is our
core strength.
总的来说，1995年我们规模适中的保险事业缴出漂亮的成绩单，而展望1996
年，在GEICO加入之后，在维持保险事业原有的品质之下，规模与成长皆可期，
较之以往，保险事业已成为我们核心竞争事业。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported
earnings. In this presentation, purchase-premium charges are not
assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are
instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you
view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been
reported had we not purchased them. This form of presentation
seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one
utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-premiums to be charged off,
business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are,
of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial
statements.
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会
计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让
旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认
为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计
师查核的数字一致。
(in millions)
---------------------------------------
Berkshire's Share
of Net Earnings
(after taxes and
Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)
------------------ ------------------
1995 1994 1995 1994
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............... $ 20.5 $129.9 $ 11.3 $ 80.9
Net Investment Income ...... 501.6 419.4 417.7 350.5
Buffalo News ................. 46.8 54.2 27.3 31.7
Fechheimer ................... 16.9 14.3 8.8 7.1
Finance Businesses ........... 20.8 22.1 12.6 14.6
Home Furnishings ............. 29.7(1) 17.4 16.7(1) 8.7
Jewelry ...................... 33.9(2) ---(3) 19.1(2) ---(3)
Kirby ........................ 50.2 42.3 32.1 27.7
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 34.1 39.5 21.2 24.9
See's Candies ................ 50.2 47.5 29.8 28.2
Shoe Group ................... 58.4 85.5 37.5 55.8
World Book ................... 8.8 24.7 7.0 17.3
Purchase-Price Premium Charges (27.0) (22.6) (23.4) (19.4)
Interest Expense(4) .......... (56.0) (60.1) (34.9) (37.3)
Shareholder-Designated
Contributions ............ (11.6) (10.4) (7.0) (6.7)
Other ........................ 37.4 35.7 24.4 22.3
-------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings ............. 814.7 839.4 600.2 606.2
Sales of Securities ............ 194.1 91.3 125.0 61.1
Decline in Value of
USAir Preferred Stock ...... --- (268.5) --- (172.6)
--------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - All Entities $1,008.8 $662.2 $725.2 $494.8
======= ======= ====== ======
(1) Includes R.C. Willey from June 29, 1995.
(1)包含R.C. Willey 1995年6月29日以后的盈余
(2) Includes Helzberg's from April 30, 1995.
(2)包含Helzberg 1995年4月30日以后的盈余
(3) Jewelry earnings were included in "Other" in 1994.
(3)珠宝事业1994年的盈余包含在其它项目之下
(4) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
(4)扣除金融事业的利息支出
A large amount of information about these businesses is given
on pages 41-52, where you will also find our segment earnings
reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 57-63, we have
rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-
GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and
I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the
financial information that we would wish you to give us if our
positions were reversed.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们
的目的是希望能够给大家，所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必
要的信息。
At Berkshire, we believe in Charlie's dictum - "Just tell me
the bad news; the good news will take care of itself" - and that is
the behavior we expect of our managers when they are reporting to
us. Consequently, I also owe you - Berkshire's owners - a report
on three operations that, though they continued to earn decent (or
better) returns on invested capital, experienced a decline in
earnings last year. Each encountered a different type of problem.
在Berkshire，我们相信查理的格言，只管告诉我坏消息，因为好消息绝对会不
胫而走，而这也是我们希望旗下事业经理人向我们报告时所采取的态度，也因此
身为Berkshire负责人的我有义务向大家报告，去年总共有三个事业营运发生问
题，虽然投资在他们身上的资金所取得的报酬率仍然相当的不错(或甚至是更
好)，但每个事业都面临了不同的问题。
Our shoe business operated in an industry that suffered
depressed earnings throughout last year, and many of our
competitors made only marginal profits or worse. That means we at
least maintained, and in some instances widened, our competitive
superiority. So I have no doubt that our shoe operations will
climb back to top-grade earnings in the future. In other words,
though the turn has not yet occurred, we believe you should view
last year's figures as reflecting a cyclical problem, not a secular
one.
去年一整年我们的鞋类事业一直面临产业困境，有些同业只能勉强赚取蝇头小
利，甚至是亏钱，当然这也代表在某个层面来说，至少我们与同业间仍维持着甚
至是扩大了竞争差距，所以我依然坚信在未来，我们的鞋类事业一定能够回复以
往的高获利，换句话说，虽然目前尚未看到反转的迹象，但我认为大家可以将去
年的数字视为景气即将反转的底部，而不是永远的谷底。
The Buffalo News, though still doing very well in comparison
to other newspapers, is another story. In this case, industry
trends are not good. In the 1991 Annual Report, I explained that
newspapers had lost a notch in their economic attractiveness from
the days when they appeared to have a bullet-proof franchise.
Today, the industry retains its excellent economics, but has lost
still another notch. Over time, we expect the competitive strength
of newspapers to gradually erode, though the industry should
nevertheless remain a fine business for many years to come.
至于水牛城新闻报的表现，较之同业虽然还是相当不错，却也面临另外的问题，
那就是报业前景不佳，在1991年的年报中，我就曾说过报业早已失去以往金刚
不摧的特许事业所享有的竞争优势，虽然时至今日，报业经营还算稳定，但却逐
渐失去另一项竞争优势，我们预期报业的竞争力将与日剧减，虽然这产业在未来
可见的年度内还是一项不错的投资。
Berkshire's most difficult problem is World Book, which
operates in an industry beset by increasingly tough competition
from CD-ROM and on-line offerings. True, we are still profitable,
a claim that perhaps no other print encyclopedia can make. But our
sales and earnings trends have gone in the wrong direction. At the
end of 1995, World Book made major changes in the way it
distributes its product, stepped up its efforts with electronic
products and sharply reduced its overhead costs. It will take time
for us to evaluate the effects of these initiatives, but we are
confident they will significantly improve our viability.
在Berkshire目前状况最多的就属世界百科全书，面临来自CD与网络激烈的竞
争，虽然我们仍能勉强维持获利，(大概没有其它百科全书业者敢这样说)，不过
业绩与获利却直线下滑，因此在1995年底，世界百科全书决定大幅改变行销方
式，加强电子产品内容并大幅降低营运成本，当然这些做法的成效还有待观察，
不过我个人相信此举绝对有助于我们继续维持生存。
All of our operations, including those whose earnings fell
last year, benefit from exceptionally talented and dedicated
managers. Were we to have the choice of any other executives now
working in their industries, there is not one of our managers we
would replace.
我们旗下所有的事业，也包含几个获利大幅衰退的公司，一直都由杰出专注的经
理人所经营，就算我们有机会能够挖到业界最好的经理人，但我们还是不会考虑
将给他们取代掉。
Many of our managers don't have to work for a living, but
simply go out and perform every day for the same reason that
wealthy golfers stay on the tour: They love both doing what they
do and doing it well. To describe them as working may be a
misnomer - they simply prefer spending much of their time on a
productive activity at which they excel to spending it on leisure
activities. Our job is to provide an environment that will keep
them feeling this way, and so far we seem to have succeeded:
Thinking back over the 1965-95 period, I can't recall that a single
key manager has left Berkshire to join another employer.
我们有许多经理人根本就不必靠这份工作过活，但每天还是一样全力以赴，就像
是口袋麦克麦克的职业高尔夫球选手还是继续打巡回赛一样，他们喜欢现在从事
的工作，而且把它做的很好，把他们形容是在工作或许是个错误的名词，他们只
不过是把他们大部分的时间花在他们所擅长的生产活动而非休闲活动之上而
已，而我的工作则是努力维持一个让他们有这样感觉的环境，截至目前为止，我
们做的还算是相当成功，回顾过去1965年到1995年这三十年间，Berkshire
没有任何一位主要经理人发生琵琶别抱的情况。
Common Stock Investments
股票投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a
market value of more than $600 million are itemized.
下表是我们超过六亿美元以上的普通股投资。
12/31/95
Shares Company Cost Market
---------- ------- -------- --------
(dollars in millions)
49,456,900 American Express Company ............. $1,392.7 $2,046.3
20,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. 345.0 2,467.5
100,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company ................ 1,298.9 7,425.0
12,502,500 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
("Freddie Mac") ................... 260.1 1,044.0
34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45.7 2,393.2
48,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600.0 2,502.0
6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 423.7 1,466.9
Others ............................... 1,379.0 2,655.4
-------- ---------
Total Common Stocks .................. $5,745.1 $22,000.3
======= =======
We continue in our Rip Van Winkle mode: Five of our six top
positions at yearend 1994 were left untouched during 1995. The
sixth was American Express, in which we increased our ownership to
about 10%.
我们继续做着我们的李伯大梦，在1994年持有的前六大持股中，有五支在1995
年维持不动，唯一有变动的是美国运通，我们将持有股权比例提高到10%左右。
In early 1996, two major events affected our holdings: First,
our purchase of the GEICO stock we did not already own caused that
company to be converted into a wholly-owned subsidiary. Second, we
exchanged our Cap Cities shares for a combination of cash and
Disney stock.
在1996年初期，有两个重大事件影响到我们的持股，首先在买下GEICO剩余
一半的股份之后，GEICO变成我们百分之百持有的子公司，第二，我们将资本
城股份转换成现金与迪士尼股票。
In the Disney merger, Cap Cities shareholders had a choice of
actions. If they chose, they could exchange each of their Cap
Cities shares for one share of Disney stock plus $65. Or they
could ask for - though not necessarily get - all cash or all stock,
with their ultimate allotment of each depending on the choices made
by other shareholders and certain decisions made by Disney. For
our 20 million shares, we sought stock, but do not know, as this
report goes to press, how much we were allocated. We are certain,
however, to receive something over 20 million Disney shares. We
have also recently bought Disney stock in the market.
在迪士尼的并购案中，原来资本城的股东可以有好几种选择，他们可以选择将原
有一股转换成迪士尼的一股外加65美元现金，或者他们可以要求全部换成现金
或是股票，但是最终可获得的分配结果还要视其它股东的选择以及迪士尼本身的
态度而定，以我们持有2,000万股来说，我们选择全部转换成股票，不过到年
报截止日为止，我们还不确定到底可以分配到多少股份，当然可以确定的是最后
收到的股数一定会超过2,000万股，除此之外，我们还透过公开市场继续收购
迪士尼的股份。
One more bit of history: I first became interested in Disney
in 1966, when its market valuation was less than $90 million, even
though the company had earned around $21 million pre-tax in 1965
and was sitting with more cash than debt. At Disneyland, the $17
million Pirates of the Caribbean ride would soon open. Imagine my
excitement - a company selling at only five times rides!
再透露一点历史，我第一次对迪士尼发生兴趣是在1966年，当时它的股票市值
还不到9,000万美元，虽然该公司在前一年度-1965年的税前净利是2,100万
美元，而且所拥有的现金甚至多过于负债，当时迪斯奈乐园斥资1,700万美元
的加勒比海海盗船才刚要开幕，而这家公司的卖价只不过是这艄海盗船的五倍!
Duly impressed, Buffett Partnership Ltd. bought a significant
amount of Disney stock at a split-adjusted price of 31?per share.
That decision may appear brilliant, given that the stock now sells
for $66. But your Chairman was up to the task of nullifying it:
In 1967 I sold out at 48?per share.
印象深刻的我，利用巴菲特合伙企业的资金，买进一大笔的股份，照分割调整后
的平均成本约31美元一股，这样的决定显然很正确，因为现在的股价大概是
66美元一股，各位的董事长却在1967年以每股48美元将这批股票卖出，使
得其效果大打折扣。
Oh well - we're happy to be once again a large owner of a
business with both unique assets and outstanding management.
不过还好，绕了半天，我们很高兴能够再度成为这家拥有独特资产与杰出管理阶
层公司的大股东。
Convertible Preferred Stocks
可转换特别股
As many of you will remember, Berkshire made five private
purchases of convertible preferred stocks during the 1987-91 period
and the time seems right to discuss their status. Here are the
particulars:
大家可能都还记得，Berkshire在1987年到1991年透过与公司私下协议的方
式，取得五种可转换特别股，现在的时机很适合来谈谈它们现在的状况，以下是
一些重点摘要。
Dividend Year of Market
Company Rate Purchase Cost Value
------- -------- -------- ------ --------
(dollars in millions)
Champion International Corp. ... 9 1/4% 1989 $300 $388(1)
First Empire State Corp. ....... 9% 1991 40 110
The Gillette Company ........... 8 3/4% 1989 600 2,502(2)
Salomon Inc .................... 9% 1987 700 728(3)
USAir Group, Inc. .............. 9 1/4% 1989 358 215
(1) Proceeds from sale of common we received through conversion in 1995.
(2) 12/31/95 value of common we received through conversion in 1991.
(3) Includes $140 we received in 1995 from partial redemption.
(1)系1995年转换为普通股后，出售股票的收入。
(2)系1991年转换为普通股后的股票市值。
(3)包含1995年收到部份赎回的1.4亿美元收入。
In each case we had the option of sticking with these
preferreds as fixed-income securities or converting them into
common stock. Initially, their value to us came primarily from
their fixed-income characteristics. The option we had to convert
was a kicker.
每一个案子我们都有权选择维持原来以固定收益证券为主的特别股形式或是将
