这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .6
它们转换成普通股，刚开始它们的价值主要来自于固定收益证券的特质，至于其
所附带的转换权利只不过具有加分的作用而已。
Our $300 million private purchase of American Express "Percs"
- described in the 1991 Annual Report - is not included in the
table because that security was a modified form of common stock
whose fixed-income characteristics contributed only a minor portion
of its initial value. Three years after we bought them, the Percs
automatically were converted to common stock. In contrast, the
five securities in the table were set to become common stocks only
if we wished them to - a crucial difference.
另外在1991年的年报中已经介绍过，我们透过私募所取得的美国运通Percs，
并未包含在本表之中，其原因主要是因为Percs事实上是一种普通股的修订版，
其固定收益的特性只占其原始价值的一小部份，在我们买下它们的三年后已经自
动转为美国运通的普通股，相对的，本表所提到的五种有价证券只有在我们有意
愿的状况下，才会转变成一般的普通股，基本上这之间有相当大的差异。
When we purchased our convertible securities, I told you that
we expected to earn after-tax returns from them that "moderately"
exceeded what we could earn from the medium-term fixed-income
securities they replaced. We beat this expectation - but only
because of the performance of a single issue. I also told you that
these securities, as a group, would "not produce the returns we can
achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects."
Unfortunately, that prediction was fulfilled. Finally, I said
that "under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to
return us our money plus dividends." That's one I would like to
have back. Winston Churchill once said that "eating my words has
never given me indigestion." My assertion, however, that it was
almost impossible for us to lose money on our preferreds has caused
me some well-deserved heartburn.
当我们买进这些可转换证券时，我曾经跟各位提到我们预期这些投资的税后报酬
率应该可以略高于其所取代的中期固定收益证券，幸运的是结果超乎预期，原因
是因为其中有一个案子发了，同时我也提醒过各位，这些投资可能无法与真正找
到具有竞争优势好公司的投资相比，不幸的就这点而言，我一语中的，最后我还
说过，不论在任何状况下，我们完全可以预期这些投资一定能够回收本金再加上
股息，这句话我想要收回来，虽然英国前首相丘吉尔曾说过︰把说过的话吞回
去，并不会让人消化不良，但是关于我说过"特别股一定不会让我们赔钱的这句
话"确实让我感到心痛。
Our best holding has been Gillette, which we told you from the
start was a superior business. Ironically, though, this is also
the purchase in which I made my biggest mistake - of a kind,
however, never recognized on financial statements.
其中表现最佳的是吉列特别股，从一开始我就跟各位说过这是一家相当好的公
司，不过讽刺的是，这也是我犯过的一个大错之一，虽然这项错误从未反应在财
务报表之上。
We paid $600 million in 1989 for Gillette preferred shares
that were convertible into 48 million (split-adjusted) common
shares. Taking an alternative route with the $600 million, I
probably could have purchased 60 million shares of common from the
company. The market on the common was then about $10.50, and given
that this would have been a huge private placement carrying
important restrictions, I probably could have bought the stock at a
discount of at least 5%. I can't be sure about this, but it's
likely that Gillette's management would have been just as happy to
have Berkshire opt for common.
我们在1989年以六亿美元取得吉列可转换特别股，之后并转换为4,800万股
吉列的普通股(分割调整后)，然而要是当初我们选择直接投资该公司的普通股，
这笔钱将可以买到6,000万股，因为吉列当时每股的市价为10.5美元，而由于
那次的私募对于我们有诸多的限制条款，所以拿到5%左右的折扣应该不成问
题，我不知道这样说对不对，我认为当时要是我们选择直接以取得普通股的方式
投资，该公司的管理阶层可能会更高兴。
But I was far too clever to do that. Instead, for less than
two years, we received some extra dividend income (the difference
between the preferred's yield and that of the common), at which
point the company - quite properly - called the issue, moving to do
that as quickly as was possible. If I had negotiated for common
rather than preferred, we would have been better off at yearend
1995 by $625 million, minus the "excess" dividends of about $70
million.
可惜人算不如天算，虽然在这两年内我们另外还收到额外的特别股股息(这是普
通股所没有的)，如果当初我选择普通股而非特别股的话，截至1995年止我们
将可多获得6.25亿美元的利益，当然还要再扣除7,000万美元的特别股股息。
In the case of Champion, the ability of the company to call
our preferred at 115% of cost forced a move out of us last August
that we would rather have delayed. In this instance, we converted
our shares just prior to the pending call and offered them to the
company at a modest discount.
另外在Champion这个案子，由于公司可以以115%的价位赎回我们持有的特
别股，使得我们被迫于去年八月有所动作，这个案子就在公司即将有权动用赎回
权的前夕，以略微打折的价格申请转换为普通股。
Charlie and I have never had a conviction about the paper
industry - actually, I can't remember ever owning the common stock
of a paper producer in my 54 years of investing - so our choice in
August was whether to sell in the market or to the company.
Champion's management had always been candid and honorable in
dealing with us and wished to repurchase common shares, so we
offered our stock to the company. Our Champion capital gain was
moderate - about 19% after tax from a six-year investment - but the
preferred delivered us a good after-tax dividend yield throughout
our holding period. (That said, many press accounts have
overstated the after-tax yields earned by property-casualty
insurance companies on dividends paid to them. What the press has
failed to take into account is a change in the tax law that took
effect in 1987 and that significantly reduced the dividends
received credit applicable to insurers. For details, see our 1986
Annual Report.)
查理跟我对造纸业从来没有涉猎，事实上在我长达54年的投资生涯中，印象中
从来就没有持有过纸类股的股票，所以去年八月我们可以做的选择大概就是将这
笔投资在市场上卖掉或是任由公司赎回，在我们投资Champion的过程中，该
公司经营阶层对我们的态度一向坦白自重，而他们也希望将这批股票买回，所以
到最后我们决定顺应公司的要求，这项举动让我们有19%的税后资本利得，当
然还要再加上持有六年期间所收到的特别股股息，(附带一提，许多新闻报导都
过度高估一般产物意外险业者所收到股利收入的税后报酬率，原因在于媒体记者
忘了将1987年通过的新税法列入考虑，这项税法大大减少了保险业者最后可以
得到的利益，相关的细节请参阅1986年的年报)。
Our First Empire preferred will be called on March 31, 1996,
the earliest date allowable. We are comfortable owning stock in
well-run banks, and we will convert and keep our First Empire
common shares. Bob Wilmers, CEO of the company, is an outstanding
banker, and we love being associated with him.
我们在第一帝国银行的特别股在1996年3月1日进行转换，这是可以转换的
最早日期，我们对于能够继续持有这家经营良好银行的股份感到相当安心，该公
司的总裁Bob Wilmers是位相当优秀的银行家，我们很高兴能够与他一起合
作。
Our other two preferreds have been disappointing, though the
Salomon preferred has modestly outperformed the fixed-income
securities for which it was a substitute. However, the amount of
management time Charlie and I have devoted to this holding has been
vastly greater than its economic significance to Berkshire.
Certainly I never dreamed I would take a new job at age 60 -
Salomon interim chairman, that is - because of an earlier purchase
of a fixed-income security.
另外两个特别股投资个案的结果就让人相当失望，虽然所罗门特别股最后的投资
报酬率仍高于其替代的固定收益证券投资，不过若考量查理跟我本人在这项投资
上所花费的心思，其所得与付出实在是不成正比，当然我根本就没有料到到了
60岁的这把年纪，会因为一笔固定收益证券的投资，还能够接下这项担任所罗
门临时董事会主席的新工作。
Soon after our purchase of the Salomon preferred in 1987, I
wrote that I had "no special insights regarding the direction or
future profitability of investment banking." Even the most
charitable commentator would conclude that I have since proved my
point.
1987年就在我们刚刚买下所罗门特别股不久之后，我就曾经说过我们对于投资
银行业的发展前景与获利能力并没有特殊的见地，我想事后看来就算是最好心的
评论家，也会觉得我当时说的那段话很有道理。
To date, our option to convert into Salomon common has not
proven of value. Furthermore, the Dow Industrials have doubled
since I committed to buy the preferred, and the brokerage group has
performed equally as well. That means my decision to go with
Salomon because I saw value in the conversion option must be graded
as very poor. Even so, the preferred has continued under some
trying conditions to deliver as a fixed-income security, and the
9% dividend is currently quite attractive.
到目前为止，我们拥有将这笔投资转换为所罗门普通股的权利，其价值尚未浮
现，另外自从买进这笔投资后，道琼指数已经涨了一倍，而券商的表现也相当不
错，这代表我因为判断转换权利相当有价值而决定继续与所罗门交往的决策品质
相当的差，不过即便如此，这笔特别股投资还是相当勉力地继续当作我们的固定
收益证券投资，毕竟每年9%的股息收入还是相当诱人的。
Unless the preferred is converted, its terms require
redemption of 20% of the issue on October 31 of each year, 1995-99,
and $140 million of our original $700 million was taken on schedule
last year. (Some press reports labeled this a sale, but a senior
security that matures is not "sold.") Though we did not elect to
convert the preferred that matured last year, we have four more
bites at the conversion apple, and I believe it quite likely that
we will yet find value in our right to convert.
除非我们选择转换，否则这项投资有一条款约定从1995年10月31日开始的
五年，该公司每年都可赎回20%的投资，所以去年我们总计7亿的投资中，1.4
亿已按计画由公司赎回，(有些新闻报导将这笔交易称呼为出售，事实上债券到
期后应该称之为"赎回")，虽然去年我们放弃转换选择而被赎回，不过我们还有四
次机会，而我也相信未来我们应该很有可能在这些转换的权利中找到一些价值存
在。
I discussed the USAir investment at length in last year's
report. The company's results improved in 1995, but it still faces
significant problems. On the plus side for us is the fact that our
preferred is structurally well-designed: For example, though we
have not been paid dividends since June 1994, the amounts owed us
are compounding at 5% over the prime rate. On the minus side is
the fact that we are dealing with a weak credit.
去年我花了相当大的篇幅讨论美国航空，这家公司今年的表现略微好转，不过还
是着面临许多的问题，幸运的是我们的特别股投资条款当初订的对我们较有利，
比如说，虽然从1994年起本来应该付给我们的特别股股息就已跳票，但是欠我
们的股息每年还是必须以5%的基放利率加计利息，不过不幸的是跟我们打交道
的是一家债信不良的公司。
We feel much better about our USAir preferred than we did a
year ago, but your guess is as good as mine as to its ultimate
value. (Indeed, considering my record with this investment, it's
fair to say that your guess may be better than mine.) At yearend
we carried our preferred (in which there is no public market) at
60% of par, though USAir also has outstanding a junior preferred
that is significantly inferior to ours in all respects except
conversion price and that was then trading at 82% of par. As I
write this, the junior issue has advanced to 97% of par. Let's
hope the market is right.
关于美国航空特别股的情况，比起一年前，我们现在乐观许多，不过这家公司最
后到底会变成怎样，我跟各位一样还是没有任何头绪，(事实上，观诸过去本人
在这项投资上的经验，或许各位的看法要比起我个人来得具参考价值)，截至去
年底，我们帐列的特别股投资金额是票面金额的60%(此特别股并没有公开明确
的市价)，虽然在此同时，美国航空还有另一项发行在外，除了转换价格之外，
其余的条件包含抵押顺位都不如我们的特别股，系以票面金额的82%左右的价
位进行交易，而就在我写这份年报的同时，其交易的价格已上涨为票面金额的
97%，衷心期盼市场的看法是对的。
Overall, our preferreds have performed well, but that is true
only because of one huge winner, Gillette. Leaving aside Gillette,
our preferreds as a group have delivered us after-tax returns no
more than equal to those we could have earned from the medium-term
fixed-income issues that they replaced.
总的来说，我们的特别股投资绩效算是相当不错的了，不过主要的原因还在于压
对了吉列特别股这个宝，若扣除吉列不记，我们其它的特别股投资带给我们的税
后盈余，大概仅与原先他们所取代的中期固定收益债券的投资报酬率差不了多
少。
A Proposed Recapitalization
股权重组提案
At the Annual Meeting you will be asked to approve a
recapitalization of Berkshire, creating two classes of stock. If
the plan is adopted, our existing common stock will be designated
as Class A Common Stock and a new Class B Common Stock will be
authorized.
今年的股东会将会有一项股权重组提案需要各位进行投票表决，一旦获得通过，
Berkshire原来发行的股份，将会被分拆为两种普通股，一种为A级普通股，一
种为B级普通股。
Each share of the "B" will have the rights of 1/30th of an "A"
share with these exceptions: First, a B share will have 1/200th of
the vote of an A share (rather than 1/30th of the vote). Second,
the B will not be eligible to participate in Berkshire's
shareholder-designated charitable contributions program.
B级普通股拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利，除了以下两点，第一，B级普通
股的投票权只有A级普通股的二百分之一(而不是三十分之一)，第二，B级普通
股不能参加Berkshire股东指定捐赠计画。
When the recapitalization is complete, each share of A will
become convertible, at the holder's option and at any time, into 30
shares of B. This conversion privilege will not extend in the
opposite direction. That is, holders of B shares will not be able
to convert them into A shares.
当股权重组完成之后，每一股A级普通股可以依持有人的自由意志在任何时候，
选择转换成30股的B级普通股，但反之则不行，也就是说30股的B级普通股
不能要求转换成一股的A级普通股。
We expect to list the B shares on the New York Stock Exchange,
where they will trade alongside the A stock. To create the
shareholder base necessary for a listing - and to ensure a liquid
market in the B stock - Berkshire expects to make a public offering
for cash of at least $100 million of new B shares. The offering
will be made only by means of a prospectus.
跟A级普通股一样，B级普通股也将在纽约证券交易所中挂牌交易，而为了维持
挂牌之后的流通性，Berkshire预计将会发行总金额1亿美元以上的B级普通
股，整个释股的过程将以透过公开说明书的方式进行。
The market will ultimately determine the price of the B
shares. Their price, though, should be in the neighborhood of
1/30th of the price of the A shares.
市场最终将会决定B级普通股的合理价格，当然若无特殊情况，B级普通股将会
以A级普通股三十分之一左右的价位进行交易。
Class A shareholders who wish to give gifts may find it
convenient to convert a share or two of their stock into Class B
shares. Additionally, arbitrage-related conversions will occur if
demand for the B is strong enough to push its price to slightly
above 1/30th of the price of A.
持有A级普通股的股东若有赠与的计画，将可以很轻易地先将持有的股份转为B
级普通股，当然可能也会有一些转换套利方面的交易可能使得B级普通股股价略
高于A级普通股股价的三十分之一。
However, because the Class A stock will entitle its holders to
full voting rights and access to Berkshire's contributions program,
these shares will be superior to the Class B shares and we would
expect most shareholders to remain holders of the Class A - which
is precisely what the Buffett and Munger families plan to do,
except in those instances when we ourselves might convert a few
shares to facilitate gifts. The prospect that most shareholders
will stick to the A stock suggests that it will enjoy a somewhat
more liquid market than the B.
然而，由于A级普通股还是享有完整的投票权以及参与Berkshire股东指定捐
赠计画的权利，所以就这方面而言，A级普通股还是比B级普通股来得好，所以
我们预期大部分的股东，就像巴菲特与曼格家族一样，还是会选择继续持有A
级普通股，除非有股东有赠与的考量时，可能会将少部份的股份进行转换，而由
于我们预期大部分会选择维持不变，所以A级普通股的流通性应该会比B级普
通股来得高。
There are tradeoffs for Berkshire in this recapitalization.
But they do not arise from the proceeds of the offering - we will
find constructive uses for the money - nor in any degree from the
price at which we will sell the B shares. As I write this - with
Berkshire stock at $36,000 - Charlie and I do not believe it
undervalued. Therefore, the offering we propose will not diminish
the per-share intrinsic value of our existing stock. Let me also
put our thoughts about valuation more baldly: Berkshire is selling
