这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .7
at a price at which Charlie and I would not consider buying it.
这次的股权重组对Berkshire来说有利有弊，原因不在于发行新股所带来的资
金，我们一定可以找到合理的用途，也不在于发行新股的价格，就在我撰写年报
的时刻，Berkshire的股价约为每股36,000美元，查理跟我本人都不认为这样
的价位过于低估，因此此次发行新股并不会使得公司原本的每股实质价值受到损
害，讲的再白一点，以现在的价位而言，查理跟我都不会考虑再加码买进
Berkshire的股份。
What Berkshire will incur by way of the B stock are certain
added costs, including those involving the mechanics of handling a
larger number of shareholders. On the other hand, the stock should
be a convenience for people wishing to make gifts. And those of
you who have hoped for a split have gained a do-it-yourself method
of bringing one about.
当然因为B级普通股的发行，Berkshire公司本身必须承担处理更多股东所带来
的股务作业，不过对于那些有赠与计画的股东来说，却变得方便许多，而对于喜
欢股票分割的投资人来说，也多了一个自助式分割的管道。
We are making this move, though, for other reasons - having to
do with the appearance of expense-laden unit trusts purporting to
be low-priced "clones" of Berkshire and sure to be aggressively
marketed. The idea behind these vehicles is not new: In recent
years, a number of people have told me about their wish to create
an "all-Berkshire" investment fund to be sold at a low dollar
price. But until recently, the promoters of these investments
heard out my objections and backed off.
当然，之所以会有这样的举动还有其它理由，主要是由于目前坊间出现一种模仿
Berkshire的信托基金，号称价位低，只要收取部份费用，人人都投资得起，这
样的主意并不是首次出现，近几年来，有一些人向我传达想要设立一种所谓的仿
Berkshire投资基金，以较低的价位对外发行，不过由于我个人并不赞同这样的
做法，所以这些人才没有进一步的举动。
I did not discourage these people because I prefer large
investors over small. Were it possible, Charlie and I would love
to turn $1,000 into $3,000 for multitudes of people who would find
that gain an important answer to their immediate problems.
对于这些人我不会一昧地打压，因为毕竟我们的目标锁定在大额投资人，如果可
能，查理跟我当然希望公司的净值可以直接由1,000美元翻个两、三翻立刻变
成3,000美元，如此一来大家因为这样的资本利得肯定不会再有其它的意见。
In order to quickly triple small stakes, however, we would
have to just as quickly turn our present market capitalization of
$43 billion into $129 billion (roughly the market cap of General
Electric, America's most highly valued company). We can't come
close to doing that. The very best we hope for is - on average - to
double Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value every five years, and
we may well fall far short of that goal.
为了将这些小筹码成长三倍，我们可能必须让Berkshire的市值从原本的430
亿美元，一下子暴增为1,290亿美元(这相当于通用电气-目前股票市场上市值
最高的公司)，这根本就不可能办得到，所以我们比较希望的是，平均而言，
Berkshire的每股价值每五年能够翻一番，当然要达到这样的目标并不容易。
In the end, Charlie and I do not care whether our shareholders
own Berkshire in large or small amounts. What we wish for are
shareholders of any size who are knowledgeable about our
operations, share our objectives and long-term perspective, and are
aware of our limitations, most particularly those imposed by our
large capital base.
总而言之，查理跟我不太在乎我们的股东们拥有公司股份的多寡，我们衷心期盼
的是不论是大、小股东，都能了解我们的营运模式、与我们拥有共同的目标与长
期投资理念，同时也能够明暸我们受到的限制，尤其是股本过大本身加诸予我们
的负荷。
The unit trusts that have recently surfaced fly in the face of
these goals. They would be sold by brokers working for big
commissions, would impose other burdensome costs on their
shareholders, and would be marketed en masse to unsophisticated
buyers, apt to be seduced by our past record and beguiled by the
publicity Berkshire and I have received in recent years. The sure
outcome: a multitude of investors destined to be disappointed.
这些基金最近纷纷以这样的号召浮上台面，通常它们都是透过经纪人以高额佣金
销售，所以加入的投资人必须背负相当沉重的成本，而一些不知情的投资人，可
能冲着Berkshire过去的成绩以及查理与我本人近年来的高知名度而受骗上
当，最后的结果肯定是︰投资大众注定会大失所望。
Through our creation of the B stock - a low-denomination
product far superior to Berkshire-only trusts - we hope to make the
clones unmerchandisable.
所以透过B级普通股的诞生-一种低面额但远优于仿Berkshire基金的产物，我
们希望可以让那些模仿的假货无法在市场上生存。
But both present and prospective Berkshire shareholders should
pay special attention to one point: Though the per-share intrinsic
value of our stock has grown at an excellent rate during the past
five years, its market price has grown still faster. The stock, in
other words, has outperformed the business.
不过我们还是必须再次提醒Berkshire现有以及未来可能的股东，虽然在过去五
年间本公司的实质价值以相当快速的速度成长，不过公司本身的股价涨升速度却
有过之而无不及，换句话说，在这期间股票的市价表现远过于公司本业的表现。
That kind of market overperformance cannot persist indefinitely,
neither for Berkshire nor any other stock. Inevitably, there
will be periods of underperformance as well. The price
volatility that results, though endemic to public markets, is
not to our liking. What we would prefer instead is to have the
market price of Berkshire precisely track its intrinsic value.
Were the stock to do that, every shareholder would benefit during
his period of ownership in exact proportion to the progress
Berkshire itself made in the period.
这样的情况不太可能无止尽的持续下去，不管是Berkshire或是其它股票都一
样，无可避免的，总有一天股价的表现会逊于本业的表现，我们不太愿意见到公
司的股价受到股票市场影响而剧烈波动，我们比较喜欢的模式是Berkshire的股
价能够与其所代表的实质价值一致，如此一来我们就可以确保每位股东在持有本
公司股份的期间所获得的报酬皆能与Berkshire本身事业的发展状况一致。
Obviously, the market behavior of Berkshire's stock will never
conform to this ideal. But we will come closer to this goal than
we would otherwise if our present and prospective shareholders are
informed, business-oriented and not exposed to high-commission
salesmanship when making their investment decisions. To that end,
we are better off if we can blunt the merchandising efforts of the
unit trusts - and that is the reason we are creating the B stock.
很显然的Berkshire的股价不可能以这样理想的方式演变，不过若是我们能够确
定现有与未来的股东在做投资决策时，能得到充分的信息、以公司发展为导向且
不会受到高佣金的营业员所引诱，我们就越有可能达到这样的目标，基于这样的
前提，我们必须降低那些想要推销仿Berkshire基金的动机，这也是我们决定推
出B级普通股的主要原因。
We look forward to answering your questions about the
recapitalization at the Annual Meeting.
当然若大家对于本次股权重组还有任何问题，欢迎在股东年会上提出讨论。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
Berkshire isn't the only American corporation utilizing the
new, exciting ABWA strategy. At about 1:15 p.m. on July 14, 1995,
Michael Eisner, CEO of The Walt Disney Company, was walking up
Wildflower Lane in Sun Valley. At the same time, I was leaving a
lunch at Herbert Allen's home on that street to meet Tom Murphy,
CEO of Cap Cities/ABC, for a golf game.
Berkshire并不是第一家采用新颖有趣的ABWA走动式并购策略的美国企业，
1995年7月14日下午1点15分，当时华德迪士尼的总裁Michael Eisner
正在Sun Valley的野花大道上行走，在此同时，我刚好从同一条街上Herber
Allen家中一场午宴离开，赶赴与资本城/ABC总裁Tom Murphy的一场高尔夫
球会。
That morning, speaking to a large group of executives and
money managers assembled by Allen's investment bank, Michael had
made a brilliant presentation about Disney, and upon seeing him, I
offered my congratulations. We chatted briefly - and the subject
of a possible combination of Disney and Cap Cities came up. This
wasn't the first time a merger had been discussed, but progress had
never before been made, in part because Disney wanted to buy with
cash and Cap Cities desired stock.
就在当天早上，面对由Allen的投资银行召集一大群企业总裁与基金经理人，
Michael做了一场有关迪士尼相当精彩的演讲，会后在街上遇到他，于是我上前
向他致意，我们做了短暂的交谈，聊到迪士尼与资本城进行合并的可能性，这并
不是第一次讨论有关合并的可能，先前之所以一直没有进展，一部份的原因是由
于迪士尼希望用现金进行交易，而资本城想要拿股票。
Michael and I waited a few minutes for Murph to arrive, and in
the short conversation that ensued, both Michael and Murph
indicated they might bend on the stock/cash question. Within a few
weeks, they both did, at which point a contract was put together in
three very busy days.
Michael跟我花了几分钟等候Murph的到来，在接下来短暂的会谈后，双方同
意在现金/股票的问题上互做让步，几个星期后，双方达成协议，而经过连续三
天马不停蹄的谈判后，终于拟订了合并契约。
The Disney/Cap Cities deal makes so much sense that I'm sure
it would have occurred without that chance encounter in Sun Valley.
But when I ran into Michael that day on Wildflower Lane, he was
heading for his plane, so without that accidental meeting the deal
certainly wouldn't have happened in the time frame it did. I
believe both Disney and Cap Cities will benefit from the fact that
we all serendipitously met that day.
我认为迪士尼与资本城的合并案是天造地设的一对，即使没有那天在Sun Valley
的巧遇，双方终究还是会结合，不过要不是那天刚好我在野花大道碰到正要赶飞
机的Michael，整个合并案可能不会那么快地顺利完成，不可讳言的，迪士尼与
资本城都将因为我们那天的巧遇而受惠良多。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
It's appropriate that I say a few words here about Murph. To
put it simply, he is as fine an executive as I have ever seen in my
long exposure to business. Equally important, he possesses human
qualities every bit the equal of his managerial qualities. He's an
extraordinary friend, parent, husband and citizen. In those rare
instances in which Murph's personal interests diverged from those
of shareholders, he unfailingly favored the owners. When I say
that I like to be associated with managers whom I would love to
have as a sibling, in-law, or trustee of my will, Murph is the
exemplar of what I mean.
在这里我特别要提一下Murph，简单的说，他是我在投资生涯中，遇到最好的
经理人之一，同时除了优秀的管理特质之外，他也拥有同等的人格特质，他是一
位杰出的朋友、父亲、丈夫与公民，许多时候当其个人利益与股东利益相冲突时，
他毫不犹豫地会选择后者，每当我提到我喜欢与那种我希望他们能够成为我的子
孙、女婿或遗嘱执行人的经理人共事时，Murph就是我所能引用的最佳典范。
If Murph should elect to run another business, don't bother to
study its value - just buy the stock. And don't later be as dumb
as I was two years ago when I sold one-third of our holdings in Cap
Cities for $635 million (versus the $1.27 billion those shares
would bring in the Disney merger).
如果Murph决定另创事业，不必费心去研究其可行性，闭着眼睛投资就对了，
而且绝对不要笨到像我前年一样把资本城三分之一的持股以6.35亿美元卖掉，
这批股票在与迪士尼合并后，价值超过12.7亿美元。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
About 96.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's
1995 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions
made were $11.6 million and 3,600 charities were recipients. A
full description of the shareholder-designated contributions
program appears on pages 54-55.
大约有96.3%的有效股权参与1995年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,160万
美元捐出的款项分配给3,600家慈善机构，详细的名单参阅附录。
Every year a few shareholders miss out on the program because
they don't have their shares registered in their own names on the
prescribed record date or because they fail to get their
designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. That
second problem pained me especially this year because two good
friends with substantial holdings missed the deadline. We had to
deny their requests to be included because we can't make exceptions
for some shareholders while refusing to make them for others.
每年都有一小部份的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下，或是没能在60天
的期限内，将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们，而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计画，
尤其是第二个原因让我感到特别头痛，因为今年有二位Berkshire大股东同时也
是我个人的好朋友，未能在截止日以前将表格送达，我们必须忍痛将他们的指定
捐赠剔除，因为我们不可能在拒绝其它不符合规定股东的同时，还破例让他们参
与。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares
that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the
nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so
registered on August 31, 1996, will be ineligible for the 1996
program. When you get the form, return it promptly so that it does
not get put aside or forgotten.
想要参加这项计画者，请必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自
己而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1996年8月31日之前完成
登记，才有权利参与1996年的捐赠计画，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，
以免被丢在一旁给忘记了。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
When it comes to our Annual Meetings, Charlie and I are
managerial oddballs: We thoroughly enjoy the event. So come join
us on Monday, May 6. At Berkshire, we have no investor relations
department and don't use financial analysts as a channel for
disseminating information, earnings "guidance," or the like.
Instead, we prefer direct manager-to-owner communication and
believe that the Annual Meeting is the ideal place for this
interchange of ideas. Talking to you there is efficient for us and
also democratic in that all present simultaneously hear what we
have to say.
每次提到年度股东会，查理跟我就变成啰唆的老头，我们实在是很喜欢这场盛
会，所以请大家务必在五月六日星期一大驾光临，在Berkshire我们没有投资人
公关部门，也从不依赖股票分析师当作信息沟通的桥梁，盈余的预估解说等等，
相反地，我们比较喜欢股东与经理人直接面对面的沟通，而且相信年度股东会正
是观念沟通的最佳场所，与各位一谈对我们来说一点也不会浪费时间，同时也让
各位以相当民主的方式听到我们想要跟各位传达的理念。
Last year, for the first time, we had the Annual Meeting at
the Holiday Convention Centre and the logistics seemed to work.
The ballroom there was filled with about 3,200 people, and we had a
video feed into a second room holding another 800 people. Seating
in the main room was a little tight, so this year we will probably
configure it to hold 3,000. This year we will also have two rooms
for the overflow.
去年我们首度在Holiday会议中心召开年度股东会，当初预定的准备动作事后
看起来相当正确，中央大厅坐满了3,200个人，同时藉由视听器材的辅助，旁
边的会议室还有800人得以参与，大厅显得有点拥挤，所以今年我们打算只排
3,000个座位，同时另外会再准备二间会议室以容纳更多的人参与。
All in all, we will be able to handle 5,000 shareholders. The
meeting will start at 9:30 a.m., but be warned that last year the
main ballroom was filled shortly after 8:00 a.m.
会场总共可以容纳5,000人，会议预定在9点30分开始，不过大家可能要早
一点到，因为去年中央大厅在8点过后不久便已座无虚席。
Shareholders from 49 states attended our 1995 meeting - where
were you, Vermont? - and a number of foreign countries, including
Australia, Sweden and Germany, were represented. As always, the
meeting attracted shareholders who were interested in Berkshire's
business - as contrasted to shareholders who are primarily
interested in themselves - and the questions were all good.
Charlie and I ate lunch on stage and answered questions for about
five hours.
来自49个州的股东参与1995年的年度股东会，你从哪里来，是佛蒙特州吗? 另
外还有一些股东来自海外地区，包含澳洲、瑞典与德国等国家，一如往常，年会
吸引了许多真正关心公司发展的股东参加，与其它只关心自己利益别的公司的股
东相较有很大的不同，所提出的问题也相当好，查理跟我花了五个多小时回答问
题，连午餐都直接在台上解决。
We feel that if owners come from all over the world, we should
try to make sure they have an opportunity to ask their questions.
Most shareholders leave about noon, but a thousand or so hardcore
types usually stay to see whether we will drop. Charlie and I are
in training to last at least five hours again this year.
因为我们认为股东们从世界各地远道而来，所以总是希望让他们都有机会可以发
问，大部分的股东在中午过后就纷纷离席，但还是有一千多名比较死忠的股东想
要瞧瞧我们到底能够撑多久，今年查理跟我希望尽量努力能够像去年那样至少撑
五个小时以上。
We will have our usual array of Berkshire products at the
meeting and this year will add a sales representative from GEICO.
At the 1995 meeting, we sold 747 pounds of candy, 759 pairs of
shoes, and over $17,500 of World Books and related publications.
In a move that might have been dangerous had our stock been weak,
we added knives last year from our Quikut subsidiary and sold 400
