这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .9
飞行的公司之后，查理的态度有了180度的转变，现在只要一提到飞机他就狂乐不
已。
Seriously, costs matter. For example, equity mutual funds incur
corporate expenses - largely payments to the funds' managers - that
average about 100 basis points, a levy likely to cut the returns their
investors earn by 10% or more over time. Charlie and I make no promises
about Berkshire's results. We do promise you, however, that virtually
all of the gains Berkshire makes will end up with shareholders. We are
here to make money with you, not off you.
认真的说，控制成本开支绝对重要，举例来说很多共同基金每年的营业费用大多在
2%上下，这等于间接剥削了投资人将近10%的投资报酬，虽然查理跟我不敢向各位
保证我们的投资绩效，但我们却可以向各位打包票，Berkshire所赚的每一分钱一定
会分文不差地落入股东的口袋里，我们是来帮各位赚钱，而不是帮各位花钱的。
The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market Price
实质价值与股票市价的关系
In last year's letter, with Berkshire shares selling at $36,000, I
told you: (1) Berkshire's gain in market value in recent years had
outstripped its gain in intrinsic value, even though the latter gain had
been highly satisfactory; (2) that kind of overperformance could not
continue indefinitely; (3) Charlie and I did not at that moment consider
Berkshire to be undervalued.
去年当Berkshire的股价约在36,000美元时，我曾向各位报告过(1)Berkshire这几
年的股价表现远超越实质价值，虽然后者的成长幅度也相当令人满意，(2)这样的情况
不可能无限制地持续下去，(3)查理跟我不认为当时Berkshire的价值有被低估的可能
性。
Since I set down those cautions, Berkshire's intrinsic value has
increased very significantly - aided in a major way by a stunning
performance at GEICO that I will tell you more about later - while the
market price of our shares has changed little. This, of course, means
that in 1996 Berkshire's stock underperformed the business.
Consequently, today's price/value relationship is both much different
from what it was a year ago and, as Charlie and I see it, more
appropriate.
自从我下了这些批注之后，Berkshire的实质价值又大幅地增加了，主要的原因在于
GEICO惊人的表现，(关于这点在后面还会向大家详细报告)，而在此同时Berkshire
的股价却维持不动，这代表在1996年Berkshire的实质价值表现优于股价，也就是
说，在今日Berkshire的价格/价值比比起一年以前而言，又有很大的不同，这同时
也是查理跟我认为比较合理的情况。
Over time, the aggregate gains made by Berkshire shareholders must
of necessity match the business gains of the company. When the stock
temporarily overperforms or underperforms the business, a limited number
of shareholders - either sellers or buyers - receive outsized benefits at
the expense of those they trade with. Generally, the sophisticated have
an edge over the innocents in this game.
就长期而言，Berkshire股东的整体利得一定会与企业经营的获利一致，当公司股价
的表现暂时优于或劣于企业经营时，少部份的股东-不管是买进的人或是卖出的人，
将会因为做出这样的举动而从交易的对方身上占到一些便宜，通常来说，都是老经验
的一方在这场游戏中占上风。
Though our primary goal is to maximize the amount that our
shareholders, in total, reap from their ownership of Berkshire, we wish
also to minimize the benefits going to some shareholders at the expense
of others. These are goals we would have were we managing a family
partnership, and we believe they make equal sense for the manager of a
public company. In a partnership, fairness requires that partnership
interests be valued equitably when partners enter or exit; in a public
company, fairness prevails when market price and intrinsic value are in
sync. Obviously, they won't always meet that ideal, but a manager - by
his policies and communications - can do much to foster equity.
虽然我们主要的目标是希望让Berkshire的股东经由持有公司所有权所获得的利益极
大化，但在此同时我们也期望能让一些股东从其它股东身上所占到的便宜能够极小
化，我想这是一般人在经营家族企业时相当重视的，不过我们相信这也适用在上市公
司的经营之上，对合伙企业来说，合伙权益在合伙人加入或退出时必须能够以合理的
方式评量，才能维持公平，同样地，对于上市公司来说，惟有让公司的股价与实质价
值一致，公司股东的公平性才得以维持，当然很明显，这样理想的情况很难一直维持，
不过身为公司经理人可以透过其政策与沟通的方式来大力维持这样的公平性。
Of course, the longer a shareholder holds his shares, the more
bearing Berkshire's business results will have on his financial
experience - and the less it will matter what premium or discount to
intrinsic value prevails when he buys and sells his stock. That's one
reason we hope to attract owners with long-term horizons. Overall, I
think we have succeeded in that pursuit. Berkshire probably ranks number
one among large American corporations in the percentage of its shares
held by owners with a long-term view.
当然股东持有股份的时间越长，那么Berkshire本身的表现与他的投资经验就会越接
近，而他买进或卖出股份时的价格相较于实质价值是折价或溢价的影响程度也就越
小，这也是为什么我们希望能够吸引具有长期投资意愿的股东加入的原因之一，总的
来说，我认为就这点而言，我们算是做的相当成功，Berkshire大概是所有美国大企
业中拥有最多具长期投资观点股东的公司。
Acquisitions of 1996
1996年的并购案
We made two acquisitions in 1996, both possessing exactly the
qualities we seek - excellent business economics and an outstanding
manager.
我们在1996年进行了两件并购案，两者皆拥有我们想要的特质-那就是绝佳的竞争
优势与优秀的经理人。
The first acquisition was Kansas Bankers Surety (KBS), an insurance
company whose name describes its specialty. The company, which does
business in 22 states, has an extraordinary underwriting record, achieved
through the efforts of Don Towle, an extraordinary manager. Don has
developed first-hand relationships with hundreds of bankers and knows
every detail of his operation. He thinks of himself as running a company
that is "his," an attitude we treasure at Berkshire. Because of its
relatively small size, we placed KBS with Wesco, our 80%-owned
subsidiary, which has wanted to expand its insurance operations.
第一桩购并案是堪萨斯银行家保险-从字面上可知，这是一家专门提供银行业者保险
的保险公司，在全美22个州从事相关业务，拥有相当不错的承保记录，全仰赖Don
Towle这位杰出的经理人的努力，Don与上百位银行家皆保持良好的关系，而且也了
解他所从事业务的每一项细节，那种感觉就好象是在经营"自己"的事业一样，这种精
神是Berkshire最欣赏的，由于它的规模不太大，同时正好Berkshire 持有80%股
权的Wesco有意拓展保险事业，所以我们决定把它摆在Wesco之下成为其子公司。
You might be interested in the carefully-crafted and sophisticated
acquisition strategy that allowed Berkshire to nab this deal. Early in
1996 I was invited to the 40th birthday party of my nephew's wife, Jane
Rogers. My taste for social events being low, I immediately, and in my
standard, gracious way, began to invent reasons for skipping the event.
The party planners then countered brilliantly by offering me a seat next
to a man I always enjoy, Jane's dad, Roy Dinsdale - so I went.
大家或许会对我们这次精心设计的购并计画感到兴趣，在1996年初我受邀参加侄媳
妇Jane 40岁的生日宴会，由于我个人对于社交活动通常不太感兴趣，所以很自然地
我按照惯例想出许多理由以婉拒这项邀请，不过对方显然有备而来，特别将我安排在
另外一位我极有兴趣打交道的对象-Roy Dinsdale也就是Jane的父亲，此举使得我
无法拒绝而欣然赴会。
The party took place on January 26. Though the music was loud - Why
must bands play as if they will be paid by the decibel? - I just managed
to hear Roy say he'd come from a directors meeting at Kansas Bankers
Surety, a company I'd always admired. I shouted back that he should let
me know if it ever became available for purchase.
生日宴会在1月26日举行，虽然当时现场音乐震耳欲聋(我实在搞不懂为何乐队总是
要弹得那么大声，难道他们的出场费是按照分贝数计算的吗?)，不过我还是听到Roy
说他刚参加完堪萨斯银行家保险的董事会，这是我一直相当欣赏的一家公司，我大声
地响应他说，如果这家公司有意出售的话，记得一定要通知我。
On February 12, I got the following letter from Roy: "Dear Warren:
Enclosed is the annual financial information on Kansas Bankers Surety.
This is the company that we talked about at Janie's party. If I can be
of any further help, please let me know." On February 13, I told Roy we
would pay $75 million for the company - and before long we had a deal.
I'm now scheming to get invited to Jane's next party.
2月12日我收到一封Roy的来函，上面写到：亲爱的华伦，随函附送一份堪萨斯银
行家保险的年度财务报表，就是上次在Janie的生日宴会上提到的那一家公司，如果
你有任何需要，请务必让我知道。2月13日，我告诉Roy愿意出7,500万美元买下
这家公司，不久之后，整个交易就搞定，现在的我正盘算明年还要再参加Jane的生
日宴会。
Our other acquisition in 1996 - FlightSafety International, the
world's leader in the training of pilots - was far larger, at about $1.5
billion, but had an equally serendipitous origin. The heroes of this
story are first, Richard Sercer, a Tucson aviation consultant, and
second, his wife, Alma Murphy, an ophthalmology graduate of Harvard
Medical School, who in 1990 wore down her husband's reluctance and got
him to buy Berkshire stock. Since then, the two have attended all our
Annual Meetings, but I didn't get to know them personally.
1996年发生的另一件购并案，全世界最大的飞行员训练公司-国际飞安公司，其规
模比起前一个案子要大得多了，总金额高达15亿美元，不过这个案子发生的过程一
样充满戏剧性，本案的功臣首推Richard Sercer-他是塔克森市的飞行顾问，当然还
要归功于他的妻子-Alma Murphy，哈佛医学院眼科学系毕业的她好不容易在1990
年说服她的丈夫买进Berkshire的股份，而且在那之后每年都到奥玛哈参加我们的股
东会，只是我一直没有机会与他们认识。
Fortunately, Richard had also been a long-time shareholder of
FlightSafety, and it occurred to him last year that the two companies
would make a good fit. He knew our acquisition criteria, and he thought
that Al Ueltschi, FlightSafety's 79-year-old CEO, might want to make a
deal that would both give him a home for his company and a security in
payment that he would feel comfortable owning throughout his lifetime.
So in July, Richard wrote Bob Denham, CEO of Salomon Inc, suggesting that
he explore the possibility of a merger.
碰巧的是，Richard同时也是国际飞安公司长期投资的股东，刚好在去年他认为这两
家公司应该有机会可以做一个结合，他相当了解Berkshire购并公司的标准，同时也
知道国际飞安79岁的总裁-Al Ueltschi想要为自己的公司找一个理想的归宿，以为
自己的股权找到一层保障，所以就在七月份，Richard写信给所罗门公司的总裁-Bob
Denham请他研究这项合并交易的可能性。
Bob took it from there, and on September 18, Al and I met in New
York. I had long been familiar with FlightSafety's business, and in
about 60 seconds I knew that Al was exactly our kind of manager. A month
later, we had a contract. Because Charlie and I wished to minimize the
issuance of Berkshire shares, the transaction we structured gave
FlightSafety shareholders a choice of cash or stock but carried terms
that encouraged those who were tax-indifferent to take cash. This nudge
led to about 51% of FlightSafety's shares being exchanged for cash, 41%
for Berkshire A and 8% for Berkshire B.
Bob于是接手进行这个案子，在9月18日我和Al正式在纽约碰面，我对国际飞安
这家公司的经营状况本来就相当熟悉，而在60秒内我马上就知道Al正是符合我们类
型的经理人，一个月后，合约正式敲定，由于查理跟我希望能够尽量避免再发行
Berkshire的新股份，所以在这项交易中，虽然我们提供国际飞安原股东换取股票或
现金两种选择，但是交易条件等于间接鼓励这些税负没有太大差异的股东选择领取现
金，结果总计最后有51%的股份领取现金，41%换得Berkshire A级普通股，另外
8%换得Berkshire B级普通股。
Al has had a lifelong love affair with aviation and actually piloted
Charles Lindbergh. After a barnstorming career in the 1930s, he began
working for Juan Trippe, Pan Am's legendary chief. In 1951, while still
at Pan Am, Al founded FlightSafety, subsequently building it into a
simulator manufacturer and a worldwide trainer of pilots (single-engine,
helicopter, jet and marine). The company operates in 41 locations,
outfitted with 175 simulators of planes ranging from the very small, such
as Cessna 210s, to Boeing 747s. Simulators are not cheap - they can cost
as much as $19 million - so this business, unlike many of our
operations, is capital intensive. About half of the company's revenues
are derived from the training of corporate pilots, with most of the
balance coming from airlines and the military.
Al 一生热爱飞行，曾经驾驶过查理林登号，在经过1930年代轰轰烈烈的飞行事业
之后，他开始担任泛美航空的机长，之后并在1951年创立国际飞安公司，将这家公
司塑造成飞行仿真器制造与飞行员训练的世界级领导公司(单引擎、直升机、客机与水
上飞机)，营业据点遍布41个地方，拥有175座的飞行仿真器，大至波音747客机，
小到Cessna 210型小飞机，大家要知道飞行仿真器的造价可不便宜，有的要价甚至
高达1,900万美金，所以这一行不像我们原来拥有的其它事业，算是相当资本密集
的，该公司大约有一半的营业收入来自于训练飞行员的收入，其余则来自于航空公司
与军事单位。
Al may be 79, but he looks and acts about 55. He will run
operations just as he has in the past: We never fool with success. I
have told him that though we don't believe in splitting Berkshire stock,
we will split his age 2-for-1 when he hits 100.
Al 今年虽然已经79岁，不过外表举止看起来像55岁，他将一如往常继续经营这家
公司，我们从来不会把成功搞混，我甚至跟他开玩笑说，虽然我们从没想过将
Berkshire的股份予以分割，不过等他满100岁时，我们倒是可以考虑把他的年纪一
分为二。
An observer might conclude from our hiring practices that Charlie
and I were traumatized early in life by an EEOC bulletin on age
discrimination. The real explanation, however, is self-interest: It's
difficult to teach a new dog old tricks. The many Berkshire managers who
are past 70 hit home runs today at the same pace that long ago gave them
reputations as young slugging sensations. Therefore, to get a job with
us, just employ the tactic of the 76-year-old who persuaded a dazzling
beauty of 25 to marry him. "How did you ever get her to accept?" asked
his envious contemporaries. The comeback: "I told her I was 86."
有人可能会怀疑我们现在雇用人的政策，可能是缘于早期年龄歧视政策所受到的创
伤，其实真正的原因乃是出于自私的观点，因为我们认为实在是很难教新狗老把戏！
在Berkshire，许多经理人虽然已经年过70，但是他们还是像年轻时一样活跃，频频
击出全垒打，所以如果各位有意到本公司谋得一职，请记得运用一位高龄76岁老翁
如何追到25岁年轻辣妹的技巧，当同年龄的同伴很钦羡地问他：你到底是如何说服
对方同意的呢 他回答到：很简单，我告诉她我今年86岁!
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now we pause for our usual commercial: If you own a large
business with good economic characteristics and wish to become associated
with an exceptional collection of businesses having similar
characteristics, Berkshire may well be the home you seek. Our
requirements are set forth on page 21. If your company meets them - and
if I fail to make the next birthday party you attend - give me a call.
接下来休息一下，顺便做点广告，如果你拥有具极佳竞争优势的大企业同时想要与拥
有同样特质的企业群为伍的话，Berkshire可以提供你绝佳的归宿，我们的要求条件
详如附件，若是你的公司符合这些条件，而我又没能来得及参加你的生日派对，记得
打电话给我。
Insurance Operations - Overview
保险事业盈余-总检讨
Our insurance business was terrific in 1996. In both primary
insurance, where GEICO is our main unit, and in our "super-cat"
reinsurance business, results were outstanding.
在1996年，我们保险事业的营运大放异彩，不管是初级保险-其中以GEICO车险为
主，或者是霹雳猫再保业务的表现都很杰出。
As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance
business is, first, the amount of "float" we generate and, second, its
cost to us. These are matters that are important for you to understand
because float is a major component of Berkshire's intrinsic value that is
not reflected in book value.
就像是在过去年报中一再跟各位解释的，对于我们的保险事业来说，真正重要的，第
一是我们因此取得的保险浮存金，第二就是取得它的成本，这两点相当的重要，大家
必须了解浮存金虽然不会反应在公司净值之上，但却是Berkshire实质价值构成的关
键因素之一。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an
insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before
losses are paid. Secondly, the premiums that an insurer takes in
typically do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay.
That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of
float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is
less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds.
But the business is an albatross if the cost of its float is higher than
market rates for money.
