这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .10
更进一步说，浮存金是一项我们持有但不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮
存金的产生原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，
而通常保险业者收取的保费不足以因应最后支付出去的相关损失与费用，于是保险公
司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当浮存金成本长期而言低于从其它管
道取得资金的成本时，保险公司就有存在的价值，不过保险事业取得浮存金的成本若
远高于资金市场利率时，它就像是一只在陆地上笨重的信天翁。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance
business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our
float - which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium
volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held
under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then
subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes
and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of
float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years
when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last four, our cost
of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding
money.
不过如同下表中的数字所显示的，Berkshire的保险事业可说是大获全胜，表中的浮
存金，系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣
金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金
部位算是相当大的，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而定，在某
些年度，就像是最近四年，由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚
至是负的，光是持有这些资金我们就已经开始赚钱了。
(1) (2) Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximat on Long-Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds
------------ ------------- ---------------- -------------
(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)
1967.......... profit 17.3 less than zero 5.50%
1968.......... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%
1969.......... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%
1970.......... 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%
1971.......... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%
1972.......... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%
1973.......... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%
1974.......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%
1975.......... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%
1976.......... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%
1977.......... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%
1978.......... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%
1979.......... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%
1980.......... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%
1981.......... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%
1982.......... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%
1983.......... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%
1984.......... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%
1985.......... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%
1986.......... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%
1987.......... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%
1988.......... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%
1989.......... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%
1990.......... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%
1991.......... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%
1992.......... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%
1993.......... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%
1994.......... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%
1995.......... profit 3,607.2 less than zero 5.95%
1996.......... profit 6,702.0 less than zero 6.64%
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has
grown at an annual compounded rate of 22.3%. In more years than not, our
cost of funds has been less than nothing. This access to "free" money has
boosted Berkshire's performance in a major way. Moreover, our acquisition
of GEICO materially increases the probability that we can continue to
obtain "free" funds in increasing amounts.
自从1967年我们进军保险业以来，我们的浮存金每年以22.3%复合成长率增加，大
部分的年度，我们的资金成本都在零以下，受惠于这些免费的资金，大大地帮助
Berkshire的绩效提升。更甚者，在完成对GEICO的并购之后，我们取得免费资金的
成长速度又加快了许多。
Super-Cat Insurance
霹雳猫保险业务
As in the past three years, we once again stress that the good results
we are reporting for Berkshire stem in part from our super-cat business
having a lucky year. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance
and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of
mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences,
our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years
- and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the
attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great many years to
measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year
in the super-cat business is not a possibility - it's a certainty. The
only question is when it will come.
与过去三年一样，我们再次强调今年Berkshire保险事业之所以能够有这么好的成
绩，部份的原因要归功于霹雳猫业务又渡过幸运的一年，从事这类业务，我们出售保
单给保险公司与再保公司以分散其面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风险，由于真正
重大的灾害并不常发生，所以我们的霹雳猫业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，才突然
发生重大的损失，换句话说，我们这项霹雳猫业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几年
才有办法看得清，不过大家必须明了，所谓的重大损失的年头不是可能会发生，而是
肯定会发生，唯一的问题是它什么时候会降临。
I emphasize this lugubrious point because I would not want you to
panic and sell your Berkshire stock upon hearing that some large
catastrophe had cost us a significant amount. If you would tend to react
that way, you should not own Berkshire shares now, just as you should
entirely avoid owning stocks if a crashing market would lead you to panic
and sell. Selling fine businesses on "scary" news is usually a bad
decision. (Robert Woodruff, the business genius who built Coca-Cola over
many decades and who owned a huge position in the company, was once
asked when it might be a good time to sell Coke stock. Woodruff had a
simple answer: "I don't know. I've never sold any.")
我之所以会把丑话说在前头，是因为我不希望大家那天突然听到Berkshire因为某某
大型意外灾害须理赔一大笔钱时，恐慌地拋售手中的持股，而如果届时你真的会有这
种反应，那么你根本就不应该拥有本公司的股份，就像是如果你是那种碰到股市崩
盘，会恐慌性的拋售手中股票的人，我建议你最好不要投资股票，听到坏消息而把手
中的好股票卖掉通常不会是一个明智的决定，(数十年前创办可口可乐的天才企业家
-Robert Woodruff曾经被问到，什么情况下是出售可口可乐股票的好时机，
Woodruff简短的回答到，我不知道，我从来就没有卖过!)。
In our super-cat operation, our customers are insurers that are
exposed to major earnings volatility and that wish to reduce it. The
product we sell - for what we hope is an appropriate price - is our
willingness to shift that volatility to our own books. Gyrations in
Berkshire's earnings don't bother us in the least: Charlie and I would
much rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%. (After all, our
earnings swing wildly on a daily and weekly basis - why should we demand
that smoothness accompany each orbit that the earth makes of the sun?)
We are most comfortable with that thinking, however, when we have
shareholder/partners who can also accept volatility, and that's why we
regularly repeat our cautions.
谈到霹雳猫保险业务，我们的客户主要是一些想要降低本身必须承担盈余变动剧烈风
险的保险公司，而我们贩卖的产品-当然一定要以合理的价格，将这些盈余变动的风
险转移到本公司的帐上，因为我们对于Berkshire公司盈余剧烈的变动一点都不会介
意，查理跟我宁可接受上下变动但平均可达15%的结果，也不要平稳的12%，(就像
是我们知道公司的盈余每天、每周都会变动，那么我们又何必强求公司的盈余变化一
定要跟地球环绕太阳轨道的时间一致呢?) 我想如果Berkshire的股东合伙人也能有
这样的看法，那么我们执行业务时便能更得心应手，而这也是为什么我们要一再提出
相同警告的原因。
We took on some major super-cat exposures during 1996. At mid-year
we wrote a contract with Allstate that covers Florida hurricanes, and though
there are no definitive records that would allow us to prove this point, we
believe that to have then been the largest single catastrophe risk ever
assumed by one company for its own account. Later in the year, however, we
wrote a policy for the California Earthquake Authority that goes into
effect on April 1, 1997, and that exposes us to a loss more than twice that
possible under the Florida contract. Again we retained all the risk for
our own account. Large as these coverages are, Berkshire's after-tax
"worst-case" loss from a true mega-catastrophe is probably no more than
$600 million, which is less than 3% of our book value and 1.5% of our market
value. To gain some perspective on this exposure, look at the table on
page 2 and note the much greater volatility that security markets have
delivered us.
我们在1996年陆续接了好几件大业务，在年中我们与全美保险签约承保佛罗里达飓
风险，虽然没有确切的资料可供左证，但我们相信这应该是单一公司独力承受单一风
险的最高记录，接着到年底，我们又与加州地震局签约承保比佛罗里达飓风高出一倍
的理赔上限，保单预计从1997年4月1日开始生效，再一次我们独立承揽所有的风
险，虽然承保的金额相当庞大，但是即使在最坏的状况下，任何一件大型灾害的税后
损失也不会超过六亿美元，大约不到Berkshire净值的3%或市值的1.5%，大家要了
解这类风险的影响性，比起年报第二页所示的股票市场变动对我们的影响性来说，前
者可谓是小巫见大巫。
In the super-cat business, we have three major competitive advantages.
First, the parties buying reinsurance from us know that we both can and
will pay under the most adverse of circumstances. Were a truly cataclysmic
disaster to occur, it is not impossible that a financial panic would
quickly follow. If that happened, there could well be respected reinsurers
that would have difficulty paying at just the moment that their clients
faced extraordinary needs. Indeed, one reason we never "lay off" part of
the risks we insure is that we have reservations about our ability to
collect from others when disaster strikes. When it's Berkshire promising,
insureds know with certainty that they can collect promptly.
在霹雳猫保险业务，我们主要有三项竞争优势，首先向我们投保再保险的客户都知道
我们有能力，也会在最糟糕的情况下履约付款，因为万一真的发生什么样的大灾难，
很难保证金融恐慌就不会接踵而至，届时在其客户最需要援助时，可能连一些原本享
有盛誉的再保公司都拿不出钱来，而事实上我们之所以从来不将风险再转嫁出去的一
个原因也是因为我们对于灾难发生时，其它保险公司能否顺利支付赔款的能力有所保
留，反之只要是Berkshire做出的保证，所有的保户都可以百分之百确定一定可以立
即得到理赔。
Our second advantage - somewhat related - is subtle but important.
After a mega-catastrophe, insurers might well find it difficult to obtain
reinsurance even though their need for coverage would then be particularly
great. At such a time, Berkshire would without question have very
substantial capacity available - but it will naturally be our long-standing
clients that have first call on it. That business reality has made major
insurers and reinsurers throughout the world realize the desirability of
doing business with us. Indeed, we are currently getting sizable "standby"
fees from reinsurers that are simply nailing down their ability to get
coverage from us should the market tighten.
我们的第二项优势，跟第一项有点关联，虽然不显著但却相当重要，当一件大灾害发
生后，保险公司最迫切需要重新办理投保时，可能会发现很难再找到新保单，在这个
时候，Berkshire保证绝对可以提供任何服务，当然我们会优先受理原来与我们有长
期往来的客户，这个经验已经使得全世界的保险公司与再保公司了解与我们维持往来
的必要性，事实上，我们现在正从许多再保公司那里收取预备准备费，以防万一市场
情况紧绷时，他们可以确保取得再保的优先机会。
Our final competitive advantage is that we can provide dollar
coverages of a size neither matched nor approached elsewhere in the
industry. Insurers looking for huge covers know that a single call to
Berkshire will produce a firm and immediate offering.
我们拥有的最后一项优势是我们能够提供别处得不到单一最高的投保上限，保险业者
都知道只要打一通电话到Berkshire，就可以立即得到确定满意的答复。
A few facts about our exposure to California earthquakes - our largest
risk - seem in order. The Northridge quake of 1994 laid homeowners' losses
on insurers that greatly exceeded what computer models had told them to
expect. Yet the intensity of that quake was mild compared to the "worstcase"
possibility for California. Understandably, insurers became - ahem -
shaken and started contemplating a retreat from writing earthquake coverage
into their homeowners' policies.
有关加州大地震方面有几点需要在这里做说明，因为这是我们最大的风险部位所在，
1994年发生的北岭大地震使得保险业的住宅保险损失远超过计算机所估算的预期范
围，不过这次地震的震度比起预估可能的最坏情况，最还算是相对轻微的，所以可想
而知某些保险业者肯定都吓坏了，因此开始考虑将地震险从他们的住宅险保单条款中
撤掉。
In a thoughtful response, Chuck Quackenbush, California's insurance
commissioner, designed a new residential earthquake policy to be written by
a state-sponsored insurer, The California Earthquake Authority. This
entity, which went into operation on December 1, 1996, needed large layers
of reinsurance - and that's where we came in. Berkshire's layer of
approximately $1 billion will be called upon if the Authority's aggregate
losses in the period ending March 31, 2001 exceed about $5 billion. (The
press originally reported larger figures, but these would have applied only
if all California insurers had entered into the arrangement; instead only
72% signed up.)
深富远见的加州保险委员会委员Chuch Quackenbush立即规划出一张由加州地震
局背后支持新的住宅地震保单，然而这项预计从1996年12月1日开始正式生效的
措施极需要再保险的庇护，这时候就轮到我们上场了，Berkshire总共提供10亿美
元的再保险防护，当地震局在2001年3月31日之前因地震发生的损失超过50亿
美元时，(媒体原先报导的数字比这更高，不过那是在所有保险业者都一同加入时的情
况，总计最后只有72%的业者参与签约)。
So what are the true odds of our having to make a payout during the
policy's term? We don't know - nor do we think computer models will help
us, since we believe the precision they project is a chimera. In fact,
such models can lull decision-makers into a false sense of security and
thereby increase their chances of making a really huge mistake. We've
already seen such debacles in both insurance and investments. Witness
"portfolio insurance," whose destructive effects in the 1987 market crash
led one wag to observe that it was the computers that should have been
jumping out of windows.
大家一定会问在保单有效期间我们最后真正必须支付理赔的机率到底有多大 老实
说我们实在是不知道，而我们也不认为用计算机运算出来的程序可以帮我们什么忙，基
本上计算机做出的预测根本就是垃圾，它们反而会让做决策的人误以为得到某种确定的
假象，从而使得他们犯下大错的机会大增，过去不管是在保险或投资业者，这种离谱
的情况屡见不鲜，看看投资组合保险在1987年股市大崩盘时所造成的惨况，有人开
玩笑说，当时应该要跳楼是计算机而不是那些被它所愚弄的人。
Even if perfection in assessing risks is unattainable, insurers can
underwrite sensibly. After all, you need not know a man's precise age to
know that he is old enough to vote nor know his exact weight to recognize
his need to diet. In insurance, it is essential to remember that virtually
all surprises are unpleasant, and with that in mind we try to price our
super-cat exposures so that about 90% of total premiums end up being
eventually paid out in losses and expenses. Over time, we will find out
how smart our pricing has been, but that will not be quickly. The supercat
business is just like the investment business in that it often takes a
long time to find out whether you knew what you were doing.
虽然保险业者无法准确地评估风险到底有多大，不过我们却还是可以合理的接下保
单，就像是你并不一定要真的知道一个人的实际年龄，才能判断他是否可以去投票或
是一定要知道一个人几公斤重才认为他该不该减肥，同样的，从事保险这一行，大家
必须谨记的是，基本上所有的意外都不会让人感到愉快，所以在接下保单时，我们心
里早有预备，准备把90%的保费收入花在损失理赔与相关费用之上，慢慢的一段时间
下来，我们就会发现，这样的订价是否合理，这绝对需要时间来证明，霹雳猫保险这
一行就像是投资事业一样，绝对需要一段很长的时间，你才能确定知道自己到底在干
什么。
What I can state with certainty, however, is that we have the best
person in the world to run our super-cat business: Ajit Jain, whose value
to Berkshire is simply enormous. In the reinsurance field, disastrous
propositions abound. I know that because I personally embraced all too
many of these in the 1970s and also because GEICO has a large runoff
portfolio made up of foolish contracts written in the early-1980s, able
though its then-management was. Ajit, I can assure you, won't make
