这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .12
Pre-tax Earnings minority interests)
---------------- -------------------
1996 1995(1) 1996 1995(1)
------- -------- ------- -------
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting.....................$ 222.1 $ 20.5 $ 142.8 $ 11.3
Net Investment Income............ 726.2 501.6 593.1 417.7
Buffalo News........................... 50.4 46.8 29.5 27.3
Fechheimer............................. 17.3 16.9 9.3 8.8
Finance Businesses..................... 23.1 20.8 14.9 12.6
Home Furnishings....................... 43.8 29.7(2) 24.8 16.7(2)
Jewelry................................ 27.8 33.9(3) 16.1 19.1(3)
Kirby.................................. 58.5 50.2 39.9 32.1
Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group....... 50.6 34.1 32.2 21.2
See's Candies.......................... 51.9 50.2 30.8 29.8
Shoe Group............................. 61.6 58.4 41.0 37.5
World Book............................. 12.6 8.8 9.5 7.0
Purchase-Accounting Adjustments........ (75.7) (27.0) (70.5) (23.4)
Interest Expense(4).................... (94.3) (56.0) (56.6) (34.9)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions.. (13.3) (11.6) (8.5) (7.0)
Other.................................. 58.8 37.4 34.8 24.4
------- -------- -------- -------
Operating Earnings....................... 1,221.4 814.7 883.1 600.2
Sales of Securities...................... 2,484.5 194.1 1,605.5 125.0
------- -------- -------- -------
Total Earnings - All Entities........... $3,705.9 $1,008.8 $2,488.6 $ 725.2
====== ======= ======= ======
1. Before the GEICO-related restatement.
(1)不包含GEICO重编部份。
(2) Includes R.C. Willey from June 29, 1995.
(2)包含R.C. Willey 1995年6月29日以后的盈余
(3) Includes Helzberg's from April 30, 1995.
(3)包含Helzberg 1995年4月30日以后的盈余
(4) Excludes interest expenseof Finance Businesses.
(4)扣除金融事业的利息支出
In this section last year, I discussed three businesses that reported
a decline in earnings - Buffalo News, Shoe Group and World Book. All, I'm
happy to say, recorded gains in 1996.
去年到这段时，我曾提到有三个事业盈余大幅下滑-水牛城新闻报、鞋子事业与世界
百科全书，今年我们高兴向大家报告，这几个事业都大有进步。
World Book, however, did not find it easy: Despite the operation's
new status as the only direct-seller of encyclopedias in the country
(Encyclopedia Britannica exited the field last year), its unit volume fell.
Additionally, World Book spent heavily on a new CD-ROM product that began
to take in revenues only in early 1997, when it was launched in association
with IBM. In the face of these factors, earnings would have evaporated had
World Book not revamped distribution methods and cut overhead at
headquarters, thereby dramatically reducing its fixed costs. Overall, the
company has gone a long way toward assuring its long-term viability in both
the print and electronic marketplaces.
不过对于世界百科全书来说，这可不是一件简单的事，尽管如今它们是全美仅存以直
销的方式销售百科全书的业者(大英百科全书在去年退出了这个市场)，不过它的销售
数量还是呈现下滑的状态，另外世界百科全书还投入大笔的经费在CD版的新产品之
上，但其效益至少要等到1997年初与IBM的合作正式展开后才有可能显现，在种种
不利的状况下，世界百科全书如果不能大力改革通路方式并降低总部营运开销，以彻
底降低固定成本的话，盈余可能会消失殆尽，不过总的来说，该公司已想尽各种方法
以确保自身能够在竞争激烈的印刷与电子出版市场上继续存活下去。
Our only disappointment last year was in jewelry: Borsheim's did
fine, but Helzberg's suffered a material decline in earnings. Its expense
levels had been geared to a sizable increase in same-store sales,
consistent with the gains achieved in recent years. When sales were
instead flat, profit margins fell. Jeff Comment, CEO of Helzberg's, is
addressing the expense problem in a decisive manner, and the company's
earnings should improve in 1997.
去年唯一让我们感到失望的反而是珠宝事业，波仙还不错，不过Helzberg的盈余却
大幅下滑，单店平均费用持续大幅增加，但是当营收表现平平时，获利自然缩减，针
对这个问题该公司总裁-Jeff Comment已经采取必要的措施，我想它们1997年的
盈余表现应该能够有所改善。
Overall, our operating businesses continue to perform exceptionally,
far outdoing their industry norms. For this, Charlie and I thank our
managers. If you should see any of them at the Annual Meeting, add your
thanks as well.
不过总的来说，我们旗下所有的营利事业的表现，比起其同业来说仍然相当杰出，对
此查理跟我本身向所有经理人致上深深的敬意，而如果各位在年会上遇到他们，也请
大家不吝给予掌声。
More information about our various businesses is given on pages 36-
46, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP
basis. In addition, on pages 51-57, we have rearranged Berkshire's
financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation
that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our
intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish
you to give us if our positions were reversed.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，另外你还可以
找到经过重编，依照Berkshire四大部门的信息，这是查理跟我能够完整呈现
Berkshire现况的模式，我们的目的是希望能够换个角度设想，提供大家所有必要的
信息。
"Look-Through" Earnings
完整透视盈余
Reported earnings are a poor measure of economic progress at
Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented
earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees - though
these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings
attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money,
since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as
more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason is simple:
Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high
rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?
我们认为帐列盈余很难表现Berkshire实际的营运状况，部份原因在于列示在本公司
帐上的股利收入，事实上仅占被投资公司收益的一小部份，其实对我们而言，我们更
重视未分配的那一部份，因为他们可以为我们创造出更高的价值，原因很简单，因为
我们的被投资公司往往比母公司更有机会把资金投入到高投资报酬的用途之上，既然
如此又何必一定要强迫他们把盈余分配回来呢?
To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than
reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through"
earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating
earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the
retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP
accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for
the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of
investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating
earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as
capital gains and other major non-recurring items.
为了要能更真实的反应Berkshire实际的经营状况，于是乎我们运用了完整透视盈余
的观念，这个数字总共包含(1)前段所提到的帐列盈余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保
留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的
盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系已扣除资
本利得、特别会计调整与企业其它非常态的项目。
The following table sets forth our 1996 look-through earnings,
though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since
they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us
by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized
on page 12, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算出1996年透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位
这些数字只不过是估计数，很多都是基于简单的判断，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入
已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益项下)。
Berkshire's Share
of Undistributed
Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings
Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend(1) (in millions)(2)
------------------------ ----------------------- ------------------
American Express Company........ 10.5% $ 132
The Coca-Cola Company........... 8.1% 180
The Walt Disney Company......... 3.6% 50
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 8.4% 77
The Gillette Company............ 8.6% 73
McDonald's Corporation.......... 4.3% 38
The Washington Post Company..... 15.8% 27
Wells Fargo & Company........... 8.0% 84
------
Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees.. 661
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3).... (93)
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire........................ 954
------
Total look-through earnings of Berkshire.................. $1,522
======
(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on
the dividends it receives
Common Stock Investments
股票投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market
value of more than $500 million are itemized.
下表是我们市价超过五亿美元以上的普通股投资。
12/31/96
Shares Company Cost* Market
----------- --------------------------------- -------- ---------
(dollars in millions)
49,456,900 American Express Company...........$1,392.7 $ 2,794.3
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company.............. 1,298.9 10,525.0
24,614,214 The Walt Disney Company............ 577.0 1,716.8
64,246,000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.. 333.4 1,772.8
48,000,000 The Gillette Company............... 600.0 3,732.0
30,156,600 McDonald's Corporation............. 1,265.3 1,368.4
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company........ 10.6 579.0
7,291,418 Wells Fargo & Company.............. 497.8 1,966.9
Others............................. 1,934.5 3,295.4
-------- ---------
Total Common Stocks................ $7,910.2 $27,750.6
====== =======
* Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.2 billion
less than GAAP cost.
*系以税务为基础的成本，比一般公认会计原则的帐面成本少12亿美元。
Our portfolio shows little change: We continue to make more money
when snoring than when active.
我们的投资组合还是没有多大变动，我们打盹时赚的钱比起醒着时多很多。
Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither we nor most
business managers would dream of feverishly trading highly-profitable
subsidiaries because a small move in the Federal Reserve's discount rate
was predicted or because some Wall Street pundit had reversed his views
on the market. Why, then, should we behave differently with our minority
positions in wonderful businesses? The art of investing in public
companies successfully is little different from the art of successfully
acquiring subsidiaries. In each case you simply want to acquire, at a
sensible price, a business with excellent economics and able, honest
management. Thereafter, you need only monitor whether these qualities
are being preserved.
按兵不动对我们来说是一项明智的行为，就像是我们或其它经理人不可能因为谣传联
准会可能调整贴放利率或是华尔街那帮土匪大幅改变他们对股市前景的看法，就决定
把旗下高获利的金鸡母卖来卖去一样，我们也不会对拥有部份所有权的好公司股票任
意出脱，投资上市公司股票的秘诀与取得百分之百的子公司的方法没有什么两样，都
是希望能够以合理的价格取得拥有绝佳竞争优势与才德兼备的经理人，也因此大家真
正应该关心注意的是这些特质是否有任何改变。
When carried out capably, an investment strategy of that type will
often result in its practitioner owning a few securities that will come
to represent a very large portion of his portfolio. This investor would
get a similar result if he followed a policy of purchasing an interest
in, say, 20% of the future earnings of a number of outstanding college
basketball stars. A handful of these would go on to achieve NBA stardom,
and the investor's take from them would soon dominate his royalty stream.
To suggest that this investor should sell off portions of his most
successful investments simply because they have come to dominate his
portfolio is akin to suggesting that the Bulls trade Michael Jordan
because he has become so important to the team.
只要执行得当，运用这样投资策略的投资人到最后会发现，少数几家公司的股份将会
占他投资组合的一大部分，这样的方式就好象一个人买下假设一群极具潜力的大学明
星篮球队员20%的未来权益，其中有一小部份的球员可能可以进到NBA殿堂打球，
那么投资人会发现其因此从中收取的权利金将会占其收入的绝大部分，要是有人建议
把这部份的权益转让掉就好象是要公牛队把麦可乔登交易出去一样，只因为他对球队
来说实在是太重要了。
In studying the investments we have made in both subsidiary
companies and common stocks, you will see that we favor businesses and
industries unlikely to experience major change. The reason for that is
simple: Making either type of purchase, we are searching for operations
that we believe are virtually certain to possess enormous competitive
strength ten or twenty years from now. A fast-changing industry
environment may offer the chance for huge wins, but it precludes the
certainty we seek.
不管是研究买下整家公司或股票投资时，大家会发现我们偏爱变化不大的公司与产
业，原因很简单，我们希望买到的公司是能够持续拥有竞争优势达十年或二十年以上
者，变迁快速的产业环境或许可能让人一夕之间大发利市，但却无法提供我们想要的
稳定性。
I should emphasize that, as citizens, Charlie and I welcome change:
Fresh ideas, new products, innovative processes and the like cause our
country's standard of living to rise, and that's clearly good. As
investors, however, our reaction to a fermenting industry is much like
our attitude toward space exploration: We applaud the endeavor but
prefer to skip the ride.
另一方面我必须强调的是，身为公民的一份子，查理跟我相当欢迎改变，因为新的观
念、新的产品或创新的方法可以提升我们的生活水准，这点很明显的对我们有好处，
不过身为投资人对于热门流行产业的态度就好象在太空探险一样，对于这种勇猛的行
为我们给予喝采，但是若要我们自己上场，那就再说吧!
Obviously all businesses change to some extent. Today, See's is
different in many ways from what it was in 1972 when we bought it: It
offers a different assortment of candy, employs different machinery and
sells through different distribution channels. But the reasons why
people today buy boxed chocolates, and why they buy them from us rather
than from someone else, are virtually unchanged from what they were in
the 1920s when the See family was building the business. Moreover, these
motivations are not likely to change over the next 20 years, or even 50.
当然所有的产业都会变化，在今日喜斯糖果的经营形态与我们当初在1972年买下这
家公司时又有很大的不同，喜斯提供了更多样的糖果、生产设备与销售通路也大不相
同，不过人们为什么要购买盒装巧克力的动机，与购买盒装巧克力又为什么一定要选
择喜斯的原因，自从喜斯在1920年代由喜太太家族创立以来就从来没有变过，而我
想这原因在往后20年，乃至于50年都不会有所改变。
We look for similar predictability in marketable securities. Take
Coca-Cola: The zeal and imagination with which Coke products are sold
has burgeoned under Roberto Goizueta, who has done an absolutely
incredible job in creating value for his shareholders. Aided by Don
Keough and Doug Ivester, Roberto has rethought and improved every aspect
of the company. But the fundamentals of the business - the qualities
that underlie Coke's competitive dominance and stunning economics - have
remained constant through the years.
在买进股票时我们同样的也追求可预测的未来，以可口可乐来说，可口可乐产品所代
表的热情与想象在总裁古崔塔的带领下升华到极点，此举为公司股东创造出可观的价
值，在Don Keough与Doug Ivester的协助之下，古崔塔从头到尾重新塑造公司的
每一部份，不过这家公司的本质-可口可乐强力的竞争优势与主导性，多年来却从未
改变。
I was recently studying the 1896 report of Coke (and you think that
you are behind in your reading!). At that time Coke, though it was
already the leading soft drink, had been around for only a decade. But
