这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .13
its blueprint for the next 100 years was already drawn. Reporting sales
of $148,000 that year, Asa Candler, the company's president, said: "We
have not lagged in our efforts to go into all the world teaching that
Coca-Cola is the article, par excellence, for the health and good feeling
of all people." Though "health" may have been a reach, I love the fact
that Coke still relies on Candler's basic theme today - a century later.
Candler went on to say, just as Roberto could now, "No article of like
character has ever so firmly entrenched itself in public favor." Sales
of syrup that year, incidentally, were 116,492 gallons versus about 3.2
billion in 1996.
最近我正在研读可口可乐1896年的年报(所以大家现在看我们的年报应该还不嫌太
晚)，虽然当时可口可乐已经成为冷饮市场的领导者，但那也不过只有十年的光景，然
而在当时该公司却早已规划好未来的百年大计，面对年仅14.8万美元的销售额，公
司总裁Asa Candler表示：「我们从没有放弃告诉全世界，可口可乐是能够提升人类
健康与快乐、最卓越超凡的一件东西。」虽然我认为健康这档子事还有待努力，但我
很高兴可口可乐在一百年后的今天，始终还是遵循Candler当初立下的愿景，Candler
又继续谈到：「没有其它东西的味道能够像可乐一样深植人心。」当年的可乐糖浆销
售量不过只有11.6万加仑，时至今日，销售量已达到32亿加仑。
I can't resist one more Candler quote: "Beginning this year about
March 1st . . . we employed ten traveling salesmen by means of which,
with systematic correspondence from the office, we covered almost the
territory of the Union." That's my kind of sales force.
我实在忍不住想要在引用Candler的另一段话：「从今年三月开始，我们雇用了十位
业务员，在与总公司保持密切联系下巡回各地推销产品，基本上我们的业务范围已涵
盖整个美联共和国。」这才是我心目中的销售力量。
Companies such as Coca-Cola and Gillette might well be labeled "The
Inevitables." Forecasters may differ a bit in their predictions of exactly
how much soft drink or shaving-equipment business these companies
will be doing in ten or twenty years. Nor is our talk of inevitability
meant to play down the vital work that these companies must continue to
carry out, in such areas as manufacturing, distribution, packaging and
product innovation. In the end, however, no sensible observer - not even
these companies' most vigorous competitors, assuming they are assessing
the matter honestly - questions that Coke and Gillette will dominate
their fields worldwide for an investment lifetime. Indeed, their
dominance will probably strengthen. Both companies have significantly
expanded their already huge shares of market during the past ten years,
and all signs point to their repeating that performance in the next
decade.
像可口可乐与吉列这类的公司应该可以被归类为"永恒的持股"，分析师对于这些公司
在未来一、二十年饮料或刮胡刀市场的预测可能会有些许的不同，而我们所说的永恒
并不意味这些公司可以不必继续贯彻在制造、配销、包装与产品创新上的努力，只是
就算是最没有概念的观察家或甚至是其最主要的竞争对手，也不得不承认可口可乐与
吉列，在终其一生的投资生涯，仍将在其各自的领域中独领风骚，甚至于他们的优势
还有可能会继续增强，过去十年来，两家公司在原有极大的市占率又扩大许多，而所
有的迹象显示，在往后的十年间，他们还会继续以此态势扩大版图。
Obviously many companies in high-tech businesses or embryonic
industries will grow much faster in percentage terms than will The
Inevitables. But I would rather be certain of a good result than hopeful
of a great one.
当然比起一些具爆发性高科技或新创的事业来说，这些被永恒持股公司的成长力略显
不足，但与其两鸟在林，还不如一鸟在手。
Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few Inevitables, even
after a lifetime of looking for them. Leadership alone provides no
certainties: Witness the shocks some years back at General Motors, IBM
and Sears, all of which had enjoyed long periods of seeming
invincibility. Though some industries or lines of business exhibit
characteristics that endow leaders with virtually insurmountable
advantages, and that tend to establish Survival of the Fattest as almost
a natural law, most do not. Thus, for every Inevitable, there are dozens
of Impostors, companies now riding high but vulnerable to competitive
attacks. Considering what it takes to be an Inevitable, Charlie and I
recognize that we will never be able to come up with a Nifty Fifty or
even a Twinkling Twenty. To the Inevitables in our portfolio, therefore,
we add a few "Highly Probables."
虽然查理跟我本人终其一生追求永恒的持股，但能够真正让我们找到的却属鳞毛凤
角，光是取得市场领导地位并不足以保证成功，看看过去几年来通用汽车、IBM与西
尔斯这些公司，都曾是领导一方的产业霸主，在所属的产业都被赋予其无可取代的优
势地位，大者恒存的自然定律似乎牢不可破，但实际结果却不然，也因此在找到真正
的真命天子之前，旁边可能还有好几打假冒者，这些公司虽然曾经红极一时，但却完
全经不起竞争的考验，换个角度来看，既然能够被称为永恒的持股，查理跟我早就有
心理准备，其数量绝对不可能超过五十家或甚至是不到二十家，所以就我们的投资组
合来说，除了几家真正够格的公司之外，还有另外几家则是属于极有可能的潜在候选
人。
You can, of course, pay too much for even the best of businesses.
The overpayment risk surfaces periodically and, in our opinion, may now
be quite high for the purchasers of virtually all stocks, The Inevitables
included. Investors making purchases in an overheated market need to
recognize that it may often take an extended period for the value of even
an outstanding company to catch up with the price they paid.
当然有时你也很有可能以过高的价格买下一家好的公司，这种风险并不是没有，而以
我个人的看法，像现在的时机买任何股票就都有可能必须承担这样的风险，当然也包
含永恒的持股在内，在过热的股市进场买股票的投资人必须要先做好心理准备，那就
是对于付出高价买进的优良企业来说，必须要有更长的一段时间才有办法让他们的价
值得以彰显。
A far more serious problem occurs when the management of a great
company gets sidetracked and neglects its wonderful base business while
purchasing other businesses that are so-so or worse. When that happens,
the suffering of investors is often prolonged. Unfortunately, that is
precisely what transpired years ago at both Coke and Gillette. (Would
you believe that a few decades back they were growing shrimp at Coke and
exploring for oil at Gillette?) Loss of focus is what most worries
Charlie and me when we contemplate investing in businesses that in
general look outstanding. All too often, we've seen value stagnate in
the presence of hubris or of boredom that caused the attention of
managers to wander. That's not going to happen again at Coke and
Gillette, however - not given their current and prospective managements.
有一个问题倒是很值得注意，那就是有一些体质原本不错的公司，由于经营阶层规划
的方向产生偏差，将原本良好的本业基础弃之不顾，反而跑去购并一堆平凡普通的公
司，当这种状况发生时，其投资人所须承受的煎熬便会加重加长，而不幸的这正是几
年前发生在可口可乐与吉列身上的惨事，(大家可以想象十几年前，可口可乐大举投入
养虾事业，而吉列竟热衷于石油探勘吗?)，失去聚焦是查理跟我在思考是否投资一些
外表看起来很不错的公司时最关心的重点，我想傲慢或不甘寂寞的出现，使得这些经
理人胡思乱想进而导致企业的价值停滞不前，这种情形屡见不鲜，不过还好这种情况
应该不会再在可口可乐与吉列现在与未来储备的管理阶层身上发生。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most
investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way
to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees.
Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees
and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment
professionals.
对于各位个人的投资方式，让我提供一点心得给各位参考，大部分的投资人，不管法
人或是散户，可能会认为投资股票最好的方式是直接去买手续费低廉的指数型基金，
当然这样的做法所得到的结果(在扣除相关手续费用之后)，应该可以很轻易地击败市
场上大部分的投资专家。
Should you choose, however, to construct your own portfolio, there
are a few thoughts worth remembering. Intelligent investing is not
complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy. What an
investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses.
Note that word "selected": You don't have to be an expert on every
company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies
within your circle of competence. The size of that circle is not very
important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.
其实你也可以选择建立自己的投资组合，但有几点是大家必须特别注意的，智能型投
资并不复杂，当然它也不是一件容易的事，投资人真正需要具备的是给予所选择的企
业正确评价的能力，请特别注意"所选择"这个字，你不必像很多专家一样同时研究许
多家公司，相反的你要做的只是选择少数几家在你能力范围之内的公司就好，能力范
围的大小并不重要，要紧的是你要很清楚自己的能力范围。
To invest successfully, you need not understand beta, efficient
markets, modern portfolio theory, option pricing or emerging markets.
You may, in fact, be better off knowing nothing of these. That, of
course, is not the prevailing view at most business schools, whose
finance curriculum tends to be dominated by such subjects. In our view,
though, investment students need only two well-taught courses - How to
Value a Business, and How to Think About Market Prices.
投资要成功，你不需要研究什么是Beta值、效率市场、现代投资组合理论、选择权
定价或是新兴市场，事实上大家最好不要懂得这一些理论，当然我这种看法与目前以
这些课程为主流的学术界有明显不同，就我个人认为，有志从事投资的学生只要修好
两门课程-亦即"如何给予企业正确的评价"以及"思考其与市场价格的关系"即可。
Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational
price, a part interest in an easily-understandable business whose
earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and
twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies
that meet these standards - so when you see one that qualifies, you
should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the
temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't willing to own a
stock for ten years, don't even think about owning it for ten minutes.
Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march
upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio's market value.
身为一位投资人，大家其实只要以合理的价格买进一些很容易了解且其盈余在未来五
到十年内会大幅成长的企业的部份股权，当然一段时间下来，你会发现只有少数几家
公司符合这样的标准，所以要是你真的找到这样的公司，那就一定要买进足够份量的
股权，在这期间，你必须尽量避免自己受到外界诱惑而偏离这个准则，如果你不打算
持有一家公司股份十年以上，那最好连十分钟你都不要拥有它，在慢慢找到这样盈余
加总能持续累积的投资组合后，你就会发现其市值也会跟着稳定增加。
Though it's seldom recognized, this is the exact approach that has
produced gains for Berkshire shareholders: Our look-through earnings
have grown at a good clip over the years, and our stock price has risen
correspondingly. Had those gains in earnings not materialized, there
would have been little increase in Berkshire's value.
虽然我们很少承认，但这正是Berkshire股东累积财富的唯一方式，我们的透视盈余
在过去几年间大幅跃进，而同期间我们的股票价格也跟着大涨，要不是我们的盈余大
幅增加，Berkshire所代表的价值就不可能大幅成长。
The greatly enlarged earnings base we now enjoy will inevitably
cause our future gains to lag those of the past. We will continue,
however, to push in the directions we always have. We will try to build
earnings by running our present businesses well - a job made easy because
of the extraordinary talents of our operating managers - and by
purchasing other businesses, in whole or in part, that are not likely to
be roiled by change and that possess important competitive advantages.
当然我们现在背负庞大的资金基础将无可避免地会影响到我们未来盈余成长的能
力，但我们还是会按照和过去一致的方向，在现有的基础之上，这部份的难度较低，
因为我们拥有一群杰出的经理人，同时继续买进全部或部份一些不会受外界环境影响
且拥有竞争优势的新事业。
USAir
美国航空
When Richard Branson, the wealthy owner of Virgin Atlantic Airways,
was asked how to become a millionaire, he had a quick answer: "There's
really nothing to it. Start as a billionaire and then buy an airline."
Unwilling to accept Branson's proposition on faith, your Chairman decided
in 1989 to test it by investing $358 million in a 9.25% preferred stock of
USAir.
当Richard Branson-维京亚特兰大航空公司的老板被问到要如才能够变成一个百万
富翁，他的回答很简单：其实也没有什么! 首先你要先成为一个亿万富翁，然后再去
买一家航空公司就成了! 但由于各位的董事长-也就是我本人不信邪，所以我在1989
年决定以3.58亿美元投资取得美国航空年利率9.25%的特别股。
I liked and admired Ed Colodny, the company's then-CEO, and I still
do. But my analysis of USAir's business was both superficial and wrong.
I was so beguiled by the company's long history of profitable
operations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior security
seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point: USAir's
revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated, fiercelycompetitive
market whereas its cost structure was a holdover from the
days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if left unchecked,
portended disaster, however reassuring the airline's past record might
be. (If history supplied all of the answers, the Forbes 400 would
consist of librarians.)
那时我相当喜爱同时也崇拜美国航空当时的总裁-Ed Colodny，直到现在仍是如此，
不过我对于美国航空业的分析研究实在是过于肤浅且错误百出，我被该公司过去历年
来的获利能力所蒙骗，同时过分相信特别股可以提供给我们在债权上的保护，以致于
忽略了最关键的一点︰那就是美国航空的营收受到毫无节制的激烈价格竞争而大幅
下滑的同时，其成本结构却仍旧停留在从前管制时代的高档，这样的高成本结构若不
能找到有效解决的办法，将成为灾难的前兆，不管以前航空业曾经享有多么辉煌的历
史(如果历史可以给人们所有的答案，那么富比士四百大富翁不就应该都是图书馆员了
吗?)。
To rationalize its costs, however, USAir needed major improvements
in its labor contracts - and that's something most airlines have found it
extraordinarily difficult to get, short of credibly threatening, or
actually entering, bankruptcy. USAir was to be no exception.
Immediately after we purchased our preferred stock, the imbalance between
the company's costs and revenues began to grow explosively. In the 1990-
1994 period, USAir lost an aggregate of $2.4 billion, a performance that
totally wiped out the book equity of its common stock.
要让成本结构合理化，美国航空必须大幅修改其劳资契约，不过这偏偏又是航空公司
难以达成的罩门，除了公司真正面临倒闭的威胁或甚至是真的倒闭，而美国航空也不
例外，就在我们投资该公司特别股不久之后，公司营收与支出的缺口突然开始大幅扩
大，在1990年至1994年间，美国航空累计亏损了24亿美元，此举让公司普通股
的股东权益几乎耗损殆尽。
For much of this period, the company paid us our preferred
dividends, but in 1994 payment was suspended. A bit later, with the
situation looking particularly gloomy, we wrote down our investment by
75%, to $89.5 million. Thereafter, during much of 1995, I offered to
sell our shares at 50% of face value. Fortunately, I was unsuccessful.
在这段期间内，美国航空还是继续支付特别股股利给我们，直到1994年才停止，也
因此在不久后，由于该公司前景展望不太乐观，我们决定将美国航空特别股投资的帐
面价值调减75%，只剩下8,950万美元，从而到了1995年，我甚至对外提出以面
额50%的折价，打算出售这笔投资，所幸最后并没有成功出脱。
Mixed in with my many mistakes at USAir was one thing I got right:
Making our investment, we wrote into the preferred contract a somewhat
unusual provision stipulating that "penalty dividends" - to run five
percentage points over the prime rate - would be accrued on any
arrearages. This meant that when our 9.25% dividend was omitted for two
years, the unpaid amounts compounded at rates ranging between 13.25% and 14%.
幸运的是在投资美国航空所犯的一连串错误当中，我总算做对了一件事，那就是当初
在投资时，我们在特别股投资合约当中，特地加了一项"惩罚股息"条款，也就是说万
一该公司延迟支付股息的话，除原有欠款外，还必须外加依基本利率5%的利息，也
就是说因为这两年我们没有收到9.25%的股息，所以以后美国航空必须就未支付的款
项加计13.25%与14%的利息。
Facing this penalty provision, USAir had every incentive to pay
arrearages just as promptly as it could. And in the second half of 1996,
when USAir turned profitable, it indeed began to pay, giving us $47.9
million. We owe Stephen Wolf, the company's CEO, a huge thank-you for
extracting a performance from the airline that permitted this payment.
Even so, USAir's performance has recently been helped significantly by an
industry tailwind that may be cyclical in nature. The company still has
basic cost problems that must be solved.
面对这样的惩罚条款将督促美国航空尽快清偿对我们的欠款，而等到1996年下半年
美国航空开始转亏为盈时，他们果真开始清偿这笔合计4,790万美元的欠款，为此我
