这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .15
to investigate possible insurance savings, bring your present policy to
the meeting. We estimate that about 40% of our shareholders can save
money by insuring with us. (We'd like to say 100%, but the insurance
business doesn't work that way: Because insurers differ in their
underwriting judgments, some of our shareholders are currently paying
rates that are lower than GEICO's.)
为了克服大家对于商业气息的厌恶，我们在会场外大厅备有Berkshire各式各样的产
品供大家选购，去年我们打破记录，总共卖出1,270磅的糖果、1,143双的鞋子以
及价值超过29,000美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品，外加700只由旗下子公司
Quikut所生产的小刀，另外在现场许多股东询问有关GEICO汽车保险的信息，如果
你想在汽车保险费上省一笔钱，记得把你现在的保单带到现场，我们估计至少有40%
的股东可以因此而节省不少保费(我很想说100%，不过保险业实务的经营并非如此，
因为每家保险业者对于风险的估计都不同，事实上，我们有些股东支付的保费就比跟
GEICO投保要来得低)。
An attachment to the proxy material enclosed with this report
explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the
meeting. We expect a large crowd, so get both plane and hotel
reservations promptly. American Express (800-799-6634) will be happy to
help you with arrangements. As usual, we will have buses servicing the
larger hotels to take you to and from the meeting, and also to take you
to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport after it is over.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，
由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，美国运通(电话
800-799-6634)将会很高兴为您提供相关安排服务，如同以往，我们会安排巴士接
送大家往返各大旅馆与会场之间，并在会后接送大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝
店或是到饭店与机场。
NFM's main store, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from
Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.
on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. Come by and say hello to
"Mrs. B" (Rose Blumkin). She's 103 now and sometimes operates with an
oxygen mask that is attached to a tank on her cart. But if you try to
keep pace with her, it will be you who needs oxygen. NFM did about $265
million of business last year - a record for a single-location home
furnishings operation - and you'll see why once you check out its
merchandise and prices.
占地75英亩的NFM主馆距离会场约1英哩远，营业时间平日从早上10点到
下午9点，星期六从早上10点到下午6点，星期日则从中午开到下午6点，
记得去向Rose Blumkin-B太太问好，她今年高龄103岁，有时还会戴上氧气罩在
轮椅上工作，不过如果你想要跟得上她的脚步，需要氧气的可能是你，NFM去年的
营业额高达2.65亿美元，这是全美单一家具店营业的新高记录，记得去现场查一查
商品的种类与标价，你就会知道原因了。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for
shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 4th. Last year on
"Shareholder Sunday" we broke every Borsheim's record in terms of
tickets, dollar volume and, no doubt, attendees per square inch. Because
we expect a capacity crowd this year as well, all shareholders attending
on Sunday must bring their admission cards. Shareholders who prefer a
somewhat less frenzied experience will get the same special treatment on
Saturday, when the store is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., or on Monday
between 10 a.m. and 8 p.m. Come by at any time this year and let Susan
Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, and her skilled associates perform a painless
walletectomy on you.
平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，特地在五月四日股东会当天会为股东与来宾开放，从
中午开到下午6点，去年在星期六股东会前一天，我们打破了波仙单日的订单量与营
业额记录，当然还包括每平方英吋的参观人数记录，今年我们考量到参观人数还会再
增加，所以大家在当天一定要准备好入场证，当然不想人挤人的股东可以选择在前一
天或后一天前往参观，星期六从早上10点开到下午5点半，星期一则从早上10点
开到晚上8点，无论如何今年大家一定要来看看波仙的总裁Susan是如何施展她的
技巧将你的荷包给掏空。
My favorite steakhouse, Gorat's, was sold out last year on the
weekend of the annual meeting, even though it added an additional seating
at 4 p.m. on Sunday. You can make reservations beginning on April 1st
(but not earlier) by calling 402-551-3733. I will be at Gorat's on
Sunday after Borsheim's, having my usual rare T-bone and double order of
hashbrowns. I can also recommend - this is the standard fare when Debbie
Bosanek, my invaluable assistant, and I go to lunch - the hot roast beef
sandwich with mashed potatoes and gravy. Mention Debbie's name and you
will be given an extra boat of gravy.
我个人最爱的牛排馆-Gorat's去年在股东年会的那个周末完全客满，虽然临时还在星
期天下午四点多排出的一个空档，今年该餐厅从四月一号开始接受预订(电话402-
551-3733)，我会在星期天参加完波仙珠宝的活动后到Gorat's享用我最常点的丁骨
牛排加上双份的肉丸，当然我也推荐我的宝贝助理Debbie标准的菜单-生烤牛肉三
明治外加马铃薯泥与肉汤，记得报上Debbie的名号，你就可以多得到一碗肉汤。
The Omaha Royals and Indianapolis Indians will play baseball on
Saturday evening, May 3rd, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Pitching in my normal
rotation - one throw a year - I will start.
在前一天5月3日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家队对印
第安纳拿波里市印第安人队的比赛，一如往年轮到由我先发，每一年就投那么一球。
Though Rosenblatt is normal in appearance, it is anything but: The
field sits on a unique geological structure that occasionally emits short
gravitational waves causing even the most smoothly-delivered pitch to
sink violently. I have been the victim of this weird phenomenon several
times in the past but am hoping for benign conditions this year. There
will be lots of opportunities for photos at the ball game, but you will
need incredibly fast reflexes to snap my fast ball en route to the plate.
虽然Rosenblatt球场的外观看起来与其它球场没有多大的不同，不过它的投手丘地
形却相当特殊，有时会发出特殊的重力短波，导致本来很平稳投出的球突然急速往下
坠，过去有好几次我都成为这种怪异自然现象的受害者，不过我还是希望今年的情况
会好一点，虽然当天会场有许多拍照的机会，不过我还是奉劝大家的快门要抓准一
点，才能完整捕捉由我投出向本垒板急速奔去的快速球。
Our proxy statement includes information about obtaining tickets to
the game. We will also provide an information packet listing restaurants
that will be open on Sunday night and describing various things that you
can do in Omaha on the weekend. The entire gang at Berkshire looks
forward to seeing you.
股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，同时我们也会提供星期天晚上会开
张的餐厅信息，同时列出假日期间在奥玛哈你可以从事的活动介绍，Berkshire总部
所有成员都期待能够见到大家。
Warren E. Buffett
February 28, 1997 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1997年2月28日
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
1997 Chairman's Letter
1997年董事长致股东信
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our gain in net worth during 1997 was $8.0 billion, which
increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B
stock by 34.1%. Over the last 33 years (that is, since present
management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to
$25,488, a rate of 24.1% compounded annually.(1)
1997年本公司的净值增加了80亿美元，每股帐面净值不管是A级股或B级股
皆成长了34.1%，总计过去33年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每
股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的25,488美元，年复合成长率约为24.1%*。
1. All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares,
the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding
before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th
that of the A.
*1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。
Given our gain of 34.1%, it is tempting to declare victory and move
on. But last year's performance was no great triumph: Any investor can
chalk up large returns when stocks soar, as they did in 1997. In a bull
market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks
boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills
have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead
compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on
the pond.
看到我们高达34.1%的超高报酬率，大家可能忍不住要高呼胜利口号，并勇往
前进，不过若是考量去年股市的状况，任何一个投资人都能靠着股票的飙涨而大
赚一票，面对多头的行情，大家一定要避免成为一只呱呱大叫的骄傲鸭子，以为
是自己高超的泳技让他冲上了天，殊不知面对狂风巨浪，小心的鸭子反而会谨慎
地看看大浪过后，其它池塘里的鸭子都到哪里去了。
So what's our duck rating for 1997? The table on the facing page
shows that though we paddled furiously last year, passive ducks that
simply invested in the S&P Index rose almost as fast as we did. Our
appraisal of 1997's performance, then: Quack.
那么我们这只鸭子在1997年的表现又如何呢? 报表显示虽然去年我们拼命的
向前划，不过到最后我们发现其它被动投资S&P 500指数的鸭子的表现一点也
不比我们差，所以总结我们在1997年的表现是︰呱呱!
When the market booms, we tend to suffer in comparison with the
S&P Index. The Index bears no tax costs, nor do mutual funds, since
they pass through all tax liabilities to their owners. Last year, on the
other hand, Berkshire paid or accrued $4.2 billion for federal income
tax, or about 18% of our beginning net worth.
当股市正热时，相较于S&P 500指数，我们比较吃亏，因为指数或共同基金不
必负担租税成本，他们可以直接将税负转嫁到投资人的身上，相对地在另一方面
Berkshire光是去年就必须认为高达42亿美元的联邦所得税，这相当于我们年
初净值的18%。
Berkshire will always have corporate taxes to pay, which means it
needs to overcome their drag in order to justify its existence. Obviously,
Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I won't
be able to lick that handicap every year. But we expect over time to
maintain a modest advantage over the Index, and that is the yardstick
against which you should measure us. We will not ask you to adopt the
philosophy of the Chicago Cubs fan who reacted to a string of lackluster
seasons by saying, "Why get upset? Everyone has a bad century now and
then."
由于Berkshire必须要负担企业所得税，所以为了要证明其存在的意义，它就一
定要能够克服这先天的障碍，不过很显然的Berkshire的主要合伙人查理曼格跟
我很难每年都打败这样的差杆，当然就长期而言，我们还是预期Berkshire能够
打败大盘指数，这也是大家可以评断我们表现的最低标准，我想我们应该不会让
大家像芝加哥小熊队球迷在面对连续几个战绩不佳球季时，自我调侃所说的︰有
什么好沮丧的 谁都可能有不好过的一世纪。
Gains in book value are, of course, not the bottom line at Berkshire.
What truly counts are gains in per-share intrinsic business value.
Ordinarily, though, the two measures tend to move roughly in tandem,
and in 1997 that was the case: Led by a blow-out performance at GEICO,
Berkshire's intrinsic value (which far exceeds book value) grew at nearly
the same pace as book value.
帐面净值的增加当然不是经营Berkshire的最终目标，因为真正重要的是每股实
质价值，虽然在Berkshire通常两者会以相当接近的频率波动，就像是1997年
便是如此，受惠于GEICO爆炸性的成长，Berkshire的实质价值(远高于帐面价
值)以接近帐面价值成长的幅度增加。
For more explanation of the term, intrinsic value, you may wish to
refer to our Owner's Manual, reprinted on pages 62 to 71. This manual
sets forth our owner-related business principles, information that is
important to all of Berkshire's shareholders.
有关"实质价值"等名词的解释，请大家参阅股东手册，手册中揭示了本公司经营
的宗旨，也包含了许多对Berkshire股东相当重要的信息。
In our last two annual reports, we furnished you a table that Charlie
and I believe is central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the
updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key
components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of
investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column
shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses
before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on
pages 69 and 70), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The
second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we
realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect,
the columns show what Berkshire would look like were it split into two
parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating
all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.
在过去两年的年报中，我们提供给各位一张查理跟我认为最能够估计Berkshire
实质价值的表，在下面这张更新过数字的表中，主要有两项跟价值息息相关的指
标，第一栏是我们平均每股持有的投资金额(包含现金与约当现金)，第二栏则是
每股在扣除利息与营业费用之后，来自本业的营业利益(但未扣除所得税与购买
法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏投资所贡献的股利收入、
利息收入与资本利得，事实上，若是把Berkshire拆成两部份的话，就等于是一
家持有我们投资部位的控股公司，以及另一家经营旗下所有事业负担全部成本盈
亏的营利事业。
Pre-tax Earnings Per Share
Investments Excluding All Income from
Year Per Share Investments
1967 $ 41 $ 1.09
1977 372 12.44
1987 3,910 108.14
199738,043 717.82
Pundits who ignore what our 38,000 employees contribute to the
company, and instead simply view Berkshire as a de facto investment
company, should study the figures in the second column. We made our
first business acquisition in 1967, and since then our pre-tax operating
earnings have grown from $1 million to $888 million. Furthermore, as
noted, in this exercise we have assigned all of Berkshire's corporate
expenses -- overhead of $6.6 million, interest of $66.9 million and
shareholder contributions of $15.4 million -- to our business
operations, even though a portion of these could just as well have been
assigned to the investment side.
对于那些无视于我们38,000名辛勤奉献员工的存在，而武断地将Berkshire当
做是一家投资公司的乡野匹夫，应该要请他们看看第二栏的数字，打从1967年
我们进行第一次的并购开始，本公司的税前营业盈余已从当时的100万美元成
长到现在的8.88亿美元，这还是吸收了Berkshire全部的开销，包含660万
美元的企业营运费用、6,690万美元的利息支出与1,540万美元的股东指定捐
赠款后的结余，虽然这其中有一部份是与投资活动相关的支出。
Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:
下表是这两个部门每十年的成长率︰
Pre-tax Earnings Per Share
Investments Excluding All Income from
Decade Ending Per Share Investments
1977 24.6% 27.6%
1987 26.5% 24.1%
1997 25.5% 20.8%
Annual Growth
Rate, 1967-1997 25.6% 24.2%
During 1997, both parts of our business grew at a satisfactory rate,
with investments increasing by $9,543 per share, or 33.5%, and
operating earnings growing by $296.43 per share, or 70.3%. One
important caveat: Because we were lucky in our super-cat insurance
business (to be discussed later) and because GEICO's underwriting gain
was well above what we can expect in most years, our 1997 operating
earnings were much better than we anticipated and also more than we
expect for 1998.
回顾1997年Berkshire两个部份都缴出漂亮的成绩单，每股投资金额增加了
9,543美元，约33.5%；而每股营业盈余则增加了296.43美元，约70.3%，
当然其中有一个很重要的关键，那就是我们的霹雳猫保险业务(后面还会在详加
说明)的运气不错，同时GEICO保险的表现甚至优于以往，这使得1997年的营
业表现超乎当初的预期，甚至超过未来1998年可能的表现。
Our rate of progress in both investments and operations is certain
to fall in the future. For anyone deploying capital, nothing recedes like
success. My own history makes the point: Back in 1951, when I was
attending Ben Graham's class at Columbia, an idea giving me a $10,000
gain improved my investment performance for the year by a full 100
percentage points. Today, an idea producing a $500 million pre-tax
profit for Berkshire adds one percentage point to our performance. It's
no wonder that my annual results in the 1950s were better by nearly
thirty percentage points than my annual gains in any subsequent
decade. Charlie's experience was similar. We weren't smarter then, just
smaller. At our present size, any performance superiority we achieve
will be minor.
我相信未来不管是投资或营业盈余的成长速度一定会向下滑落，对于任何负责资
金运用的人而言，成功必然导致衰退，就拿我个人的投资历史来说，回想当初我
在1951年进入哥伦大学拜在葛拉汉名下时，只要抓住能够赚到1万美元的投
资机会就能让我的投资绩效超过百分之百，不过时至今日，一笔能赚5亿美元
的成功投资个案，也不过只能让Berkshire增加区区一个百分点的投资绩效，也
