这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .16
难怪个人在1950年代早期的投资绩效会比接下来几十年的年度绩效差距达30
个百分点以上，而查理本身的经历也很相似，不是我们变笨了，而是因为我们目
前的规模实在是太大了，现在任何一项重大进展都会因为规模庞大的关系而显得
微不足道。
We will be helped, however, by the fact that the businesses to
which we have already allocated capital -- both operating subsidiaries
and companies in which we are passive investors -- have splendid
long-term prospects. We are also blessed with a managerial corps that
is unsurpassed in ability and focus. Most of these executives are wealthy
and do not need the pay they receive from Berkshire to maintain their
way of life. They are motivated by the joy of accomplishment, not by
fame or fortune.
当然只要我们投资的子公司以及股票具有远景，我们绝对能够因此受益，同时也
要感谢旗下这群卓越的能力与专注力的经营管理团队，大家要知道这些经理人本
身大多都已经很有钱了，根本就不需要靠Berkshire这份薪水过活，他们不为
名，也不为利，纯粹是冲着那份成就感。
Though we are delighted with what we own, we are not pleased
with our prospects for committing incoming funds. Prices are high for
both businesses and stocks. That does not mean that the prices of
either will fall -- we have absolutely no view on that matter -- but it
does mean that we get relatively little in prospective earnings when we
commit fresh money.
虽然对于现有的投资部位感到相当满意，但是我们也对于陆续进来的资金找不到
理想的去路而感到忧心，目前不管是整家公司或是单一股票的市场价格都过高，
但我并不是要预言股价将会下跌，我们从来就不对股市发表任何看法，这样说的
意思只是要提醒大家未来新投入资金的预期报酬将会大大减少。
Under these circumstances, we try to exert a Ted Williams kind of
discipline. In his book The Science of Hitting, Ted explains that he
carved the strike zone into 77 cells, each the size of a baseball.
Swinging only at balls in his "best" cell, he knew, would allow him to
bat .400; reaching for balls in his "worst" spot, the low outside corner of
the strike zone, would reduce him to .230. In other words, waiting for
the fat pitch would mean a trip to the Hall of Fame; swinging
indiscriminately would mean a ticket to the minors.
在这种情况下，我们试着学习职棒传奇明星Ted Williams的作法，在他的"打击
的科学"一书中解释到，他把打击区域划分为77个框框，每个框框就约当一个
棒球的大小，只有当球进入最理想的框框时，他才挥棒打击，因为他深深知道只
有这样做，他才能维持四成的超高打击率，反之要是勉强去挥击较差的框框，将
会使得他的打击率骤降到二成三以下，换句话说，只有耐心等待超甜的好球，才
是通往名人堂的大道，好坏球照单全收的人，迟早会面临被降到小联盟的命运。
If they are in the strike zone at all, the business "pitches" we now
see are just catching the lower outside corner. If we swing, we will be
locked into low returns. But if we let all of today's balls go by, there can
be no assurance that the next ones we see will be more to our liking.
Perhaps the attractive prices of the past were the aberrations, not the
full prices of today. Unlike Ted, we can't be called out if we resist three
pitches that are barely in the strike zone; nevertheless, just standing
there, day after day, with my bat on my shoulder is not my idea of fun.
目前迎面朝我们而来的"投"资机会大多只在好球带边缘，如果我们选择挥棒，则
得到的成绩可能会不太理想，但要是我们选择放弃不打，则没有人敢跟你保证下
一球会更好，或许过去那种吸引人的超低价格已不复存在，所幸我们不必像Ted
Williams一样，可能因为连续三次不挥棒而遭三振出局，只是光是扛着棒子站
在那里，日复一日，也不是一件令人感到愉快的事。
Unconventional Commitments
非常态性投资
When we can't find our favorite commitment -- a well-run and
sensibly-priced business with fine economics -- we usually opt to put
new money into very short-term instruments of the highest quality.
Sometimes, however, we venture elsewhere. Obviously we believe that
the alternative commitments we make are more likely to result in profit
than loss. But we also realize that they do not offer the certainty of profit
that exists in a wonderful business secured at an attractive price.
Finding that kind of opportunity, we know that we are going to make
money -- the only question being when. With alternative investments,
we think that we are going to make money. But we also recognize that
we will sometimes realize losses, occasionally of substantial size.
有时我们的资金不一定能够找到最理想的去处-也就是经营良好、价码合理的企
业，这时我们就会将资金投入到一些期间较短但品质不错的投资工具上，虽然我
们很明白这样的做法可能无法像我们买进好公司那样稳健的获利，甚至在少数的
状况下有可能赔大钱，不过总得来说我们相信赚钱的机率还是远高于赔钱，唯一
的关键在于其获利何时能够实现。
We had three non-traditional positions at yearend. The first was
derivative contracts for 14.0 million barrels of oil, that being what was
then left of a 45.7 million barrel position we established in 1994-95.
Contracts for 31.7 million barrels were settled in 1995-97, and these
supplied us with a pre-tax gain of about $61.9 million. Our remaining
contracts expire during 1998 and 1999. In these, we had an unrealized
gain of $11.6 million at yearend. Accounting rules require that
commodity positions be carried at market value. Therefore, both our
annual and quarterly financial statements reflect any unrealized gain or
loss in these contracts. When we established our contracts, oil for future
delivery seemed modestly underpriced. Today, though, we have no
opinion as to its attractiveness.
截至年底，我们总共有三项异于往常的投资，首先是1,400万桶的原油期货合
约，这是我们在1994-1995年间所建立4,570万桶原油的剩余部位，预计在
1998-1999年陆续到期，目前未实现获利约有1,160万美元，而已经结仓的
3,170万桶原油合约总共贡献我们6,190万美元的获利，会计原则规定期货合
约必须依市场价格评价，因此这些合约所有未实现的损益皆已反应在我们年度或
每季的财务报表上，当初我们之所以会建立这些部位，主要考量当时的石油期货
价位有些低估，至于现在的市场状况我们则没有任何意见。
Our second non-traditional commitment is in silver. Last year, we
purchased 111.2 million ounces. Marked to market, that position
produced a pre-tax gain of $97.4 million for us in 1997. In a way, this is
a return to the past for me: Thirty years ago, I bought silver because I
anticipated its demonetization by the U.S. Government. Ever since, I
have followed the metal's fundamentals but not owned it. In recent
years, bullion inventories have fallen materially, and last summer
Charlie and I concluded that a higher price would be needed to establish
equilibrium between supply and demand. Inflation expectations, it
should be noted, play no part in our calculation of silver's value.
至于第二项则是白银，去年我们一口气买进总共1.112亿盎斯的白银，以目前
的市价计算，总共贡献1997年9,740万美元的税前利益，某个角度来说，这
仿佛又让我回到过去，记得在三十年前，我因为预期美国政府货币将自由化而买
进白银，自此之后，我便一直追踪贵金属的基本面，只是并没有其它的买进动作，
直到最近这几年，银条的存货突然大幅下滑，查理跟我得到一个结论，那就是白
银的价格应该要稍微向上调整以维持供给与需求的平衡，至于一般人较注意的通
膨预期则不在我们计算价值的范围之内。
Finally, our largest non-traditional position at yearend was $4.6
billion, at amortized cost, of long-term zero-coupon obligations of the
U.S. Treasury. These securities pay no interest. Instead, they provide
their holders a return by way of the discount at which they are
purchased, a characteristic that makes their market prices move rapidly
when interest rates change. If rates rise, you lose heavily with zeros, and
if rates fall, you make outsized gains. Since rates fell in 1997, we ended
the year with an unrealized pre-tax gain of $598.8 million in our zeros.
Because we carry the securities at market value, that gain is reflected in
yearend book value.
最后一项是46亿美元以帐面摊销长期的美国零息债券，这些债券不支付利息，
相反的是以透过折价发行的方式回馈给债券持有人，也因此这类债券的价格会因
市场利率变动而大幅波动，如果利率上升，持有零息债券的人可能损失惨重，反
之若利率下跌，投资人就可能因此大赚一笔，而因为1997年的利率大幅下滑，
所以光是1997年我们的未实现利益就高达5.98亿美元，这些利益已全数反应
在公司年底的帐上。
In purchasing zeros, rather than staying with cash-equivalents, we
risk looking very foolish: A macro-based commitment such as this
never has anything close to a 100% probability of being successful.
However, you pay Charlie and me to use our best judgment -- not to
avoid embarrassment -- and we will occasionally make an
unconventional move when we believe the odds favor it. Try to think
kindly of us when we blow one. Along with President Clinton, we will be
feeling your pain: The Munger family has more than 90% of its net worth
in Berkshire and the Buffetts more than 99%.
当然不把现金好好的摆着而拿去投资零息债券不是没有风险的，这种基于总体经
济分析的投资绝对不敢保证百分之百能够成功，不过查理跟我绝对会运用我们最
佳的判断能力，大家可不是请我们来闲闲没事干，当我们认为胜算颇大时，我们
就会大胆地去做一些异于往常的举动，当然万一不小心突锤时，还请大家多多包
含，就如同柯林顿总统一样，我们绝对与各位感同身受，因为曼格家族有90%
的资产系于Berkshire，而巴菲特家族更高达99%。
How We Think About Market Fluctuations
我们对于股市波动的看法
A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life
and are not a cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices
for beef? Likewise, if you are going to buy a car from time to time but are
not an auto manufacturer, should you prefer higher or lower car prices?
These questions, of course, answer themselves.
一则小谜语︰如果你打算一辈子吃汉堡维生，自己又没有养牛，那么你是希望牛
肉价格上涨或是下跌呢? 同样的要是你三不五时会换车，自己又不是卖车的，你
会希望车子的价格上涨或是下跌呢? 这些问题的答案很显然显而易见。
But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during
the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market
during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though
they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they
are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect,
they rejoice because prices have risen for the "hamburgers" they will
soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be
sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks
rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.
最后我再问各位一个问题︰假设你预估未来五年内可以存一笔钱，那么你希望这
期间的股票市场是涨还是跌? 这时许多投资人对于这个问题的答案就可能是错
的，虽然他们在未来的期间内会陆续买进股票，不过当股价涨时他们会感到高
兴，股价跌时反而觉得沮丧，这种感觉不等于是当你去买汉堡吃时，看到汉堡涨
价却欣喜若狂，这样的反应实在是没有什么道理，只有在短期间准备卖股票的人
才应该感到高兴，准备买股票的人应该期待的是股价的下滑。
For shareholders of Berkshire who do not expect to sell, the choice
is even clearer. To begin with, our owners are automatically saving even
if they spend every dime they personally earn: Berkshire "saves" for
them by retaining all earnings, thereafter using these savings to
purchase businesses and securities. Clearly, the more cheaply we make
these buys, the more profitable our owners' indirect savings program
will be.
对于不准备卖股票的Berkshire股东来说，这样的选择再明显也不过了，首先就
算他们将赚来的每一分钱都花掉，Berkshire也会自动帮他们存钱，因为
Berkshire会透过将所赚得的盈余再投资其它事业与股票，所以只要我们买进这
些投资标的的成本越低，他们将来间接所获得的报酬自然而然就越高。
Furthermore, through Berkshire you own major positions in
companies that consistently repurchase their shares. The benefits that
these programs supply us grow as prices fall: When stock prices are low,
the funds that an investee spends on repurchases increase our
ownership of that company by a greater amount than is the case when
prices are higher. For example, the repurchases that Coca-Cola, The
Washington Post and Wells Fargo made in past years at very low prices
benefitted Berkshire far more than do today's repurchases, made at
loftier prices.
此外，Berkshire许多重要的投资部位都持续不断地买回自家公司的股份，在这
种情况下，股票价格越低对我们越有利，因为这代表同样的一笔钱可以买进更多
的股份，从而间接提高我们持股的比例，举例来说，过去几年可口可乐、华盛顿
邮报与富国银行皆以非常低的价格大量买回自家股票，其所带来的效益要比在现
在的高价再进行要来得有利的多。
At the end of every year, about 97% of Berkshire's shares are held
by the same investors who owned them at the start of the year. That
makes them savers. They should therefore rejoice when markets decline
and allow both us and our investees to deploy funds more advantageously.
每年度结束，大约有97%的Berkshire股东会选择继续持有本公司的股份，这
些人都是储蓄爱好者，所以每当股市下跌时，他们都会感到高兴，因为这代表我
们以及被投资公司的资金可以作更好的运用。
So smile when you read a headline that says "Investors lose as
market falls." Edit it in your mind to "Disinvestors lose as market falls -
- but investors gain." Though writers often forget this truism, there is a
buyer for every seller and what hurts one necessarily helps the other.
(As they say in golf matches: "Every putt makes someone happy.")
所以下次当你看到"股市爆跌-投资人损失不贷"的新闻头条时，就知道应该要改
成"股市爆跌-不投资的人损失不贷而投资的人赚翻了"，虽然记者常常忘记这样
的真理，不过只要有卖方就代表会有买方，一方损失就代表有另一方会得利，就
像是高尔夫球场上常讲的，每当一个柏忌出现时，就会有人在旁边暗爽。
We gained enormously from the low prices placed on many equities
and businesses in the 1970s and 1980s. Markets that then were hostile
to investment transients were friendly to those taking up permanent
residence. In recent years, the actions we took in those decades have
been validated, but we have found few new opportunities. In its role as a
corporate "saver," Berkshire continually looks for ways to sensibly
deploy capital, but it may be some time before we find opportunities
that get us truly excited.
当初我们靠着在1970与1980年代股价低迷时所做的一些投资，确实让我们赚
了不少，这是一个对股市短暂过客不利却对股市长期住户有利的市场，近几年
来，我们在那个年代所做的一些投资决策陆续获得了验证，不过现在我们却找不
到类似的机会，身为企业资金的积蓄者，Berkshire致力于寻找资金合理运用的
方法，不过以现在的状况来看，我们可能还需要一段时间才能再找到真正让我们
感到兴奋的投资机会。
Insurance Operations -- Overview
保险事业营运-总检讨
What does excite us, however, is our insurance business. GEICO is
flying, and we expect that it will continue to do so. Before we expound
on that, though, let's discuss "float" and how to measure its cost. Unless
you understand this subject, it will be impossible for you to make an
informed judgment about Berkshire's intrinsic value.
真正令我们感到兴奋的是保险事业的营运，GEICO正处于爆炸性的成长阶段，
而且这种情况预期还会继续维持下去，在进一步说明之前，让我们先解释一下何
谓浮存金，以及如何来衡量它的取得成本，因为除非你对于这个课题有所了解，
否则你根本就不可能有办法对Berkshire实际的价值做合理的判断。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an
insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before
losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years.
During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant
activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in
usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay.
That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float.
An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than
the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the
business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for
money.
首先浮存金是一项我们持有但不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存金
的产生原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，
在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要付出
代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以因应最后支付出去的相关损失与费用，
于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得浮存
金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价值，否
则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗酸柠
檬。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be
estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their
underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to
calculate a company's true cost of float. Estimating errors, usually
innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these
miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer
