这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .20
却不得不默认自己的股价确实被高估，通常他们玩的宛如华尔街版的连锁信游
戏。
In some mergers there truly are major synergies -- though
oftentimes the acquirer pays too much to obtain them -- but at other
times the cost and revenue benefits that are projected prove illusory. Of
one thing, however, be certain: If a CEO is enthused about a particularly
foolish acquisition, both his internal staff and his outside advisors will
come up with whatever projections are needed to justify his stance. Only
in fairy tales are emperors told that they are naked.
虽然有些合并案确实可以发挥综合效益，但通常买家所付出的代价过高，且通常
成本节省与营收增加的预期效益最后都会成一场空，不过有一点可以确定的是，
不管这个购并案多么的不合理，只要老板有强烈的意愿，其内部的同僚与外部的
专家顾问都能够提出一份看似合理的评估报告来支持其立场，只要在童话中才有
人敢大胆地告诉国王他没有穿衣服。
Common Stock Investments
股票投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a
market value of more than $750 million are itemized.
下表是Berkshire市价超过七亿五千万美元以上的股票投资。
12/31/97
Shares Company Cost* Market
(dollars in millions)
49,456,900 American Express Company $1,392.7 $ 4,414.0
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company 1,298.9 13,337.5
21,563,414 The Walt Disney Company 381.2 2,134.8
63,977,600 Freddie Mac329.4 2,683.1
48,000,000 The Gillette Company 600.0 4,821.0
23,733,198 Travelers Group Inc. 604.4 1,278.6
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company 10.6 840.6
6,690,218 Wells Fargo & Company 412.6 2,270.9
Others 2,177.1 4,467.2
-------- ----------
Total Common Stocks $7,206.9 $ 36,247.7
======== ========
* Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.8 billion less than GAAP cost.
*系以税务为基础的成本，比一般公认会计原则的帐面成本少18亿美元。
We made net sales during the year that amounted to about 5% of
our beginning portfolio. In these, we significantly reduced a few of our
holdings that are below the $750 million threshold for itemization, and
we also modestly trimmed a few of the larger positions that we detail.
Some of the sales we made during 1997 were aimed at changing our
bond-stock ratio moderately in response to the relative values that we
saw in each market, a realignment we have continued in 1998.
今年我们大概处分了5%左右的投资部位，其中包含一些市价未达七亿五千万表
列门槛的股票被大幅地处分掉，此外也有一部份超过七亿五千万的股票被小幅的
调整，主要是为了调整债券与股票投资部位间的比例，以因应我们认为市场相对
价值的认知，这个动作一直到1998年仍在持续进行。
Our reported positions, we should add, sometimes reflect the
investment decisions of GEICO's Lou Simpson. Lou independently runs
an equity portfolio of nearly $2 billion that may at times overlap the
portfolio that I manage, and occasionally he makes moves that differ
from mine.
不过有一点必须强调的是，报表上显示的投资部位，有时反应的是GEICO保险
公司Lou Simpson所做的决策，Lou独自管理将近20亿美元的股票投资组合，
当然其中有些部位与我重叠，但通常他的投资动作与我有别。
Though we don't attempt to predict the movements of the stock
market, we do try, in a very rough way, to value it. At the annual meeting
last year, with the Dow at 7,071 and long-term Treasury yields at 6.89%,
Charlie and I stated that we did not consider the market overvalued if 1)
interest rates remained where they were or fell, and 2) American
business continued to earn the remarkable returns on equity that it had
recently recorded. So far, interest rates have fallen -- that's one
requisite satisfied -- and returns on equity still remain exceptionally
high. If they stay there -- and if interest rates hold near recent levels -
- there is no reason to think of stocks as generally overvalued. On the
other hand, returns on equity are not a sure thing to remain at, or even
near, their present levels.
虽然我们从来不愿尝试去预测股市的动向，不过我们却试着大约评估其合理价
位，记得在去年的股东会时，道琼指数约为7,071点，长期公债的殖利率为
6.89%，查理跟我就曾公开表示，如果符合以下两点条件，则股市并未高估，1)
利率维持不变或继续下滑，以及2)美国企业继续维持现有的高股东权益报酬率。
现在看起来，利率确实又继续下滑，这一点算是符合条件，另一方面，股东权益
报酬率仍旧维持在高档，换句话说，若这种情况继续维持下去，同时利率也能够
维持现状，则一般来说没有理由认为现在的股市过于高估，不过从保守角度来
看，股东权益报酬率实在很能永远维持在现有的这种荣景。
In the summer of 1979, when equities looked cheap to me, I wrote
a Forbes article entitled "You pay a very high price in the stock market
for a cheery consensus." At that time skepticism and disappointment
prevailed, and my point was that investors should be glad of the fact,
since pessimism drives down prices to truly attractive levels. Now,
however, we have a very cheery consensus. That does not necessarily
mean this is the wrong time to buy stocks: Corporate America is now
earning far more money than it was just a few years ago, and in the
presence of lower interest rates, every dollar of earnings becomes more
valuable. Today's price levels, though, have materially eroded the
"margin of safety" that Ben Graham identified as the cornerstone of
intelligent investing.
记得1979年的夏天，在当时的股票市场当中，便宜的股票垂手可得，为此我特
地在富比士写了一篇文章，名为"在股票市场中，想让大家有乐观的共识是要付
出相当大的代价的"，当时市场弥漫着怀疑与悲观的情绪，不过当时我力排众议
认为对于这种现象投资人应该要感到高兴，因为悲观的情绪使得许多公司的股价
跌到相当吸引人的价位，不过现在看来我们似乎已经快要达到乐观的共识了，当
然这不代表现在就不能买股票，近年来美国企业的获利大增，搭配现在的利率水
准，企业赚取的每一块盈余比起过去来说要珍贵的许多，虽然以现在的股票价
位，已经严重地脱离的葛拉汉一再强调的安全边际，这是智能型投资哲学的基
石。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In last year's annual report, I discussed Coca-Cola, our largest
holding. Coke continues to increase its market dominance throughout
the world, but, tragically, it has lost the leader responsible for its
outstanding performance. Roberto Goizueta, Coke's CEO since 1981,
died in October. After his death, I read every one of the more than 100
letters and notes he had written me during the past nine years. Those
messages could well serve as a guidebook for success in both business
and life.
去年年报我花了相当多的篇幅谈到我们现有最大的投资部位-可口可乐，虽然目
前可口可乐仍然继续扩大其在全世界饮料市场的霸主地位，不过很不幸的是，该
公司总裁Roberto Goizueta却在去年十月过世，在他死后，我再一度阅读过去
九年来，我与Goizueta超过上百篇的往来书信，这些讯息确实可以做为如何成
功经营企业与人生的最佳教材。
In these communications, Roberto displayed a brilliant and clear
strategic vision that was always aimed at advancing the well-being of
Coke shareholders. Roberto knew where he was leading the company,
how he was going to get there, and why this path made the most sense
for his owners -- and, equally important, he had a burning sense of
urgency about reaching his goals. An excerpt from one handwritten
note he sent to me illustrates his mind-set: "By the way, I have told
Olguita that what she refers to as an obsession, you call focus. I like
your term much better." Like all who knew Roberto, I will miss him
enormously.
在这些书信中，Roberto展现出高瞻远瞩的识见，总是将重点摆在如何增进可口
可乐股东的权益，Roberto很清楚他要将公司带往何处，以及要如何才能到达目
的地，同时了解为何这样的方法最适合所有的股东，当然更重要的是他对于达成
这样目标抱持着强烈的渴望，有一张他手写给我的字条最能充分说明当时他的心
境，"对了，我跟Olguita提到有关于她常常讲的"着魔"，我个人比较喜欢巴菲
特的说法"专注"，就像是所有认识Roberto的人一样，我会永远怀念他!
Consistent with his concern for the company, Roberto prepared for
a seamless succession long before it seemed necessary. Roberto knew
that Doug Ivester was the right man to take over and worked with Doug
over the years to ensure that no momentum would be lost when the
time for change arrived. The Coca-Cola Company will be the same
steamroller under Doug as it was under Roberto.
一如他对于公司的关心，Roberto早就安排好接班的问题，他认为Doug Ivester
正是最佳的人选，与他共事多年的经验足以确保在公司领导高层更迭的同时，公
司的运作不致受到任何的影响，相信在Doug的领导之下，可口可乐仍能一本初
衷勇往直前。
Convertible Preferreds
可转换特别股
Two years ago, I gave you an update on the five convertible
preferreds that we purchased through private placements in the 1987-
1991 period. At the time of that earlier report, we had realized a small
profit on the sale of our Champion International holding. The four
remaining preferred commitments included two, Gillette and First
Empire State, that we had converted into common stock in which we had
large unrealized gains, and two others, USAir and Salomon, that had
been trouble-prone. At times, the last two had me mouthing a line from
a country song: "How can I miss you if you won't go away?"
两年前，我曾经就1987到1991年间进行的五项可转换特别股投资做了一番现
况报告，在报告出具的当时，我们出脱了冠军国际部份的持股实现小部份的获
利，剩下的四项投资中，吉列与第一帝国早已转换成普通股，并享有高额的未实
现获利，而美国航空与所罗门兄弟则发生严重的经营问题，这两项投资让我不得
不哼起一首乡村歌曲的歌词，"要是你不离开，我又怎么会想念你呢?"
Since I delivered that report, all four holdings have grown
significantly in value. The common stocks of both Gillette and First
Empire have risen substantially, in line with the companies' excellent
performance. At yearend, the $600 million we put into Gillette in 1989
had appreciated to $4.8 billion, and the $40 million we committed to
First Empire in 1991 had risen to $236 million.
而就在报告发布之后，所有四项投资的价值皆大幅增加，吉列与第一帝国的普通
股股价飙涨，与公司的经营基本面一致，截至年底，当初我们在1989年投入吉
列的6亿美元已经增值为48亿美元，而在1991年投入第一帝国的4,000万
美元，则已增值至2.36亿美元。
Our two laggards, meanwhile, have come to life in a very major
way. In a transaction that finally rewarded its long-suffering
shareholders, Salomon recently merged into Travelers Group. All of
Berkshire's shareholders -- including me, very personally -- owe a huge
debt to Deryck Maughan and Bob Denham for, first, playing key roles in
saving Salomon from extinction following its 1991 scandal and, second,
restoring the vitality of the company to a level that made it an attractive
acquisition for Travelers. I have often said that I wish to work with
executives that I like, trust and admire. No two fit that description better
than Deryck and Bob.
在此同时另外两个后段班，也已起死回生，其中所罗门最近决定并入旅行家集团
的举动，终于让长久以来饱受苦难的股东获得的回报，Berkshire所有的股东，
包含我个人在内，实在是亏欠Deryck Maughan跟Bob Denham太多了，首
先要感谢他们在1991年所罗门爆发丑闻时，拯救公司免于倒闭，之后更让公司
恢复以往的活力，使得公司得以风光地嫁给旅行家集团，我常常说，我渴望与我
喜爱、信任与崇拜的经理人共事，Deryck与Bob正是这样绝佳的组合。
Berkshire's final results from its Salomon investment won't be
tallied for some time, but it is safe to say that they will be far better than
I anticipated two years ago. Looking back, I think of my Salomon
experience as having been both fascinating and instructional, though
for a time in 1991-92 I felt like the drama critic who wrote: "I would
have enjoyed the play except that I had an unfortunate seat. It faced the
stage."
虽然Berkshire投资所罗门的最终成果到目前仍未定案，所幸目前的情况要比我
两年前预期要好得多，回顾过去，我觉得投资所罗门的经验令人感到刺激有趣同
时又具教化意义，虽然我在1991到1992年间的感觉就好象是一个戏迷曾这样
写到"要是因为坐到一个不幸的位子，我可能就能够好好地欣赏表演，因为它正
对着台上"。
The resuscitation of US Airways borders on the miraculous. Those
who have watched my moves in this investment know that I have
compiled a record that is unblemished by success. I was wrong in
originally purchasing the stock, and I was wrong later, in repeatedly
trying to unload our holdings at 50 cents on the dollar.
另一方面美国航空的重生过程近乎奇迹，熟悉整个投资过程的朋友都知道，个人
在这项投资上获得了前所未有的胜利，一开始买进这家公司的股票就是一项错
误，后来又反悔打算以半价出售再度犯了第二次的错误。
Two changes at the company coincided with its remarkable
rebound: 1) Charlie and I left the board of directors and 2) Stephen Wolf
became CEO. Fortunately for our egos, the second event was the key:
Stephen Wolf's accomplishments at the airline have been phenomenal.
两项改变促使该公司得以东山再起，1)查理跟我辞去该公司董事的职位，2)
Stephen Wolf接任成为该公司总裁，还好后者才是公司真正能够重生的主因，
否则我们的脸可就丢大了，Stephen Wolf的表现对整个航空业而言，可说是意
义非凡。
There still is much to do at US Airways, but survival is no longer an
issue. Consequently, the company made up the dividend arrearages on
our preferred during 1997, adding extra payments to compensate us
for the delay we suffered. The company's common stock, furthermore,
has risen from a low of $4 to a recent high of $73.
当然美国航空还有很长的一段路要走，不过存活下来应该不是问题，也因此该公
司在1997年顺利地偿还积欠我们的特别股股息，还包含延迟支付的赔偿损失，
该公司的普通股股价更从原来的4块钱，一举涨到目前73块钱的新高。
Our preferred has been called for redemption on March 15. But the
rise in the company's stock has given our conversion rights, which we
thought worthless not long ago, great value. It is now almost certain
that our US Airways shares will produce a decent profit -- that is, if my
cost for Maalox is excluded -- and the gain could even prove indecent.
我们持有的特别股已在三月15日被赎回，不过受惠于该公司股价大涨，原本一
文不值的转换权现在却变得价值不菲，可以肯定的是我们现在持有的美国航空普
通股将为我们创造极高的获利，当然还要先把我买胃药的钱给算进去。
Next time I make a big, dumb decision, Berkshire shareholders will
know what to do: Phone Mr. Wolf.
我想哪天要是我再度干下什么愚蠢的投资决策，Berkshire的股东肯定知道该怎
么做了，没错，记得打电话给Wolf先生。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In addition to the convertible preferreds, we purchased one other
private placement in 1991, $300 million of American Express Percs.
This security was essentially a common stock that featured a tradeoff in
its first three years: We received extra dividend payments during that
period, but we were also capped in the price appreciation we could
realize. Despite the cap, this holding has proved extraordinarily
profitable thanks to a move by your Chairman that combined luck and
skill -- 110% luck, the balance skill.
除了可转换特别股，我们在1991年还透过私募的方式投资了三亿美元的美国运
通俗称"Percs"的股票，这种证券基本上算是一种普通股，只不过在投资的前三
年我们可以领取一笔特别的股利，条件是在同时间我们因为股价上涨所带来的资
本利得将受到限制，然而即便如此，这笔投资还是因为本人的英明决策而获利不
菲，当然其中也包含一些运气的成份，比例约是110%(剩下的才是本人的能力)。
Our Percs were due to convert into common stock in August 1994,
and in the month before I was mulling whether to sell upon conversion.
One reason to hold was Amex's outstanding CEO, Harvey Golub, who
seemed likely to maximize whatever potential the company had (a
supposition that has since been proved -- in spades). But the size of
that potential was in question: Amex faced relentless competition from
a multitude of card-issuers, led by Visa. Weighing the arguments, I
leaned toward sale.
根据约定我们的Percs必须在1994年八月以前转换成普通股，而就在前一个月
我还一直在考虑是否应该在转换期限到期以前把这项投资给处分掉，当时考量的
是虽然美国运通总裁Harvey Golub表现相当优异，他总是有办法将公司的潜力
发挥到极致(这点从一开始便不断地获得证明)，只是这种潜能还是面临严重的挑
战，那就是美国运通来自于以Visa为首的其它发卡单位激烈的竞争，在衡量各
种利弊得失之后，我还是倾向于把这笔投资提前给处分掉。
Here's where I got lucky. During that month of decision, I played
golf at Prouts Neck, Maine with Frank Olson, CEO of Hertz. Frank is a
brilliant manager, with intimate knowledge of the card business. So
from the first tee on I was quizzing him about the industry. By the time
we reached the second green, Frank had convinced me that Amex's
corporate card was a terrific franchise, and I had decided not to sell. On
the back nine I turned buyer, and in a few months Berkshire owned 10%
of the company.
还好我走狗运，就在要做决定的那个月，我正好到缅因州和Hertz租车公司总
