这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .22
地点，在店的两旁有好几百个停车场供大家使用，同时该店也会延长假日营业时
间到晚上11点，以接待所有前往光顾的Berkshire股东。
The 114th Street operation is now run by two sisters, Coni Birge
and Deb Novotny, whose grandfather put up the building in 1962 at
what was then the outer edge of the city. Their mother, Jan Noble, took
over in 1972, and Coni and Deb continue as third generation ownermanagers.
Jan, Coni and Deb will all be on hand Sunday evening, and I
hope that you meet them. Enjoy one of their hamburgers if you can't get
into Gorat's. And then, around eight o'clock, join me in having a Dusty
Sundae for dessert. This item is a personal specialty -- the Dairy Queen
will furnish you a copy of my recipe -- and will be offered only on
Shareholder Sunday.
114街的分店目前由Coni Birge与Deb Novotny两姊妹所经营，系由她们的
祖父于1962年在当时还是市中心外围的现址创立，在1972年由她们的母亲接
手经营，Coni与Deb则是第三代的经营者，Jan、Coni及Deb在星期天晚上
将会在现场为大家服务，希望大家可以去和她们见见面，若是大家挤不进Gorat's
的话，也可以尝尝两姊妹亲手做的汉堡，八点整我将会出现享用我的喜欢的冰风
暴圣代，这是个人特调的秘方，当然你也可以要求乳品皇后照我的配方给你来一
份，这可是只有在股东会当天才对外提供独家秘方。
The Omaha Royals and Albuquerque Dukes will play baseball on
Saturday evening, May 2nd, at Rosenblatt Stadium. As usual, your
Chairman, shamelessly exploiting his 25% ownership of the team, will
take the mound. But this year you will see something new.
在前一天5月2日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家队
对Albuquerque Dukes队的比赛，一如往年厚颜无耻的我会利用拥有该球队
25%的特权，站上投手丘担任先发，不过今年我保证各位一定会有新的感受。
In past games, much to the bafflement of the crowd, I have shaken
off the catcher's first call. He has consistently asked for my sweeping
curve, and I have just as regularly resisted. Instead, I have served up a
pathetic fast ball, which on my best day was clocked at eight miles per
hour (with a following wind).
过去几年，可能是受到现场观众喧闹声所影响，我总是不顾捕手对我所做出的暗
号，虽然他一直要求我投出拿手的变化曲球，但我总是极力反抗，结果总是投出
软趴趴的快速球，最快的球速也不过是每小时8英哩(这还是在顺风的情况下)。
There's a story behind my unwillingness to throw the curve ball. As
some of you may know, Candy Cummings invented the curve in 1867
and used it to great effect in the National Association, where he never
won less than 28 games in a season. The pitch, however, drew
immediate criticism from the very highest of authorities, namely Charles
Elliott, then president of Harvard University, who declared, "I have heard
that this year we at Harvard won the baseball championship because we
have a pitcher who has a fine curve ball. I am further instructed that the
purpose of the curve ball is to deliberately deceive the batter. Harvard is
not in the business of teaching deception." (I'm not making this up.)
其实我之所以不愿意投曲球背后有极大的隐情，大家或许知道，Candy
Cummings在1867年发明曲球的时候，曾在国家联盟引起极大的效应，这种
球路使得他每个球季至少可以赢得28场胜投，但是这样的投球方式也立刻引起
最高当局的严厉批评，当时的哈佛校长Charles Elliott对外宣称，我听说今年
哈佛棒球队靠着一位专门投曲球的投手赢得冠军，有人还告诉我，这种曲球基本
上是一种欺骗打者的行为，我必须说的是，哈佛从来不教人这种骗人的勾当。
Ever since I learned of President Elliott's moral teachings on this
subject, I have scrupulously refrained from using my curve, however
devastating its effect might have been on hapless batters. Now,
however, it is time for my karma to run over Elliott's dogma and for me
to quit holding back. Visit the park on Saturday night and marvel at the
majestic arc of my breaking ball.
而自从我知道Elliott校长的教诲之后，我就一直小心翼翼地避免使用到我这种
杀人无数拿手的曲球，不过现在已经到了忍无可忍的地步了，我决定再度使出我
的杀手戬，星期六晚上大家记得光临球场，让你们见识一下我这魔球的威力。
Our proxy statement includes information about obtaining tickets
to the game. We will also provide an information packet describing the
local hot spots, including, of course, those 12 Dairy Queens.
股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，里面同时包含一本旅行小手
册，介绍本地热门的旅游景点，当然也包括12家乳品皇后在内。
Come to Omaha -- the cradle of capitalism -- in May and enjoy
yourself.
欢迎大家在五月莅临奥玛哈-资本主义的摇篮，也预祝大家玩得愉快。
Warren E. Buffett
February 27, 1998 Chairman of the Board
华伦．巴菲特
董事会主席
1998年2月27日
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致所有股东:
Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, whic
increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B
stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present
management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to
$37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*
1998年本公司的净值增加了259亿美元，每股帐面净值不管是A级股或B级
股皆成长了48.3%，总计过去34年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，
每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的37,801美元，年复合成长率约为
24.7%*。
* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only
stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic
interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
*1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股则拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。
Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings -- but no
this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better
than it sounds? Well, Berkshire's progress in 1998 -- though more than
satisfactory -- was not as good as it looks. That's because most of that
48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.
通常当公司的净值一年能够成长48.3%时，大家应该要高兴的手舞足蹈，不过
今年却不行，还记得德国音乐天才华格纳吗? 他的音乐曾被形容为没有想象中好
听，嗯! 我想Berkshire在1998年的进展，虽然已经相当令人满意了，但还是
没有表面上看起来那么好，主要的原因在于在增加的48.3%净值当中，有绝大
部份系来自于因购并交易所发行的新股。
To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value
which means that any issuing of shares we do -- whether for cash or as
consideration in a merger -- instantly increases our per-share bookvalue
figure, even though we've earned not a dime. What happens is that
we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up.
These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in
per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what
we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice
Chairman and my partner, and I can't tell you too often (though you may
feel that we try), it's the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts
rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire's
intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of
the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far
exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms,
and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our
Owner's Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our ownerrelated
business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and
62.)
再进一步说明，由于我们公司目前的股价远高于帐面价值，这意思代表每当我们
发行新股，不管是现金增资或者是合并发行新股，都会立即大幅拉高我们每股的
帐面净值，但实际上我们没有因此多赚进半毛钱，而真实的情况是，这类交易对
我们每股实质价值并不会产生立即的效果，主要是由于我们所得到的跟我们所付
出的只能算是相当，而就像我与合伙人查理孟格不厌其烦，但却一再强调的真正
重要的是实质的价值的增加而非帐面净值的增加，虽然Berkshire 1998年的实
质价值大幅成长，但绝不到帐面净值增加48.3%的那种幅度，不过尽管如此，
我还是必须强调，目前的实质价值仍远高于帐面净值，(有关这些名词的说明，
请大家参阅股东手册，在里头我们揭示了与股东相关的经营原则)。
We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses an
managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998,
General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way -- more about
both later -- and the performance of our operating businesses last year
exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On
the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major
investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither
they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity
portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The
problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and
Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.
展望1999年，我们拥有有史以来最佳企业与经理人的黄金组合，我们在1998
年买下的两家公司，分别是通用再保与Executive Jet在各方面的条件皆是一时
之选(后面还会详加说明)，而原有拥有的企业表现更是超乎我个人的预期，
GEICO保险再一次令人瞠目结舌，当然也有不好的消息，几家我们拥有大笔投
资的大型上市公司经营纷传缺失，这也是当初我们没有预期到的，也因此使得我
们股票投资组合的绩效表现低于同期S&P 500指数，还好这些公司所发生的问
题都只是暂时的，查理跟我都相信他们长期发展的远景还是相当的乐观。
In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a tablehat we
regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the
updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key
components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if
we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our pershare
ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but
excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the
second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's
operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting
adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and
corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest
and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the
first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it
were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and
the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate
costs.
在最近三年的年报中，我们提供了我们认为可以最能够估计Berkshire实质价值
的一张表，在今年刚刚更新资料的表中，我们以拟制的方式将通用再保的数字加
入其中，也就是假设该公司自年度一开始就为我们所拥有，第一栏的数字代表我
们拥有每股的投资金额(包括现金与约当现金，但扣除财务金融单位持有的证
券)，第二栏则是每股在扣除利息与营业费用之后，Berkshire来自本业的营业利
益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏
投资所贡献的股利收入、利息收入与资本利得，事实上，从这张表可以看出若是
把Berkshire分拆成两部份的话会变成怎样，其结果就等于是一家持有我们投资
部位的控股公司，以及另一家经营旗下所有事业负担全部成本盈亏的营利事业。
Investments
Per Share
Pre-tax Earnings Per
Share
With All Income from
Investments Excluded
Year
1968 .................. $ 53 $ 2.87
1978 ...... 465 12.85
1988 ..... 4,876 145.77
1998 . 47,647 474.45
Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:
Investments Per
Share
Pre-tax Earnings Per
Share With All
Income from
Investments Excluded
Decade Ending
1978 ...... 24.2% 16.2%
1988 ...... 26.5% 27.5%
1998 ...... 25.6% 12.5%
Annual Growth Rate,
1968-
1998 ...................
25.4% 18.6%
During 1998, our investments increased by $9,604 per share, o
25.2%, but per-share operating earnings fell by 33.9%. General Re
(included, as noted, on a pro-forma basis) explains both facts. This
company has very large investments, and these greatly increased our
per-share investment figure. But General Re also had an underwriting
loss in 1998, and that hurt operating earnings. Had we not acquired
General Re, per-share operating earnings would have shown a modest
gain.
回顾1998年，我们每股的投资金额增加了9,604美元，约25.2%，不过每股
营业盈余却减少33.9%，主要的原因缘自于通用再保(如先前所说，在今年以拟
制的方式并入Berkshire)，这家公司拥有相当大的投资部位，这使得我们每股的
投资金额大幅增加，不过另一方面，该公司在1998年也产生承保损失，这又拖
累了我们的每股营业盈余表现，事实上，要是我们没有买下通用再保，我们当年
的每股营业盈余可能还能维持小幅增加。
Though certain of our acquisitionand operating strategies may
from time to time affect one column more than the other, we continually
work to increase the figures in both. But one thing is certain: Our future
rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire's
capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized
returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales
but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only
three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who
can't).
虽然某些特定的购并案与经营策略会影响到其中某一栏数字，但我们还是尽量让
两栏数字能够均衡发展，不过有一点可以确定的是，我们未来的成长率将远不及
过去所创造的水准，Berkshire现在的规模实在是大到我们很难再做出任何重大
的突破，若是你不这样认为，你应该去从事业务员的工作，而不是去教数学(请
永远记住，世界上只有三种人，一种会算术，另一种不会算术)。
Currently we are woing to compound a net worth of $57.4
billion, the largest of any American corporation (though our figure will
be eclipsed if the merger of Exxon and Mobil takes place). Of course,
our lead in net worth does not mean that Berkshire outranks all other
businesses in value: Market value is what counts for owners and General
Electric and Microsoft, for example, have valuations more than three
times Berkshire's. Net worth, though, measures the capital that
managers must deploy, and at Berkshire that figure has indeed become
huge.
净值代表着一家公司经理人可以运用的资金，就这方面而言，Berkshire的规模
无疑是相当可观的，现在我们可以掌控的净值高达574亿美元，这数字居所有
美国公司之冠，(虽然如果艾克森和Mobil石油合并案成功的话，我们必须让出
宝座)，当然这并不代表Berkshire实际的价值，对于股东来说，公司总市值才
是最重要的，就这点而言，通用电气与微软的市值就是Berkshire的三倍以上。
Nonetheless, Charlie a I will do our best to increase intrinsic
value in the future at an average rate of 15%, a result we consider to be
at the very peak of possible outcomes. We may have years when we
exceed 15%, but we will most certainly have other years when we fall far
short of that -- including years showing negative returns -- and those
will bring our average down. In the meantime, you should understand
just what an average gain of 15% over the next five years implies: It
means we will need to increase net worth by $58 billion. Earning this
daunting 15% will require us to come up with big ideas: Popcorn stands
just won't do. Today's markets are not friendly to our search for
"elephants," but you can be sure that we will stay focused on the hunt.
不过说归说，查理跟我还是希望能够尽力让公司的价值在未来以每年15%的平
均速度成长，这是我们认为可能达到的极限，在往后的日子，有时我们可能可以
超过15%，但也很有可能远不如这个标准，甚至可能会变成负的，而使得我们
平均成长率往下拉，另外大家要知道，所谓每年平均15%的成长率代表在往后
的五年之内，我们的净值必须要成长580亿美元，如果没有几个轰轰烈烈的大
案子的话，是绝对不可能办的到的，像爆米花摊这种小玩意可不行，而现在的市
场环境也不利于我们寻找合适的大象猎物，不过我们可以向大家保证一定会全神
贯注。
Whever the future holds, I make you one promise: I'll keep at
least 99% of my net worth in Berkshire for as long as I am around. How
long will that be? My model is the loyal Democrat in Fort Wayne who
asked to be buried in Chicago so that he could stay active in the party.
To that end, I've already selected a "power spot" at the office for my urn.
不管未来会如何，有一点我可以向各位保证的是，只要我还在，我都会将我个人
99%以上的身家摆在Berkshire，至于能够维持多久? 我则是希望能够效法Fort
Wayne忠诚的民主党员，临终时还表示希望死后能够葬在芝加哥，好就近参加
党的活动，所以我也在办公室事先选好的一个好位置，以后可以用来摆我的骨灰
坛。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Our financial growth has been matched by employment growth
We now have 47,566 on our payroll, with the acquisitions of 1998
bringing 7,074 employees to us and internal growth adding another
