这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .23
2,500. To balance this gain of 9,500 in hands-on employees, we have
enlarged the staff at world headquarters from 12 to 12.8. (The .8
doesn't refer to me or Charlie: We have a new person in accounting,
working four days a week.) Despite this alarming trend toward
corporate bloat, our after-tax overhead last year was about $3.5
million, or well under one basis point (.01 of 1%) of the value of the
assets we manage.
随着经济实力的增长，我们雇用员工的人数也同步增加，我们现在拥有47,566
位员工，其中包含1998年购并通用再保后并进来的7,074人，以及内部增聘
的2,500人，而未了服务新增加的9,500个人手，我们的总部人员也从原来的
12人扩编为12.8人(0.8指的不是查理或是我本人，而是我们新请的一位会计
人员，一个礼拜工作四天)，尽管这是组织浮滥的警讯，但是我们去年税后总部
开支却只有区区350万美元，大概占我们管理总资产的一个基本点(万分之一)
还不到。
Taxes
租税
One beneficiary of our increased size has been the U.S. Treasury
The federal income taxes that Berkshire and General Re have paid, or
will soon pay, in respect to 1998 earnings total $2.7 billion. That means
we shouldered all of the U.S. Government's expenses for more than a
half-day.
我们规模扩大最直接的受惠者之一就是美国国库，今年光是Berkshire与通用再
保已经支付或即将支付的联邦所得税就有27亿美元之谱，这笔钱足够供美国政
府支应半天以上的开销。
Follow that thought a little further: If only 625 other U.S
taxpayers had paid the Treasury as much as we and General Re did last
year, no one else -- neither corporations nor 270 million citizens --
would have had to pay federal income taxes or any other kind of federal
tax (for example, social security or estate taxes). Our shareholders can
truly say that they "gave at the office."
也就是说，全美国只要有625个像Berkshire及通用再保这样的纳税人的话，
其它所有的美国公司或二亿七千万的美国公民都可以不必再支付任何的联邦所
得税或其它任何形式的联邦税(包含社会福利或房地产税)，所以Berkshire的股
东可以说是"功在国家"。
Writing checks to the IRS that include strings of zeros does no
bother Charlie or me. Berkshire as a corporation, and we as individuals,
have prospered in America as we would have in no other country.
Indeed, if we lived in some other part of the world and completely
escaped taxes, I'm sure we would be worse off financially (and in many
other ways as well). Overall, we feel extraordinarily lucky to have been
dealt a hand in life that enables us to write large checks to the
government rather than one requiring the government to regularly write
checks to us -- say, because we are disabled or unemployed.
对于查理跟我来说，签发后面有一长串"零"的大额支票一点都不会感到困扰，
Berkshire身为一家美国企业，以及我们身为美国公民，得以在美国这个伟大的
国家繁荣发展，这是在其它国家所不可能达到的，我想要是我们生在世界上的别
的角落，那么就算是我们再怎么努力的逃避税负，我们也不可能像现在这么富有
(也包含生活上其它层面)，从另一个角度来说，我们感到很幸运能够支付一大笔
钱给政府，而非因为我们残障或失业，要靠政府三不五时来救济我们。
Berkshire's tax situation isometimes misunderstood. First,
capital gains have no special attraction for us: A corporation pays a 35%
rate on taxable income, whether it comes from capital gains or from
ordinary operations. This means that Berkshire's tax on a long-term
capital gain is fully 75% higher than what an individual would pay on an
identical gain.
Berkshire的租税负担常常引起外界的误解，首先资本利得对我们并不太有利，
企业不论是资本利得或是其它正常的营利都必须支付35%的所得税，这也就是
说面对相同的长期资本利得，Berkshire的租税负担要比一般个人要高出75%
以上。
Some people harbor another misconception, believing that w
can exclude 70% of all dividends we receive from our taxable income.
Indeed, the 70% rate applies to most corporations and also applies to
Berkshire in cases where we hold stocks in non-insurance subsidiaries.
However, almost all of our equity investments are owned by our
insurance companies, and in that case the exclusion is 59.5%. That still
means a dollar of dividends is considerably more valuable to us than a
dollar of ordinary income, but not to the degree often assumed.
另外有些人还抱有一个不正确的观念，以为我们可以将70%以上的股利收入列
为免税收入，事实上这种适用于大部分美国企业的优惠，仅适用于Berkshire旗
下非保险事业所持有的股票，可惜我们大部分的股份都是由保险事业所持有，这
部份的免税比例就只有59.5%，当然这仍然代表每一块钱的股利收入比起其它
一般的应税收入来得有价值。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Berkshire truly went all out for the Treasury last year.
connection with the General Re merger, we wrote a $30 million check to
the government to pay an SEC fee tied to the new shares created by the
deal. We understand that this payment set an SEC record. Charlie and I
are enormous admirers of what the Commission has accomplished for
American investors. We would rather, however, have found another way
to show our admiration.
Berkshire去年真的是卯起来贡献国库，像是去年的通用再保合并案，我们就付
了3,000万美元给美国证管会作为发行新股的手续费，这金额创下了证管会有
史以来的新纪录，查理跟我对于证管会为所有投资人所做的努力感到崇敬，只是
如果能用其它方法来表示敬意就更好了。
GEICO (1-800-847-7536)
GEICO保险
Combine a great idea with a great manager and you're certain t
obtain a great result. That mix is alive and well at GEICO. The idea is
low-cost auto insurance, made possible by direct-to-customer
marketing, and the manager is Tony Nicely. Quite simply, there is no
one in the business world who could run GEICO better than Tony does.
His instincts are unerring, his energy is boundless, and his execution is
flawless. While maintaining underwriting discipline, Tony is building an
organization that is gaining market share at an accelerating rate.
好的理念加上好的经理人，最后一定可以获得好的成果，这样的完美组合在
GEICO身上获得最佳的印证，透过直效行销大幅降低成本的汽车保险搭配像
Tony Nicely这样优秀的经理人，很显然的全世界再没有其它人可以像Tony可
以把GEICO经营的这样好，他的直觉毫无偏差、他的能量没有上限，而他的行
动完美无暇，在严守承保纪律的同时，Tony所带领的团队正以超高的速度攻占
市场占有率。
This pace has been encouraged by our compensation picies.
The direct writing of insurance -- that is, without there being an agent
or broker between the insurer and its policyholder -- involves a
substantial front-end investment. First-year business is therefore
unprofitable in a major way. At GEICO, we do not wish this cost to deter
our associates from the aggressive pursuit of new business -- which, as
it renews, will deliver significant profits -- so we leave it out of our
compensation formulas. What's included then? We base 50% of our
associates' bonuses and profit sharing on the earnings of our
"seasoned" book, meaning policies that have been with us for more than
a year. The other 50% is tied to growth in policyholders -- and here we
have stepped on the gas.
这样的速度更因为受到我们特殊的奖励计画激励而加快，通常保单直接销售-也
就是不透过代理或中介，直接由保险公司与客户接洽的业务，需要一笔相当大的
前置投资，也因此第一年刚接到的保单通常都没有什么利润，不过要是客户在接
下来年度能够继续续约的话，公司将享有极高的获利，在GEICO我们为了不希
望公司的同仁因而降低争取新业务的企图心，所以我们特别将第一年的数字排除
在关乎员工奖金与分红的奖金计算公式之外，其中有50%是基于每季的帐上获
利-代表投保期间超过一年以上的保单，另外的50%则是视公司保单数量的成长
情况，这也是我们正加紧油门全力冲刺的。
I1995, the year prior to its acquisition by Berkshire, GEICO
spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last
year the company spent $143 million, and the counselor count grew to
2,162. The effects that these efforts had at the company are shown by
the new business and in-force figures below:
1995年当Berkshire还没有完全买下GEICO时，该公司每年的行销预算是
3,300万美元，并有652位电话咨询员，到了去年，公司的行销预算增加为1.43
亿美元，电话咨询员的人数也增加至2,162位，这些努力所得到的成果可以从
下表该公司新接保单与有效保单数字中看出端倪。
New Auto Auto Policies
Years Policies* In-Force*
1993 354,882 2,011,055
1994 396,217 2,147,549
1995 461,608 2,310,037
1996 617,669 2,543,699
1997 913,176 2,949,439
1998 1,317,761 3,562,644
* "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.
In 1999, we will again increase our marketing budget, spendin
at least $190 million. In fact, there is no limit to what Berkshire is willing
to invest in GEICO's new-business activity, as long as we can
concurrently build the infrastructure the company needs to properly
serve its policyholders.
展望1999年我们将继续增加行销预算到至少1.9亿美元，事实上Berkshire
对于GEICO在新业务取得上的投资是没有上限的，只要我们可以帮公司建立起
能够客户更好服务的各种措施。
Because of the first-year costs, companies that are concerne
about quarterly or annual earnings would shy from similar investments,
no matter how intelligent these might be in terms of building long-term
value. Our calculus is different: We simply measure whether we are
creating more than a dollar of value per dollar spent -- and if that
calculation is favorable, the more dollars we spend the happier I am.
而也由于第一年的成本负担，许多关心短期利益的公司都吝啬于从事相同的投
资，不管这些动作对公司长期的利益而言，是如何的有助益，但是我们的盘算就
不一样了，我们只是很简单的去评量现在所投入的每一块钱在未来是否能产生高
于一块钱的效益，如果估算出来确实有利，那么就算是花再多的钱我也开心。
There is far more to GEICO's success, of course, than low price
and a torrent of advertising. The handling of claims must also be fair,
fast and friendly -- and ours is. Here's an impartial scorecard on how we
shape up: In New York, our largest-volume state, the Insurance
Department recently reported that GEICO's complaint ratio in 1997 was
not only the lowest of the five largest auto insurers but was also less
than half the average of the other four.
当然GEICO成功的原因决不仅于低价与强势的行销，申诉的处理也要合理、快
速、亲切，这里有一个客观的数据可说明这点，在业务量居我们首位的纽约地区，
保险主管机关最近公布GEICO在1997年前五大汽车保险公司当中，其申诉比
率是最低的，其比例甚至远低于其它四家同业平均数的一半。
GEICO's 1998 profit margin of 6.7% was better than we ha
anticipated -- and, indeed, better than we wished. Our results reflect an
industry-wide phenomenon: In recent years, both the frequency of auto
accidents and their severity have unexpectedly declined. We responded
by reducing rates 3.3% in 1998, and we will reduce them still more in
1999. These moves will soon bring profit margins down -- at the least
to 4%, which is our target, and perhaps considerably lower. Whatever
the case, we believe that our margins will continue to be much better
than those of the industry.
GEICO 1998年的获利率达到6.7%，超过我们当初的预期，事实上是远高于我
们所能想象的程度，我们的成绩反映出产业间普遍存在的一种现象，近几年来，
汽车意外发生的频率与程度都比以往减轻许多，也因此我们立刻反应调降3.3%
的费率，预计在1999年还会降得更多，虽然这个举动马上使得我们的获利率下
降，但我们的目标至少是4%或甚至更低，不过不论如何，我们相信GEICO的获
利率还是远比同业的数字来得好的许多。
With GEICO's growth and profitability both outanding in 1998,
so also were its profit-sharing and bonus payments. Indeed, the
profit-sharing payment of $103 million or 32.3% of salary -- which
went to all 9,313 associates who had been with us for more than a year
-- may well have been the highest percentage payment at any large
company in the country. (In addition, associates benefit from a
company-funded pension plan.)
由于GEICO 1998年优异的绩效与获利能力，该公司的分红数字亦跟着水涨船
高，总计1.03亿美元，约占薪资的32.3%，由公司全体年资超过一年以上的
9,313位同仁共同来分享，这个数字在全美所有公司当中比例可以说是最高的，
(此外同仁还可经由公司提拨的退休金持股计画间接受惠)。
The 32.3% may turn out to be a high-water mark, given that th
profitability component in our profit-sharing calculation is almost
certain to come down in the future. The growth component, though,
may well increase. Overall, we expect the two benchmarks together to
dictate very significant profit-sharing payments for decades to come.
For our associates, growth pays off in other ways as well: Last year we
promoted 4,612 people.
虽然公司分红计画中的成长因子应该还会继续维持，但考量到获利因子在未来几
乎可以肯定会逐渐下降，所以32.3%的比例可以说是破天荒的新高，当然我们
预期这两项因子在未来的十年内仍然会是分红计画中扮演极为重要的角色，不过
对于我们的同仁来说，成长还代表着另一个意义，去年总计有4,612位同仁获
得升迁。
Impressive as the GEICO figures are, we have far more to do. Ou
market share improved significantly in 1998 -- but only from 3% to 3?
%. For every policyholder we now have, there are another ten who should
be giving us their business.
虽然GEICO的绩效数字是如此的令人印象深刻，但是我们仍然还有相当大的成
长空间，没错! GEICO1998年的市场占有率确实大幅提升，但也只不过从3%
增加为3.5%而已，换句话说相较于我们现在服务的每一个保单客户，等于还有
十个在外面等待我们去给他们提供服务。
Some of you who are reading this may be in that category. Abou
40% of those who check our rates find that they can save money by
doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers
differ in their underwriting judgements, with some giving more credit
than we do to drivers who live in certain geographical areas or work at
certain occupations. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer
the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all
comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount --
usually 8% -- to our shareholders. So give us a call and check us out.
有些正在读我们年报的人很可能就属于这类的人，在每个来征询GEICO保单费
率的人当中，平均有40%的人会发现向我们投保能为他们省下一笔钱，而之所
以不是百分之百的原因在于每家保险业者对于风险的判断估计都有所不同，有些
保险公司对于居住于某些特定地区的居民或从事某些特定职业的客户有偏好，不
过我仍然坚信我们提供给一般民众的费率通常都低于其它全国性的业者，在随年
报附赠的GEICO资料中，大家将可以看到我们提供给来自全美40州股东最高
8%的折扣费率，所以记得打电话给我们试一试。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
You may think that one commercial in this section is enough. Bu
I have another to present, this one directed at managers of publiclyowned
companies.
在这段我还有一个广告要打，这广告主要是要写给上市公司的经理人看的。
At Berkshire we feel that telling outanding CEOs, such as Tony,
how to run their companies would be the height of foolishness. Most of
our managers wouldn't work for us if they got a lot of backseat driving.
(Generally, they don't have to work for anyone, since 75% or so are
independently wealthy.) Besides, they are the Mark McGwires of the
business world and need no advice from us as to how to hold the bat or
when to swing.
在Berkshire我们一直认为要教像Tony这样杰出的经理人如何经营公司是一件
相当愚蠢的事，事实上要是我们一直在背后指指点点的话，大部份的经理人可能
早就干不下去了，(坦白说他们大多根本就可以不必要再靠工作过活，75%以上
的人都已经相当有钱)，他们可以说是商场上的强打麦奎尔，根本就不需要我们
去指导他如何拿棒子或何时挥棒。
Nevertheless, Berkshire's ownership may make even the best o
managers more effective. First, we eliminate all of the ritualistic and
nonproductive activities that normally go with the job of CEO. Our
managers are totally in charge of their personal schedules. Second, we
give each a simple mission: Just run your business as if: 1) you own
100% of it; 2) it is the only asset in the world that you and your family
have or will ever have; and 3) you can't sell or merge it for at least a
century. As a corollary, we tell them they should not let any of their
decisions be affected even slightly by accounting considerations. We
want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be
counted.
但是由Berkshire掌控企业所有权，却能够让这些经理人有更好的发挥，首先我
们去除掉所有一般总裁必须面对所有的繁文缛节与没有生产力的活动，我们的经
理人可以全心全意的安排自己个人的行程，第二，我们给予相当明确简单的任务
指示，那就是一、像自己拥有公司一样的心态来经营，二、把它当作是你跟你家
人在全世界仅有的资产来看待，第三、在有生之年内，你没办法将它卖掉或是让
别人给并走，我们告诉他们完全不要被会计帐面方面的考量来影响到其实际经营
上的决策，我们希望经理人了解什么才是最关键紧要的事。
Very few CEOs of public companies operate under a simila
