这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .24
mandate, mainly because they have owners who focus on short-term
prospects and reported earnings. Berkshire, however, has a shareholder
base -- which it will have for decades to come -- that has the longest
investment horizon to be found in the public-company universe.
Indeed, a majority of our shares are held by investors who expect to die
still holding them. We can therefore ask our CEOs to manage for
maximum long-term value, rather than for next quarter's earnings. We
certainly don't ignore the current results of our businesses -- in most
cases, they are of great importance -- but we never want them to be
achieved at the expense of our building ever-greater competitive
strengths.
很少有上市公司的经理人可以如此自在的经营公司，这是因为大部分公司背后的
股东往往只着重短期的利益，相较之下，Berkshire背后有几十年来一直相当稳
定的股东群，拥有其它上市公司少见的长期投资眼光，事实上，这些股东打算一
直持有Berkshire至死方休，也因此旗下的经理人可以用一辈子的时间来经营公
司，而不用为了下一季的获利情况来烦恼，当然这绝不代表我们就不关心公司经
营的现况，事实上，这点也相当的重要，只是我们不希望只因为一昧追求短期的
获利而被迫牺牲掉公司长远发展的竞争优势。
I believe the GEICO story demonstrates the benefits of Berkshire'
approach. Charlie and I haven't taught Tony a thing -- and never will -
- but we have created an environment that allows him to apply all of his
talents to what's important. He does not have to devote his time or
energy to board meetings, press interviews, presentations by
investment bankers or talks with financial analysts. Furthermore, he
need never spend a moment thinking about financing, credit ratings or
"Street" expectations for earnings per share. Because of our ownership
structure, he also knows that this operational framework will endure for
decades to come. In this environment of freedom, both Tony and his
company can convert their almost limitless potential into matching
achievements.
我想GEICO成功的经验再再显示出Berkshire经营模式的优越性，查理跟我从
来就没有指示Tony该怎么做事，我想以后也不会，我们的工作就是提供他一个
绝佳的环境，让他能够彻底发挥才能去做该做的事，他不需要把时间耗费在无意
义的董事会、记者会或分析师与投资银行业者的演示文稿上，此外他也不必担心公司
的资金问题、信用评等或坊间对于公司获利的预期，而更因为我们特殊的股权结
构，他更了解这样的营运模式至少可以继续维持长达数十年以上，在这样自由的
环境之下，Tony跟他所带领的团队就可以将百分百的心思花在应付外在多变的
环境。
If you are running a large, profitable business that will thrive in
GEICO-like environment, check our acquisition criteria on page 21 and
give me a call. I promise a fast answer and will mention your inquiry to
no one except Charlie.
所以如果你同样也在管理一家获利稳定的大型企业，并且向往在像GEICO一样
的经营环境下大展鸿图的话，建议你先看看我们报告后段的购并标准，然后打个
电话给我，我保证一定会很快可以回复，而且除了查理之外，我不会把这件事告
诉其它任何人。
Executive Jet Aviation (1-800-848-6436)
企业主管飞行计画
To understand the huge potential at Executive Jet Aviation (EJA)
you need some understanding of its business, which is selling fractional
shares of jets and operating the fleet for its many owners. Rich Santulli,
CEO of EJA, created the fractional ownership industry in 1986, by
visualizing an important new way of using planes. Then he combined
guts and talent to turn his idea into a major business.
想要了解企业主管飞行计画(EJA)的无限潜力，你必须要先了解这个产业的特
性，它专门出售专机部份所有权给客户并且帮所有权人维护保养机队，EJA的总
裁-Rich Stantulli预视到飞机使用的革命新方法，于是在1986年发挥其个人
绝佳的胆识与才能让其创意成真，开创了专机部份所有权这个新兴行业。
In a fractional ownership plan, you purchase a portion -- sa
1/8th -- of any of a wide variety of jets that EJA offers. That purchase
entitles you to 100 hours of flying time annually. ("Dead-head" hours
don't count against your allotment, and you are also allowed to average
your hours over five years.) In addition, you pay both a monthly
management fee and a fee for hours actually flown.
按照部份所有权计画，你可以买下，由EJA提供各种系列的飞机，比如说八分之
一的部份所有权，如此你便可获得该架飞机每年100个小时的飞行时数，(不包
含飞机停机的时间，而且你还有权利将这些时数自由分配到五年内)，不过每个
月你还必须支付一些管理费以及真正搭乘时的钟点费。
Then, on a few hours notice, EJA makes your plane, or another a
least as good, available to you at your choice of the 5500 airports in the
U.S. In effect, calling up your plane is like phoning for a taxi.
然后，你只要在几个小时前通知我们，EJA就可以在全美指定的5,500座机场
安排好飞机，换言之，这种便利性跟你打电话叫出租车一样的方便。
I first heard about the NetJetsR program, as it is called, about
four years ago from Frank Rooney, our manager at H.H. Brown. Frank
had used and been delighted with the service and suggested that I meet
Rich to investigate signing up for my family's use. It took Rich about 15
minutes to sell me a quarter (200 hours annually) of a Hawker 1000.
Since then, my family has learned firsthand -- through flying 900 hours
on 300 trips -- what a friendly, efficient, and safe operation EJA runs.
Quite simply, they love this service. In fact, they quickly grew so
enthusiastic that I did a testimonial ad for EJA long before I knew there
was any possibility of our purchasing the business. I did, however, ask
Rich to give me a call if he ever got interested in selling. Luckily, he
phoned me last May, and we quickly made a $725 million deal, paying
equal amounts of cash and stock.
我是在四年前头一次知道它的存在，当时它叫做Netjets计画，经由我们旗下
H.H. Brown鞋业的经理人Frank Roony的介绍，Frank本身就常利用该公司
所提供的服务，而且觉得相当满意，于是他建议我可以和Rich碰个面研究看看
是否可以让我的家族加入，结果Rich前后只花了15分钟的时间就说服我买下
四分之一的(也就是每年200小时)的霍克1000型飞机的所有权，从此之后，我
的家族在经过900个飞行小时，300次旅程的亲身体验之后，渐渐了解这种服
务为客人所带来的亲切、方便与安全性，毫无疑问地就爱上它，而我本人也在家
族成员热心的督促下，为该公司的服务在广告中做了见证，而事实上，在当时我
还没有想到有可能能够买下这家公司，不过我还是跟Rich提到，如果他有意愿
记得随时打电话给我，而幸运的是，Rich真的在去年五月份打电话给我，我们
很快就达成这笔7.25亿美元的交易，其中现金与股票各半。
EJA, which is by far the largest operator in its industry, has mor
than 1,000 customers and 163 aircraft (including 23 "core" aircraft that
are owned or leased by EJA itself, so that it can make sure that service is
first-class even during the times when demand is heaviest). Safety, of
course, is the paramount issue in any flight operation, and Rich's pilots
-- now numbering about 650 -- receive extensive training at least twice
a year from FlightSafety International, another Berkshire subsidiary and
the world leader in pilot training. The bottom line on our pilots: I've sold
the Berkshire plane and will now do all of my business flying, as well as
my personal flying, with NetJets' crews.
EJA目前已是这个产业规模最大的业者，拥有超过1,000位的客户以及163架
的飞机，(其中包含23架由EJA本身拥有或出租的核心飞机，用来确保在订位
需求最强劲时还能保持最高品质的服务)，安全性当然是任何飞行单位最重要的
考量，而Rich旗下650位的飞行驾驶每年都要到国际飞安公司(另一家由我们
转投资全世界最大的飞行员训练公司)接受至少两次广泛的训练课程，对我来说
我能做的都做了，我已经把Berkshire原来的专机给卖掉，并把我的事业与家庭
连同Netjets的同僚一起飞上天际。
Being the leader in this industry is a major advantage for al
concerned. Our customers gain because we have an armada of planes
positioned throughout the country at all times, a blanketing that allows
us to provide unmatched service. Meanwhile, we gain from the
blanketing because it reduces dead-head costs. Another compelling
attraction for our clients is that we offer products from Boeing,
Gulfstream, Falcon, Cessna, and Raytheon, whereas our two
competitors are owned by manufacturers that offer only their own
planes. In effect, NetJets is like a physician who can recommend
whatever medicine best fits the needs of each patient; our competitors,
in contrast, are producers of a "house" brand that they must prescribe
for one and all.
在这个产业成为领导品牌是最重要的一件事，我们的客户因为我们遍布全美各地
的机队而受惠，因为我们可以提供别家公司比不上的服务，所以我们也可大幅降
低飞机停在地面的时间，另一个令客户无法抵挡的致命吸引力是我们提供了各式
各样的飞机，从波音、湾流、Falcon、Cessna到雷神，相较之下我们其它两个
由飞机制造商经营的竞争对手就只能提供自家生产的飞机，事实上，Netjets就
好象是一位医生一样，可以为个别的病人量身订做，依其所需提供不同的配方，
不像另外两家业者，都是千篇一律的开出家传的狗皮膏药。
In many cases our clients, both corporate and individual, ow
fractions of several different planes and can therefore match specific
planes to specific missions. For example, a client might own 1/16th of
three different jets (each giving it 50 hours of flying time), which in total
give it a virtual fleet, obtained for a small fraction of the cost of a single
plane.
实际上我们有许多客户，包含企业与一般个人，同时拥有不同种类的飞机部份所
有权，以应付不同场合所需不同的机型，举列来说，一个客户可以拥有三种飞机
各16分之一的所有权(也就是每年各50小时的飞行时数)，这等于只要花一笔
为数不多的钱，就拥有一群机队一般。
Significantly, it is not only small businesses that can benefit fro
fractional ownership. Already, some of America's largest companies use
NetJets as a supplement to their own fleet. This saves them big money in
both meeting peak requirements and in flying missions that would
require their wholly-owned planes to log a disproportionate amount of
dead-head hours.
更重要的是，并不是中小企业才可以利用到这种服务，目前已经有一些大企业利
用Netjets来补充本身机队调度的不足，这让他们可以不必因为应付尖峰时间与
避免必须长期间停留地面的任务而省下一大笔开支。
When a plane is slated for personal use, the clinching argumen
is that either the client signs up now or his children likely will later.
That's an equation I explained to my wonderful Aunt Alice 40 years ago
when she asked me whether she could afford a fur coat. My reply settled
the issue: "Alice, you aren't buying it; your heirs are."
当一架飞机被用来当作私人使用，有一个很大的争议那就是不是由现在的客户买
单，就是由后辈的子孙来买单，这也是我最敬爱的阿姨Alice在40年前，问我
是否应该买一件貂皮大衣时，我回答她的话:"阿姨，你花的不是自己的钱，而是
你的继承人的"。
EJA's growth has been explosive: In 1997, it accounted for 31% o
all corporate jets ordered in the world. Nonetheless, Rich and I believe
that the potential of fractional ownership has barely been scratched. If
many thousands of owners find it sensible to own 100% of a plane --
which must be used 350-400 hours annually if it's to make economic
sense -- there must be a large multiple of that number for whom
fractional ownership works.
EJA正以爆炸性的速度成长，1997年31%以上的企业专机订单是由它所下，不
过Rice与我都认为飞机部份所有权的潜力根本还未充分的被挖掘，如果目前有
成千上万的人认为值得花一整架飞机的钱(也就是每年花350-400个小时飞
行)，那么我们认为就应该有更多人需要拥有部份飞机的所有权。
In addition to being a terrific executive, Rich is fun. Like most o
our managers, he has no economic need whatsoever to work. Rich
spends his time at EJA because it's his baby -- and he wants to see how
far he can take it. We both already know the answer, both literally and
figuratively: to the ends of the earth.
Rich除了身为一位杰出的经理人之外，本人也非常风趣幽默，就像是我们旗下
大多数的经理人一样，Rich根本就不需要靠工作来过活，Rich之所以愿意全心
全力地投入在EJA，完全因为这是他一手催生带大的孩子，他只想要看自己能够
做到怎样的地步，当然我们都已经知道最后的答案，不论是从文字上或是从数字
上皆是如此。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
And now a small hint to Berkshire directors: Last year I spen
more than nine times my salary at Borsheim's and EJA. Just think how
Berkshire's business would boom if you'd only spring for a raise.
另外给Berkshire董事会们一个小暗示，去年我光是在波仙珠宝与EJA的花费就
是我个人薪水收入的九倍以上，所以大家可以想象到只有给我一点小小的加薪，
保证会对Berkshire集团企业的生意有大大的提升。
General Re
通用再保
On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition o
General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance
Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company
also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the
oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two
companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124
countries.
12月21号我们完成对通用再保公司220亿美金的购并案，除了拥有这家全美
国最大的产物险再保险公司之外，这家公司亦拥有世界上历史最悠久的再保公司
-科隆再保82%的股权(包含预计准备要买进的股份)，两家公司合起来将可接受
所有保险险种的再保险，并在全世界124个国家设有营业据点。
For many decades, General Re's name has stood for quality
integrity and professionalism in reinsurance -- and under Ron
Ferguson's leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more.
Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re's and
Cologne Re's managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can
teach us.
几十年来，通用再保代表的是再保业界品质、正直与专业的保证，而在Ron
Ferguson的领导之下，这个招牌更加获得肯定，关于通用再保的专业，
Berkshire实在没有太多的东西可以给他们，反倒是他们应该有很多的东西可以
教我们。
Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire's ownership will benefi
General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now
will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the
merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re's
management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow
the company to exploit its strengths.
不过我们仍然相信Berkshire的所有权可以让通用再保在许多方面受益，而在往
后的十年内，通用再保的获利情况应该可以比合并之前要好的许多，而我们的自
信心完全建立在我们能够提供通用再保一个可以完全自由发挥的经营环境。
Let's look for a moment at the reinsurance business t
understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under
Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary
insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result
from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for
absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.
让我们花一点时间来了解为何通用再保自己在再保险业没有办法像在
Berkshire之下那样的发挥，再保险的需求大部分来自于第一线保险公司想要规
避大型的意外损失所造成获利状况大幅波动的风险，事实上，再保险业者就是因
为吸收保险业客户想要规避的变动性而存在。
Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by bot
its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its
own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e
ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an
expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality
sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying
off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are
called "retrocessions") or rejecting good business simply because it
threatens to bring on too much volatility.
讽刺的是一家上市的再保险公司必须要同时接受股东以及外界评估其获利稳定
的检验，因此盈余变动过大将会影响其债信评等与本益比，就算就长期而言，这
家公司或许可以获得更有利的平均报酬，市场的现实有时却可能导致再保公司因
此犯下重大的错误，包含被迫放弃原先接下的一大部分业务(业界一般称之为倒
退)或放弃上门的好生意，只因为要避免带来获利的不稳定性。
Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as i
carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time.
Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile
earnings can't impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the
perfect structure for writing -- and retaining -- reinsurance in virtually
any amount. In fact, we've used this strength over the past decade to
build a powerful super-cat business.
不过Berkshire却很能够接受这样的不确定性，只要就长期而言，它的预期报酬
能够有好的表现，更重要的是，Berkshire可以说是资金的诺克斯金库，也就是
说任何盈余的剧烈变动一点也不会影响到我们的债信评等，也因此我们有能力也
有意愿签下并自留没有任何上限的再保金额，事实上，过去十年来，我们早已运
