这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .26
Additional information about our various businesses is given o
pages 39-53, where you will also find our segment earnings reported
on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 65-71, we have rearranged
Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a
presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the
company.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，另外你还
可以找到经过重编，依照Berkshire四大部门编排的信息，这是查理跟我认为最
能够完整呈现Berkshire现况的模式。
Normally, we follow this section with one on "Look-Through
Earnings. Because the General Re acquisition occurred near yearend,
though, neither a historical nor a pro-forma calculation of a 1998
number seems relevant. We will resume the look-through calculation in
next year's report.
通常接下来这一段应该是报告完整透视盈余，但是由于通用再保的购并案发生的
时点接近年底，所以不管是历史性或拟制性的1998年的获利数字都已无关紧
要，在明年的报告中，我们会再恢复完整透视盈余的计算式。
Investments
投资
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with
market value of more than $750 million are itemized.
下表是Berkshire市价超过七亿五千万美元以上的股票投资。
12/31/98
Shares Company Cost* Market
(dollars in millions)
50,536,900 American Express Company .. . . . . $1,470 $ 5,180
200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company . . . . . . .. . 1,299 13,400
51,202,242 The Walt Disney Company . . . . . . 281 1,536
60,298,000 Freddie Mac .. 308 3,885
96,000,000 The Gillette Company . . . . . . . . 600 4,590
1,727,765 The Washington Post Company . . . . . . 11 999
63,595,180 Wells Fargo & Company . . . .. . . . 392 2,540
Others . . . . . . .. . . . 2,683 5,135
Total Common Stocks . . . . . . . . $ 7,044 $ 37,265
===== =====
Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.5 billion less than GAAP cost.
*系以税务为基础的成本，比一般公认会计原则的帐面成本少15亿美元。
During the year, we slightly increased our holdings in America
Express, one of our three largest commitments, and left the other two
unchanged. However, we trimmed or substantially cut many of our
smaller positions. Here, I need to make a confession (ugh): The portfolio
actions I took in 1998 actually decreased our gain for the year. In
particular, my decision to sell McDonald's was a very big mistake.
Overall, you would have been better off last year if I had regularly snuck
off to the movies during market hours.
今年我们稍微提高了在美国运通的持股，至于其余另外两项重大的股票投资则维
持不变，不过在此同时我们也大幅出脱其余一些较小的投资部位，在这里我也必
须承认，嗯! 我在1998年做的一些举动事实上导致我们的利得不增反减，尤其
是决定卖出麦当劳使得我们损失惨重，也就是说如果去年我在股票交易时间一动
也不动的话，大家可能会更好过一点。
At yearend, we held more than $15 billion in cash equivalent
(including high-grade securities due in less than one year). Cash never
makes us happy. But it's better to have the money burning a hole in
Berkshire's pocket than resting comfortably in someone else's. Charlie
and I will continue our search for large equity investments or, better yet,
a really major business acquisition that would absorb our liquid assets.
Currently, however, we see nothing on the horizon.
到年底，我们手上持有超过150亿美元的约当现金(包含一年内到期的优质债
券)，抱着这么多现金让我们感到相当不自在，但是我们宁愿让这150亿美元放
在我们的手里发痒，也不要让他们轻轻松松落入他人的口袋里，当然查理跟我还
是会继续去寻找合适的大型股票投资，当然要是能来一个真正的企业购并案会更
好，以消化我们手上过剩的流动资金，不过到目前为止，我们还没有发现任何潜
在的目标。
Once we knew that the General Re merger would definitely ke
place, we asked the company to dispose of the equities that it held. (As
mentioned earlier, we do not manage the Cologne Re portfolio, which
includes many equities.) General Re subsequently eliminated its
positions in about 250 common stocks, incurring $935 million of taxes
in the process. This "clean sweep" approach reflects a basic principle
that Charlie and I employ in business and investing: We don't back into
decisions.
当整个合并案正式敲定之后，我们立刻要求公司处分掉手头上所有的股票投资
(就像之前提到过的，这不包含科隆再保手上持有的各类有价证券)，而通用再保
也立刻将手上超过250种以上的股票出脱，为此还缴了9.35亿美元的税，这个
清仓的动作充分反应查理跟我在经营与投资上的基本原则，我们不替过去决策背
书。
Last year I deviated from my standard practice of not disclosin
our investments (other than those we are legally required to report) and
told you about three unconventional investments we had made. There
were several reasons behind that disclosure. First, questions about our
silver position that we had received from regulatory authorities led us to
believe that they wished us to publicly acknowledge this investment.
Second, our holdings of zero-coupon bonds were so large that we
wanted our owners to know of this investment's potential impact on
Berkshire's net worth. Third, we simply wanted to alert you to the fact
that we sometimes do make unconventional commitments.
去年我打破从来不主动公开投资组合的惯例(除非法令有特别要求)，告诉大家我
们最近参与的三项不同于以往的投资，之所以会这样做主要有几个原因，第一关
于投资银币，主管机关提出的一些问题，让我们感觉他们希望我们能够公开承认
这项投资的存在，第二由于零息债券的投资部位大到让我们觉得还是让我们的股
东知道这项投资对公司净值的影响性会比较好，第三我们只是要让大家知道，三
不五时我们还是会做出一些与以往大不相同的投资动作。
Normally, however, as discussed in the Owner's Manual on pag
61, we see no advantage in talking about specific investment actions.
Therefore -- unless we again take a position that is particularly large -
- we will not post you as to what we are doing in respect to any specific
holding of an unconventional sort. We can report, however, that we have
eliminated certain of the positions discussed last year and added certain
others.
不过就像是我们在股东手册一再提到的，我们不认为主动揭露特定的投资动作会
给公司带来任何的好处，也因此除非我们再度在某些特别的项目有非常大笔投
资，我们将不会再向各位报告我们在某些非传统投资的有关事项，当然我们还是
会定期向大家报告去年我们出脱的某些部位或是新增了某些投资部位。
Our never-comment-even-if-untrue policy in regard t
investments may disappoint "piggybackers" but will benefit owners:
Your Berkshire shares would be worth less if we discussed what we are
doing. Incidentally, we should warn you that media speculation about
our investment moves continues in most cases to be incorrect. People
who rely on such commentary do so at their own peril.
我们这种对投资"就算不对也不评论"的做法，虽然让一些有意搭顺风车的人无法
得逞，但却也能达到保护股东权益的目的，因为如果我们不断地公开讨论所有的
投资细节，将会严重损及各位所持有的Berkshire股份的价值，同时我也要提醒
大家通常媒体报导有关我们的投资动向往往都是错误的，相信他们话的人可能会
自食恶果。
Accounting -- Part 1
会计问题-第一部份
Our General Re acquisition put a spotlight on an egregious fw
in accounting procedure. Sharp-eyed shareholders reading our proxy
statement probably noticed an unusual item on page 60. In the proforma
statement of income -- which detailed how the combined 1997
earnings of the two entities would have been affected by the merger --
there was an item stating that compensation expense would have been
increased by $63 million.
我们与通用再保之间的购并案反映出会计原则一直以来存在的一个重大瑕疵，眼
尖的股东在阅读合并相关的股东会文件时，应该都会发现其中有一项不寻常的项
目，在拟制性的损益表中，清楚仿真出如果两者1997年的盈余如果在合并后会
是怎么的结果，其中有一项薪资酬劳费用因为合并而增加了6,300万美元。
This item, we hasten to add, does not signal that either Charlie o
I have experienced a major personality change. (He still travels coach
and quotes Ben Franklin.) Nor does it indicate any shortcoming in
General Re's accounting practices, which have followed GAAP to the
letter. Instead, the pro-forma adjustment came about because we are
replacing General Re's longstanding stock option plan with a cash plan
that ties the incentive compensation of General Re managers to their
operating achievements. Formerly what counted for these managers
was General Re's stock price; now their payoff will come from the
business performance they deliver.
这个项目我必须特别强调的是并不代表查理跟我的个性有任何重大的改变(他还
是一样搭乘长途巴士出差，并以富兰克林的名字订位)，同时也不表示通用再保
本身的会计政策有何疏失之处，该公司业已完全依照一般公认会计原则运作，实
际的情形是我们特别要求通用再保将原先发给员工的认股权全部以等值的现金
奖励取代，在此之前与这些经理人本身权益息息相关的是公司的股价，在此之
后，他们可以领到的报酬完全要看他们各自负责单位的绩效表现。
The new plan and the terminated option arrangement hav
matching economics, which means that the rewards they deliver to
employees should, for a given level of performance, be the same. But
what these people could have formerly anticipated earning from new
option grants will now be paid in cash. (Options granted in past years
remain outstanding.)
新的计画与先前的认股权计画对公司员工来说具有相同的效益，也就是说在相同
的表现之下，公司给予员工同样的报酬奖励，只不过原先大家预期可以获得的股
票将会改以现金取代，(至于先前已经发放的选择权则继续保持流通在外)。
Though the two plans are an economic wash, the cash plan w
are putting in will produce a vastly different accounting result. This
Alice-in-Wonderland outcome occurs because existing accounting
principles ignore the cost of stock options when earnings are being
calculated, even though options are a huge and increasing expense at a
great many corporations. In effect, accounting principles offer
management a choice: Pay employees in one form and count the cost, or
pay them in another form and ignore the cost. Small wonder then that
the use of options has mushroomed. This lop-sided choice has a big
downside for owners, however: Though options, if properly structured,
can be an appropriate, and even ideal, way to compensate and motivate
top managers, they are more often wildly capricious in their distribution
of rewards, inefficient as motivators, and inordinately expensive for
shareholders.
虽然两项计画在经济实质上相当，但我们改采的现金奖励计画在会计帐面上却相
当不利，这种爱莉丝梦游仙境的结果主要起源于会计原则在计算公司获利时，根
本上忽略认股权的成本，虽然在许多大企业员工认股权早已成为公司庞大的成本
负担，事实上，会计原则给予公司经理人一个相当弹性的空间，若你以这种形式
给予员工报酬，就必须计入成本，但若你以另一种形式给予员工报酬，就不必计
入成本，也难怪员工认股权已经到了过度泛滥的地步，一面倒地采用这种方式使
得公司的股东权益大大受损，虽然我承认选择权若能够好好的规划，有时候是可
以成为一种补偿同时激励高阶经理人的好方法，只是大部分的时候，他们通常过
于慷慨，严重损及原有股东的利益，并不适合作为一项好的激励工具。
Whatever the merits of options may be, their accountin
treatment is outrageous. Think for a moment of that $190 million we
are going to spend for advertising at GEICO this year. Suppose that
instead of paying cash for our ads, we paid the media in ten-year, atthe-
market Berkshire options. Would anyone then care to argue that
Berkshire had not borne a cost for advertising, or should not be charged
this cost on its books?
不过不管选择权到底有怎样的优点，有关它们的会计处理原则实在是太离谱，试
想今年我们预计投入1.9亿美元在GEICO汽车保险的广告之上，假若我们不支
付现金而改以同等价值的Berkshire股票选择权作为给予厂商的对价，那么有没
有人会跳出来说Berkshire的广告怎么就可以不花一毛钱，难道它不应该反应在
公司的会计帐簿之上吗?
Perhaps Bishop Berkeley -- you may remember him as th
philosopher who mused about trees falling in a forest when no one was
around -- would believe that an expense unseen by an accountant does
not exist. Charlie and I, however, have trouble being philosophical
about unrecorded costs. When we consider investing in an optionissuing
company, we make an appropriate downward adjustment to
reported earnings, simply subtracting an amount equal to what the
company could have realized by publicly selling options of like quantity
and structure. Similarly, if we contemplate an acquisition, we include in
our evaluation the cost of replacing any option plan. Then, if we make a
deal, we promptly take that cost out of hiding.
或许Berkeley主教，(大家或许还记得他曾经提到一棵倒在无人迹深山中的大树
的笑话)，会真的相信会计师没有发现的成本就代表它不存在，不过要查理跟我
接受这样的概念实在是有点困难，当我们考虑要投资一家有发行选择权的公司，
我们会先将这家公司的获利能力向下修正，直接扣除若对外公开发行这些选择权
所能得到的对价，同样的，要是我们准备要购并一家公司时，我们也会将更换原
有选择权的成本列入考量，然后等到合并案正式通过后，我们会立即将相关成本
反应在会计帐上。
Readers who disagree with me about options will by this time b
mentally quarreling with my equating the cost of options issued to
employees with those that might theoretically be sold and traded
publicly. It is true, to state one of these arguments, that employee
options are sometimes forfeited -- that lessens the damage done to
shareholders -- whereas publicly-offered options would not be. It is
true, also, that companies receive a tax deduction when employee
options are exercised; publicly-traded options deliver no such benefit.
But there's an offset to these points: Options issued to employees are
often repriced, a transformation that makes them much more costly
than the public variety.
不同意我对选择权看法的读者这时可能会抗议我将发给员工认股权的成本跟对
外公开发行的股票选择权划上等号，没有错，在这些争辩中，员工的认股权有时
会被没收，使得股东权益受损的程度有可能会减小，公开发行的选择权就没有这
项优点，而员工在行使认股权时，公司也可因而获得抵税权，公开发行的选择权
也没有这项好处，但是在另外一方面，员工选择权的转换价格常常会做修正，比
起公开发行的选择权来说，所付出的代价更为高昂。
It's sometimes argued that a non-transferable option given to a
employee is less valuable to him than would be a publicly-traded option
that he could freely sell. That fact, however, does not reduce the cost of
the non-transferable option Giving an employee a company car that can
only be used for certain purposes diminishes its value to the employee,
but does not in the least diminish its cost to the employer.
也有人认为限制移转的员工认股权其价值对于员工来说，比没有可以公开交易的
选择权来得低，但这种讲法并没有办法淡化公司发行认股权给员工所需付出的代
价，就像是公司配给员工的配车，虽然限制员工只能作为公务使用，但是这并不
代表公司就可以不必花钱买车。
The earning revisions that Charlie and I have made for options i
recent years have frequently cut the reported per-share figures by 5%,
with 10% not all that uncommon. On occasion, the downward
adjustment has been so great that it has affected our portfolio
decisions, causing us either to make a sale or to pass on a stock
purchase we might otherwise have made.
而查理跟我在对这类选择权所作的盈余修正通常会在5%以上，而就算是10%以
上的幅度也不会令人感到意外，有时调整的幅度甚至大到影响我们的投资决策，
有时更因此被迫要将持股卖出或是放弃买进原先看上的投资标的。
A few years ago we asked three questions in these pages t
which we have not yet received an answer: "If options aren't a form of
compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is
it? And, if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where
in the world should they go?"
几年前，我们就曾提出至今还没有得到解答的三个问题，"如果选择权不算是一
种报酬的话，那它又算是什么? 而如果给予员工的报酬不算是一种费用的话? 那
它又算是什么? 而如果费用不必列入损益表计算盈余的话，那么又应该把它们摆
到哪里去呢 "
Accounting -- Part 2
会计问题-第二部份
The role that managements have played in stock-option
accounting has hardly been benign: A distressing number of both CEOs
and auditors have in recent years bitterly fought FASB's attempts to
replace option fiction with truth and virtually none have spoken out in
support of FASB. Its opponents even enlisted Congress in the fight,
pushing the case that inflated figures were in the national interest.
管理阶层在员工认股选择权会计问题上所扮演的角色绝对不能马虎，最近有一群
公司主管与会计师极力反对美国财务会计准则委员会打算将原先不实的选择权
予以更正，但结果却没有人公开表示支持，反对者甚至动员国会议员参与游说，
