这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表 .27
将这种虚增盈余的议题提升到国家利益的层次。
Still, I believe that the behavior of managements has been eve
worse when it comes to restructurings and merger accounting. Here,
many managements purposefully work at manipulating numbers and
deceiving investors. And, as Michael Kinsley has said about Washington:
"The scandal isn't in what's done that's illegal but rather in what's legal."
此外，我认为有些管理当局在公司再造与合并的会计处理上的心态更为可议，很
多管理当局刻意操纵损益，欺骗投资人，而就像Michael Kinsley曾经批评华府
的"真正的丑闻不是那些违反法律的，而是那些完全合法的行为"。
It was once relatively easy to tell the good guys in accountin
from the bad: The late 1960's, for example, brought on an orgy of what
one charlatan dubbed "bold, imaginative accounting" (the practice of
which, incidentally, made him loved for a time by Wall Street because he
never missed expectations). But most investors of that period knew who
was playing games. And, to their credit, virtually all of America's mostadmired
companies then shunned deception.
在以前透过财务报表，很容易可以分辨一家公司的好坏，但时至1960年代后
期，却掀起一波骗徒称之为"大胆且富想象力的会计"的热潮，(这种做法在当时受
到华尔街人士的热烈欢迎，因为他们从来都不会让人失望)，不过在当时大家都
知道谁是老千，至于一般受到崇敬的美国大公司基本上都洁身自好，相当爱惜自
己的羽毛。
In recent years, probity has eroded. Many major corporations stil
play things straight, but a significant and growing number of otherwise
high-grade managers -- CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses
for your children or as trustees under your will -- have come to the view
that it's okay to manipulate earnings to satisfy what they believe are Wall
Street's desires. Indeed, many CEOs think this kind of manipulation is
not only okay, but actually their duty.
只是近年来，道德逐渐沦丧，虽然许多大企业还是开大门走大路，不过却有越来
越多所谓高格调的经理人，(就是那种你想要把女儿许配给他或请他担任遗嘱执
行人的人)，渐渐认为玩弄数字以符合华尔街预期的做法没有什么大不了的，没
错，有许多经理人不但觉得这类操纵数字的行为很正常，甚至是他们的工作责任
之一。
These managers start with the assumption, all too common, tha
their job at all times is to encourage the highest stock price possible (a
premise with which we adamantly disagree). To pump the price, they
strive, admirably, for operational excellence. But when operations don't
produce the result hoped for, these CEOs resort to unadmirable
accounting stratagems. These either manufacture the desired
"earnings" or set the stage for them in the future.
这些经理人一开始往往就认定他们的主要工作之一是让公司的股价越高越好，
(关于这点我们实在不敢苟同)，而为了撑高股价，他们可以说是无所不用其极地
在公司营运上冲刺，只是当公司营运结果不若预期时，他们自然而然地会想到运
用不当的会计手法，不是"制造"出想要的盈余数字，就是预埋伏笔，在未来的盈
余做手脚。
Rationalizing this behavior, these managers often say that thei
shareholders will be hurt if their currency for doing deals -- that is, their
stock -- is not fully-priced, and they also argue that in using accounting
shenanigans to get the figures they want, they are only doing what
everybody else does. Once such an everybody's-doing-it attitude takes
hold, ethical misgivings vanish. Call this behavior Son of Gresham: Bad
accounting drives out good.
而为了让这样的行为合理化，这些经理人常常表示如果公司股票的价格不能合理
反应其价值，则公司股东的权益将会受损，同时他们也声称运用会计骗术以得到
想要的数字的做法很普遍，而一旦这种"别人都这样，为何我不行"的想法生根
后，道德方面的顾虑早已消失殆尽，Gresham之子称这样的行为叫做:邪恶的会
计创造出伪装的善良。
The distortiodu jour is the "restructuring charge," an
accounting entry that can, of course, be legitimate but that too often is a
device for manipulating earnings. In this bit of legerdemain, a large
chunk of costs that should properly be attributed to a number of years
is dumped into a single quarter, typically one already fated to
disappoint investors. In some cases, the purpose of the charge is to
clean up earnings misrepresentations of the past, and in others it is to
prepare the ground for future misrepresentations. In either case, the
size and timing of these charges is dictated by the cynical proposition
that Wall Street will not mind if earnings fall short by $5 per share in a
given quarter, just as long as this deficiency ensures that quarterly
earnings in the future will consistently exceed expectations by five
cents per share.
有一种会计科目叫做"重整损失"，在法理上虽然属于合法但却通常被当作操纵损
益的工具，通常公司会将多年来累积的开支在单一个季节一次提列损失，这是一
种典型让投资人大失所望的骗术，有时候，公司则是为了将过去塑造不实在的盈
余所累积的垃圾一次出清或是为虚增未来年度的盈余预先做铺路，不管怎样，这
些做法的主要前提都是抓住华尔街只关心未来年度的盈余高于预期五分钱，却一
点也不在乎公司当季的盈余少了五块钱的心理。
This dump-everything-into-one-quarter behior suggests a
corresponding "bold, imaginative" approach to -- golf scores. In his
first round of the season, a golfer should ignore his actual performance
and simply fill his card with atrocious numbers -- double, triple,
quadruple bogeys -- and then turn in a score of, say, 140. Having
established this "reserve," he should go to the golf shop and tell his pro
that he wishes to "restructure" his imperfect swing. Next, as he takes his
new swing onto the course, he should count his good holes, but not the
bad ones. These remnants from his old swing should be charged
instead to the reserve established earlier. At the end of five rounds,
then, his record will be 140, 80, 80, 80, 80 rather than 91, 94, 89, 94,
92. On Wall Street, they will ignore the 140 -- which, after all, came
from a "discontinued" swing -- and will classify our hero as an 80
shooter (and one who never disappoints).
这种将所有的垃圾在当季一次出清的做法跟高尔夫球场上一种大胆偷机的方法
类似，在球季一开始，取巧的高尔夫球员不管本身实际的实力，先在计分卡上填
上最离谱的成绩-柏忌、双柏忌、三柏忌，结果一算下来可能有140杆之多，接
着他再跑到高尔夫球店给教练表示他想要调整一下不理想的挥杆，然后等到他再
度回到球场上时，他就专挑好的洞的成绩，而不好的部份则全部归到先前所预留
的准备，结果五回合下来，他的成绩就变成140杆、80杆、80杆、80杆、80
杆，而不是本来的91杆、94杆、89杆、94杆、92杆，不过对华尔街的哪些
人来说，他们根本就不管最前面的140杆，因为那不是正常情况下的表现，然
后直接把这位选手归类为平均80杆的高手(而且成绩还相当稳定)。
For those who prefer to cheat up front, there would be a varian
of this strategy. The golfer, playing alone with a cooperative caddyauditor,
should defer the recording of bad holes, take four 80s, accept
the plaudits he gets for such athleticism and consistency, and then turn
in a fifth card carrying a 140 score. After rectifying his earlier
scorekeeping sins with this "big bath," he may mumble a few apologies
but will refrain from returning the sums he has previously collected
from comparing scorecards in the clubhouse. (The caddy, need we add,
will have acquired a loyal patron.)
而对于这种喜欢偷鸡摸狗的球员来说，有几个变量是他们要注意的，首先球员要
找到能够配合的杆弟-也就是会计师，好让他可以将不好的洞数往后递延，顺利
地先拿下四局80杆，使得这位球员可以得到表现杰出且稳定的运动家称号后，
然后再偷偷地把第五局的140杆球卡交出，结果只见到他随便应付几句抱歉的
话语便间接承认先前计算成绩时候的罪行，而且他还会不断地拿着自己的成绩跟
其它好手相比，(而这位杆弟，不用我们说，当然是深得其老板的心，不怕下次
得不到主人的惠顾)。
Unfortunately, CE who use variations of these scoring schemes
in real life tend to become addicted to the games they're playing -- after
all, it's easier to fiddle with the scorecard than to spend hours on the
practice tee -- and never muster the will to give them up. Their behavior
brings to mind Voltaire's comment on sexual experimentation: "Once a
philosopher, twice a pervert."
不幸的是，这些惯用作弊技俩的总裁在回到现实世界后，还是习惯玩这种把戏，
毕竟与其花费时间在辛苦练习上，还不如轻轻松松在计分卡上动手脚，要说服他
们放弃不玩可能比登天还难，他们这种行为不禁让我想到法国文豪伏尔泰
Voltaire对于性实验的评论：「一回生，二回熟。」(编按伏尔泰头一次到妓院
去体验那里的情境，事后有人问他感觉如何，他回答说，第一次去还算是哲学家，
但要是再去的话，可能便会成为堕落者)。
In the acquisition arena, restructuring habeen raised to an art
form: Managements now frequently use mergers to dishonestly
rearrange the value of assets and liabilities in ways that will allow them
to both smooth and swell future earnings. Indeed, at deal time, major
auditing firms sometimes point out the possibilities for a little
accounting magic (or for a lot). Getting this push from the pulpit, firstclass
people will frequently stoop to third-class tactics. CEOs
understandably do not find it easy to reject auditor-blessed strategies
that lead to increased future "earnings."
在购并的世界里，组织重整早已被提升至艺术的层次，经理人现在越来越习惯透
过合并来操控公司资产与负债的价值，以使得公司未来的盈余能够平稳地虚增，
事实上，在交易的时候，大型的会计师事务所偶尔也会建议公司来点小小会计戏
法(当然有时也可能会搞的很大)，而在得到领路者的引诱，一流的人格往往会屈
服于三流的伎俩，CEO实在是很难拒绝会计师所提出让公司未来盈余好看一点
的美意。
An example from e property-casualty insurance industry will
illuminate the possibilities. When a p-c company is acquired, the buyer
sometimes simultaneously increases its loss reserves, often
substantially. This boost may merely reflect the previous inadequacy of
reserves -- though it is uncanny how often an actuarial "revelation" of
this kind coincides with the inking of a deal. In any case, the move sets
up the possibility of 'earnings" flowing into income at some later date,
as reserves are released.
产物意外险业有一个很好的例子可以作为说明，当一家公司取得另一家产险公司
时，买方通常会顺势大幅补提拨大量的损失准备，这项举动只会凸显以前损失准
备提拨不足的问题，虽然你会发现这种精算调整的时机与整个交易签字的时点是
如此令人惊异的吻合，更重要的是，这样的举动等于是为以后损失准备回冲，以
增加公司未来获利数字所预埋的伏笔。
Berkshire has kept entirely clear of these practices: If we are t
disappoint you, we would rather it be with our earnings than with our
accounting. In all of our acquisitions, we have left the loss reserve
figures exactly as we found them. After all, we have consistently joined
with insurance managers knowledgeable about their business and
honest in their financial reporting. When deals occur in which liabilities
are increased immediately and substantially, simple logic says that at
least one of those virtues must have been lacking -- or, alternatively,
that the acquirer is laying the groundwork for future infusions of
"earnings."
不过Berkshire从来都不会干这类的勾当，如果我们真要让你们失望，那么决定
会是真实的获利情况而不是会计手法，在我们所有的购并案当中，我们皆让损失
准备的数字保持在当初我们发觉时的水准，因为一直以来与我们共事的保险事业
经理人都很了解自己本业的状况，同时在财务报表的编制上也都坦诚布公，所以
要是在这些购并案进行的同时，还发生负债大幅增加的状况的话，那么就代表这
些美德其中之一出现了问题，或者说购并者为虚增未来盈余预留的后路。
Here's a true story that illustrates an all-too-common view i
corporate America. The CEOs of two large banks, one of them a man
who'd made many acquisitions, were involved not long ago in a friendly
merger discussion (which in the end didn't produce a deal). The veteran
acquirer was expounding on the merits of the possible combination,
only to be skeptically interrupted by the other CEO: "But won't that mean
a huge charge," he asked, "perhaps as much as $1 billion?" The
"sophisticate" wasted no words: "We'll make it bigger than that -- that's
why we're doing the deal."
这里有一件真实的故事充分说明美国企业普遍存在的一种观点，有两家大型银行
的CEO，其中有一位主导了很多购并案，在不久前参与了一项友善购并的讨论(虽
然后来并没有成功)，正当这位经验丰富的购并老手侃侃而谈合并后可能的种种
好处时，突然被另一位CEO的问题给打断：「那不是要耗费相当高的成本吗? 我
想可能不下十亿美元吧!」这位老练的银行家毫不迟疑的回答到：「这正是我们
要搞这个案子的原因，而且我们可以把它搞的更大。」
A preliminary tally by R. G. Associes, of Baltimore, of special
charges taken or announced during 1998 -- that is, charges for
restructuring, in-process R&D, merger-related items, and write-downs
-- identified no less than 1,369 of these, totaling $72.1 billion. That is a
staggering amount as evidenced by this bit of perspective: The 1997
earnings of the 500 companies in Fortune's famous list totaled $324
billion.
根据巴尔的摩R.G.协会初步的统计，光是1998年宣布或认列的特别开支，也
就是包含组织重整开支、R&D、购并费用以及相关科目打销等1,369种各项名
义，加总的金额就超过721亿美元，相较之下1997年财星500大企业的总获
利也不过是3,240亿美元而已。
Clearly the attitude of disrespect that many executives hav
today for accurate reporting is a business disgrace. And auditors, as we
have already suggested, have done little on the positive side. Though
auditors should regard the investing public as their client, they tend to
kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their
pay. ("Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.")
很显然的，现今许多经理人对于编制正确报表的藐视态度可说是商业界的一大耻
辱，而另一方面如我们先前所提到的，会计师却未能够导正这样的偏差，尽管理
论上会计师应该要把投资大众当作是他们的老板，但他们却宁可向那些有权决定
会计师人选的经理人弯腰磕头以求分一杯羹，(唉! 正所谓拿人手短)。
A big piece of news, however, is that the SEC, led by its chairman
Arthur Levitt, seems determined to get corporate America to clean up its
act. In a landmark speech last September, Levitt called for an end to
"earnings management." He correctly observed, "Too many corporate
managers, auditors and analysts are participants in a game of nods and
winks." And then he laid on a real indictment: "Managing may be giving
way to manipulating; integrity may be losing out to illusion."
不过告诉各位一个大消息，在现任主席Arthur Levitt的带领下，主管机关证管
会似乎有意要好好地整顿美国企业的种种不当行为，在去年九月的一次历史性演
说中，Levitt呼吁大家停止"盈余管理"，他一针见血地指出太多的企业经理人、
会计师与分析师参与这种大家心知肚明的戏局，接着他又开门见山地提出一项指
控，当经理人得到太多的机会来操纵盈余的同时，其人格也随着消失殆尽化成幻
影。
I urge you to read the Chairman's speech (you can fd it on the
Internet at www.sec.gov) and to support him in his efforts to get
corporate America to deliver a straight story to its owners. Levitt's job
will be Herculean, but it is hard to think of another more important for
him to take on.
我强烈建议大家读一读Levitt主席的演说内容(你可以在证管会的官方网站
www.sec.gov上找到)，同时共同声援他致力于导正美国企业向股东们提供真实
财务报告所作的努力，Levitt这项工作或许相当艰巨，但也很难再找到其它任何
比这个更重要的任务了。
Reports to Shareholders
给股东的报告
Berkshire's Internet site, www.berkshirehathaway.com, ha
become a prime source for information about the company. While we
continue to send an annual report to all shareholders, we now send
quarterlies only to those who request them, letting others read these at
our site. In this report, we again enclose a card that can be returned by
those wanting to get printed quarterlies in 1999.
Berkshire的官方网站www.berkshirehathaway.com成为取得本公司信息的
最重要来源，除非事先要求，否则我们每季的季报都只透过网站对外公布，当然
我们还是一如往来将每年的年报邮寄给股东们，里头也包含了申请寄发1999年
季报的申请表格。
Charlie and I have two simple goals in reporting: 1) We want t
give you the information that we would wish you to give us if our
positions were reversed; and 2) We want to make Berkshire's
information accessible to all of you simultaneously. Our ability to reach
that second goal is greatly helped by the Internet.
在编写报告时，查理跟我禀持两个简单的原则：1)我们希望能够提供各位所有换
个立场我们希望各位能够提供给我们的所有信息；2)我们希望这些信息能够在同
一个时间到达所有人的手上，而透过网络使得我们第二个目标得以更容易地达
成。
In another portion of his September speech, Arthur Levit
deplored what he called "selective disclosure." His remarks were timely:
