安然破产的另一个教训是，落实到位的保护措施无法规避危机的发生。安达信是全球最大的会计师事务所之一，但它并没有保护公众免受安然公司过于激进的财务和金融行为的影响，经验丰富的董事会也没有起到任何保护作用。
更重要的是，不要让典型的保护措施成为居心不良者的保护伞。安然案的辩护律师说，安然的所有行为都不应该被视为非法行为，因为它的所有行为都经过了精明的外聘律师、会计师和投资者的检查。而陪审团肯定从一开始就推翻了这种说辞，判决结果对那些试图获得保护伞而不是专心为客户创造价值的人发出了明确的警告。再回头看看塞缪尔·英萨尔的无罪释放，警告意味就更加明晰了。英萨尔被判无罪释放的前提条件是，该案涉及的会计处理方法简单得多，而且英萨尔的功过相抵。英萨尔的功劳是让所有人都用得起电，陪审团肯定非常看重他的这项功劳，因此没有追究他的控股公司账目不清这个错失。安然公司的多项罪名最终成立，正是因为它的行为没有让公众获得任何好处。
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