1．哲学家托马斯·内格尔（Thomas Nagel）请读者想象，作为蝙蝠是什么体验。
T. Nagel. 1974. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83.
2．意识不可还原于物质，但非还原论并没有产生持久影响。
“The stuff of the world is mind-stuff.” A. S. Eddington. 1928. The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 276.
“The old dualism of mind and matter . . . seems likely to disappear . . . through substantial matter resolving itself into a creation and manifestation of mind.” J. Jeans. 1930. The Mysterious Universe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 158.
“The only acceptable point of view appears to be the one that recognizes both sides of reality—the quantitative and the qualitative, the physical and the psychical—as compatible with each other, and can embrace them simultaneously.” W. Pauli, C. P. Enz, and K. v. Meyenn. [1955] 1994. Writings on Physics and Philosophy. New York: Springer-Verlag, p. 259.
“The conception of the objective reality of the elementary particles has thus evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new reality concept, but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer the behavior of the particle but rather our knowledge of this behavior.” W. Heisenberg. 1958. “The Representation of Nature in Contemporary Physics.” Daedalus 87(Summer): 100.
“We simply cannot see how material events can be transformed into sensation and thought, however many textbooks . . . go on talking nonsense on the subject.” E. Schrödinger. 1964. My View of the World, trans. C. Hastings. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 61–62.
3．比如，泡利很尊重卡尔·荣格，他效仿荣格，分析了至少1300个伟人的梦。
F. Dyson. 2002. “The Conscience of Physics.” Nature 420 (December 12): 607–8.
4．我在其他地方也反驳过这个观点。
S. Harris. 2004. The End of Faith: Religion, Terror; and the Future of Reason. New York: Norton, pp. 276–77)
5．“解释的鸿沟”
J. Levine. 1983. “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64.
6．“意识的硬难题”
D. J. Chalmers. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
7．目前为止，这样一个对身心关系问题的解释尚且难以想象，但它仍然是可能的。”
T. Nagel. 1998. “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophy 73[285]: pp. 337–52.
8．也有人认为意识可以被理解为物质世界的产物，却无法在概念上被还原为这些成因。
J. R. Searle. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992; J. R. Searle. 2007. “Dualism Revisited.” J Physiol Paris 101 (4–6); J. R. Searle. 1998. “How to Study Consciousness Scientifically.” Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 353 (1377).
9．还有一些人认为，非还原论的物质决定说本身就是自相矛盾的。
J. Kim. 1993. “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism.” In Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
10．也许人类根本就无法理解意识的涌现。
C. McGinn. 1989. “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” Mind 98; C. McGinn. 1999. The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books. 斯蒂芬·平克也与麦金所见略同：S. Pinker. 1997. How the Mind Works. New York: Norton, pp. 558–65。托马斯·内格尔也有类似观点，但他自认比麦金更乐观：Nagel, “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem”。
11．意识怎么就让那么多人相信意识可以轻易被解释为信息处理过程呢？
R. Llinas. 2001. I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; R. Llinas et al. 1998. “The Neuronal Basis for Consciousness.” Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 353[1377]; A. Damasio. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace; G. M. Edelman. 2006. Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; R. Penrose. 1994. Shadows of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press; J. W. Cooney and M. S. Gazzaniga. 2003. “Neurological Disorders and the Structure of Human Consciousness.” Trends Cogn Sci 7[4].
12．从他们的角度来看，意识就是一个“统一的神经过程”，诞生于“持续反复的在大脑不同区域内部和区域之间的高度平行的信号过程”。
Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi. 2002 . A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination. New York: Basic Books; G. Tononi and G. M. Edelman. 1998. “Consciousness and Complexity.” Science 282[5395].
13．“对意识做出科学解释正变得越来越可行。”
G. Tononi and G. M. Edelman. 1998. p. 1850.
14．无限期地繁衍自身。
Cited in C. Sagan. 1995. The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark. New York: Random House, p. 272 .
15．‘用这样或那样的方式行动’。”
Cited in A. Beckermann. 2000. “The Reductive Explainability of Phenomenal Consciousness.” In Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions, ed. T. Metzinger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 49
16．“如果精神事件就是物质事件，那么它就既不是物质的，也不是精神的了。同一性本就是一种对称关系。”
D. Davidson. 1987. “Knowing Ones Own Mind.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61.
17．可以说，我们把独立事件放在一个时间顺序中的能力，或是把事件分类的能力，是因果推论的产物。
M. R. Waldmann, Y. Hagmayer, and A. P. Blaisdell. 2006. “Beyond the Information Given: Causal Models in Learning and Reasoning.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 15 [6]; M. J. Buehner and P. W. Cheng. 2005. “Causal Learning.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, ed. K. J. Holyoak and R. G. Morrison. New York: Cambridge University Press.
18．到底为什么这些事件在头脑中能被体验到呢？
D. J. Chalmers. 1995. “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience.” Sci Am 273 [6]; Chalmers, The Conscious Mind; D. J. Chalmers. 1997. “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 4[1].
19．许多神经科学家相信，这个“绑定”现象可以被解释为不同神经元组块的同步激发。
W. Singer. 1999. “Neuronal Synchrony: A Versatile Code for the Definition of Relations?” Neuron 24(1).
20．这个研究和其他很多的神经科学发现一样，表明了意识的内容可以用其背后的神经生物学过程解释。
若对此有疑问，可查看M. N. Shadlen and J. A. Movshon. 1999. “Synchrony Unbound: A Critical Evaluation of the Temporal Binding Hypothesis.” Neuron 24(1)。
21．我们又回到了意识的谜团里。
普林茨也注意到绑定现象和意识是完全可分的，见J. Prinz. 2001. “Functionalism, Dualism and Consciousness.” In Philosophy and the Neurosciences, ed. W. Bechtel et al. Oxford: Blackwell。
22．克里斯托弗·科赫（Christof Koch）等人就视力做过很杰出的研究，他们想知道大脑中哪个部分负责给有意识的视觉编码。
A. Polonsky et al. 2000. “Neuronal Activity in Human Primary Visual Cortex Correlates with Perception During Binocular Rivalry.” Nat Neurosci 3(11); G. Rees, G. Kreiman, and C. Koch. 2002. “Neural Correlates of Consciousness in Humans.” Nat Rev Neurosci 3(4); F. Crick and C. Koch. 1998. “Consciousness and Neuroscience.” Cerebral Cortex 8; F. Crick and C. Koch. 1999. “The Unconscious Humunculus.” In The Neural Correlates of Consciousness, ed. T. Metzinger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; F. Crick and C. Koch. 2003. “A Framework for Consciousness.” Nat Neurosci 6 (2); J. D. Haynes. 2009. “Decoding Visual Consciousness from Human Brain Signals.” Trends Cogn Sci 13(5).
23．它代表着一个大型连接系统，比连接皮层和其他神经系统的纤维的总和还要大。
G. M. Bogen and J. E. Bogen. 1986. “On the Relationship of Cerebral Duality to Creativity.” Bull Clin Neurosci 51.
24．通过把胼胝体切断，防止局部突发的神经元异常活动传导到大脑的其他部分，进而引发癫痫。
J. E. Bogen, R. W. Sperry, and P. J. Vogel. 1969. “Addendum: Commissural Section and Propagation of Seizures.” In Basic Mechanisms of the Epilepsies, ed. Jasper et al. Boston: Little, Brown; E. Zaidel, M. Iacoboni, D. Zaidel, and J. E. Bogen. 2003. “The Callosal Syndromes.” In Clinical Neuropsychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press; E. Zaidel, D. W. Zaidel, and J. Bogen. Undated. “The Split Brain.”
25．20世纪60年代，分裂脑的概念因为罗杰·斯佩里（Roger Sperry）及其同事的工作受到全世界的关注。
M. S. Gazzaniga, J. E. Bogen, and R. W. Sperry. 1965. “Observations on Visual Perception after Disconnexion of the Cerebral Hemispheres in Man.” Brain 88 (2); R. W. Sperry. 1961. “Cerebral Organization and Behavior: The Split Brain Behaves in Many Respects Like Two Separate Brains, Providing New Research Possibilities.” Science 133(3466); R. W. Sperry. 1968. “Hemisphere Deconnection and Unity in Conscious Awareness.” Am Psychol 23(10); R. W. Sperry, E. Zaidel, and D. Zaidel. 1979. “Self Recognition and Social Awareness in the Deconnected Minor Hemisphere.” Neuropsychologia 17(2).
26．当患者从手术中恢复后，他们大都显得很正常，在神经测验中的表现也没问题。
R. Sperry. 1982. “Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres. Nobel Lecture, 8 December 1981.” Biosci Rep 2(5).
27．先是在猴子和猫身上测试
R. E. Myers and R. W. Sperry. 1958. “Interhemispheric Communication through the Corpus Callosum: Mnemonic Carry-over between the Hemispheres.” AMA Arch Neurol Psychiatry 80(3); Sperry, “Cerebral Organization and Behavior.”
28．后来在人身上测试
M. S. Gazzaniga, J. E. Bogen, and R. W. Sperry. 1962. “Some Functional Effects of Sectioning the Cerebral Commissures in Man.” Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 48.
29．哪怕在手术多年后，实验对象的左脑仍然会在右脑回应实验者的指示时，表现出吃惊或恼怒。
Zaidel et al., “The Callosal Syndromes”; Zaidel, Zaidel, and Bogen, “The Split Brain.”
30．很多科学家和哲学家相当抗拒这个结论
K. R. Popper and J. C. Eccles. [1977] 1993. The Self and Its Brain. London: Routledge.
31．正常运转的左脑又怎么会夺走右脑的主体性呢？
C. E. Marks. 1980. Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and the Unity of Mind. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books; J. E. Bogen. 1997. “Does Cognition in the Disconnected Right Hemisphere Require Right Hemisphere Possession of Language?” Brain Lang 57(1).
32．他的左脑回答“手艺人”，而右脑却用拼图板拼出了“赛车手”。
T. Nørretranders. 1998. The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size. New York: Viking.
33．分裂的大脑半球有时甚至会直接找对方谈话，用口头和书面语言表达自己的观点。
V. Mark. 1996. “Conflicting Communicative Behavior in a Split Brain Patient: Support for Dual Consciousness.” In Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates, ed. S. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak, and A. C. Scott. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
34．右脑在面部识别、凭直觉判断几何原理和空间关系、从部分中感知整体以及辨识和弦上，都更具优势。
Sperry, “Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres.”
35．右脑也更善于展示情绪（用左脸）和察觉他人的情绪。
J. J. Schmitt, W. Hartje, and K. Willmes. 1997. “Hemispheric Asymmetry in the Recognition of Emotional Attitude Conveyed by Facial Expression, Prosody and Propositional Speech.” Cortex 33(1).
36．绝大部分心理变态者的右脑在感知情绪方面有所欠缺，这或许是他们不善察觉他人悲痛情绪的一个原因。
J. Blair, D. R. Mitchell, and K. Blair. 2005. The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
37．但也有研究得到了不一致的证据。
A. J. Carson et al. 2000. “Depression after Stroke and Lesion Location: A Systematic Review.” Lancet 356(9224); D. W. Desmond et al. 2003. “Ischemic Stroke and Depression.” J Int Neuropsychol Soc 9(3).
38．以“趋近”“回避”这两个概念来解读这种情绪非对称性要更为贴切，因为愤怒这种典型的负面情绪也也和左脑活动有关。
E. Harmon-Jones, P. A. Gable, and C. K. Peterson. 2010. “The Role of Asymmetric Frontal Cortical Activity in Emotion-Related Phenomena: A Review and Update.” Biol Psychol 84 [3]: 451–62.
39．向两侧大脑半球展示不同的影片，可以发现右脑对影片的情绪内容反应更敏锐，尤其是对负面情绪内容。
W. Wittling and R. Roschmann. 1993. “Emotion-Related Hemisphere Asymmetry: Subjective Emotional Responses to Laterally Presented Films.” Cortex 29[3].
40．右脑能比左脑更快地识别出单个词汇，如“愚蠢”“美丽”的情绪内涵，而抑郁症患者的右脑对负面词汇的识别力尤为突出。
R. A. Atchley, S. S. Ilardi, and A. Enloe. 2003. “Hemispheric Asymmetry in the Processing of Emotional Content in Word Meanings: The Effect of Current and Past Depression.” Brain Lang 84 [1].
41．杏仁核是颞叶中对情绪最敏感的区域，灵长类动物的左右杏仁核之间没有直接连接，这说明情绪的偏侧现象具有解剖学基础。
R. W. Doty. 1998. “The Five Mysteries of the Mind, and Their Consequences.” Neuropsychologia 36 [10].
42．因为哪怕是被切掉整个大脑半球，你都不会失去意识。
Popper and Eccles, The Self and Its Brain.
43．在手术后，你可能会出现述情障碍，即无法描述自己的情绪感受，也可能会表现得缺乏礼貌。
Zaidel, Zaidel, and Bogen, “The Split Brain.”
44．胼胝体不能完全促成两个大脑半球之间的信息交换。
Myers and Sperry, “Interhemispheric Communication through the Corpus Callosum.”
45．2亿根神经纤维似乎不足以整合大脑皮层200亿个神经元的同时活动，况且这些神经元相互之间又有着成百上千甚至上万种联系。
Bogen, “On the Relationship of Cerebral Duality to Creativity.”
46． 它习惯了作为大脑中受轻视的那位，这种得不到感恩的合作已经成为一种日常。
R. Puccetti. 1981. “The Case for Mental Duality: Evidence from Split-Brain Data and Other Considerations.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4: 93–123.
47．那若隐若现的第一个音节好像在阵阵嘲弄着我们，却却没有变得更清晰。
W. James. 1950 [1890]. The Principles of Psychology (Vol. I). Dover Publications, p. 251.
48．这个实验可以让语言和图像进入潜意识，
L. Naccache and S. Dehaene. 2001. “Unconscious Semantic Priming Extends to Novel Unseen Stimuli.” Cognition 80(3). Though several studies indicate that the priming stimulus must at least be attended to: M. Finkbeiner and K. I. Forster. 2008. “Attention, Intention and Domain-Specific Processing.” Trends Cogn Sci 12(2).
49．潜意识承诺的回报驱动着大脑的奖赏中心，
M. Pessiglione et al. 2007. “How the Brain Translates Money into Force: A Neuroimaging Study of Subliminal Motivation.” Science 316(5826).
50．而带有可怕面具的脸孔和富有情绪的词语则会增加杏仁核的活跃度。
P. J. Whalen et al. 1998. “Masked Presentations of Emotional Facial Expressions Modulate Amygdala Activity without Explicit Knowledge.” J Neurosci 18(1); L. Naccache et al. 2005. “A Direct Intracranial Record of Emotions Evoked by Subliminal Words.” Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 102(21).
51．健忘症患者无法形成有意识的记忆，却仍然能够通过练习，提升他们在许多任务中的表现。
D. L. Schacter. 1987. “Implicit Expressions of Memory in Organic Amnesia: Learning of New Facts and Associations.” Hum Neurobiol 6 (2).
52．两者之间的模糊性主要是因为意识的内容必须在100～200微秒中被整合。
Crick and Koch, “A Framework for Consciousness.”
53．因此，意识有赖于所谓的“工作记忆”。
很多研究者都得出了这一结论：J. M. Fuster. 2003. Cortex and Mind: Unifying Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press; P. Thagard and B. Aubie. 2008. “Emotional Consciousness: A Neural Model of How Cognitive Appraisal and Somatic Perception Interact to Produce Qualitative Experience.” Conscious Cogn 17(3); B. J. Baars and S. Franklin. 2003. “How Conscious Experience and Working Memory Interact.” Trends Cogn Sci 7(4)。埃德尔曼关于意识是“记忆中的现在”的概念，更宽泛地体现了这一观点。见G. M. Edelman. 1989. The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books。
54．识别名字
L. R. Squire and R. McKee. 1992. “Influence of Prior Events on Cognitive Judgments in Amnesia.” J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 18(1).
55．生成概念
M. M. Keane et al. 1997. “Intact and Impaired Conceptual Memory Processes in Amnesia.” Neuropsychology 11(1).
56． 他们看得见，却根本不知道自己看得见。
L. Weiskrantz. 1996. “Blindsight Revisited.” Curr Opin Neurobiol 6 [2]; L. Weiskrantz. 2002. “Prime-Sight and Blindsight.” Conscious Cogn 11 [4]; L. Weiskrantz. 2008. “Is Blindsight Just Degraded Normal Vision?” Exp Brain Res 192[3].
57．我在《道德的图景》一书以及其他场合详述过，人类是否对其他生物负有伦理责任，取决于我们的行动对它们的有意识感受是否会产生或好或坏的影响。
S. Harris. 2004. The End of Faith, New York: Norton, pp. 173–75, 275–77; S. Harris. 2010. The Moral Landscape. New York: Free Press.
