[6] 这一推测通过美国与芬兰的数据做了检测（参见第10章）。
[7] Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell, and David Hémous,“Innovation and Top Income Inequality,” Review of Economic Studies 86, no. 1（2019）:1 -45.
[8] Charles Jones和Jihee Kim利用创造性破坏范式来解释顶层收入群体的动态不平等。他们认为增长既来自在位企业获得的经验积累，也来自新企业进入带来的创造性破坏。前者会加剧不平等，而后者会减少不平等。参见Charles I. Jones and Jihee Kim,“A Schumpeterian Model of Top Income Inequality,” Journal of Political Economy 126, no. 5（2018）:1785 -1826.
[9] Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell, and Rachel Griffith,“The Innovation Premium to Soft Skills in Low-Skilled Occupations,” unpublished manuscript, 2019.
[10] Gallup annual survey of Honesty and Ethics in the Professions, 2017, https: //news. gallup. com/ poll/ 1654 / honesty-ethics-professions. aspx.
[11] Konstantinos Dellis and David Sondermann,“Lobbying in Europe: New Firm Level Evidence,” Working Paper 2071, European Central Bank, June 2017.
[12] Ufuk Akcigit, Salomé Baslandze, and Francesca Lotti, “Connecting to Power:Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics” （NBER Working Paper No. 25136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, October 2018）.
[13] Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi, “Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process,” American Economic Review 104, no. 12（2014）:3885 -3920.
[14] Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak, and Jeffrey F. Timmons,“Lobbying and Taxes,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 4（2009）:893 -909.
[15] 一个州越靠近x轴的左侧，该州的游说活动越密集。由于不同年份的游说密度不同，同一个州可能在x轴方向上左右移动。
[16] 关于这次不仅影响瑞典而且波及其他三个北欧国家（挪威、芬兰和丹麦）的税制改革的理论基础，可参阅Céline Antonin and Vincent Touzé,“Loi des finances 2018 et fiscalité du capital. Fondements et impact sur les taux marginaux supérieurs,” Revue de l'OFCE 161, no. 1（2019）:77 -112.
[17] Philippe Aghion and Alexandra Roulet, Repenser l'Etat. Pour une social démocratie de l'innovation （Paris: Seuil, in collaboration with La République desidées, 2011）.
[18] Thomas Blanchet, Lucas Chancel, and Amory Gethin,“Why Is Europe Less Unequal Than the United States?” unpublished manuscript, 2020, https: // wid. world/ wp content/ uploads/ 2020/10/ WorldInequalityLab_WP2020_19_Europe-2. pdf.
[19] 尽管如此，近期有批评认为，瑞典在1991年改革之后的某些后续改革中取消了财产税与遗产税，这走得太远了。
[20] Ufuk Akcigit, Salomé Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva,“Taxation and the International Mobility of Inventors,” American Economic Review 106, no. 10（2016）:2930 -2981.
[21] 这些面板数据让我们能精确追踪法国的个人收入变化轨迹，是公共财政总局（Directorate General of Public Finance）通过安全数据接入中心（Secure Data Access Center, CASD）提供给研究人员的关于所得税的匿名信息。
[22] Ufuk Akcigit, Salomé Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva,“Taxation and the International Mobility of Inventors,” American Economic Review 106, no. 10（2016）:2930 -2981.
[23] Ufuk Akcigit, John Grigsby, Tom Nicholas, and Stefanie Stantcheva,“Taxation and Innovation in the 20th Century”（NBER Working Paper No. 24982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, September 2018）.
[24] Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Julia Cagé, and William R. Kerr,“Taxation,Corruption, and Growth,” European Economic Review 86（2016）:24 -51.
[25] 对于增长、腐败和税收收入等变量，该研究均采用5个子时期的平均值，对47个州与4个子时期做了回归。
