IO6 . THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM:YANG CHU
All these developments are illustrated by a story which we find in the twentieth chapter of the Chuang-tzu, titled "The Mountain Tree." The story runs:
"Chuang Tzu was traveling through the mountains, when he saw a great tree well covered with foliage. A tree—cutter was standing beside it, but he did not out it down. Chuang Tzu asked him the reason and he replied: 'It is of no use.' Chuang Tzu then said: 'By virtue of having no exceptional quali-ties, this tree succeeds in completing its natural span.
"When the Master (Chuang Tzu) left the mountains, he stopped at the home of a friend. The friend was glad and ordered the servant to kill a goose and cook it. The servant asked: 'One of the geese can cackle. The other cannot. Which shall I kill?' The Master said: 'Kill the one that cannot cackle.' Next day, a disciple asked Chuang Tzu the question: 'Yesterday the tree in the mountains, because it had no exceptional quality, succeeded in completing its natural span. But now the goose of our host, because it had no exceptional quality, had to die. What will be your position?
"Chuang Tzu laughed and said: My position will lie between having ex-ceptional qualities and not having them. Yet this position only seems to be right, but really is not so. Therefore those who practice this method are not able to be completely free from troubles. If one wanders about with Too and Te (the Way and its spiritual power), it will be otherwise."'
Then Chuang Tzu went on to say that he who links himself with Too and Te is with the ancestor of things, using things as things, but not being used by things as things. When that is so, what is there that can trouble him? "
In this story, the first part illustrates the theory of preserving life as practiced by Yang Chu, while the second part gives that of Chuang Tzu. "Having exceptional quality' corresponds to the doing of good things, mentioned in the earlier quotation from the third chapter of the Chuang—Iza. "Having no exceptional quality" corresponds to the doing of bad things in that same quotation. And a position between these two extremes corresponds to the middle way indicated in that quotation. Yet if a man cannot see things from a higher point of view, none of these methods can absolutely guarantee him from danger and harm. To see things from a higher point of view, however, means to abolish the self. We may say that the early Taoists were selfish. Yet in their later development this selfishness became reversed and destroyed itself.
IO8 THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM:YANG CHU
CHAPTER 7
THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS
ACCORDING to the Historical Records (ch. 74), Mencius (371 ?-l8o ? B.C.) was a native of the state of Tsou, in the present southern part of Shantung province in East China. He was linked with Confucius through his study under a disciple of Tzu-ssu, who in turn was Confucius' grandson. At that time, the Kings of Ch i, a larger state also in present Shantung, were great admirers of learning. Near the west gate of their capital, a gate known as Chi, they had established a center of learning which they called Chi—hsia, that is, below Chi. All the scholars living there were ranked as great officers and were honored and courted by having large houses built for them on the main road. This was to show to all the pensioned guests of the feudal lords that it was the state of Ch i that could attract the most eminent scholars in the world." ([bid.)
Mencius for a while was one of these eminent scholars, but he also trav-eled to other states, vainly trying to get a hearing for his ideas among their rulers. Finally, so the Historical Records tell us, he retired and with his dis-ciples composed the Mencius in seven books. This work records the conver-sations between Mencius and the feudal lords of his time, and between him and his disciples, and in later times it was honored by being made one of the famous "Four Books," which for the past one thousand years have formed the basis of Confucian education.
Meneius represents the idealistic wing of Confucianism, and the somewhat later Hstin Tzu the realistic wing. The meaning of this will become clear as we go on.
The Goodness of Human Nature
We have seen that Confucius spoke very much about jen (humanhearted-ness), and made a sharp distinction between yi (righteousness) and li (profit). Every man should, without thought of personal advantage, unconditionally do what he ought to do, and be what he ought to be. In other words, he should
HO. THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS
extend himself so as to include others, which, in essence, is the practice of jen. But though Confucius held these doctrines, he failed to explain why it is that a man should act in this way. Mencius, however, attempted to give an answer to this question, and in so doing developed the theory for which he is most famed: that of the original goodness of human nature.
Whether human nature is good or bad-that is, what, precisely, is the na-ture of human nature—has been one of the most controversial problems in Chinese philosophy. According to Mencius, there were, in his time, three other theories besides his own on this subject. The first was that human na-ture is neither good nor bad. The second was that human nature can be ei-ther good or bad (which seems to mean that in the nature of man there are both good and bad elements), and the third was that the nature of some men is good, and that of others is bad. (Mencius, Via, 3-6.) The first of these the-ories was held by Kao Tzu, a philosopher who was contemporary with Men-cius. We know more about it than the other theories through the long dis-cussions between him and Mencius which are preserved for us in the Men-cms.
When Mencius holds that human nature is good, he does not mean that every man is born a Confucius, that is, a sage. His theory has some similari-ty with one side of the second theory mentioned above, that is, that in the nature of man there are good elements. He admits, to be sure, that there are also other elements, which are neither good nor bad in themselves, but which, if not duly controlled, can lead to evil. According to Meneius, howev-er, these are elements which man shares in common with other living crea-tures. They represent the animal aspect of man s life, and therefore, strictly speaking, should not be considered as part of the human nature.
To support his theory, Mencius presents numerous arguments, among them the following: "All men have a mind which cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others .... If now men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress....From this cuse we may perceive that he who lacks the feeling of commiseration is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of modesty and yielding is not a man; and that he who lacks a sense of right and wrong is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of human-heartedness. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and yielding is the beginning of propriety. The sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Man has these four beginnings, just as he has four limbs....Since all men have these four beginnings in themselves, let them know how to give them full development and completion. The result will be like fire that be-gins to burn, or a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to protect all within the four seas. If they are denied that development, they will not suffice even to serve one's parents." (Mencius, TIa, 6.)
112 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS
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All men in their original nature possess these "four beginnings," which, if fully developed, become the four constant virtues, so greatly emphasized in Confucianism. These virtues, if not hindered by external conditions, de-velop naturally from within, just as a tree grows by itself from the seed, or a flower from the bud. This is the basis of Mencius controversy with Kao Tzu, according to whom human nature is in itself neither good nor bad, and for whom morality is therefore something that is artificially added from without.
There remains another question, which is: Why should man allow free de-velopment to his "four beginnings, instead of to what we may call his lower instincts? Mencius answers that it is these four beginnings that differentiate man from the beasts. They should be developed, therefore, because it is only through their development that man is truly a man. Mencius says: That whereby man differs from birds and beasts is but slight. The mass of the people east it away, whereas the superior man preserves it." (Mencius, IVb, 19.) Thus he answers a question which had not occurred to Confucius.
Fundamental Difference between Confucianism, and Mohism
Here we find the fundamental difference between Confucianism and Mo— hism. One of Mencius self-appointed tasks was to "oppose Yang Chu and Mo Ti." He says: "Yang's principle of 'each one for himself' amounts to making one s sovereign of no account. Mo s principle of all—embracing love amounts to making one s lather of no account. To have no father and no sovereign is to be like the birds and beasts....These pernicious opinions mislead the people and block the way of human-heartedness and righteous-ness. (Mencius, Illb, 9?) It is very clear that Yang Chu s theory opposes humanheartedness and righteousness, since the essence of these two virtues is to benefit others, while Yang Chu's principle is to benefit oneself. Rut Mo Tzu s principle of all-embracing love also aimed to benefit others, and he was even more outspoken in this respect than the Confucianists. Why, then, does Mencius lump him together with Yang Chu in his criticism?
The traditional answer is that according to Mohist doctrine, love should have in it no gradations of greater or lesser love, whereas according to Con-fucianism, the reverse is true. In other words, the Mohists emphasized equal-ity in loving others, while the Confucianists emphasized gradation. This dif-ference is brought out in a passage in the Mo—tzu in which a certain Wu—ma Tzu is reported as saying to Mo Tzu: "[ cannot practice all-embracing love. I love the men of Tsou [a nearby state] better than I love those of Yileh [a distant state]. I love the men of Lu [his own state] better than I love those of Tsou. I love the men of my own district better than I love those of Lu. I love the members of my own clan better than I love those of my district. 1 love my parents better than 1 love the men of my clan. And I love myself better than 1 love my parents." (Mo-tzu, ch. 46-)
Wu-ma Tzu was a Confucianist, and the representation of him as saying,
114 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS
"I love myself better than I love my parents, comes from a Mohist source and is probably an exaggeration. Certainly it is not consistent with the Con-fucianist emphasis on filial piety. With this exception, however, Wu -ma Tzu s statement is in general agreement with the Confucianist spirit. For ac-cording to the Confucianists, there should be degrees in love.
Speaking about these degrees, Mencius says:' The superior man, in his re-lation to things, loves them but has no feeling of human-heartedness. In his relation to people, he has human-heartedness, but no deep feeling of family affection. One should have feelings of family affection for the members of one' s family, but human -heartedness for people; human -heartedness for people, but love for things." (Mencius, Vila, 45.) In a discussion with a Mo-hist by the name of Yi Chih, Mencius asked him whether he really believed that men love their neighbors children in the same way as they love their brothers children; the love for a brother s child is naturally greater. (Men-cius, Ilia, 50 This, according to Mencius, is quite proper; what should be done is to extend such love until it includes the more distant members of so-ciety. "Treat the aged in your family as they should be treated, and extend this treatment to the aged of other people's families. Treat the young in your family as they should be treated, and extend this treatment to the young of other people s families. (Mencius, la, 7-) Such is what Mencius calls ex-tending one's scope of activity to include others." (Ibid.) It is an extension based on the principle of graded love.
To extend the love for one s family so as to include persons outside it as well, is to practice that "principle of chung [conscientiousness to others] and shu [altruism]" advocated by Confucius, which in turn is equivalent to the practice of human-heartedness. There is nothing forced in any of these practices, because the original natures of all men have in them a feeling of commiseration, which makes it impossible for them to bear to see the suffer-ing of others. The development of this "beginning" of goodness causes men naturally to love others, but it is equally natural that they should love their parents to a greater degree than they love men in general.
Such is the Confucianist point of view. The Mohists, on the contrary, insist that the love for others should be on a par with the love for parents. Regard-less of whether this means that one should love one s parents less, or love others more, the fact remains that the Confucianisl type of graded love should be avoided at all costs. It is with this in mind that Mencius attacks the Mohist principle of all-embracing love as meaning that a man treats his father as of no account.
The above difference between the Confucianist and the Mohist theory of love has been pointed out very clearly by Mencius and by many others after him. Besides this, however, there is another difference of a more fundamen-tal nature. This is, that the Confucianists considered human—heartedness as a quality that develops naturally from within the human nature, whereas the Mohists considered all-embracing love as something artificially added to man
Il6 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS
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from without.
Mo Tzu may also be said to have answered a question that did not occur to Confucius, namely: Why should man practice human-heartedness and righteousness? His answer, however, is based on utilitarianism, and his em-phasis on supernatural and political sanctions to compel and induce people to practice all—embracing love is nol consistent with the Confucianist princi-ple that virtue should be done for its own sake. If we compare the Mo—tzu s chapter on "All-Embracing Love, as quoted above in the fifth chapter, with the quotations here from the Mencius on the four moral beginnings in man's nature, we see very clearly the fundamental difference between the two schools.
