Political Philosophy
We have seen earlier that the Mohist theory of the origin of state is like-wise a utilitarianistic one. Here again the Confucianist theory differs. Men-cius says: If men have satisfied their hunger, have clothes to wear, and live at ease but lack good teaching, they are close to the birds and beasts. The sage [Shun, a legendary sage-ruler J was distressed about this and appointed Hsieh as an official instructor to teach men the basic relationships of life. Father and son should love each other. Ruler and subject should be just to each other. Husband and wife should distinguish their respective spheres. Elder and younger brothers should have a sense of mutual precedence. And between friends there should be good faith. (Mencius, Ilia, 4.) The exis-tence of the human relationships and the moral principles based on them is what differentiates man from birds and beasts. The state and society have their origin in the existence of these human relationships. Therefore, accord-ing to the Mohists, the state exists because it is useful. But according to the Confucianists, it exists because it ought to exist.
Men have their full realization and development only in human relation-ships. Like Aristotle, Mencius maintains that man is a political animal and can fully develop these relationships only within state and society. The state is a moral institution and the head of the state should be a moral leader. Therefore in Confucianist political philosophy only a sage can be a real king. Mencius pictures this ideal as having existed in an idealized past. According to him, there was a time when the sage Yao (supposed to have lived in the twenty-fourth century B.C.) was Emperor. When he was old, he selected a younger sage, Shun, whom he had taught how to be a ruler, so that at Yao s death, Shun became Emperor. Similarly, when Shun was old, he again selected a younger sage, Yii, to be his successor. Thus the throne was hand-ed from sage to sage, which, according to Mencius, is as it ought to be.
If a ruler lacks the ethical qualities that make a good leader, the people have the moral right of revolution. In that case, even the killing of the ruler is no longer a crime of regicide. This is because, according to Meneius, if a
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sovereign does not act as he ideally ought to do, he morally ceases to be a sovereign and, following Confucius theory of the rectification of names, is a "mere fellow," as Mencius says. (Mencius, lib, 8.) Mencius also says: "The people are the most important element Lin a stateJ; the spirits of the land and the grain are secondary; and the sovereign is the least. (Merwius, Vllb, I4-) These ideas of Mencius have exercised a tremendous influence in Chi-nese history, even as late as the revolution of 1911, which led to the estab-lishment of the Chinese Republic. It is true that modern democratic ideas from the West played their role too in this event, but the ancient native con-cept of the right of revolution had a greater influence on the mass of the people.
If a sage becomes king, his government is called one of kingly govern-ment. According to Mencius and later Confucianists, there are two kinds of government. One is that of the wring or (sage) king; the other is that of the pa or military lord. These are completely different in kind. The government of a sage—king is carried on through moral instruction and education; that of a military lord is conducted through force and compulsion. The power of the wang government is moral, that of the pa government, physical. Mencius says in this connection: "He who uses force in the place of virtue is a pa. He who is virtuous and practices human—heartedness is a wang. When one subdues men by force, they do not submit to him in their hearts but only outwardly, because they have insufficient strength to resist. But when one gains follow-ers by virtue, they are pleased in their hearts and will submit of themselves as did the seventy disciples to Confucius. (Mencius, Ha, 3.)
This distinction between wang and pa has always been maintained by laler Chinese political philosophers. In terms of contemporary politics, we may say that a democratic government is a wang government, because it represents a free association of people, while a Fascist government is that of a pa, be-cause it reigns through terror and physical force.
The sage-king in his kingly government does all he can for the welfare and benefit of the people, which means that his state must be built on a sound economic basis. Since China has always been overwhelmingly agrari-an, it is natural that, according to Mencius, the most important economic ba-sis of kingly government lies in the equal distribution of land. His ideal land system is what has been known as the "well-field system. According to this system, each square li (about one third of a mile) of land is to be divided in-to nine squares, each consisting of one hundred Chinese acres. The central square is known as the "public field, while the eight surrounding squares are the private land of eight fanners with their families, each family having one square. These farmers cultivate the public field collectively and their own fields individually. The produce of the public field goes to the govern-ment, while each family keeps for itself what it raises from its own field. The arrangement of the nine squares resembles in form the Chinese character for "well" 7T, which is why it is called the "well—field system. (Mencius Ilia, '■_
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Describing this system further, Meneius states that each family should plant mulberry trees around its five—acre homestead in its own field so that its aged members may be clothed with silk. Each family should also raise fowls and pigs, so that its aged members may be nourished with meal. If ihis is done, everyone under the kingly government can "nourish the living and bury the dead without the least dissatisfaction, which marks the beginning of ihe kingly way. {Mencius, Ta, 3-)
It marks, however, only the beginning, because it is an exclusively eco-nomic basis for the higher culture of the people. Only when everyone has re-ceived some education and come to an understanding of the human relation-ships, does the kingly way become complete.
The practice of this kingly way is not something alien to human nature, but is rather the direct outcome of the development by the sage-king of his own feeling of commiseration. As Mencius says: All men have a mind which cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others. The early kings, having this unbearing mind, thereby had likewise an unbearing government." (Men-cius, I la, 6.) The unbearing mind and feeling of commiseration are one in Mencius thought. As we have seen, the virtue of human—heartedness, ac-cording to the Confucianists, is nothing but the development of this feeling of commiseration; this feeling in its turn cannot be developed save through the practice of love; and the practice of love is nothing more than the "extension of one s scope of activity to include others, which is ihe way of cluing and sliu. The kingly way or kingly government is nothing but the result of the king's practice of love, and his practice of chung and slm.
According to Mencius, there is nothing esoteric or difficult in the kingly way. The Mencius (1b, 9) records that on one occasion, when an ox was being led to sacrifice, King Hsuan of Ch i saw it and could not endure its fright-ened appearance, as if it were an innocent person going to the place of death. He therefore ordered that it be replaced by a sheep. Mencius then told the King that this was an example of his "unbearing mind," and if he could only extend it to include human affairs, he could then govern in the kingly way. The King replied that he could not do this because he had the defect of loving wealth and feminine beauty. Whereupon Mencius told ihe King that these are things loved by all men. If the King, by understanding his own desires, would also come to understand the desires of all his people, and would take measures whereby the people might satisfy these desires, this would result in the kingly way and nothing else.
What Mencius told King Hsiian is nothing more than the extension of one's own scope of activity to include others, which is precisely the prac-tice of chung and shu. Here we see how Mencius developed the ideas of Confucius. In his exposition of this principle, Confucius had limited himself to its application to the self-cultivation of the individual, while by Mencius its application was extended to government and politics. For Confucius, it was a principle only for sageliness wilhin, but by Mencius il was expand—
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ed to become also a principle for "kingliness without.
Even in the former sense of "sageliness within," Mencius expresses his concept of this principle more clearly than did Confucius. He says: He who has completely developed his mind, knows his nature. He who knows his na-ture, knows Heaven." (Mencius, Vila, I.) The mind here referred to is the unbearing mind or the feeling of commiseration. It is the essence of our nature. Hence when we fully develop this mind, we know our nature. And according to Mencius, our nature is 'what Heaven has given to us.' (Men-cius, Via, I5-) Therefore, when we know our nature, we also know Heaven.
Mysticism
According to Mencius and his school of Confucianism, the universe is es-sentially a moral universe. The moral principles of man are also metaphysi-cal principles of the universe, and the nature of man is an exemplification of these principles. It is this moral universe that Mencius and his school mean when they speak of Heaven, and an understanding of this moral universe is what Mencius calls knowing Heaven. If a man knows Heaven, he is not only a citizen of society, but also a "citizen of Heaven," t hen min, as Men-cius says. (Mencius, Vila, 19.) Mencius further makes a distinction between human honors and heavenly honors. He says: There are heavenly hon-ors and human honors. Human -hcartedness, righteousness, loyalty, good faith, and the untiring practice of the good: these are the honors of Heaven. Princes, ministers, and officials: these are the honors of man. (Mencius, VI— a, 16.) In other words, heavenly honors are those to which a man can attain in the world of values, while human honors are purely material concepts in the human world. The citizen of Heaven, just because he is the citizen of Heaven, cares only for the honors of Heaven, but not those of man.
Mencius also remarks: "All things are complete within us. There is no greater delight than to realize this through self-cultivation. And there is no better way to human— heartedness than the practice of the principle of shu. (Mencius, Vila, I.) In other words, through the full development of his na-ture, a man can not only know Heaven, but can also become one with Heaven. Also when a man fully develops his unbearing mind, he has within him the virtue of human-heartedness, and the best way to human-hearted-ness is the practice of chung and shu. Through this practice, one s egoism and selfishness are gradually reduced. And when they are reduced, one comes to feel that there is no longer a distinction between oneself and oth-ers, and so of distinction between the individual and the universe. That is to say, one becomes identified with the universe as a whole. This leads to a re-alization that "all things are complete within us." In this phrase we see the mystical element of Mencius philosophy.
We will understand this mysticism better, if we turn to Mencius discus-sion on what he calls the Hao Jan Chih Ch'i, a term which T translate as the
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Great Morale. In this discussion Meneius describes the development uf his own spiritual cultivation.
The Meneius (Ha, 2.) tells us that a disciple asked Meneius of what he was a specialist. Meneius replied: "I know the right and wrong in speech, and am proficient in cultivating my Hao Jan Chih Ch'i." The questioner then asked what this was, and Meneius replied: It is the Ch i, supremely great, supremely strong. If it be directly cultivated without handicap, then it per-vades all between Heaven and Earth. It is the Ch' i which is achieved by the combination of righteousness and Too [the way, the truth], and without these it will be weakened.
Hao Jan Chih Ch'i is a special term of Meneius. In later times, under his increasing influence, it came to be used not infrequently, but in ancient times it appears only in this one chapter. As to what it signifies, even Men-eius admits that "it is hard to say." (Ibid.) The context of this discussion, however, includes a preliminary discussion about two warriors and their method of cultivating their valor. From this I infer that Meneius Ch i (a word which literally means vapor, gas, spiritual force) is the same ch i as oc-curs in such terms as yung ch' i (courage, valor) and shih ch i (morale of an army). That is why I translate Hao Jan Chih Ch'i as the "Great Morale." It is of the same nature as the morale of the warriors. The difference between the two, however, is that this Ch' i is further described as hao jan, which means "great to a supreme degree." The morale which warriors cultivate is a matter concerning man and man, and so is a moral value only. Bui ihe Great Morale is a matter concerning man and the universe, and therefore is a su-per-moral value. It is the morale of the man who identifies himself with the universe, so that Meneius says of it that it pervades all between Heaven and Earth."
The method of cultivating the Great Morale has two aspects. One may be called the "understanding of Too"; that is, of the way or principle that leads to the elevation of the mind. The other aspect is what Meneius calls the ac-cumulation of righteousness ; that is, the constant doing of what one ought to do in the universe as a "citizen of the universe." The combination of these two aspects is called by Meneius the combination of righteousness and T(u>.
After one has reached an understanding of Too and the long accumulation of righteousness, the Great Morale will appear naturally of itself. The least bit of forcing will lead to failure. As Meneius says: We should not be like the man of Sung. There was a man of Sung who was grieved that his grain did not grow fast enough. So he pulled it up. Then he returned to his home with great innocence, and said to his people: I am tired today, for I have been helping the grain lo grow. His son ran out to look at it, and found all the grain withered." (Ibid.)
