Defense of All-embracing Love
Against this view of the later Mohists, there were at that time two main ob-jections. The first was that the number of men in the world is infinite; how, then, is it possible for one to love them all? This objection was referred to un-der the title: Infinity is incompatible with all—embracing love. And the sec-ond objection was that if failure to love a single man means failure to love men in general, there should then be no such punishment as killing a rob-ber." This objection was known under the title: To kill a robber is to kill a man." The later Mohists used their dialectic to try to refute these objections.
In the second Canon there is the statement: Infinity is not incompati-ble with all-embracingness. The reason is given under 'full or not.'" (Ch. 40.) The second Exposition of the Canons develops this statement as fol-lows: "Infinity: (Objection:) 'If the South has a limit, it can be included in toto. [Theke was a common belief in ancient China that the South had no limit] If it has no limit, it cannot be included in toto. It is impossible to know whether it has a limit or not and hence it is impossible to know whether it can all be included or not. It is impossible to know whether peo-ple fill this [space] or not, and hence it is impossible to know whether they can be included in toto or not. This being so, it is perverse to hold that all people can be included in our love. (Answer:) If people do not fill what is unlimited, then [the number of] people has a limit, and there is no difficulty in including anything that is limited [in number]. But if people do fill what is unlimited, then what is [supposed to be] unlimited is limited, and then there is no difficulty in including what is limited. " (Ch. 43-)
To kill a robber is to kill a man is the other major objection to the Mo—
2.OO . THE LATER MOHISTS
hists, because killing a man is not consistent with loving all men equally and universally. To this objection the Minor Illustrations answers as follows:
"A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse. A black horse is a horse. To ride a black horse is to ride a horse. Huo [name of a person J is a man. To love Huo is to love a man. Tsang [ name of a person ] is a man. To love Tsang is to love a man. This is to affirm what is right.
"But Huo's parents are men. Yet when Huo serves his parents, he is not serving men. His younger brother is a handsome man. Yet when he loves his younger brother, he is not loving handsome men. A cart is wood, but to ride a cart is not to ride wood. A boat is wood, but to ride a boat is not to ride wood. A robber is a man, but that there are many robbers does not mean that there are many men; and that there are no robbers does not mean that there are no men.
"How is this explained? To hate the existence of many robbers is not to hate the existence of many men. To wish that there were no robbers is not to wish that there were no men. The world generally agrees on this. And this being the ease, although a robber—man is a man, yet to love robbers is not to love men, and not to love robbers is not to love men. Likewise to kill a robber-man is not to kill a man. There is no difficulty in this proposition." (Ch. 45-)
With such dialectic as this the later Mohists refuted the objection that the killing of a robber is inconsistent with their principle of all-embracing love.
Criticsm of Other Schools
Using their dialectic, the later Mohists not only refute the objections of other schools against them, but also make criticisms of their own against these schools. For example, the "Mohist Canons" contain a number of obj-ections against the arguments of the School of Names. Hui Shih, it will be remembered, had argued for the "unity of similarity and difference." In his ten paradoxes he passed from the premise that all things are similar lo each other," to the conclusion: "Love all things equally. Heaven and Earth are one body." This, for the later Mohists, is a fallacy arising from the ambiguity of the Chinese word t ung. T ung may be variously used to mean identity, "agreement, or "similarity. In the first "Canon there is a statement which reads: "Tung: There is that of identity, that of part-and-whole relationship, that of co—existence, and that of generic relation. (Ch. 4?-) And the Expo-sition" explains further: "T ung: That there are two names for one actuality is identity. Inclusion in one whole is part—and—whole relationship. Both be-ing in the same room is co-existence. Having some points of similarity is generic relation. (Ch. 42-)The same Canon and Exposition also have a
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discussion on "difference," which is just the reverse of t'ung.
The Mohist Canons fail actually to mention Hui Shih by name. As a matter of fact, no name is ever mentioned in these chapters. But from this analysis of the word t' ung, Hui Shih' s fallacy becomes dear. That all things are similar to each other means that they have generic relationship, that they are of the same class, the class of "things." But that Heaven and Earth are one body means that they have a part—and—whole relationship. The truth of the one proposition as applied to a particular situation cannot be inferred from the truth of the other, even though the same word, t ung, is used in both cases.
As regards Kung-sun Lung s argument for "the separation of hardness and whiteness, the later Mohists thought only in terms of concrete hard and white stones as they actually exist in the physical universe. Hence they maintained that the qualities of hardness and whiteness both simultaneously inhere in the stone. As a result, they are not mutually exclusive, but "must pervade each other." (Chaps. 40, 42.)
The later Mohists also criticized the Taoists. In the second Canon we read: "Learning is useful. The reason is given by those who oppose it." (Ch. 41-) The second "Exposition' comments on this: "Learning: By maintaining that people do not know that learning is useless, one is thereby informing them of this fact. This informing that learning is useless, is itself a teaching. Thus by holding that learning is useless, one teaches. This is perverse." (Ch. 43.)
This is a criticism of a statement in the Lao-tzu: Banish learning and there will be no grieving." (Ch. 10.) According to the later Mohists, learning and teaching are related terms. If learning is to be banished, so is teaching. For once there is teaching, there is also learning, and if teaching is useful, learning cannot be useless. The very teaching that learning is useless proves in itself that it is useful.
In the second "Canon" we read: "To say that in argument there is no win-ner is necessarily incorrect. The reason is given under 'argument'." The second "Exposition comments on this: "In speaking, what people say either agrees or disagrees. There is agreement when one person says something is a puppy, and another says it is a dog. There is disagreement when one says it is an ox, and another says it is a horse. [That is to say, when there is dis-agreement, there is argumencj When neither of them wins, there is no argu-ment. Argument is that in which one person says the thing is so, and another says it is not so. The one who is right will win." (Ch. 43.)
In the second Canon we also read: To hold that all speech is perverse is perverse. The reason is given under speech.'" (Ch. 41.) The second "Ex-position comments on this: [To hold that all speech J is perverse, is not
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permissible. If the speech of this man Lwho holds this doctrine J is permissi-ble, then at least ihis speech is not perverse, and there is some speech that is permissible. If the speech of this man is not permissible, then it is wrong to take it as being correct. (Ch. 43>)
The second "Canon" also says: "That knowing it and not knowing it are the same, is perverse. The reason is given under no means. (Ch. 4L) And the second "Exposition" comments: "When there is knowledge, there is dis-cussion about it. Unless there is knowledge, there is no means [of discus-sion]." (Ch. 43.)
Yet again the second "Canon states: "To condemn criticism is perverse. The reason is given under 'not to condemn.'" (Ch. 41.) On which the second "Exposition" comments: "To condemn criticism is to condemn one's own con-demnation. If one does not condemn it, there is nothing to be condemned. When one cannot condemn it, this means not to condemn criticism. (Ch. 43-)
These are all criticisms against Chuang Tzu. Chuang Tzu maintained that nothing can be decided in argument. Even if someone wins, he said, the win-ner is not necessarily right or the loser necessarily wrong. But according lo the later Mohists, Chuang Tzu, by expressing this very doctrine, showed him-self in disagreement with others and was himself arguing. If he won the ar-gument, did not this very fact prove him to be wrong? Chuang Tzu also said: "Great argument does not require words." And again: "Speech that argues falls short of its aim. (Chuaiig—lzu, oh. 2..) Hence all speech is perverse. Furthermore, he held that everything is right in its own way and in its own opinion, and one should not criticize the other. (Ibid.) But according to the later Mohists, what Chuang Tzu said itself consists of speech and itself con-stitutes a criticism against others. So if all speech is perverse, is not this saying of Chuang Tzu also perverse? And if all criticism against others is to be condemned, then Chuang Tzu's criticism should be condemned first of all. Chuang Tzu also talked much about the importance of having no knowl-edge. But such discussion is itself a form of knowledge. When there is no knowledge, there can be no discussion about it.
In criticizing the Taoists, the later Mohists pointed out certain logical paradoxes that have also appeared in Western philosophy. Il is only with the development of a new logic in recent times that these paradoxes have been solved. Thus in contemporary logic, the criticisms made by the later Mohists are no longer valid. Yet it is interesting to note that the later Mohists were so logically minded. More than any other school of ancient China, they attempted to create a pure system of epistemology and logic.
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CHAPTER 12
THE YIN-YANG SCHOOL AND EARLY CHINESE COSMOGONY
In the second chapter of this book I said that the Yin-Yang School had its origin in the occultists. These occultists were anciently known as the fang shih, that is, practitioner of occult arts. In the "Treatise on Literature" (ch. 30) in the History of the Former Han Dynasty, which is based on the Seven Summaries by Liu Hsin, these occult arts are grouped into six classes.
The Six Classes of Occult Arts
The first is astrology. "Astrology, says this chapter in the Han History; "serves to arrange in order the twenty-eight constellations, and note the pro-gressions of the five planets and of the sun and the moon, so as to record thereby the manifestations of fortune and misfortune."
The second deals with almanacs. "Almanacs," says the same treatise, serve to arrange the four seasons in proper order, to adjust the times of the equinoxes and solstices, and to note the concordance of the periods of the sun, moon, and five planets, so as thereby to examine into the actualities of cold and heat, life and death....Through this art, the miseries of calamities and the happiness of prosperity all appear manifest."
The third is connected with the five Elements. "This art," says the "Trea-tise on Literature," "arises from the revolutions of the Five Powers [Five Ele-ments], and if it is extended to its farthest limits, there is nothing to which it will not reach.
The fourth is divination by means of the stalks of the milfoil plant and that done with ihe lortuise shell or shoulder bones of the ox. These were the two main method* of divination in ancient China. In the latter method, the diviner bored a hole in a tortoise shell or a flat piece of bone, and then ap-plied heat to it by a metal rod in such a way as to cause cracks to radiate from the hole. These cracks were interpreted by the diviner according to their configuration as an answer to the question asked. In the former method,
2O8 THK. YIN-YANG SCHOOL AND EARLY CHINESE COSMOGONY
the diviner manipulated the stalks of the milfoil in such a way as to produce certain numerical combinations which could be interpreted by means of the Book of Changes. Such interpretation was the primary purpose of the original corpus of this work.
The fifth group is that of miscellaneous divinations and the sixth is the system of forms. The latter included physiognomy together with what in later times has been known as feng-shui, literally, "wind and water." Feng-shui is based on the concept that man is the product of the universe. Hence his house or burial place must be so arranged as to be in harmony with the natu-ral forces, i.e., with "wind and water.
In the days when feudalism was in its prime during the early centuries of the Chou dynasty, every aristocratic house had attached to it hereditary ex-perts in these various occult arts, who had to be consuited when any act of importance was contemplated. But with the gradual disintegration of feudal-ism, many of these experts lost their hereditary positions and scattered throughout the country, where they continued to practice their arts among the people. They then came to be known as the fang shih or practitioners of oc-cult arts.
Occultism or magic is itself, of course, based on superstition, but it has often been the origin of science. The occult arts share with science the de-sire to interpret nature in a positive manner, and to acquire the services of nature through its conquest by man. Occultism becomes science when it gives up its belief in supernatural forces, and tries to interpret the universe solely in terms of forces that are natural. The concepts of what these natural forces are may in themselves initially look rather simple and crude, yet in them we find the beginnings of science.
Such has been the contribution of the Yin -Yang school to Chinese thought. This school represents a scientific tendency in the sense that it tried to give a positive interpretation to natural events in terms solely of natural forces. By the word positive I mean that which has to do with matters of fact.
