Taoism and Legalism represent the two extremes of Chinese thought. The Taoists maintained that man originally is completely innocent; the Legalists, on the other hand, that he is completely evil. The Taoists stood for absolute individual freedom; the Legalists for absolute social control. Yet in the idea of non-action, the two extremes meet. That is to say, they had here some common ground.
Under somewhat different wording, the Legalist way of government was also maintained by the later Taoists. In the Chuang-tzu we find a passage that speaks about the way of employing human society. Tn this passage distinctions are made between having activity and having-no-activity, and between "being employed by the world" and "employing the world." Hav-ing-no-activity is the way of employing the world; having-activity is the way of being employed by the world. The ruler s reason for existence is to rule the whole world. Hence his function and duty is not to do things himself, but to tell others to do them for him. In other words, his method of rule is to em-ploy the world by having—no—activity. The duty and function of subordinates, on the other hand, is to take orders and do things accordingly. In other words, the function of the subordinate is to be employed by the world by having activity. The same passage says: "The superior must have no activity, so as thus to employ the world; but the subordinates must have activity, so as thus to be employed by the world. This is the invariable way." (Chuang-tzu, ch. 13.)
The Chuang-tzu continues: "Therefore, the rulers of old, although their knowledge spread throughjout the whole universe, did not themselves think. Although their eloquence beautified all things, they did not themselves
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speak. Although their abilities exhausted all things within the four seas, they did not themselves act." (Ibid.) A ruler should be so, because if he once thinks about something, this means that there is something else about which he does not think; yet his whole duty and function is to think about all things under his rule. The solution, therefore, is for him not to try to think, speak, and act himself, but merely to tell others to think, speak, and act in his place. In this way he does nothing, and yet there is nothing that is not done.
As to the detailed procedure by which the ruler is thus to "employ the world, the same passage says: Those of old who made manifest the great Tan, first made manifest Heaven, and Too and Te came next. Too and Te being manifested, the virtues of human-heartedness and righteousness came next. These being manifested, the division of offices came next. These being manifested, actualities and names came next. These being manifested, em-ployment without interference came next. This being manifested, examina-tions and discriminations came next. These being manifested, judgement of right and wrong came next. This being manifested, rewards and punishments came next. With the manifestation of rewards and punishments, the foolish and the wise assumed their proper positions, the noble and the humble occu-pied their proper places, and the virtuous and the worthless were employed according to their nature. ...This is perfect peace, the acme of good govern-ment. (Ibid.)
It is clear that the latter part of this program is the same as that of the Legalists. Yet the passage goes on by saying: Those of antiquity who spoke about the great Too, mentioned actualities and names only at the fifth step, and rewards and punishments only at the ninth step. He who speaks imme-diately about actualities and names, does not know the fundamentals [that underlie them I. He who speaks immediately about rewards and punishments, does not know their beginning....Such a one knows the implements of gov-ernment, but not its principles. He can be employed by the world, but is not sufficient to employ the world. He is a one-sided man and only knows how to talk." (Ibid.)
Here we have the criticism of the Taoists against the Legalists. The Le-galist way of government requires unselfishness and impartiality on the part of the ruler. He must punish those who ought to be punished, even though they be his friends and relatives, and he must reward those who ought to be rewarded, even though they be his enemies. If he fails only a few times to do this, the whole mechanism breaks down. Such requirements are too much for a man of only average intelligence. He who can really fulfill them is nothing less than a sage.
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Legalism and Confucianism
The Confucianists maintained that the people should be governed by li and morality, not by law and punishment. They upheld the traditional way of government, but did not realize that the circumstances that had once ren-dered this way practical had already changed. In this respect, they were con-servative. In another respect, however, they were at the same time revolu-tionary, and reflected in their ideas the changes of the time. Thus they no longer upheld the traditional class distinctions that were based merely on the accident of birth or fortune. Confucius and Mencius, to be sure, continued to speak about the difference between the princely man and the small man. Yet for them, this distinction depended upon the moral worth of the individual, and was not necessarily based upon inherited class differences.
I pointed ont at the beginning of this chapter that in early Chinese feudal-istic society, the nobles were governed according to the li, but the common people only according to the punishments. Hence the Confucian insistence that not only the nobles, but the mass of the people as well, should be gov-erned by li rather than by punishment, was in fact a demand for a higher standard of conduct to be applied to the people. In this sense the Confu — cianists were revolutionary.
In Legalist thought, too, there were no class distinctions. Everyone was e— qual before law and the ruler. Instead of elevating the common people to a higher standard of conduct, however, the Legalists lowered the nobles to a lower standard by discarding li and putting sole reliance on rewards and punishments for all alike.
The Confucianist ideas are idealistic, while those of the Legalists are realistic. That is the reason why, in Chinese history, the Confucianists have always accused the Legalists of being mean and vulgar, while the Legalists have accused the Confucianists of being bookish and impractical.
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L
CHAFrER 15
CONFUCIANIST METAPHYSICS
In chapter twelve we have seen that the Yi Ching or Book of Changes (also known simply as the Yi) was originally a book of divination. Later the Con-fucianists gave it cosmological, metaphysical, and ethical interpretations, which constitute the "Appendices" now found in the Book of Change,s.
The cosmological theory contained in the "Appendices" has already been considered in chapter twelve, and we shall revert to it again in chapter twen-ty-three. In the present chapter we shall confine ourselves to the metaphysi-cal and ethical theories found in the "Appendices" and in the Chung Yung.
The Chung Yung or Doctrine of the Mean is one of the chapters in the Li Chi (Book of Rites). According to tradition, it was written by Tzu—ssu, the grandson of Confucius, but in actual fact a large part of it seems to have been written at a somewhat later date. The "Appendices" and the Chung Yung represent the last phase in the metaphysical development of ancient Confucianism. So great is their metaphysical interest, indeed, that the Neo-Taoists of the third and fourth centuries A.D. considered the Yi as one of the three major classics of speculative philosophy, the others being the Lao-tzu and Chitting—tzu. Similarly, Emperor Wu (501-549) of the Liang dynasty, himself a Buddhist, wrote commentaries on the Chung Yung, and in the tenth and eleventh centuries, monks of the Ch an sect of Buddhism also wrote such commentaries, which marked the beginning of Neo—Confucianism.
The Principles of Things
The most important metaphysical idea in the "Appendices," as in Taoism, is that of Too. Yet it is quite different from the concept of Too of the Taoists. For the latter, Too is nameless, unnamable.
But for the authors of the "Appendices, not only is Too namable, but, strictly speaking, it is Too and Too only that is thus namable.
We may distinguish between the two concepts by referring to the Too of
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Taoism as the Too, and to that of the "Appendices" as too. The Too of Tao-ism is the unitary "that" from which springs the production and change of all things in the universe. The too of the "Appendices, on the contrary, are multiple, and are the principles which govern each separate category of things in the universe. As such, they are somewhat analogous to the concept of the "universal" in Western philosophy. Kung-sun Lung, as we have seen, regarded hardness as a universal of this kind, since it is this hardness that enables concrete objects in our physical universe to be hard. Likewise, in the terminology of the "Appendices," that by which hard things are hard would be called the too of hardness. This too of hardness is separable from the hardness of individual physical objects, and constitutes a namable meta-physical principle.
There are many such too, such as the too of sovereignship and ol minister-ship, or of fatherhood and sonhood. They are what a sovereign, a minister, a father, and a son ought to be. Each of them is represented by a name, and an individual should ideally act according to these various names. Here we find the old theory of the rectification of names of Confucius. In him, howev-er, this was only an ethical theory, whereas in the Appendices it becomes metaphysical as well.
The Yi, as we have seen, was originally a book of divination. By the ma-nipulation of the stalks of the milfoil plant, one is led to a certain line of a certain hexagram, the comments on which in the Yi are supposed to provide the information one is seeking. Hence these comments are to be applied to the various specific cases in actual life. This procedure led the authors of the "Appendices" to the concept of the formula. Seeing the Yi from this point of view, they considered the comments on the hexagrams and the indi-vidual lines of these hexagrams as formulas, each representing one or more tav or universal principles. The comments on the entire sixty-four hexagrams and their 384 individual lines are thus supposed to represent all the too in the universe.
The hexagrams and their individual lines are looked upon as graphic sym-bols of these universal tan. Appendix III says: The Yi consists of sym-bols." Such symbols are similar to what in symbolic logic are called vari-ables. A variable functions as a substitute for a class or a number of classes of concrete objects. An object belonging to a certain class and satisfying cer-tain conditions can fit into a certain formula with a certain variable; that is, it can fit into the comment made on a certain hexagram or a certain line within a hexagram, these hexagrams or lines being taken as symbols. This formula represents the too which the objects of this class ought to obey. From the point of view of divination, if they obey it, they will enjoy good luck, but if not, they will suffer bad fortune. From the point of view of moral teaching, if they obey it, they are right, but if not, they are wrong.
The first of the sixty-four hexagrams, Ch ien, for example, is supposed to
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be the symbol of virility, while the second hexagram, K' un, is that of docili-ty. Everything that satisfies the condition of being virile can fit into a formu-la in which the symbol of Ch'ien occurs, and everything that satisfies the condition of being docile can fit into one in which the symbol of K un oc-curs. Hence the comments on the hexagram Ch ien and its individual lines are supposed to represent the tao for all things in the universe that are virile; those on the hexagram K un and its individual lines represent the tao for all things that are docile.
Thus in "Appendix I," the section dealing with the hexagram K'un says: "If it takes the initiative, it will become confused and lose the way. If it fol-lows, it will docilely gain the regular [way]." And in "Appendix IV": "Al-though the Yin has its beauties, it keeps them under restraint in its service of the king, and does not dare to claim success for itself. This is the tao of Earth, of a wife, of a subject. The tao of Earth is, not to claim the merit of achievement, but on another s behalf to bring things to their proper issue.
Quite the opposite is the hexagram of Ch ien, the symbol of Heaven, of a husband, of a sovereign. The judgements made on this hexagram and its in-dividual lines represent the tao of Heaven, of a husband, of a sovereign.
Hence if one wants to know how to be a ruler or a husband, one should look up what is said in the Yi under the hexagram Ch'ien, but if one wants to know how to be a subject or a wife, one should look under the hexagram K'un. Thus in "Appendix III" it is said: "With the expansion of the use of the hexagrams, and the application of them to new classes, everything that man can do in the world is there. Again: What does the Yi accomplish? The Yi opens the door to the myriad things in nature and brings man's task to completion. It embraces all the governing principles of the world. This, and no more or less, is what the Yi accomplishes."
It is said that the name of the Yi has three meanings: (i) easiness and sim-pleness, (2.) transformation and change, and (3) invariability.* Transformation and change refers to the individual things of the universe. Simpleness and in-variability refers to their tao or underlying principles. Things ever change, but tao are invariable. Things are complex, but tao are easy and simple.
The Tao of the Production of Things
Besides the tao of every class of things, there is another Tao for all things as a whole. In other words, besides the specific multiple tao, there is a gen-eral unitary Tao which governs the production and transformation of all things. "Appendix III" says: "One Yang and one Yin: this is called the Tao. That which ensues from this is goodness, and that which is completed there-
* See Cheng HsUan (A.D. 12.7-200), Discussion of the Yi, quoted by K'ung Ying-ta (574-648), in the Preface to his sub-commentary on Wang Pi's (226-49) Commentary on the Yi
